Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato

+ It seems that the following words are wanting in this place in the original: εἰ τοινυν ecnre 9 πλατων ποήέρον Τὸ παν πασαξέχει PAS γενεσειξ. Gods, yet we say this indicating their ineffable progression, and the difference of secondary natures with reference to the causes of them. Theologists, however, previously subverting all such doubts, in order that the generations of the Gods may be rationally devised by them, call the first principle of things Time, because it is ft that where there is generation, time should precede, according to which and on account of which generation subsists. With these, therefore, cause and time are the same; since also with them progression is the same as generation. That however which is truly generated, is that which does not generate itself, but is generated by another, becomes the image of another thing, 15 composed of many dissimilar things, and always receives a renovated hypostasis; with which also time is conjoined. It Vkewise has a never-failing generation, co-extended with the infinity of time, and is always becoming to be one and the same in number, but is not one according to an eternal subsistence. But that which is. thus generated you may say proceeds from non-being. For that which is self-subsistent, being generated by itself, does not proceed from non-being. For though youmay divide it by conception into cause and effect, yet it proceeds from being. For the maker and that which is made are one, so that it proceeds from the being of itself, Hence also it:

is eternal, never at any time deserting itself, But that which is alone from another thing, subsists from non-being, because it no longer is when separated from its cause; and the cause 15 different from the effect. Thus, therefore, the physical axiom δ may be adapted according to analoy to this generated nature : and that which is always generated and illuminated by being, to that which is always in time, But this is evident; forif you take away the maker, the universe is immediately imperfect ; which is likewise the case with every thing that is 51}}} generated. At one and the same time, however, the universe is generated and perfect, and is always venerated. H{ence also its pey- -petuity and its perfection, are according to the whole of time. For time was generated together with the heaven (or the universe], not a part of time, but all time: so that the heaven is generated in an infinite time, and is never-failing both with respect to beginning and end, in the same manner as time. Thus, therefore, it is also said to have a principle of generation, and to originate from a certain other principle. And in the first place, indeed, it originates as he says from the most proper principle, the final. For from this, the generating cause commences the generation of the world. In the next place, the generation of the

i.e. That the cause is different from the effect. world subsists with reference to the final principle, and as the world is always becoming to be, it is beginning to be generated, and possesses the end of it, through generation in the whole of time. For with respect to the world, if was generated, is not one thing, and iis generated another; as neither is the beginning of it one thing, and the end another. That, therefore, which is generated in a part of time, begins at one time, and is perfected at another; but that which ts gencrated in the whole of time is always beginning, and is always perfect: And it has indeed, a certain principle of generation, which is perfected by something different from itself, but it has not a certain principle, as not having the beginning ofa certain partial time. For since generation is multifarious, the principle also of it is multifarious. So that the generation which subsists through the whole of time ἢ is a certain generation, and this principle is the principle of a certain, and not of all generation. What therefore is this generation? That which has both the beginning * and the end contracted together [so as to be simultaneous]. Because therefore the world is a body, it is generated, and has a principle or beginning of generation. But because intellect is the maker of it, it was generated, and has an end of generation. Through both, however, it is rising into existence, and is perfect according to generation, was generated, is always becoming to be, and is gencrated. For these do not” subsist at one and the same time, in things which are generated in a part of time. Thus for instance the motion of the heavens, not being generated in a part of time, is always, as Aristotle says, in the end ; but this is not the case with motions on the earth.

“It was generated. Tor it is visibie and tangible, and has ἃ body. But all such things are sensible. And sensibles are apprehended by Opinion in conjunction with sense, and appear to be things which are becoming to be, and are generated.” As the Demiurgus of wholes looking to himself, and always abiding in his own accustomed manner, produces the whole world, totally and at once collectively, and with eternally invariable sameness ; for he does not make at one time, and at another not, lest he should depart from eternity ; after the same manner also 4 * xpovoy is omitted in the original. * apxn also is omitted in this place in the original. ? It is necessary to supply ovy here. 248 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ τι. Timeus, being converted to himself, delivers the whole theory, recurring to intellect from dianoia, and proceeding into a reasoning process from intellect; doubting, therefore, and interrogating himself, he energizes according to the selfmotive nature of soul; but in answering he imitates the projecting energy of intellect.. For he first comprehends the dogma in one word γέγονε, it was generated, and proclaims the conclusion prior to the demonstration, directly after the manner of those who energize enthusiastically. For these see the whole collectively, and contract in intellect the end prior to the egress, perceiving all things at once. But syllogizing, he descends from intellect to logical progressions, and the investigation through demonstration of the nature of the world.

Hence, in a manner perfectly divine, he shows from the hypotheses the whole form of the universe. For if the world is visible and tangible, and has a body, but that which is visible and tangible, and has a body, ts sensible, and that which is sensible is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense, and is generated, the world therefore is generated. fence he shows this demonstratively from the definition, according to a conversion’ of the definition ; since geometricians also use demonstrations of this kind.* And thus much concerning the form of the words. ΐ Since, however, as we have said, he asks whether the universe is eternal, or has a certain principle of generation, he answers, if was generated From this, therefore, itis evident that he gives a certain generation to the world: for this was the other part of the before-mentioned opposition, — If, however, this be the case, he establishes the universe remote from temporal generation ; for if the world has a certain, and not every principle of generation, but that which is generated in time has the principle of every generation, the world was not generated in tume. Farther still, let us also consider the wonderful hypotheses of Atticus, who says that what was moved in ἃ confused and disorderly manner is unbegotten, but that the world was generated in’ time, and let us speak concerning this assertion, “7 was generated.” | Since, therefore, Atticus admits that there is a cause of generation, let us see what the nature of this cause is according to him; for the world is visible and tangible. Whether, therefore, was every thing sensible generated in time, or not every thing? If indeed every thing, then that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner will be generated in time: for he says that this alsg

* For exirpoxny here, it is necessary to read exwrpogny. > See this explained farther on. 1 Γέγονε is omitted here in the original, was visible. But if not every thing, then the reasoning of Atticus is unsyllogistic and conclusive of nothing. Unless he should say, indeed, that the world 15 visible and tangible, but that what was moved in a confused and disorderly manner, is not now visible, but was so prior to the fabrication of the world; since Plato also speaks in this manner when he says, “ every such thing as was visible, and was moved in a confused and disorderly manner.” But in the words before us he says, “ for it is visible and tangible, and has a body.” He shows therefore that every thing which is visible and tangible, was generated, but not that which was visible and tangible. Though, therefore, these things should be asserted hy Atticus; for the man is skilful in defending what he advances ; it must be said in answer to him, that there is nothing of this kind in the definition of that which is generated, but it is simply said, that every thing generated is the object of opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. So thatif there is any thing which is entirely sensible, such thing will be generated. But every thing visible is sensible; and therefore that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, is generated.

In addition to which we may also say ‘that Plato calls this very disorderly thing itself generated, For he says that prior to the generation of the world, there were \ three things, being, place and generation, subsisting in the vestiges of forms. Hence that disorderly nature was generated, as well as that which is visible. It is not proper therefore to say that it was unbegotten according to time, and that the universe was generated ; but either both were generated according to Plato, or both were unbegotten. For both are similarly said by him to be visible and | 4 generated. If however both were generated, the world prior to being generated such as it now is was changed into the confused: for to a contrary, the generation is entirely from a contrary. And if he who made the world is good, how is it possible he should not adapt it in a beautiful manner, or that having beautifully adapted it, he should corrupt it? But if he is not good, how not being good, did he make it to be arranged and adorned? For it is the province of a good being to adorn and arrange other things. If, however, 7 being visible and generated, it is not generated according to time, it is not necessary immediately to make the universe to be generated in time, because it is visible and generated. And thus much against Atticus.

But let us recur to our principles, and discuss the affair as follows: Whether is the world perpetual being, in the same maaner as the eternal, or is it not * For gws here, it is necessary to read payer, 440 PROCLUS ON THE [poox i. eternal, but consubsistent with time? And whether is it self-subsistent, or produced ἡ by another? Such then is the inquiry. But the answer is, that it is produced by another, and is consubsistent with time. A thing of this kind however, is generated. For if it has a composite form, it has a ceneration according to the composition. And if it alone subsists from another cause, it is generated, as not being itself productive of itself. If likewise it is not * eternal, it has the whole of its hypostasis according to time. For it is fabricated on account of another, and is generated as a flowing image of being. Hence, as that which is composite is to that which is simple, and as time is to eternity, so is generation to essence, Tf, therefore, a simple and uniform essence is eternal, the essence which is composite, multiform, and conjoined with time, is generation, For it is divinely said by Plato, that the world originated from a certain principle, For thet which is generated ina portion of time began from a temporal, from a producing, from a final, from a material, and from a formal cause.

Lor since principle is multifariously predicated that which was once generated has a beginning of generation according to all these causes. The world however originated from a certain, and not from every principle, What therefore is this principle ? You must not say it is a temporal principle. Por that which originates from this is also allotted the principle of generation from all the rest, But it onyinated froin that principle, In which he afterwards instructs us, IT mean the most proper, or the final principle. For it was generated on account of the good ; and this is the principle from which its generation originated, He says therefore that this is the most proper principle, so that this may be called the principle of the generation of the world. lence in the first place he shows that the world is generated from its composition; forit is visible and tangible. Phese, therefore, are the extremes of the universe. For heaven is visible, but earth is tangible, And visibility is in earth so far as it participates of light; and tangibility in heaven, so far as a terres: trial nature is antecedently comprehended in it according to cause, But the world is simply {visible and tangible], ! and has a body in order that you may also assume the middle plenitudes which it contains, And this again is asserted by Plato conformably to the oracle, which says: /é ts an tnitation of intellect, but that which is fabricated has somethings of body. So far, therefore, as the universe

* For rayoperoy here, read rapayoperoy. * For μὲν here, itis requisite to read μη. > The words oparoy καὶ axroy appear to me to be omitted ia this place, has something corporeal, it is generated ; for according to this it is visible and tanzible, But every thing visible and tangible, is sensible 5 for sense is touching and secing. That however which is sensible is the object of opinion, as being mingled from sensibles, and not able to preserve the purity of intelligible forms. But every thing of this kind ts generated, as having a composite essence. ; Plato, therefore, does not subvert the perpetuity of the universe, as some who follow the Aristotelian hypotheses faney he does. And that this is true we may easily learn from hence. | He says that time was generated together with the heaven oY universe. If therefore time is perpetual, the universe also is perpetual. πε if the universe had a temporal beginning, then time also had a temporal beginning, which is of all things the most impossible." They say, however, that time is twofold, the one disorderly, but the other proceeding according to number, For motion is twofold, the one kind disorderly and confused, but the other orderly and elegant. But there is a time * co-ordinate to each of these motions.

but it is impossible to conceive an equable and anomalous time. For thus the essence of time will be a composite. And why do 1 say this? For when the motion is anomalous, time is equable. There are now, therefore, many motions 3 and some are switter, but others slower, and one is more equable than another ; but there is one continued time -of all these, and which proceeds according to number. Ehence itis not τι τ, thus to make a twofold time. If, however, time is one and continued; ifindeed itis unbegotten, the universe also is unhegotten, Which is consubsistent with time. But if it was generated, an absurdity will follow 3 since time, in order that it may be generated, will be in want of time, and this, though it does not yet exist. For when time was gencrated, time was not yet. Farther still, Plato conjoins the soul of the universe immediately on its being generated, with body, and does not give to it life prior to the corporeal-formed nature, but as soon as itis constituted incloses it in body. Moreover, he “says ‘ that soul ranks among beings that always exist. If, therefore, he makes body and soul to be consubsistent, but soul always exists, according to him body also is perpetual. Vor that which is at once consubsistent with the perpetual, is unbe-

' Instead of σι δε APXNY EXEL χρονικὴν, καὶ ο οὐρανὸς σρχην εξει XPorANY, in this place it seems to be necessary toread, εἰ δε ovparos ἀρχὴν EXEL χρονικὴν, Καὶ ὁ ypovos ἀρχὴν eee χρονικην. * For xpory here, it is requisite tu read ypovos. Tim. Plat. Vou -: ae ἢ 242 PROUCLUS ON TIE {[Buok 11, gotten. Again, Timwus here says, that the soul was generated ; but Socrates in the Phadrus says, it is unbegotten, Hence, he after another manner calls that eenerated, which is clearly unbesotten according to time, Farther still, he saye that the world is incorruptible, which is also granted by those who oppose him, But in the Republic he clearly asserts, or rather the Muses, that every thing wenerated is necessarily corrupted, assuming in this place generation according to time. From these things, therefore, you may understand what Tsay: for the world is thus demonstrated to be unbegotten, Por if the world is incorruptible, hut nothing which is generated according to time is incerrupuble, the world ts not generated aceording to time, What occasion 15 there, however, for these syllogisms ? Por Plato in the Laws clearly says, Ghat tre ds infinite aecording to the past, and thatin this infinity there have been myriads on ΔῊΝ εἰν of barren and fertile periods of men. Por investigating the begin of a polity, from which cites change into virtue and vice, he adds se! But you wall say, frou whence 2 7 indeed think from the length and infinity of time, and the mutations whiel take place wna thing of this kind” Ov rather that we may argue from what ts tin our hands, a little prior to this, we may hear him saying, that “where there is neither catreme heat or cold, there the race of men aleays evivts more or icss numerous.” Bacit the race of men always enists, the universe also is necessarily perpetual,

Again, therefore, if the Deuiuurgus ranks among eternal betigzs, he does not at one time fabricate, and at another not. Por if he did, he would not have an in- variable sameness of subsistence, and immutability. Βα εὐ he always fabricates, that which is fabricated by him always exists. For why, being willinaly at rest for an Infinite time, did he at leneth convert: himself to fabrication? Was it because he apprehended it to be better? But was he, prior to this, tznorant that itwas betteror not? Por itis absurd, betae intellect, that he should be ignorant; since there will be about him both tooraice and hoowledge. Bat ithe ον this, why did he not before begin to generate and produce the world? Numa it it was better, why did he not persevere in this enerey, iit be lawful so to speak ! For it is not holy to conceive that, being intellect and al God, he would) pursue that which os fess instead of that whieh is more beautiful Dt is necessary, however, to admit these things, Wf the world is generated according to ime, and is net consubsistent with the infinity of time. Those also appear to me to sin against

V Instead of ἀλλὰ ry ἀπειρίᾳ tou κυσμον συνηλεστων ait this place, it is necessary to read «ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ απειρίᾷτου KPUdUU GUM OTWS. nook χε] ΓΜ ΠΝ OF PLATO, 243 the Deminrgus of the world, in another way, who say that the world once was not. For if it once was not, there was a time in which the Demiurgus did not make it. For that which is made, and that which makes, subsist together. But if there was atime in which he did not make, he was then a maker in capacity. And if he was in eapacity, he was imperfect, and afterwards perfect when he made. Tf, however, there is prior and posterior about him, itis evident that he docs not belong to natures which energize eternally ; but that he passes from not making aceording to tine, to making. Moreover, he produces time. How therefore having an energy which is in want of tine, does he produce it through this energy?) For he once produced tine, of which he is indigent, in’ order that by his eflective energy he may produce time. This, therefore, cannot be otherwise. After this opinion, however, let us direct our attention to Severus, who says that the world stmply considered is indeed perpetual, but that this which now exists, and is thus moved, was eenerated. For there are twofold circulations, as the Elean euest has shown; one of whichis that which the universe now circumvolves, but the other the contrary to it.

The world therefore is cenerated, and originated from ἃ eertain principle, which is) the eause of this cireulation. Bat supply considered itis net generated. This interpretation, however, we shall oppose, by observing, that itis net proper to transfer fabulous enigmas to phySiology. For how is it possible that the soul which moves the universe, should be weary, and change the ancient circulation? [Tow also is the universe pertect, and suflictent to itsclf fit desires mutation? Pow ean there be an alternate change of circulations, when both that whichis moved, and that which moves, preserve their proper hab? And bow does Timiens say, that the circulation of the nature which is characterized by sameness, is moved to the right hand, according to the demiurgie will, but that which is characterized by ditlerence, to the left hand ? Por ifit is necessary that the works of the Deminrgns should remain invariably the same, and be perpetnal, iis likewise necessary that the circulations should be always the same ; and that the period characterized by sameness should be moved to the right hand, bat that which is characterized by diderence, to the left.” For they proceeded at one and the same time from the Demiurgus, and were allotted this circulation. Barther sull, is id not necessary, that inequability must thus be mtroduced to the

' The words την de θάτερον ex’ apecrepa, are omitted ia the original, but evidently ought to be inserted 244 PROCLUsS ON ΤῊΣ motion of the universe’ For every thing which is about to cease from its former motion, and to pass on to another, hastens to the contrary, Le. to rest, and causes the precedaneous motion to waste away. For if it continued tived in the same energy, What Is the cause of the second circulation?" By no means, therefore, are these interpretations which are not physical to be admitted. Nor again, must such explanations be adopted, though they are more rational, as those which asenibe generation to the world, mm conception only, Por thus we may also infer according to conception, aud not according to truth, that there isa Demiurgus of the universe. Por from admitting that the world was generated, it is demonstrated that there is a producing and demiurgic eause of it. Orit may be said, that the universe is admitted to be generated * for the sake of perspicuity, and the doctrinal method, in order that we may Jearn what the numerous goods are, of which it participates, from the demiurgic providence. Por this is mdeed ina certain respect true, yet is not sufficient to the theory of Plato. Por the perspreaous, says Tamblichus, is venerable, when itis adapted to scienee. Por admittines also that the universe is perpetual, it is possible to point out the goods imparted to it by the Gods. And thus much tn opposition to these interpretitrons,

Again, however, let us show from the beginning, after what manner the universe is said to be generated. Por itis neither so according to ὅπ τὸ, through the before mentioned arguments, nor simply because it proceeds froma eause ; since itis not sufficient to say this, Por intellect also ts from: the first eause, and all things after (he one are froma cause, ΜΟῚ 41} things are not generated, Por where does the eternal subsist, fall: things are generated? Por the one is prior to eternity, After what manner therefore, ttmay be said, is the universe generated) As that which now is always becoming to be, and at the same tine always was becoming to be, or rising into existence. For itis not that whieh ts partial Body there. fore, (i. e. partial body) is not only generated, but there is also a time when it was generated. But the whole world alone subsists in becoming to be, and is not at the same time that which was generated. Ttis also according to Aristotle always in the end, the always being temporal, according to temporal infinity, Por as the solar-form light: proceeds from its) proper fountain, thus also the world is always venerated, and always produced, and is always becoming to be, and at the

Pap is omitted in this ploee; aod the sentence ought to be interrogative, Hence instead of τι τὴν QUTNS COTWS ε!εέργείιν, TEs HITE Τὴν δέντεμαν avususrrdews, We ust read ἐπὶ γαρ TYS αὐτὴν ἐστων crepyeas «XN. with ἃ note of interrogation at theeud., * After uredero re saz here, the word σεν τον must be supplied. rook αι] TIMZUS OF PLATO. 245 same time always was so, Asa composite likewise itis generated. For all | Composition is ceaeration. But if is always composed, it Was always becoming ᾿ to be, with which to be generated conears. And it appears τὸ me that Plate Knowing this, says ἐδ weas generated instead of it is generated, just as of [real] being, hesavs it was, instead of itis: for his words are“ whether it aleays was.” Sor as in the intelligible, the was and is are the same ; for all things are there accord. / Ing to sameness, since all things are in dhe now, which is more mpartible than the now which is according to time; thas also iis generated and it was generated proceed to the same thing inevery sensible nature. For it was generated, as that Which always was becoming to be,and as generated, itis. But that a thing generated, when it is assumed aceording to a certain time, does not indicate that which is simply a composite, is evident: from its opposite. For to. this Plato opposes perpetual being.

Tf therefore, perpetual being manifests that which is simple, we must say that what is alone a composite is generated. Bat if eternal heme siguified that which is always according to time, that which is originating trom ἃ certam thing, would be said to be becoming to be. For that which is cenerated is not opposed to the eternal, so far as itis cenerated, but) so far as it participates of time; on which account also it iss generated. That perpetual being, however, [er that which alw avs is,} manifests the eternal, is evident ; since the Deminrgus also who produces time, is called perpetual being, and the paradigm likewise is thus denominated. Hence, it: sicnifies an eternal hypostasis, and not that which participates of temporal perpetuity.

Some one, however, who acnnowledges this ay nevertheless doubt, why we have before καὶ that the world is generated, from having a body? For as there are in ita body, which is alone generated, a divine soul, which always is, and a divine intellect prior to this, why do we say that it is generated on account of its body, and not denominate it unbegotten, on account of its soul, or its intellect? tis said, therefore, that the whole world is every where characterized from form, and not from the subject nature. For do we not call Socrates mortal, though he has an immortal soul, because the animal which is in him is mortal? If, however, you say that we now consider the corporeal-formed nature of the universe, not yet co-arranged with sont, you will speak richtly. Bat when vou see it animated and endued with intellect, vou may eall ita God. Por thus Plato in the Republie calls it a divine generated thing, But inthis dialogue, he thinks fit to denominate the world, a blessed God. In the very words also before us, he ina sreater degree celebrates the universe. For as he is about to call that which is

246 PROCLUS ON THE (Book It. unbegotten [viz. soul] generated, though he attributes an unbegotten subsistence to eternal natures, thus also he calls the world generated. For it is not when denominated generated, diminished by a juataposition with the eternal, He likewise conjoins the becoming to be of it, with if was generated ; in order that as all or the universe, he may evince that it is perfect and being, but as having its essence in time, that it is generated. Te likewise assigns to it the principle ofa certainand not of all generation. And according to its corporeal-formed nature, he calls it, generation, omitting the divine powers in it, through which it is happy, and ts called a God. Moreover, the demonstration is worthy of admiration, viz. how. scientifically it proceeds from the definition. Llence also, he mverts the order. For inthe hypotheses indeed, he defined that which is generated to be the objcet of opinion butte the demonstration of that which is generated, he assures the converse, in order that he may make the definition to be the middle term, as in demonstrations is perfectly requisite. Por this will cause what ts said to be traly a demonstration, For opinion through ' possessing the reasons of generated natures, introduces the order of eauses with reference to them. Elence itappears to me that Plato is not satistied with the term sensible ma order to demonstrate that the world is generated, but adds also that what is sensible is the object of opinion 5 since sense indeed knows the energy of sensibles, in consequence of suffering by them, but opinion knows also.

their essences. Por itantecedently comprehends the reasons of them. In order, therefore, that he might evince the esscnce of sensibles to be generated, he forms lis demonstration from that which ts the object ofopinton, Farther stu, lis not adding that which ts destructible to that which is venerated, shows his reverential Conceptions of the world; though it ds in a certain respect trae that the world is destructible, as we dave before said. At the sume time, this exhibits tous the caution and reverence of Plato: for having that which is consequent [τὸ the being generated], vet he does not add it; which he ought to admire who thinks that the world was generated according to Plato in time. Por this generated natare which he calls the object of opinion, isat the same time destructible ; but the world is not cestructible at) the same time that itis generated. Hence the world is both destructible and ticerraptuble, yet the philosopher does not call it both these according to the same; for this would be ridiculous ; but he calls it incorruptible, in the same manner as unbe-

gotten, according to time, For if that which ts gencrated according to time, "Instead of ἡ yap Sofa ra τοὺς Auzous execw τῶν yeryrwy in this place, itis necessary to read y yap toga τῷ rovs Noyors KA. is corraptible, as atts said to be in the Republie, that which is incorruptible is unbezetten, But ie work! is destructiile, as net bein abl to connect its fo For ws that whieh ts corporeal so faras pertains τὸ itselfis alteramotive, or maved hy another, thus also so faras pertains to itself itis destructible, in consequence of hong connected by something else. Por no body is either generative or connec. live of itself; since every thing which generates, makes; but every thing which mahes is ineorporeal. For though it should be a body, yet it makes by incorporeal powers. Every thing, therefore, which generates is incorporeal ; and every. thing which connects, is efective of a certain thing, viz. it is efleetive of union, and the undissipated. Bat every thing which is effective is impartible. Every thing therefore connective is impartible. Henee itis impossible for that which connects itself to bea body. Poritis not the province of body to connects; since so. far as itis body, tis partible, as itis said in the Sophista against those who assert that all things are bodies, Bat that which connects is inpartible, Tf however, that whieh is connected is body, but that which couneets is imeerporeal, body is not itself connective of itself Hence that whieh is connected by itse:f is necessarily impartble. As therefore body has in its own nature a tinite power, so likewise iis inits own nature destructible, not as being adapted to corruption, but as not naturally capable of preserving itself, nor as corruptible in’ capacity, that vou may also investigate the corruptible in energy, but as incapable of impartiig Incorruptibility to itself.

Whence, therefore, has it the perpetual, and whenee does it receive intinite power? We reply, from its producing cause. For as it is moved from thence, so likewise it is generated from thence, and is always generated, Por every thing which is generated fren an immoveable cause, is allotted a never-failing nature, as also the damontacal Aristotle says 5 so that according to this reasoning likewise, the world will have the perpetual proceeding from the immoveable (i. e. from the intellectual) fabrication, Since, however, according to its own proper nature it is senerated, it is always generated from the father, But since the world being all anda whele, is not imperfect, in addition to being generated, or beconune to be, it always Was generaied, since, likewise, the motion of itis always in the end, as Aristotle says. Much more, therefore, is the essential gener. Gon of italways in the end, imitating the perfection of its maker. So Mat it is always generated, and always was generated ; not receiving’ at once the whole infinity of the generative ΛῊ is pecessary here to supply μη δέχομένοι. 248 PROCLUS ON TIE [Book i. power of its Maker, but always according to the now possessing the ability of existing from this power, and receiving something from it, according to the instantaneous participation of infinity. And it receives the same infinity, indeed, on account of that which is imparted, but on its own account is not able to receive the same at ence.

After this manner, therefore, the perpetuity of the world remains, and the weneration of it takes place ; and in this respect the before mentioned men {i. ὁ. Plato and Aristotle} are not at variance. At the same tine, however, they differ, because Plato says, that the essence of the universe is co-extended with all time, but Aristotle supposes that it simply always exists, infers this to be necessary through many arguments, and ascribes to it temporal infinity, asserting at the same time that eternity is stable infinite power. He likewise demonstrates that no infinite power whatever can be present with a finite body, Hence it follows, that the world being corporeal always receives infinite power, but never tras the whole of it, because it is finite, [tis therefore alone trae to say, that from intimnite power itis generated, but ay not, infinitely, But if itis eenerated, It receives infinity on account of infinite time. ΕῸΓ fo be infinite pertains alone to that which is eternal; but a gene raced infinite belongs to that w hichis temporal; for generation is conjoined with time. Hence Aristotle himself is compelled to acknowledge that the world is in a certain respect generated,

Both likewise assert that itis the same in number, but) Plato conformably to principles, says that it is venerated. Por he established: prior to the universe a producing cause, from which he gives subsistence to the universe. But Aristotle does not admit that any eternal nature is an effective cause. And the former, indeed, generates time together with the essence of the universe, but the latter together with motion: for time according to him is that which is numbered. Aristotle, however, is accustomed to do this in his other Preatises. Lor such things as Plato asserts of the ove, Aristotle ascribes to intellect,’ viz. the nonpossession of multitude, the desirable, the having no intellectual perception of secondary natures. But such things as Plato attributes to the demiurgic intellect, Aristotle ascribes to the heavens, and the celestial Gods: for according to hin, falrication and providence are from these. Such things also as Plato ascribes to the essence of the heavens, Aristotle attributes to their circular motiun; departing indeed from theological principles, but dwelling more than is fit on physical * Aristotle in his metaphysical discussions ascends no higher than intelligible intellect, which is with him the first cause. And perhaps this was in consequence of knowing that all beyond this intellect is

productive powers.’ Since, however, the demoniacal Aristotle is very copious in discussing the reciprocations of the generated with reference to the corruptible, and of the unbegotten with reference to the incorruptible, he must be reminded, that Plato much prior to him assents to these axioms; in the Republic indeed asserting that corruption follows every thing which is generated; but in the Phadrus, that the unbegotten is also incorruptible. How is it possible, therefore, since Plato gives generation to the universe, that he should not also introduce corruption to it; or that corrupting that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, he should not give generation to it prior to corruption? The generation of the universe, therefore, was devised by him after a manner different [from its apparent * But we say that whatever is generated, is necessarily generated bv a eS ᾽ ~ 5 - The discussion accords with the hypotheses, or rather with the order of the things from which the hypotheses are assumed. Tor as every where form is suspended from the effective cause, so likewise, the first hypotheses are in continuity with the second, and afford a principle to the demonstrations which are consequent to them. For since it was demonstrated according to the first hypothesis, that the world was generated, through the object of opinion as a medium, afterwards that which is consequent to this is demonstrated according to the second hypothesis, viz. that it was generated by a cause. For it the world is a thing generated, or becoming to be, but every thing generated is generated by a certain cause, hence the world was necessarily generated by a certain cause. What therefore is the producing cause of the universe? That from which the being generated is present to the world, For it is necessary to investigate this immediately after the present demonstration. And we shall see as we proceed, what kind of arguments Plato uses on this subject.

Now, however, let us briefly recall to our memory, [the reasoning by which it is shown] that every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a cer- (ain cause. Every thing gencrated, therefore, is in its own nature imperfect. But being imperfect, it is not naturally adapted to perfect itself; since neither is any other imperfect thing. For every thing which is perfected, is perfected from that * This is because he discussed metaphysics physically, justas Plato discussed physics metaphysically. 250 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 1). which is in energy. Bat that which is in energy is perfect; so that every thing which perfects another ἐμ always when it perfeetein energy! according to that form to which it gives perfection). ‘Phat however, Which ix generated, so far us it is venerated, is imperfect. Hence that which is generated, so far as it is generated is not naturally adapted to perfect another thing, But if it cannot perfect another thing, much more is it incapable of perfecting itself Phe latter, therefore, is ἃ vreater undertaking than the former, Por that which perfects itself, is also) perfective of another thing.’ Butifitis not perfected by itself, it is evident that itis perfected by another. For how will it be generated, unless it is perfected ?

Again, therefore, it must be said, the world is generated, But every thing which is generated being imperfeet, is either perfected: by another thing, or by itself. Hence every thing which is generated, is either perfected by another, or hy itself. But it is not perfected by itsell. It is therefore perfected by another, so that it is generated by a certain cause. Farther still, the world 15. a composite, and has its hypostasis from dissimilars. But if itis a composite, itis either composed by itself, or by another, For it is, necessary that composition should be from a eause, unless we intend to make it an accidental thing, and froin chance, If therefore it is composed by itself, again it will perfect itself, and give subsistence to itself, and we shall ignorantly transfer it to an incorporeal essence. Vor how will it compose itself? Will it be from the parts arranging themselves? But thus we shall make bodies to be self-motive. Or will it be from impelling each other? And what in this case is that which primarily moves them, And how is itholy to commit the whole world to such like impulsions and contrivances ? How likewise will there be order from things deprived of order, and ornament from things unadorned? For every where that which makes is better than its effect, and that which generates, than the thing generated. And if indeed the parts are the material causes of the composition of the world, what ' αἰ which made them? For this is what we investigate. Buatif they are the eflicient causes, how is it possible that thingsunadorned ean be eflective of things that are adorned, and disorderly natures, of such as have order and arrangement? Tf however the world is not composed by itself, it is evident that it has this composition: from another. Hence if the world is a composite,’ but that which isa COMposile is

. ν * Tustead of ἀεὶ ον ἐστι ἴῃ this place, we should doubtless read ἀεὶ εὐ ἐργεια ἐστι. τ Instead of τὸ yap εαυτίν τελειωτίκον cor, which is evidently defective, it seems requisite to read ro yap ἐαντὸ τελειοῦν, saca\Xov re λειωζίκον ἐστι». "δ υθετον is omitted inthe original, noox τι TIMEUS OF PLATO. 251 composed by a certain cause, the world therefore has its generation from a cause. Hence too, trom these things it is manifest, that what is generated, is generated by a certain cause. It is not however wonderful, if Plato calls the cause of every thing generated, _ acertain cause. For the cause of all things, is stmply cause, and not ἃ certain cause ; concerning which he also says, that it is the cause of all beautiful things. For itis simply God. Butevery divinity posterior to it is @ certain God, as for instance, demiurgic or vivific. The cause therefore of generated natures is a certain cause, as differing from the cause ofall. Hence, he says, that what is generated, 15 generated by a certain cause. It is also well that Plato says one’ cause precedes the whole of generation, For multitude is co-arranged about one principle, and the many unities about the one. But with respect to other physiologists, some rank cause with con-causes; others recur to physical powers; others to dispersed infinite principles; others to‘ nature ; and others to soul. Plato, how ever, dismisses indeed these causes, but supposes that there is one cause which is the first of all causes.

For with this cause, the psychical order indeed co-operates, but nature is ministrant to it, and all con-causes are subservient to it, and are moved conformably to its will, Because, therefore, the demiurgic monad precedes multitude, he denominates this monad a cause: for this is significant of unity. Because, however, it has not the first order among causes, nor is imparticipable,” he adds the word certain. So that the words “ by a certain cause,” have the same signification as, by one cause indced, yet not the first cause. Hence, neither is it reasonable immediately to produce that which is generated, but that which is eternal, from éhe one ; in order that from the one, which is prior to eternity, every eternal nature may proceed ; but from an eternal nature, that which is generated and temporal. And that selfsubsistent natures likewise may proceed from that which is superior to beings that produce themselves; but from these, those that are generated by others, Vor the series and order of things which proceed from the one, is continued; and things nearer to the principle, give subsistence to such as are more remote from it.

“Tt is difficult, therefore, to discover the maker and father of this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men.” * For we here, itis requisite to read εἰς * The demiurgic monad, (i.e. Jupiter or the Demiurgus,) is not imparticipable because it immediately illuminates, or is con-subsistent with, intellectual intellect. See the 6th Book of my Translation of Proclus on the theology of Plato. 252 PROCLUS ON THE [pook νυ". It has been rightly observed by some prior to us, that Plato having shown that the world was generated by a cause, immediately after ascends to the God who is the Demiurgus of it, in a manner worthy of his intellectual conceptions, Vor it seems that the artificial nature of the progeny, introduces a rational and divine cause, and not accident or chance, which are neither causes, nor have an hypostatic power, nor in short, sustain the well-ordered progression of beings. [1 is requisite, however, that we should first examine the words themselves, and afterwards thus recur to the whole theory. Father and maker therefore, differ from) each other, so far as the former is the cause of matter,: but the latter of the world and order, and in short, of the formal cause; and so far indeed as the former is the supplier of bem and union, but the latter of powers and a multiforn essence 5 anid so far ax the one stably contains all things in himself, but the other is the eause of progression and veneration ;

and so far as the former signifies ineffable and divine providence, but the Tatter an abundant communication of productive principles. Porphyry however says, that father is he who generates the universe from himself, but maker he who receives the matter of it from another. Hence Aristo indeed, is said to be the father of Plato, but the builder of a house is the maker or fabricator of it, as not himself generating the matter of which it consists. If however, this is true, there was no occasion to call the Demiurgus father, because, according to Timwus, he does not give subsistence to matter. Is not the demiurgus therefore, rather the maker as producing form? For we call all those makers who produce any thing from a non-existent state into existence, But so far as the Demiurgus produces that which he produces, in conjunction with life, he is father. Tor fathers are the causes of animals, and of certain living beings, and impart seed together with life. And thus much concerning this particular.

But “ this universe” signifies indeed, the corporeal masses, and the whole spheres [of which it consists] and the plenitudes of each. It also signifies the vital and intellectual powers, which ride as it were in the corporeal masses. It also comprehends all the mundane causes * and the whole divinity of the world, about which the number of the mundane Gods proceeds ; likewise, the one divinity, the divine soul, and the whole bulk of the world, together with the divine, ' For o\ns here, it is necessary to read vAys, because matter according to Plato proceeds from the father Phanes, or animal itself, and not from the Demiurgus. * For avrovs, it is vecessary to read αἰτίας. ποοκ 11.]} TIMA:US OF PLATO. 253 intellectual, psychical, and corporeal-formed number that is conjoined with the world, For every monad has a multitude co-ordinate to itself. All these therefore must be assumed for the wuiverse ; since it signifies all these. Perhaps likewise the addition of the pronoun ¢his, is significant of the universe being ina certain respect sensible and partial. For the intelligible universe is not ¢his, because it is comprehensive of all intellectual forms. But the term this is adapted to the visible universe which is allotted a sensible and material nature. It is ditticult therefore, as Plato says, to discover the Demiurgus of this universe. For since with respect to discovery one kind proceeds scientifically from such things as are first,’ but another journeys on from things of a secondary nature, according to reminiscence ;

the discovery from such things as are first may be said to be dificult, because the invention of the intermediate powers, pertains to the highest theory. But the discovery from such things as are secondary, is nearly more ditficult than the former. For if we intend from these to survey the essence of the Demiurgus, and his other powers, it is necessary that we should have beheld all the nature of the things generated by him, all the visible parts of the world, and the nnapparent natural powers which it contains, according to which the sympathy and antipathy of the parts in the world subsist. Prior to these also, we must have surveyed the stable physical reasons, and natures themselves, both the more total and the more partial,* and again, the immaterial and material, the divine and diaemoniacal, and the natures of mortal animals. And farther still, the genera which are under life, the perpetual and the mortal, the undefiled and the material, such as are wholes, and sach as are parts, the rational and the irrational, and the prerogatives which are superior to ours, through which every thing between the Gods and the mortal nature are bound together. We must likewise have beheld the all-various souls, the diflerent numbers of Gods according to the diflerent parts of the universe, and the ineffable and effable impressions of the world through which it is conjoined with the father. For he who without having seen these is impelled to the survey of the Demiurgus, is more imperfect than is requisite to the intellectual perception of the father. But it is not lawful for any thing imperfect to be conjoined with that which is all-perfect.

Moreover, it is necessary,’ that the soul becoming an intellectual world, and being assimilated as much as possible to the whole intelligible world, should in- * viz. From axioms and definitions. * Meptcwrepas is omitted in the original. Ὁ For δη here, it is requisite to read bec. 254 PROCLUS ON THE (Boon 11. trofuce herself to the maker of the universe ; and from this introduction, should in a certain respect become familiar with him through a continued intellectual energy. For uninterrupted energy about any thing, calls forth and resuscitates our (dormant) ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed at the door of the father, it is necessary that we should be united to him. For discovery is this, to meet with him, to be united to him, to associate alone with the alone, and to see him himself, the soul hastily withdrawing herself from every other energy to him. For being present with her father, she then considers scientific discussions to be but words,’ banquets together with him on the truth of real being, and in pure splendor is purely initiated in entire and stable visions. Such therefore is the discovery of the father, not that which is doxastic ; for this is dubious, and not very remote from the irrational life. Neither ts it scientific ; for this is syllogistic and composite, and does not come into contact with the intellectual essence of the intellectual Demiurgus. But it is that which subsists according to intellectual vision itself, acontact with the intelligible, and a union with the demiurgic intellect.

For this may properly be denominated difficult, either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to souls after every evolution of life; or as the true labour of souls. For after the wandering about generation, after purification, and the light of science, intellectual energy and the intellect which is in us shine forth, placing the sonl in the father as ina port, purely establishing her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining hight with light, not such as that of science, but more beautiful, more intellectual, and partaking more of the nature of the onethan this. For this is the paternal port," and the discovery of the father, viz. an undefiled union with him.

* This is in consequence of a union with the Demiurgus beiug so much superior to scientific perception. * Proclus here alludes to the fabulous wanderings of Ulysses in the Odyssey. Por Homer by these oecultly indicates the life of a man who passes ina regular manner from a sensible to ao intellectual life, and who being throughly purified by the excrcise of the cathartic virtues, is at length able to energize according to the intuitive perception of intellect, and thus after becoming re-united to Penelope or Philosophy, meets with and embraces his father. This appears also to have been the opinion af tbe Pythagorean Numenius, as we are informed by Porphyry in his treatise De Antro Nympharuin, “ΤῸ he thought that the persou of Ulysses in the Odyssey represented to us a man who passes in a regular maoner over the dark and stormy sea of generation; and thus at Jength arrives at that region (ἡ. ἐν the intellectual region) where temmpests and seas are unknown, and finds a nation “Who ne'er knew salt, or heard the billows roar.’” See more onthis subject in my Restoration of the Platonic Theology, p. 294. Rook 11.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 255 But to say “ thatwhen found it ts impossible to speak of him to all men,”* perhaps indicates the custom of the Pythagoreans, who had arcane assertions about divine natures, and did not divulge them to all men. For as the Elean guest says, the eyes of the multitude are not strong enough to look to truth.

Perhaps also this may be said which is much more venerable, that it is impossible for him who has discovered the maker and father of the universe to speak of him to certain persons such ashe has seen him. For the discovery was not made by the soul speaking, bat closing her eyes, and being converted,” to the divine light. Nor was it made by her being moved with her own proper motion, but through being silent with a silence which leads the way (to union}. For since the essence of other things is not naturally adapted tobe spoken of, either through a name, or through definition, orthrough science, butis seen through intellection alone, as Plato saysin his Epistles, inwhat other way can itbe possible to discover the essence of the Demiurgus, than by intellectual energy? And how when having thus found it, is it possible to tell whatis seen, and explain it to others, through nouns and verbs? For the evolution which is conversant with composition, cannot exhibit a uniform and simple nature, What then, some one may say, do we not assert many things about the Demiurgus, and about the other Gods, and even of the one ilself? To this we reply, we speak indeed about them, but we do not speak of cach of them itself. And we are able indeed to speak scientifically of them, but not intellectually. For this, as we have before observed, is to discover them. But if the discovery is a silence of the soul, how can speech flowing through the mouth, be sufficient to lead that which is discovered into light. ᾿

After these things, therefore, let us, following the light of science, survey who the Demiurgus is, and to what order of beings he belongs. For different philosophers among the ancients were led to different opinions on this subject. For Numenius, indeed, celebrating three Gods, calls the first father, but the second maker, and the third that which is made, For the world according to him is the third God. So that with him the Demiurgus is two-fold, viz. the first and the second Goud, and that which is fabricated is the third God. For itis better to say this, than’ to say as he does speaking tragically, grandfather, ofispring, nephew. He how- * For μηδε evpovra δυνατα δυνατον εἰναι λέγειν it is necessary to read, μηδε evporra εἰς axarras δυνατον, κι ἃ. ; * For axcorpayperns, it is requisite to read extorpapiperns. Ὁ It is necessary here to supply i. 256 PROCLUS ON THE (Boox 1, ever, who asserts these things, in the first place does not nghtly con-numerate the good with these other causes. For it is not naturally adapted to be conjoined with certain things, nor has it an order secondary to another. But father with Plato {in the text] is arranged as the second to maker, Farther still, Numenius co-arranges that which is exempt, ' from all habitude, with the natures that are under and posterior to it. It is necessary, however, to refer these indeed to the first, but to take away from it all habitude.

Neither therefore, is the paternal nature of the maker* adapted to the first. For these things’ are apparent in the orders of Gods posterior to it. In the third place; it is not right to divide father and maker, since Plato celebrates one and the same God by both these names. For one divine fabrication, and one maker and father, are every where delivered by Plato. And by following names, to divulse the one cause fof the world,] is just as if some one, because Plato calls the universe both heaven and the world, should say there are two fabrications, the one heaven, and the other the world; just as here, Numenius says there is a two-fold demiurgic God, the one father, but the other maker.

With respect to Harpocration, it would be wonderful, if he were consistent with himself, in determining things of this kind about the Demiurgus, For this man is inconsistent in what he says according to the doctrine of three Gods and so far as he makes the Demiurgus to be two-fold. For he calls the first God, Heaven and Saturn, the second, Dia and Zena, and the third, Heaven and the World. But again changing the order he calls the first God Dia, and the king of the intelligible; but he denominates the second God, the ruler, and the same divinity, is with him Jupiter, Saturn, and Heaven. The first God therefore, 1s all these; from whom Parmenides takes away all things, every name, all language, and all habitude. And we, indeed, cannot endure to call the first God even father; but he denominates him father, and offspring, and the offspring of an offspring. But Atticus, the preceptor of Harpocration, immediately makes the Demiurgus to be the same with the good, though the Demiurgus is called good by Plato, but not the good. He is also denominated by him intellect, but he says that the good * For efnprnyevoy in this place, itis requisite to read εξηρημενον.

* Instead of παντος here, the sense evideotly requires that we should read ποιητὸν. * Father and maker are first apparent in the intelligible and intellectual, and afterwards iu the other orders of Gods. Book 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 257 — is the cause of all essence, and is beyond being, as we may learn in the Republic. What then will Atticus say concerning the paradigm? For it is either prior to the Demiurgus, and in this case, there will be something more ancient and honorable than the good; or itis in the Demiurgus, and the first God will be many things ; or it is posterior to the Demiurgus, and thus the good, which it is not lawful to assert, will be converted to things posterior to itself, and = will intellectually perceive them. After these men, Plotinus the philosopher, asserts that there is a twofold Demiurgus, one in the intelligible world, but the other the leader and ruler of the universe. And he says rightly. For the mundane intellect is in a certain respect the Demiurgus of the universe. And Aristotle shows that this is the first God, denominates it Fate, and calls it by the name of Jupiter. But again, there is an exempt father and maker, which Plotinus places in the intelligible, calling every thing between ἐδ one and the world, the intelligible. For there, according to him, the true heaven, the king of Saturn, and the Jovian intellect subsist. Just as if some one should say, that the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, are in the heavens. For the whole intelligible is one many, and is one intellect comprehensive of many intelligibles. Plotinus therefore philosophizing asserts these things,

Amelius, however, makes a threefold Demiurgus, three intellects, and three kings, one being him that exists, another him that possesses, and the third him that sees. But these differ, because the first intellect, indeed, is tru/y that which itis. The second, is the intelligible which is in it, but has the intelligible prior to itself, participates entirely of it, and on this account is the second intellect. But the third, is also the intelligible which it contains ; for every intellect is the same with its conjoined intelligible; but it possesses the intelligible which is in the second, and sees the first intellect. For by how inuch greater the interval is, by so much the more obscure is that which is possessed. He supposes, therefore, that there are these three intellects and Demiurgi, and says that with Plato there are three kings, and with Orpheus also three, Phanes, Heaven, and Saturn. And he who, according to him, is especially the Demiurgus, is Phanes. It is worth while, therefore, to observe to him, that every where Plato is accustomed to recur from multitude to the unities, from which the order in the many proceeds, Or rather, prior to Plato, unity always precedes multitude according to the arrangement itself of things. And every divine order originates from a monad. . For it is necessary, indeed, that divine number should proceed from the triad ;

Tim. Plat. Vou... I. 2K 458 PROCLUS ON THE [soon 11, but the monad is prior to the triad. Where, therefore, is the demiurgic monad, in order that the triad may procced from it? How likewise is the world one, unless it was fabricated by one cause? For it is by a much greater priority necessary that the cause itselfshould be united, and be monadic, in order that the world may become only begotten. Let there then be three Demiurgi; but who is the one Demiurgus prior to the three? For no one of the divine orders originates from multitude. Farther still, if the paradigm is one, and the world is one, how is it possible that there should not also be one Demiurgus prior to the many, who looks indeed to the one paradigm, but makes the world to be only begotten ? Hence, it is not proper that the demiurgic number should originate from a triad, but from a monad. After Amelius, Porphyry thinking to accord with Plotinus, calls the supermundane soul the Demiurgus, but the intellect of it to which it ix, converted, animal itself, so as to be according to him the paradigm ofthe Demiurgus; whom itis worth while to ask, in which of his writings Plotinus makes soul to be the Demiurgus. How, likewise, is this conformable to Plato, who continually denominates the Demiurgus a God and intellect, but never calls him soul? ILow also does he call the world a God? How does the Demiurgus proceed through all mundane natures? For all things do not participate of soul, but all things partake of the demiurgic providence, And divine production, indeed, Is able to generate intellect and Gods, but soul is not naturally adapted to produce any thing above the psychical order. 1 omit to say that this very thing itself requires much confirmation, whether Plato knew that there is a certain imparticipable® soul.

In the next place, therefore, the divine Jamblichus has written much against the opinion of Porphyry, and has subverted it as being Plotinian; but delivering his own theology, he calls the whole intelligible world the Demiurgus; so that from what has been said, it is evident that he asserts the same thing as Plotinus,— He says, therefore, in his Commentaries, ** Thus we call that which is truly cause, and the principle of generated natures, and the intelligible paradigms of the world, the intelligible world. Such causes, likewise, as we admit to have an existence prior to all things in nature, these, the demiurgic God, whom we now investigate, comprehending in one, possesses inhimself.” If, therefore, in what is here said, he intends to signify that in the Demiurgus all things subsist demiur- + i.e. A soul which is not consubsisteut with body. gically, and being itself, and the intelligible world, he speaks conformably both to himself, and to Orpheus who says: For in Jove’s ample dwelling all things lie, And in Jove’s belly they together flow. And all such like assertions. Nor is it at all wonderful, that each of the Gods should be the universe, but after a different manner, one demiurgically, another connectively, another immutably, another convertively,' and another in some other way according to a divine peculiarity. But if he says that the whole extent between the world and the one, is the Demiurgus, this deserves to become the subject of doubt;

and we may urge against this assertion the arguments which we derive from him. For where are the kings that are prior to Jupiter, and are the fathers of Jupiter?) Where are the kings, according to Plato, whom he thinks fit to arrange above the world next to the onc? How likewise can we say that perpetual being itself is the first being, if we also say that the Demiurgus is the whole intelligible order, who is himself perpetual being, as is likewise animal itself? For shall we not thus be compelled to say, that the Demiurgus is notan eternal being? Unless the Demiurgus likewise is comprehended together with other eternal beings. That Iamblichus himself, however, though he here celebrates the demiurgic order in a more confused manner, yet speaks of it more accurately elsewhere, may be from thence assumed, Tor writing concerning the fabrication of Jupiter in the Timanus, after the intelligible triads, and the three tricds of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual’ Gods, he attributes the third order in the intellectual hebdomad to the Demiurgus. Tor he says that these three Gods are celebrated by the Pythagoreans, who assert that the first of them is an intellect comprehending in itself whole monads, the simple, the indivisible, the boniform, that which abides and is united in itself, and who deliver such like indications of its transcendency. But they say that the second is collective of the perfection of things of this kind, and that the inost beautiful indications of it are divine fecundity, that which is collective of the three Gods, that which gives

completion to energy, that which is generative of divine life, that which proceeds * Instead of των δε rpexrws, it is necessary to read τὸν δε excorperrixws. * It is here necessary to supply καὶ voepwy. For the three triads of the intelligible and at ‘hes same time intellectual Gods, immediately follow the intelligible triads, and the intellectual hebdomad follows as the third in order. 260 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ τῷ) every where, and that which is beneficent. And they teach us that of the third who fabricates wholes, the most beautiful signatures are, prolific progressions, the productions and connections of total causes, together with total causes defined by forms, all proceeding fabrications, and other things similar to these. It is worth while, therefore, to form a judgment of the Tamblichean theology from these things, and to determine what the nature of it is respecting the Demiurgus of wholes. For how can the Demiurgus be the whole’ of perpetual being, if indeed perpetual being has been already defined by Plato; but he now says that it Is difficult to find the Demiurgus, and when found, impossible to speak of him to all men? And how can these things be verified of that which is definitively delivered, and unfolded into light to all those that were present ?

After Lamblichus, therefore, Theodorus, following Atnelius, says that there are three Demiurgi. He arranges them, however, not immediately after the one, but at the extremity > of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. He also calls the first an essential intellect, the second, an intellectual essence, and the third, the fountain of souls. He likewise says, that the first is indivisible, but the second, divided into wholes, and the third receives a division into particulars. Again, therefore, the same things must be said to himas were said to the illustrious Amelius ; viz. that we indeed acknowledge that there are three Gods, or Gods analogous to these, yet we do not admit that there are three Deminrgi, but that the first is the intelligible of the Demiurgus, the second, his generative power, and that the third is truly the demiurgic intellect. It is likewise requisite to consider whether the fountain of souls is to be arranged as the third: for power pertains to the middle, as he somewhere says; and thus it must be denominated partially, and not called the universal fountain of life. For the fountain of souls, is one of the fountains contamed in this middle [or generative power of the Demiurgus.} For life is not in souls only, norin animated 1tures alone, but there is also a divine, and an intellectual, prior to the psychical life, which is said to proceed diversely from thence, from divided rivers. And such, in short, are the dogmas ? of the ancicnt interpreters concerning the Demiurgus.

Let ux, however, concisely relate the opinion of our preceptor (Syrianus] on this subject, as we think that it especially accords with the conceptions of Plato. * For o\ew here, itis necessary to read odor. 1 ΓῚ Instead οἵ exe τὰ δε των νοητων τέ καὶ νυέρων θεων, I read ex’ ἐσχατον τῶν γοήτων κ. λ. 2. For δυγματων here, it is becessary to read δυγματα. The one Demiurgus, therefore, according to him," subsists at the extremity of the intellectual divine monads, and the fountains of life. But he emits from himself the total fabrication, and presides over the more partial fathers of wholes, Being, however, himself immoveable, he is eternally established on the summit of Olympus,* and rules over the twofold worlds, the supercelestial and the celestial, comprebending also the beginning, middles, and ends of wholes. For of the? whole demiurgic order, one part is a distribution of wholes totally, another of wholes partially, another of parts totallys, and another of parts partially. Fabrication, therefore, being fourfold, the demiurgic monad binds to itself the total providence of wholes; but a demiurgic triad, is suspended from it, which rules over parts totally, and over the divided power of the monad’ Just again, as in the other, or the partial fabrication, a monad is the leader of a triad, which orderly distributes wholes partially, and parts partially. But all the multitude of the triad dances [as it were] round the monad, and being divided about it, distributes its productions, and is filled from it.

Of the many Demiurgi, therefore, there is one Demiurgus (who is the monad of the rest], in order that all things may be - consequent to each other, viz. the one, the paradigm in intelligibles, the one intelligible Demiurgus, the one only-begotten world. If, however, these things are rightly asserted, the Demiurgus of wholes is the boundary of intellectuals, established indeed in the intelligible, but being full of power, according to which he produces wholes, and converting all things to himself. On this account also Timaus calls him intellect, and the best of causes, and says that he looks to the intelligible paradigm ; in order that by this he may separate him from the first intelligible Gods. But by calling him intellect, he distinguishes him from the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. And by denominating him the best of causes, he establishes him above all the other supermundane Demiurgi. For he denominates the causes demiurgic, as also he had before said, “ Every thing generated is generated by a cause,” and adds, “ /Vhen therefore an artificer, &c.” Hence the Demiurgus is an intellectual God, exempt from all the Demiurgi. If,

* For avrny in this place, it is obviously requisite to read avroy. * i.e. He dwells eternally in the highest intellectual splendor. * Instead of πως yap δημιουργικης κι Δ.» here, it is requisite to read rns yap «. A. Afier ro δὲ των ὁλων pepixws, it is necessary to supply the words, ro δε των μέρων oducws, in order to render the division complete. * For rpcados here, we must read μοναδοε. 262 PROCLUS ON THE (Βοοκ 11. however, he was the first among the intellectual Gods, he would alone abide in his own accustomed manner: for this is the illustrious property of the first. If he was the second, he would be particularly the cause of life. But now, when he generates soul, he energizes with the Crater [i.e. with Juno}, but when he generates intellect, he energizes by himself. Hence he is no other than the third of the intellectual fathers. For his illustrious and principal work is to produce intellect, and not to fabricate body. For he produces body not alone, but together with necessity ; but he produces intellect through himselt. Nor does his principal work consist in producing soul: for he generates soul together with the Crater. But he alune by himself gives subsistence to intellect, and causes it to preside over the universe.

Existing, therefore, as the producer of intellect, he very properly has an intellectual order. Hence also he is said by Plato to be both maker and father, and neither father alone, nor maker alone, nor again father and maker. For the extremes indeed, are father and maker; the former possessing the summit of intelligibles, and being prior to the royal series [1. ὁ. to Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, and Bacchus]; but the latter possessing the end of the [intcllectual]order. And the former being the monad of paternal deity; but the latter being allotted a producing power in the universe. Between both these, however, are father and at the same time maker, and maker and at the same time father. For each of these is not the same; but in one order the paternal, and in another the eflective has dominion. The paternal, however, is more excellent than the (fective. Hence in the media, though both are in each, yet the former’ is more father than maker. For it is the boundary of the paternal depth, * and the fountain of intellectuals. But the second is more maker than father. ΠῸΓ it is the monad, of total fabrication. Hence I think the former is called JZetis, but the latter Afetietes. And the former indeed is seen, but the latter sees, ‘The former also is absorbed, but the latter is replete with the power of the former. And what the former is in intelligibles, that the latter is in intellectuals. For the former is the boundary of the intelligible, but the latter of the intellectual Gods. Concerning the former likewise, Orpheus says,

In a dark cavern these the father made. * Viz. father and at the same time maker. This God also is Phanes or animal itself, and subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order. * For βοῖτον in this place, we must read βνθου. But concerning the latter Plato says, “ Of whom I am the Demiurgus and father of works.” In the Politicus likewise, he makes mention of the doctrine of the Demiurgus and father; because with the former [i. e- with Phanes] the paternal is more predominant, but with the latter [i. 6. with Jupiter] the demiurgic. Each ot the Gods however is denominated from his peculiarity, though each is comprehensive of all things. And he indeed who is alone maker, ' is the cause of mundane natures. Ife who is maker and father, is the cause of supermundane and mundane natures. Ile who is father and maker, is the cause of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane natures. But he who is alone father, is the cause of intelligibles, of intellectuals, of supermundane and mundane natures. Plato, therefore, admitting a Demiurgus of this kind, suffers him to be ineffable and without a name, as having an arrangement prior to wholes in the portion of the good.” Yor in every order of the Gods, there is that which is analogous to the one. Such therefore is the monad in each world. But Orpheus gives a name to the Demiurgus, in consequence of being moved [i. e. inspired] from thence ; whom Plato himself likewise elsewhere follows. For the Jupiter with him, who is prior to the three sons of Saturn, is the Demiurgus of wholes. After the absorption therefore of Phanes, the ideas of all things shone forth in him, as the theologist says :

Hence with the universe great Jove contains, Extended wther, heav'n’s exalted plains; The barren restless deep, and earth renown’d, Ocean immense, and Tartarus profound ; Fountains and rivers, and the boundless main, With all that nature’s ample reaims contain ὁ And Gods and Goddesses of each degree ; All that is past, and all that e’er shall be, Occultly, and in fair connection lies, In Jove’s wide belly,? ruler of the skies.* * viz, The Demiurgus has an arrangement analogous to the good. For as the good is the exempt monad of the intelligible order, so the Demiurgus is the exempt monad of the supermundane order. ? Celestial and sublunary causes and effects, are very properly said by Orpheus to subsist in the belly of Jupiter, because these have a middle subsistence between supermundane and Tartarean natures, just as the belly is in the middle of the body. : ᾿ * These verses are very defective in the original; but the learned reader will find them in a correct state in the Orpheus of Herman. 264 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 11. Jupiter however, being full of ideas, through these comprehends in himself wholes: which the theologist also indicating adds: Jove is the first, and last, high-thundering king, Middle and head, from Jove all beings spring. Jove the foundation of the earth contains,

And the deep splendor of the starry plains. Jove is a hing by no restraint confin’d, And all things flow from Jove’s prolific mind. One mighty principle which never fails, One power, one damon, over all prevails, For in Jove’s royal body all things he, Fire, night and day, earth, water, and the sky. Jupiter therefore, comprehending in himselt wholes, produces in conjunction with Night all things monadically and intellectually, according to her oracles, and likewise all mundane natures, Gods,* and the parts of the universe. | Night therefore says to him asking, how all things will be a certain one, and yet each be separate and apart from the rest: All things receive inclosed on ev'ry side, In wther’s wide inctlable embrace : Then in the midst of wther place the heav’n ; Tn which let earth of infinite extent, The sea, and stars, the crown of heav’n, be fixt. But after she has laid down rules respecting all other productions, she adds: And when your power around the whole has spread A strong coercive bond, a golden chain Suspend from wther. This bond which is derived from nature, soul and intellect, being perfectly strong and indissoluble. For Plato also says, that animals were generated, bound

with animated bonds. Orpheus, likewise, Homerically calls the divine orders * For θεὼν here, it is necessary to read θέον. which are above the world,' a golden chain; which Plato emulating says, “ That the Demiurgus placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, fabricated the universe 5” and that he gave subsistence to the junior Geds, through whom also he adorns the parts of the universe. If therefore, itis Jupiter who possesses the one power, who absorbs Phanes, in whom the intellizible causes of wholes first subsist, who produces all things, according to the counsels of Night, and who gives authority both to the other Gods, and to the three sons of Saturn,—he is the one and whole Demiureus of all the world, and has the fitth order among'the kings, [1. e. among the Gods of the royal series,] as it is divinely demonstrated by our preceptor in his Orphic Conferences. Jupiter likewise,.is co-ordinate with Heaven and Phanes, and on this account he is both maker and father, and each of these totally. That Plato, however, had these conceptions respecting the mighty Jupiter, is manifested by him in the Cratylus from names: for he there shows that he is the cause and supplier of life to all things. For he says, “ Zhat we denominate him Dia and Zena, through whom life ts present to all things.” But in the Gorgias he co-arranges, and at the same time exempts him from the sons of Saturn, in order that he may be prior to the three, and participated by them.

He also makes Law to be his assessor, in the same manner as Orpheus. For with him also Law is placed by the side of Jupiter, according to the counsels of Night. Farther still, Plato in the Laws represents total Justice to be the attendant of Jupiter, in the same manner as the theologist. But in the Philebus he shows, that a royal soul and a royal intellect pre-exist in Jupiter according to the reason of cause. And conformably to this he now represents him as giving subsistence to intellect and soul, unfolding the laws of Fate, and producing all the orders of the mundane Gods, and constituting all animals as far as to the last of things; some things being generated by him alone, but others through the celestial Gods as media. To which we may also add, thatin the Politicus he calls Jupiter the Demiurgus and father of the universe, just as in the present dialogue he says concerning him, “Ofwhom Lam the Demiurgus, and father of works.” He likewise says inthe Politicus, that the present order of the world is Jovian, aud that the world is moved wcording to Fate. The world therefore living a Jovian life, has Jupiter for the Demiurgus and father of its life. If, likewise, he represents the Demiurgus delivering a speech,’ this too is in reality Jovian. For in the Meno, he on this

* Instead of των θείων πραξεων vo των exoopiwy in this place, it is necessary to read των θείων rulrwy νπερ Tey ἐγκοσμιων. * For δημιουργουντα here, it is necessary to read énunyopourra. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. aL 268 PROCLUS ON THE [Βουκ 11. account calls him a sophist, as filling the Gods posterior to him with allvarious reasons. This also the divine poet [Homer] manifests, who represents him thus speaking' from the summit of Olympus. Hear, all ye Gods and Goddesses, my words. And converting the two-fold co-ordinations to himself. Through the whole of his poetry, likewise, he praises him as the supreme of rulers, and the father of men and Gods, and celebrates him with all demiurgic conceptions. As, therefore, we have shown that all the Grecian theology attributes the total fabrication of things to Jupiter, what ought we to conceive of these words of Plato? Is it not, that the same God king Jupiter, is with him maker and father, and is neither father alone, nor father and maker. For father is the monad, as the Pythagoreans say, but the decad is the demiurgic® order of divine natures, “to which divine number arrives from the secret recesses of the monad, which decad is the venerable universal recipient, surrounding all things with bound, is immutable and unwearied, and is called the sacred decad.” Hence, after the paternal monad, and the paternal and at the same time effective tetrad, the demiurgic decad proceeds.

And it is indeed immutable, because an immutable deity subsists together with it. But it surrounds all things with bound, as supplying with order things that are disorderly, and with ornament things that are unadorned. It likewtse illuminates souls with intellect, as being intellect totally, and body with soul, as possessing and comprehending the cause of soul, and generates things which are truly generated, both such as are middles, and such as are last, in consequence of comprehending in itself demiurgic being. From what is written also in’ the Protagoras, we may collect what the demiurgic order is. For Jupiter there becomes the cause of the whole political science, and of the reasons essentially disseminated in souls. This, however, is to bind the whole fabrication of things, and to connect all things by his own immutable powers. For as the theolovist establishes about him. the Curetic order, thus also Plato says, that he is surrounded with terrible guards. And as the former establishes him on the summit of Olympus, so the latter assigns to him a tower, in which being eternally seated, he adoins all things through the middle orders. Who the Demiurgus therefore is, and that he is a divine intellect, the cause of total fabrication, is evident from what has been said; and likewise that Jupiter himselfis celebrated as the Demiurgus both by Orpheus and Plato.

* Here also it is requisite to make the same emendation as above, * Δημιονργικὴ is omitted in the original, Whether, however, we must say that he is a fontal or a ruling God, or belongs to some other order of the demiurgic series, deserves not to be passed over in silence. It appears, therefore, that such things as the theurgist [Julian] ascribes to the third divinity of the rulers, these Plato assigns to the Demiurgus ;* such as to fabricate the heavens, iaclosing them in a convex figure; to establish the numerous multitude of inerratic stars; to give subsistence to the heptad of planetary animals; and to place earth in the middle, but water in the hosoms of the earth, and air above these. If, however, we accurately consider the affair, we shall find that the third of the mundane rulers divides the universe into parts; that the second divides it into wholes, and is celebrated as the demiurgic cause of motion ; and that the first by his will alone disposes all things, and constitutes the whole world according to union. But the God who is said by Timzus to be the Demiurgus, produces all things by his will, imparts to the universe a division into wholes, and also into parts, which give completion to all the wholenesses [rag ολοτητας πασας]. For he not only makes the universe to be a whole of wholes, but he also produces the multitude of each wholeness.

On all these accounts therefore, we think it proper to assert that the Demiurgus is beyond the triad of ruling fathers ; that he is one fontal cause, and that the Oracles represent him eradicating the multitude of ideas in the fontal soul, and constituting the world from intellect, soul and body, and producing our souls, and sending them into generation. The Oracles likewise assert the same things of him as Timzus. For they say, “ The father of Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul in sluggish body.” But this is the admirable thing celebrated by the Greeks, concerning him who is according to them? the Demiurgus. If however these things are asserted conformably * both to Timaus and the Oracles, those who are incited by the divinely delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] will say that this Demiurgus is fontal; that he fabricates the whole world conformably to ideas, considered as

ἡ Itappears to be necessary here to read ry δημιουργῳ instead of ry κοσμῳ. * The Greek in this place is very faulty. For it is κατέθετο yap νον μὲν ev ψνχῃ ἐνιματι de ἡμεαι cysareOnce πατὴρ ανδρων re θεων re. Instead of which it ought to be, careflero yap Novy μεν ere ψυχῃ, Yuxny δ᾽ ενε σώματι apyy Ἡμεων εγκατεθηκε xarnp ανδρων τε θεων τε. 3 For παρ᾽ avrne here, it isnecessary to read παρ᾽ ἀντοιε. * For ομωφνλως in this place read opoperws. 268 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ "1. one, and as many, and as divided both into wholes and parts, and that he is celerated as the maker and father of the universe, and as the father of Gods and men hy Plato, Orpheus, and the Oracles ; generating indeed, the multitude of Gods, but ~ending souls to the generations of men, as Timeus himself also says. For if he is the best of causes, as he says, by what contrivance can he be arranged in the second orders of Demiurg:? Por the most excellent among the Demiurgi is significant of the highest transcendency in the demiurzic series. But the highest summit of every serivs is fontal, so that this Demiurgus is necessarily fontal, and not ruling; the rulers being every where secondary to their proper fountam, Henee also he renders the mundane Gods Demiurgi, or fabricators, as being a certain demiurgic fountain, Since, however, thereare many fontal Demiurgt, in what place this Demiurgus is to be arranged, requires greater Consideration.

But from what has been said, it is evident in what order of Gods it’ is necessary to investigate him; from which hhewise, it is manifest after what manner it 18 dificult to find him, and when found to speak of him to all men. Its also evident how he is father and maker, and what his eNective power Is 5 and that he is not as sume say, the maler of inanimate natures, but the father of such as are animated. For he is both the maker! and father ofall things. Por he ts called the father of works, as he himself says in his speech (to the junior Gods). But heis maker and father, as the cause of union, essence, and hypostasis, and the

supplier of providential inspection in all things. Again, however, this must be considered respecting him, viz. according to Pry of the paradigms the artificer fabricated the world, whether according to that which subsists with invariable sameness, or that which Timaus having shown what the form is of the mundane system, that it Is generated, and the manner in which it is generated, viz. as sensible ; for he makes no mention whatever of time, because he has not yet constituted time 5 and having also shown what the demiurgic cause Is, viz. that it is effective and at the same time paternal, but this is intellectual, imparticipable and total :—he now passes to the third object of inquiry, what the nature is of the paradigm of the universe, whether generated, or etern: il?) For he perceived that every artificer either assumes the paradigm of the things which he fabricates, externally, or himself produces them from the paradigm in himself. Just as of human artificers, some ave able to imitate other things accurately ; but others possess themselves a power capable of fashioning admirable and useful works. Thus he who first made a ship formed in his imagination the paradigm of if. Farther still, this also must be observed, that every thing which makes in an orderly manner, has the scope and ineasure of that which is made. For if it has not, it will err in making, and will not know whether it has arrived at the end when it has.

For whence will it know that this is the end, since something may be deficient or redundant, and it may be necessary to take something away, orto add something? For on. this account bodies make irrationally and stupidly, because they have no measure, hor cause of the thing that is made. For it is necessary that the medicine should be heated to a certain degree ; but if art and the medical intellect are not present, defining the’ measure of energy to the fire, it will operate too abundantly and destroy the whole, though it was intended to contribute to the production of the remedy. For it has not the form of the thing produced. Every thing, therefore, which makes ought to have the reason of the thing that is made, if it intends to make in an orderly manner, Hence Plato perceiving this, at the same time that he admuts the eflective cause, introduces the paradigm of the universe ; just as Aristotle also by subverting the paradigm, co-subverts likewise the maker. — Plato therefore, taking it for granted that there is a paradigm, investigates through these things what the nature ofitis, and employing the before-mentioned definitions, discovers the object of his inquiry, through the three former hypotheses. But in what manner he makes the discovery, and through what kind of demon- “stration, we shall shortly after survey,

In the first place, however, this very thing must be shown by us, that the world was generated according toa certain paradigm. And in the next place, we must mvestigate what this paradigm is, and in what order of beings it subsists. — If indeed the fabrication of wholes is indefinite and without design, there is nota paradigmatic cause of the universe ; but if itis not lawful to conceive this to be the case, and the Demiurgus knows what he produces, and knowing thus produces the fabrication of the world, the causes of the things generated are contained in him, and it is necessary either that he should primarily possess these causes, or that they should be imparted to him by more ancient principles. But whichever of these we admit, there is a paradigmatic cause prior to the world. Farther still, since the Demiurgus is intellect, if he produces by his very being, 470 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 1}. he produces that which is most similar to himself. But this is to produce an image of himself. If, however, he produces from deliberation, this is entirely and in every respect unworthy of the demiurgic cause. And if some one should admit this to be the case, yet it will follow that the form of the demiurgic work pre-exists in him. For every one who deliberates and consults, antecedently assumes in himself the paradigm of that about which he deliberates.

“This therefore, may be demonstrated through many other arguments, that it is necessary the paradigm of the world should have an existence prior to the w orld, and especially when the demiurgic cause is pre-supposed. For it is necessary that the Demiurgus being intellectual, should either be ignorant of the order of what is fabricated, or that he should know it. But if he isignorant of this, how can he providentially attend to it?) And how can he give arrangement to the universe? If, therefore, he knows it, how is it possible he should not comprehend that which is generated by the intellection of it, according to one cause?

In the next place, it must be considered what this paradigm is, and in what order of beings itranks. For there is a difference of opinion respecting this among the more ancient interpreters. Thus according to the divine lamblichus, that which is being itself, and which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, is the paradigm of the universe. For he admits that ¢he one is beyond the paradigm, but shows that what is being itself concurs with it, and denominates each that which is comprehended by intelligence. But the philosopher Porphyry supposes, as we have before observed, that imparticipable soul is the Demiurgus, but that intellect is the paradigm, thus beholding in subordinate, natures which exist in more ancient and venerable orders. For Plato having said that the Demiurgus is intellect, denominates the paradigm intelligible. But this interpreter assuming soul for the Demiurgus, calls the paradigm intellect. In the third place, the admirable Theodorus dividing the demiurgic triad, and perceiving that in each monad of it there 1s a first, middle and last, calls the last’ in each animal itself, and thus says that intellect looks to animal itself; for according to him, intellect is proximately suspended from essential animal. Hence, either the essential Demiurgus does not fabricate looking to animal itself, or the paradigmatic causes are not many, or not every Demuurgus effects his proper production according to a certain paradigm, lest the maker should make looking to things posterior to himself, and thus should ignorantly sustain the passion of a partial soul,

* For ἕκαστον here, it is necessary to read ἐσχατον. Our preceptor, however, according to his divine intellectual conceptions, has thought fit to give this subject an appropriate examination. For of the ancients, some have made the Demiurgus himsclf to possess the paradigms of wholes, as Plotinus ; others, not the Demiurgus, but have asserted that the paradigm is prior to him, as Porphyry ; and others, as Longinus, that it is posterior to him, whom our preceptor asks, whether the Demiurgus is immediately posterior to the one, or there are also other intelligible orders, between the Demiurgus and the one. For if the Demiurgus subsists immediately after the one, it is absurd that all the multitude of intelligibles should be immediately posterior to that which is without multitude. For through numbers proximate to the one, the progression is to the whole of number, and the whole of multitude. But if there are other orders between the one and the Demiurgus, it must be investigated whether the paradigm of the universe is in the Demiurgus primarily, or posterior to, or prior to him. For if itis primarily in him, we must admit that he contains every intelligible multitude. Lor the paradigm is the most beautiful of intelligibles, so that again he will be intelligible, and not what we a little before demonstrated him to be, intellectual, though the paradigm has four ideas alone, but the Demiurgus has those which are more partial than these, viz.

the ideas of the sun and moon, and each of the natures that have a perpetual subsistence. But if the paradigm is posterior to him, he will be converted to that which is less excellent, and less honorable, which it is not lawful to admit of any divine nature. So that the paradigm is prior to the Demiurgus. If, however, it is prior to the Demiurgus, whether is it seen by him, or not seen by him? To say, therefore, that it is not seen by him, does not accord with Plato and the nature of things. For it is absurd that our soul should see it, and speak about it, but that it should not be seen by intellect, and by a total intellect. But if the Demiurgus sees the intelligible, whether being converted tv himself does he see it, or does he alone perceive it external to himself? If, however, he alone sees it external to himself, he sees the image of being, and possesses sense instead of intelligence. But if converted to himself, the object of his intellectual perception will be in himself. So that the paradigm is prior to, and in the Demiurgus; intelligibly indeed prior to him, but intellectually in him,

The words of Plato also appear at one time to make the paradigm different from, and at another the same with the Demiurgus. For when he says, “ Such and so many ideas therefore, as intellect saw in that which is animal itself, so many he conceived by a dianoetic energy this universe also should possess,” he asserts that 272 PROCLUS ON THE [poox a. the Demiurgus, as being different from the paradigm, is extended to animal itself. And again, when he says, ‘ Let us consider after the similitude of what animal the composing artificer constituted the world. Indeed, we must by no means think that he fushtoned it similar to such animals as subsist in the form of a part ; but we must admit that ut is the most similar of all things to that animal, of which other animals, both considered individually, and according to their genera, are nothing more than parts 7°—in these words also he separates him who constituted the universe from the paradigm. But when again he clearly says, "776 was good ; but in that which is good, envy can never be inherent about any thing whatever: being therefore void of this, he was willing that all things should be as much as possible similar to himself ;” here, the sameness of the Demiargus with the paradigm, appears to be manifest. So that in some places Plato says that the Demnurgus is the same, and in others, that he is differentfrom the paradigm, and very properly makes each of these assertions.

For the ideas, or four monads of ideas, prior to the fabrication of things subsist intelligibly ; but the order of forms proceeds into the Demiurgus; aud the whole number of ideas ts one of the monads which he contains. Orpheus also indicating these things says, that the intelligible God [Phanes] was absorbed by the Demiurgus of wholes. And Plato asserts that the Demiurgus looks to the paradigm, indicating through sight intellectual perception. According to the theolovist, however, the Demiurgus leaps as it were to the intelligible God, and as the fable says, absorbs him. For if it be requisite clearly to unfold the doctrine of our preceptor, the God who ts called Protogonus by Orpheus, and who is established at the end of intelligibles, is animal itself,’ with Plato. Hence it is eternal, and the most beautiful of intelligibles, and is in intelligibles that which Jupiter is in intellectuals. Each however is the boundary of these orders.*| And the former indeed, is the first of paradigmatic causes; but the latter is the most monadic of demiurgic causes. Hence Jupiter is united to the paradigm through Night as the medium, and being filled from thence, becomes an intelligible world, as in intellectuals.

Then of Protogonus the mighty strength Was seen; for in his belly he contain’d * For τῳ αὐτοθωψ here, read τὸ avrozwoy. * 1. @, Protogonus is the boundary of the intelligible, and Jupiter of the intellectual order, The whole ἡ of things, and mingled where ’twas fit, The force and powerful vigour of the God. Hence, with the universe great Jove contains, &c. Very properly, therefore, does Plato now say that the Demiurgus looked to the paradigm, in order that becoming all things through the intellectual perception of it, he may give subsistence to the sensible world. For the paradigm was the universe intelligibly, but the Demiurgus intellectually, and the world sensibly. Ilence also the theologist says: For in his sacred heart he these conceal’d, And into joyful light again reveal'’d. That the world therefore, was generated according to a paradigm, what this paradigm is, after what manner it is above, and how it is in, the demiurgic intellect, is manifest thronch what has been said. Some however doubt why Plato inquires whether the world was fabricated according to that which is generated, or according to that which is intelligible ; for there is not any other generated nature in order that the universe might be fabricated with relation to it. If therefore the inquiry had been concerning Socrates, or any other partial nature, the question, say they, would have been reasonable. But as the inquiry is concerning the universe, is it not impossible it should have been constituted with relation to that which is generated?

For what other generated nature is there besides the universe?) We may dissolve this doubt however, by recollecting what has been frequently said, that Plato calls soul generated, so far as it participates of time. But the inquiry here is, what is the paradizm of the universe, whether itis soul, or intellect, or the intelligible? For these are the only things that are eternal. And on this account he asks, whether the world was generated with relation to a generated or to an eternal nature. After this manner, as it has appeared to some, the doubt may be solved. May it not, however be possible to solve it, by another more perfect method, through which it will also be evident that the confused and disorderly nature prior to the

* In the original τῶν xarrwr Se Sepas, the word Seas or body obviously signifying whole. Tn this sense also, the word σώμα, which ts likewise body, is used by Aristotle in Lib. 2, Cap. 2. of his Meteors. For he there says, that the sea is the principle and body of all water, ἀρχὴν εἰναι καὶ σωμα του παντὸς vdaros ηδ᾽ ἐστι. This principle tov, he afterwards calls nOpocoperos oyxos, a collected bulk or mass. So that ὅεμας with Orpheus, and wa with Aristotle, have in these places the same meaning as odorms οὐ wholeness with the Platonists. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. . 2M 474 PROCLUS ON THE fecon τὸ world, must not be said, as Atticus and Plutarch thought it must, to be unbegotten? For if nothing was generated prior to the universe, it was ridiculous to inquire whether the world was generated with relation to perpetual being, or to that which is generated. This however, is now investigated. Prior to the world therefore, there was a certain generated nature. And since it was neither perpetual being, nor place ; for three things (as Plato says] were prior to the generation of the universe, viz. being, place, and generation; it is evident that the so-much celebrated confused and disorderly nature was a thing of this kind, Hence not the universe only, but that which was moved ina confused and disorderly manner, Was generated, as we have said, and had a prior subsistence.

The world therefore, possessing this confused nature as matter, but the intelligible pre-existing as more excellent, whether was the universe assimilated to the material nature which it contains, or to that which is essentially more divine? For being a medium between the two, it 15 necessarily assimilated to one of the extremes. For it is supposed that the Demiurgus assumed that disorderly nature, and perceives animal itself; so that Plato very properly inquires to which of these the Demiurgus assimilates the universe, whether to that which he assumes, orto that which he sees. To these things therefore, that which follows Is conformable ; viz. that the world being beautiful, it was assimilated to the intelligible, and not to that which was moved ina confused and disorderly manner. For that which is assimilated to this is deformed.

Some of the interpreters however say, that Plato does not inquire concerning the Demiurgus, according to which of the paradigms he made the world, but that he asks as with reference to us who know that there are twofold paradigms, with relation to which of these the universe was generated. And this assertion 15 after a certain manner reasonable. For we are those who look to both these paradigins, and not the Demiurgus. For it is not lawful for him to look to that which is less excellent; bat) we perceiving the natures Which are prior, and also those which are posterior to him, interrogate ourselves, in which of them it is. tit to place the paradigm. But others say that Plato adduces that which is generated, forthe sake of a perfect division, in order that he may not appear to prevent the object of investigation, whether the mundane paradigm js eternal. For supposing the paradigm to be venerated, he shows that a certain absurdity will fullow. Others again say, that since of sensibles, some are preternatural, but others according to nature ; and of these, some have the images of certain venerated natures, but others are the similitudes of them ;—hence Plato wishing

nook 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 275 to demonstrate that the world was generated with relation to an eternal paradigm, makes a subversion of the others, on account of the universe being most beautiful. For that which is most beautiful, is neither preternatural, nor is derived from a generated paradigmatic essence 3 since that which is derived from this is not most beautiful. But because, in short, the universe is beautiful, it is not preternatural. Such therefore, is the solution of the doubt. It is worth while however concisely to survey the accuracy of the words. For the words “ again,” and “ must be considered,” indicate the order of the problem ; viz. that it is in continuity with the things which precede it, and that this immediately follows those speculations. But the words, “ respecting him,” collect all the investizations, and refer them to the one theory about the world. For what is said about the Demiurgus and the paradigm, is assumed for the sake of the theory of the universe, The words, “ according to which of the paradigms,” separate as extremes, and as different from each other, the intelligible, and that which is generated ; the former existing among the first, but the latter among the last of beings. But the word artificer exhibits the production of form by its cause, and demiurgic art proceeding into the world. For as the theologist says, the first manual artificers gave to Jupiter the demiurgic powers of all the mundane production. And,

Who thunder, and the lightning formed for Jove. Vulcan and Pallas the first artists, taught Jove all the dadal arts, the world contains. Plato therefore following what the theologist here asserts, continually uses the words τέχτὴνάμενος and erexryvara, Which signify fabricative energy, when speaking of the demiurgic production, But the words, “ according to that which sub sists with invartable sameness,” indicate the eternal paradigm of the universe, which is the first of eternal natures, and is established at the end of the first intelligibles. And again, “ that which was generated” signities, that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For this is a composite, is much mingled, and alter-motive, or moved by another; all which are the clements of a generated nature. Tle does not therefore say that this disorderly nature is unbegotten and incorruptible, and that the world is generated and corruptible; but that the former of these was generated, as being alter-motive and co-mingled. For Plato clearly says, that prior to the generation of the universe there were these three things, place, generation, and being. And it is evident that by generation he means the confused and disorderly nature. Generation therefore is this; and the world is unbegotten according to temporal generation. Hence these things are more concordant with Plato, and with our unperverted cpinions about the universe.

Indeed, if this world is beautiful, and the Demiurgus of it 1s good, it is evident that he looked to an eternal paradigin; but if he is not good, which it is not lawful for any one to assert, he looked to that which was In the first place, it is requisite that we should understand the logical method of Plato, in order that we may see how demonstratively it proceeds. For from the hypotheses he had these twofold axioms, that what is generated according to an eternal paradigm is beautiful; but that what is generated according to a generated paradigin ts not beautiful. The converse however to these are, that what is beautiful was generated according to an eternal paradigm, but what is not beautiful was not generated according to an eternal paradigm. Por τὸ the opposite of that which precedes, the opposite of that which is consequent follows, then these reciprocate with cach other, and that which was proposed from the beginning is demonstrated, through a deduction to an impossibility. Por if that whieh is beautiful was generated according to a generated paradigin, but that which is so generated is not beautiful, through one of the axioms, then it will follow that what is not beautiful is beautiful, Why therefore, did not Plato immediately in the hypotheses assume these axioms, viz. that what is beautiful was generated according to an eternal paradigm, what is not beautiful was not so generated ;

but those to which these are the converse, though he intended to use the former, and not the latter in his demonstration? In answer to this, it must be said, that the latter which commence from causes, are more adapted to hypotheses, but the former which are derived from things caused, are more allied τὸ things posterior to hypotheses. For when he says, “ That which was generated according toaneternal paradigm ts beautiful,” he begins froin causes, but ends in that which is caused. But when vice versa, le says, Zhat is beautiful which was generated according toan eternal paradigm,” he makes the beautiful to be precedancous, but the cause consequent. He employs therefore, the former of these, in order that

ΣΝ με. «ὦ δ. κ᾿. ROOK 41} TIMEUS OF PLATO. 277 he may assume things adapted to principles and causes in the hypotheses, but he employs the latter, which is the converse of the former, in the demonstrations, selecting that whieh is appropriate to: the things demonstrated. Hence laying down these four axioms, he very properly enquires concerning the universe, Whether itis beautiful, or is not beautiful. Brat if indeed the world is beautiful, it was generated according to an eternal paradigin; bat if it is not beautiful, according to a generated paradigm. That the world however is beautiful, is evident from sense, ΠῚ was therefore generated according to an eternal paradigm. Since however beanty is imparted to the world from_ the paradigm, through the demiurgie cause as a medium, in the proposition which precedes, for the purpose of showing that the world is beautiful, he assumes that the Demiurgus is good. For every artificer, who is a good artist, has dominion over his proper matter, and superinduces the form which he wishes, on the subjects of his art. And this is accomplished in a much greater degree by the whole Demiurgus, who also gives subsistence to nature, the (universal) subject of things, as other assertions evince; and who produced i, thatit might co-operate‘ with him, in receiving the world and fabrication from him. Since however, he had added this in the second proposition, he passes over the opposite in silence. ΕῸΓ the defamation of the world is atrocious. since it is most beautiful, and a blessed God, but the defamation of the Demiurgus is still more so. Hence Plato employs Themis* as a guard to what he says, who collects the Gods themselves to the Demiurzus, and does not sufler them to be divulsed from the goodness of the father. And he does this, in order that through Themis, he may not ascribe any

thing disorderly or defamatory to the Demiurgus. The propositions therefore, being such, and receiving their beginning from the dividing art, let us see what “It is however, manifest to every one, that he looked to an eternal paradigm; for the world indeed is the most beautitul of generated natures, and the Demiurgus is the best of causes. But being thus gene- ‘rated, it is fabricated according to that which may be apprehended by reason and intelligence, and which subsists invariably the same.” * Instead of aepyos here, it is requisite to read ovrepyos. ? For Plato uses the word Oeyss, or ἐσμ μέ, in this place. 278 PROCLUS ON THE [noo τι. Through what is here said, in the first place, he antecedently assumes the conclusion, as he is accustomed to do, deriving the principles of his demonstrations from intellect. Inthe next place, he introduces the recollection of the assumption, and afterwards adds the rest... For the words, “ lt is however manifest to every one, that he looked to an eternal paradigm,” are the conclusion. But the words, “ For the world indeed is the most beautiful of generated natures, and the Demiurgus is the best of causes,” are a narration of the assumption, as the causal conjunction μὲν indeed manifests. And the rest is the conclusion of all that is said. Such therefore is the logical arrangement of the words. But again, betaking ourselves to the theory of the tings, let us in the first place see through what cause he transfers the word dcautiful to the word most beautiful, and good to the best. In the next place, let us survey how these things are true, and what kind of order they have with reference to each other.

That a beautiful fabrication therefore, was fabricated according to an eternal paradigm 15 evident, and was before asserted. For whence could it obtain the beautiful, except from the imitation of this paradigm? If however, this is most beautiful, the fabrication was not simply made according to an eternal paradigm, but if it be requisite to say so, it was assimilated to the most eternal of eternal natures. For every image which more clearly participates of form, is the Image of a purer paradigm, And as of the statues produced by the telestic art, some partaking of the presence of a divine nature more obscurely, enjoy the second and third powers of the divinity, but others participating of it more clearly, partake also of the first and highest powers of the God ;—after the same manner likewise, the God who gives perfection to the world, has rendered it most beautiful, as an image of the first of eternal natures. For that which is most beautifal is derived to the world from thence, and is extended to a similitude towards it, through its own beauty. Again therefore, if the demiursic cause is good, he looked to that which is eternal, and not to that which is generated ; lest by looking to whatis less excctlent, which it is not lawful to assert, he should fall off from goodness. [f, however, this be the case, not only a good cause, but thre best among causes, looked to the most eternal of paradigms. For by how much the perceiver is more divine, hy so much the more elevated is the object: of perception. For the same thing will not be surveyed by the better and the less excellent nature, Plato therefore, indicating these things, and through these latently assisting the position that the para-

* Instead of ro Anyor here, it is necessary to read ro λοιπὸν. digm of the universe does not rank among the multitude of eternal natures, but is the most eternal of all of them, and primarily eternal, calls the world indeed most beautiful, but the Demiurzus most excellent. For that which is most beautiful was generated according to the most divine paradigm, and that which is most excellent necessanly looks to that which is supreme. For if that which is most beautiful was not derived trom the first paradigm, this first paradigm will either be the paradigm of nothing, or of something less excellent. But it is not lawful for superior natures to make that which is less excellent in secondary natures, And unless that which is best looked to that which is first [either it will not make that which is most beautiful'] or not looking to that which is first it will make it. How likewise, will that which is the first paradigm, rank as a paradigm, unless* that which is best intellectually perceives it?) And how can that which 15 intelligible to a less excellent nature, be incoinprehensible through transcendency by that which is more excellent? Hence it is necessary that what is most beautiful shculd have been generated according to that whichis most divine, and that what is most excellent should look to that which is most eternal. Farther still, it isnecessary that what is most beautiful should be fabricated by that which is best.

For of what is that which is best the cause, unless of that whichis the most beautiful of generated natures? For if it is not the cause of the most beautiful effect, it is the cause of something less excellent. If, therefore, that which is best is the cause of that which is less excellent, that which is not best will be entirely the cause of that which is most beautiful, and thus the order of things will be radically subverted. It must be admitted therefore, that these three things are, as it is said, demonstrated by geometrical necessities ; and through these we are reminded after what manner names are assumed by Plato. Porphyry however adds, that if the Demiurgus is most excellent, it follows that he looks to an eternal nature, or? that he will not fabricate what is beautiful. And in the next place,* it is necessary that he who fabricates What is [truly] beautiful, should look to that.which is eternal, or’ he will not make what is beautiful as the best of fabricators, but he will make it casually. Hence also, Plato asserts that the fabricators of mortal natures are damons. And ifindeed, they are simply most excellent, nothing will prevent the artificers and framers of mortal natures from being likewise most excellent, and on this

* The words ἢ ov ποίει ro καλλιστον, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted. Ὁ Instead of ἡ in this place, it is requisite to read εἰ yn. 3 Instead of ec here, read ἡ. 2. For ecre read era, 5" The same emendation is also requisite here as above. 280 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK tr. account the fabricators of beautiful images. Such therefore are the observations. of Porphyry. We may easily however learn, that it is rightly said the world is most beautiful, and the Demiurgus the best of causes. In the first place, indeed, the beauty of the heavens, the order of the periods, the measures of the seasons, the harmony of the elements, and the analogy which pervades through all things, demonstrate to those who are not entirely blind, that the universe is most beautiful. [ἢ the next place, does not the order of the invisible powers it contains, according to which the parts of the world are connected, and the gift of the intellectual essence, evince that it is the most beautiful of generated natures? For there are in it the harmonious choir of souls, the participation of intellect, the supply ofa divine life, the progression ἡ of ineffable deity, and the number of henads or unities, from which the whole becomes full of beauty. Since also, the fpartial] soul which is assimilated to the universe, becoming elegantly adorned, exhibits mn herself an admirable beauty, how is it possible that the universe should) not possess beauty in a still greater degree? hence theolosists conjoining Venus with Vulcan, say that he thus fabricated the universe, And again, from VWulean and Agata, they generate Eucleia and Eusthenia, Eupheme and Philophrosune, who render the corporeal-formed nature decorated with beauty. Neither therefore, do those who revile the Demiurgus, dare to say that the world Is not most beautiful, but on the contrary they say that through the beauty of it souls are allured and ensnared.

But how are we to adnit that the Demiurgus is the best of eternal natures? For some think that we must understand by this word dest, the best of the causes of generated natures, in order that he may not be absolutely the best of causes. For this would be false, but that he may be the best of the causes of things that are generated ; since the natures that are above him are not the causes of these. I however, should be ashamed of myself, if L were in want of such an artifice as this, forgetting what was a little before said, in which the Demiurgus now delivered to us by Plato, was shown to be the fountain and monad of every demiurzic order. On account of this therefore, he is the best of causes, because he is allotted the first order among the demiurgi of the universe ; Plato here, directly emulating Homer, who calls the Demiurgus the father of wholes, and the supreme of rulers; and he thus denomiaates him though he mentions the Geds * Itappears to me that the word xpocéus must be supplied in this place. prior to him, as far as to the Goddess Night. Because therefore Jupiter is the most ancient and venerable of demiurgi, he is celebrated by Tomer as the supreme of rulers, but by Plato as the best’ of causes. Others however by no means dare to aceuse the Demiurgus, but blame this universe, and pervert. thie assertions of the ancients, who eall ita eavern and aden. And others, as Hera-° clitus, say, Chat the Demiargus sported in fabricating the world,

To these objections however it is easy to reply. Por though the world is, as Plato says, most beautiful, and a blessed God, yet when compared with the intelligible, and the place which is there, it is deservedly called a cavern and a den. And it is especially so to partial souls who verge to bodies and matter. But with respect to the Demiurgus, though he is the best of causes, yet the whole of his providential energies about the recent fabrications, may be called sport, when compared with the energies which are exempt from sensibles. For these reasons therefore, the Demiurgus is thus celebrated in the present: words by Plato. Tt is requisite also to understand how the co-ordination of the most beautiful with the most excellent, is suspended from the first principles. For as in them beauty is suspended from (he good, and the beautifying cause, from the fountain of all cood, thus also here, the world is said to be most beautiful, but the Demiurgus most execient, and the most beautiful is suspended from that which is best. Inthe next place i is requisite to understand how what is said about the fabrication itself (of things] imitates this fabrication. For as the world itself was led from confusion to order, and a similitade to the intelligible, by fabrication, thas also the discussion of it first employed abhorrent: appellations, calling it generated and destructible, but now the most venerable names, denominating it the best of generated natures, the offspring of the most excellent father, and the image of the most divine paradigm. And shortly after, he reminds us of it hy the most sacred of names.

“ But again, these things [thus] subsisting, there is every necessity that the world should be the image of a certain thing.” To those who are more simple, what is here said may appear to be the same with what was before asserted. For some one who does not survey things accurately may ask what difference there is between saying, thatthe world was fabricat- * For αἴτιος here, itis necessary to read aproros. Tim. Plat. Vor. i. 2N 289 PROCLUS ON THE [ποὺκ 11. ed according toa paradigm, and that it is the image of a certain thing. In reality however, each of these is separated from the other. For since itis possible for an artificer to make conformably to a paradigin, but the thing fabricated may not become the image of the paradigm in consequence of not being vanquished by the fabricating cause; in order that vou may not fancy that this is alse the ease with the world, Plato has shown that the Demiargus indeed looked to a paradigm, and that being most excellent he looked to the most divine paradigm, trom what he said respeeting the universe being fabricated conformably to the itellt- gible, But that the universe also is vanquished by form, and traly paradigm, he manifests from what is now said. Por if the world is an image, the universe is assimilated to the intelligible, For that which is not dissimilar but similar and consentancous, is an image.

You have therefore, the sensible universe, the most beautiful of images, the intellectual universe, the best of causes, and the intelligible universe, the most divine of paradigms, Each of these also is every where. Por the sensible universe participates of intellect and being; the intellectual universe possesses sensibles uniformly, but itelligibles “secondarily 5 and the intelligible universe antecedently comprehends, primordially and umitedly, intellectuals and sensibles. Phe universe however, subsists appropriately in each order. And the sensible universe indeed, is placed before us as a fabrication; but the eternal is two-fold, the one beme as demiurgic, but the other as paradigmatic 3 though the paradigmatic is also in the demiurgic. Por the Demiurgus makes looking to himself; since every Intellect sees itself) and is the same with the intelligible it contains. And again the demiurgic is in the paradigmatic; since it makes that which is generated, Por it is not a paradigm like a form impressed in wax, nor as the Image of Socrates is the image of another Image; but the paradigmatic cause by its very being makes secondary natures similar to itself At the same time however, to fabricate paradigmatically, and τὸ be a paradigm demiurgically (16. fabricatively] differ, For the former is to energize essentially ; but the latter is to impart essence energetically, And the former is to perceive intellectually, intelligibly ; bat) the Latter is to be intelliwible intellectually. For (he peculiarity of he paradigm ww to make by is very being ; but of the Demiurgus, to make by cnergismg. Vor itis wot the same thing tumake by existing, and to hnow and energize through knowledges siice soul also produces life by evisting, but makes artificially through knowledge. And it

* For ovros here, read ovrws. * For ra αἰσθητὰ here, it is necessary to read ra sonra, nook 11} TIMAUS OF PLATO. 283 possesses indeed, the former essentially, but the latter according to energy. And Why is it requisite to lengthen these observations philosophically ? For the theologist lone before, celebrates the demiurgic cause in Phanes. 10)" there, ds he SAYS, the gre.t Bromius, or ali-sceing Jupiter, was, and antecedently existed y in order that he micht have as it were the fountains of the twofold fabrication of things. He also celebrates the paradigmatic eause in Jupiter, For again, he likewise is, as hosayvs, Metis the first ccnerator, and much-pleasing Love. He is also continually denominaied by him, Dionysius, aud Phanes, and Ericapwus. All the causes thereiore participate ofeach other, and are in each other; so that he who Says as the εν το Tamblehus, that the Deminrgus comprehends in himself the paradigm, and he who evinces, as the dlustrious Amehus, that the paradicm is the Demiurgus, a eertain respeet speak rightly, For the latter saw the demiurgic peculiarity pre-existing Inthe paradigm; for there the first Jupiter exists, and on this account he makes Phanes to be the Demiurgus ; but the former saw the paradigm in the Demiturcns, For Metis also was in the Demiurgus, being absorbed by him, And on this account he considered the paradigmatic to be the same with the deminraic eause. And thus much concerning these particulars,

We ought not however, to wonder if Plato calls the world an image. For though itis most beautiful, vet itis the image of intelligible beauty. Through this similitude also, aoexhibits such things as adorn! and beautify. generation, and receives as a whole the form of the paradigm. ‘Thus the philosopher calls the world the image of the intelligible, as being assimilated to its paradigm. The addition likewise of vecessity, shows that the similitade of the former to the latter is admirable and metlable. Afterwards also, le testifies this by a demonstration indubitable and firm. For it proceeds trom the hypotheses themselves, But in every thing, to begin from a principle according to nature, is the greatest of undertakings.” Some read what is here said by stopping at the word ravros, every thing, according to whom the words indicate, that it is the greatest of all things, to make that bezinning. of the discussion which is according to nature. But others, stopping at the word μέγιστον, ereaiest, conjoin the word rayrog with what follows; so that with them the colon signifies that it is the greatest undertaking, to begin * For exirpowevorra here, I rcad eximpexovra, 504 PROCLUS ON THE [nook τι.

the discussion of tho universe, from a principle which is according to nature, Others again say that these words are introduced for the sake of the things previously assumed, these being rightly concluded through) the hypotheses which were necessary. But according to others, they are introduced for the sake of what is directly after asserted, it being requisite, if we intend to make a proper beginning, to define previously what hind of discourses ought to be adopted concerning sensibles, And others say, they are introduced for the sake of what will afterwards be delivered concerning the tinal cause, Por this is the greatest principle, and according to nature, which it is requisite especially to survey, and from which commencing it is fit to discuss what follows. But that previous to the disquisition of this, he informs us what the mode will be gf physical discussions. To me however, this axiom appears to be rightly asserted of all things. Vor it is universal, and is adapted to what has been before said, to what immediately follows, and to what will be again said. Or rather, it is not adapted to these alone, but to all fabrication. Por beginning from a principle according to nature as from a root, Plato delivers afterwards explanations of cause homologous to this principle. And science itself, from) proper hypotheses, collects appropriate conclusions. Science therefore follows the order of things ; but doctrinal disquisition follows science. And this is the greatest undertaking.