Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato

lence there is not a common genus of perpetual being, and that which is generated. For perpetual being precedes according to cause that whichis generated ; and the former is when the latter is not. But perpetual being not existing, which it is not lawful to suppose, ceneration also would vanish. How likewise, is there one genus of the first, and the last of things? For the division of genera into species, takes place in the middle psychical reasons {i. e. productive powers}. But things prior to soul, subsist in more excellent genera; and things posterior to soul, have their essence in co-ordinate natures. How therefore, can being itself and that which is generated, be arranged under one genus? What also will this genus be? For it is not being, lest that which is generated, and which never [truly] is, should be arranged in being. Nor will being itself be the oxe. Because every genus is divided by its proper diflerences, and antecedently assumes the differences, either in capacity, or in energy. But it is not lawful that she ove should have differences either in capacity, lest it should be more imperfect than secondary natures 3 or in energy, lest it should have multitude, But as it is in short demonstrated to be superior both to power and energy, it cannot in any way whatever have diflerences ; so that neither will there in short, be a division of the one.

What then shall we say?) Must it not be this, that Plato does not now make any division whatever, but that he proposes to detine separately what cach of these two, perpetual being, and that which is generated, is? For it appears to me that the word é:aszereov has the same signification with διακρινητεον. For since he discourses about the world, the Demiurgus, and the paradigm of the world, he wishes separately to define perpetual being, and separately that which is generated, in order that through the given definitions we may know where the world, where the Demiurgus, and where the paradigm are to be arranged 3 and that we may not confound the orders of things, but may separate them from each other, so far as they are severally adapted to be separated. He likewise docs the very same thing in the Philebus. For inquiring concerning intellect, pleasure and the mixed life, which is the best of these, he assumes the genera of them, viz, bound, infinity, and that which is mingled from bound and the infinite. For thus the order of each will become apparent, and he will manifest the peculiarity of them trom their genera, There however, hound and infinity beginning from the Gods, proceed throuzh all beings of whatever Kind they may be. Mor these also were in intelligibles according to the stable and generative cause of intelligibles. They were lkewise in the intellectual order according to the paternal and material principle of the intellectual Gods.

And they were in the supermundane order, according to the demiurgic monad and vivifie duad, and in the last place, according to effective and prolific powers, Here however, being and that which is generated, do not bevin from the Gods; for the unities of the Gods are superior to being, and prior tu these the one itself is exempt from all beings, because the first God is one,” but the other Gods are wniticy. Nor are being and that which is generated) things which are participated by the Gods, in the same manner as the unities which are posterior to the Gods, are said tobe and are participated by being. Nor do they extend as faras to the last ofthings, For neither is it possible to say that matter is perpetual being, since we are accustomed to call it non-being ; nor that which is generated, which is not able even to sufler being, lest perishing by so doing, it should entirely vanish. This therefore, will again be asserted by us. It is however, [evident]* that the division is not of one certain thing, and that the proposed theory has necessarily, prior to other things, the definition of these two-fold genera, in order that the discussion proceeding as if from geometrical hypotheses to the investigation of things consequent, may Giscover the nature of the universe, and the paternal and paradigmatic Catse ofit. For if the universe was generated, it was generated by a cause. ‘There is therefore a denuargic cause of the universe, [fthere isa Demiurgus, there is also a paradigm of the world, with reference to

which he who constituted the universe fabricated. And thus in a consequent ’ For ov here, itis obviously necessary to read er, * φανερὸν is omitted in the original. order the discussion about these things is introduced, and the physical theory beautifully terminates for us in theology. * What that is which is always being, but is without generation, and what that is which is generated indeed, [or consists in becoming to be] but is never [real] being.” According to some, all beings whatever, whether they subsist paradigmatically or iconically, are comprehended in this distinction ; but not all beings according to others, And the interpreters contradict each other respecting this, not a little. We however, cannot know which of these assertions it is fit to adopt, unless we examine each of them by itself, Let us then consider from the beginning, what power each of the words fof Plato] possesses in itself. In the first place, therefore, τὸ τι, or the what is definitive. For we are accustomed to give rs an antecedent arrangement in definitions. But it is not a genus, as the Platonic Severus thought it was, who says that ro τί is the genus of being and that which is generated; and that the all is signified by it. For thus that which is generated, and likewise perpetual being, will be all. It was also doubted by some that preceded us, why Plato did not demonstrate ἐλ αν there is such a thing as perpetual being, prior to the inquiry what it is.

For whence is the subsistence of perpetual being evident? And it is the law in demonstrative discussions, to consider if a thing is previous to the investigation, what itis. In answer to this doubt it may be said, that perhaps Timeus did not think this was requisite to his purpose; as the day before, it was shown by Socrates in what he said about the soul, that the soul is unbegotten and incorruptible, and that it philosephises through its alliance to real beings, with which it comes into contact.

And likewise, as it was shown by him, that what is perfectly being, and tmily the object of science, is one thing; that what is partly being, and partly nonbeing, is another, and on this account is of a doxastic nature; and that what in no respect is being, and is entirely unknown, is another. This was also granted to Timwus by Socrates, when he divides a line into four parts, the intelligible, the dianoetic, the sensible, and the conjectural; where likewise speaking about the good he says, that it reigns in the intelligible place, in the same manner as the sun in the visible region." And farther still, the introduction of prayer previous to the discussion, is a demonstration of the existence of being which always is. For if * See the latter end of the 6th book of the Republic, where all this is asserted, 192 PROCLUS ON THE [s0ox It. there are Gods, it is necessary that there should be truly existing being: for this is united to the Gods; but not that which is generated and which perishes, but is never ¢ruly being. Or rather prior to these things it may be said, that the existence of something which always is, is deposited in our common conceptions. For whence was that which is generated produced except from perpetual being? For if this also was generated, it must have been venerated from some other being. And this must either be perpetual being, or must likewise have been itself generated.

So that we must either proceed to infinity, or generation 1s In acircle, or perpetual being has a subsistence. But it isnot lawful to proceed to infinity. For from one principle which is te one, all things originate. Nor is generation in a circle, lest the same things should be both better and worse, causes and eiects. Hence it remains that (true) being always is. Why then, it may be said, is not generation from the one? Because, we reply, itis absurd that multitude should be entirely produced without being. Itis necessary therefore, that there should be truly existing being, which primarily proceeds from ¢he one, in order that the first principle may not be alone the cause of the last of things, but prior to these may be the cause of being, from which also generation proceeds. After all that has been said, however, the most true solution of the doubt 15, that Plato now assuming as an hypothesis that there is perpetual being, defines it. But after the discussion about the fabrication of the world, resuming this very thing, he demonstrates that perpetual being has a subsistence. Preserving however, what pertains to physiology, he proceeds from this hypothesis, and demonstrates such things as are consequent to it. For science itself also is from hypothesis, and requires that hypotheses should be assumed prior to its demonstrations. In what he says therefore about matter, he demonstrates not only that matter is, but also that being 15.

But a little after, from one of the hypotheses, i. e. from the third, demonstrating that there is a Demiurgus of the world, he obtains also from this that perpetual being subsists prior to that which is generated. And again from the fourth hypothesis he evinces, that the Demiurgus fabricated the universe, looking to an eternal paradigm. But in the place we have mentioned, be demonstrates that perpetual being is itself by itself prior to generated natures. And thus much for this particular.

With respect however, to. perpetual being itself, whether does it signify the whole intelligible world, or the Demiurgus, or the paradigm of the universe? for it is diflurently assumed by different interpreters. And if indeed, it is the whole intelligible world, whence does the intelligible breadth begin, and where does it μονρ γα ρα τον proceed? But if it is the paradigm, how comes it to pass that the Deminrgus 1. not perpetual being, if the paradigm is one thing, and the Demiurgus another? And if it is the Demiurgus, whence is it that the paradigm ts not a thing of this kind? That the paradigmatic cause, therefore, is ta be arranged in perpetual being, is clearly evident from Plato when he says, “ According to which of the paradigms did the artificer fabricate the world? Was it according to that which subsists with tnvariahle sameness, or according to that which was gencrated 2?” And he immediately decides by saying, “ Jfthe world indeed is beautiful, and the Demiurgus ws good, tt is evident that he looked to an eternal paradigm. But if the world is not beautiful, and the Demiurgus is not good, which ibis not lawfullo assert, then he looked to a generated paradigm.” If therefore itis not lawful to assert this, the paradigm of the universe is perpetual being. But that this is also true of the Demiurgus, is evident from this; that Plato calls the soul, which the Demiurgus constitutes, the first of generated natures, and delivers the generation of it.

The Demiurgus, however, Is prior to soul, so that he belongs to eternal beings. Hence also Plato says concerning him, “ Afler this manner therefore was there truly an eternal reasoning of the God.” And how is it possible that being a divine intellect he should not rank among eternal beings? Is therefore every intelligible world perpetual being ? The divine Tamblichus, however, strenuously contends on this subject, evineing that eternal being is superior both to the genera and the species of being; and establishes itat the summit of the intelligible essence, as that which primarily part: cipates of the one, But whatis written in the Parmenides concerning the one being Cor being characterized by ¢he one}, and also in the Sophista, bears testimony to these things. For there Plato arranges the one being prior to whole, and prior to the intelligible all; though the whole and the all are intelligible. Here, however, Plato clearly ealls the paradigm’ perpetual being, and a whole, and all-perfect. For he denominates it all-pertect animal ; and a whole, when he says, ‘ of which other animals are parts according to one, and according to genera.” So that if the paradigm isa whole and all-perfect, but that which is primarily being is above whole and all, the paradizm and that being will not be the same.

Will it not, therefore, be better to say, that there is indeed such an order of being, as that divine man (lamblichus] has delivered, and such as Plato elsewhere surveys; but that now Plato thus denominates every cternal world? Nor is this at all wonderful. For, at one time, the intelligible is asserted of every Pr. petual and invisible nature, as when itis said that the soul also is intelligible, as by Socrates in the Phxdo. But at another time it is asserted of the natures that 194 PROCLUS ON THE [BooKx 41, are more excellent than every psychical essence, as the division in the Republic manifests. And at another time, it is asserted of the first triads of being, as is evident from what ‘Timweus a little after says of them. After the same manner, therefore, being in the Sophista, indeed, manifests the order of the one being; but here it signifies the whole eternal world, — For it is evident that being which is primarily being, is the summit of the intelligible breadth, and the monad of all beings, Forevery where, that whieh is primarily betng in’ tts own series, has the highest order; since if it ranked as the second, it would not have the same form; for it would no longer be primarily that which itis. As therefore, virtue itself possesses the bighest phice in the series of the virtues, as the equal itself in equals, and animal itself in animals, thus also beiy itself which is primarily being, ix the summit of all beings, and frome at all beings procecd.!

But every intelligible and intellectual being, ἀπ whatever appears to exist, has * the appellation of being, yet being and perpetual being are not the same. For the one being is beyond eternity, Por eternity participates of being. Henee all such things as participate of eternity, have also a certain portion of being, but not all such things as participate of being, participate Likewise of eternity. The natures therefore that exist in time, participate also of being, so that what is primarily being is beyond the order of eternity. But perpetual berg is eternal, Tlenee the reasoning demonstrates: the very contrary, that every thing is rather to be assumed trom perpetual bene, than the one being. For this latter ty better than ἐπ creer, as subsisting between dhe one and eternity, and prior Co eternity being denominated one ΠΟΙ

Vf, therefore, it be requisite that I should say what appears to me to he the truth, Plato now precedancously asstanes every thing which is clernally being ; beginning, indeed, from the nature of animal itself, Pur dus ts pronwarily elcrnal ; but ending in partial intellects, But the one being, he perhaps omits, in consequence of its existing as the? monad of these, and as being ineffable, and conjoined to the one. Hence Plato will now speak in reality of every intelligible, that intelligible is mot assumed which is oceult, is) the highest, and does not depart from the one. He says, therefore, shortly after this, that animal itself is the inost beautiful of intelligibles, in consequence of the natures prior to this, bein: "An the orizinal curw δηπον καὶ τὸ aurcor, © πρωτωφεἐστιον, ὁ κυρνψη Των ΟΙΤῸΝ COTE GRA) των, καὶ ἀπ᾿ dure ᾿ ΠΡ πρυεισιν, After az’ αὐτὸν therefore, the words πάντα ra ovra muot be suy pled, * eyecis Wanting here in the original. Χχ = δ 4 30} μονα here, read μονα». nook 11.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. | 195 through excess of union, superior to a subsistence as objects of intellect. Unless he says that animal itselfis the most beautiful ofall the objects of intellect, both animal itself and the one being existing as objects of intellect also, the latter as being causally ever, eternity as being so according to Ayparvis, and animalitself or the eternal, as existing always, according to participation.

Hence, if these things are admitted, in that which always exists, eternity, animal itself, and the Demiurgus will be comprehended, and likewise the one being itself, which possesses the ocenltcause of eternity. So that it is evident from this, that perpetual being comprehends every nature prior to souls, whether it be intelligible, or intellec- | tual; beginning indeed trom being itself, but ending in a partial intellect, and that it does not alone comprehend, as Tamblichus says it does, the summit of all beings, such as the being is which is characterized by the one, or the one being, through which all beings are said to be beings, and to which the one itself alone, and the principles of being [bound and infinity] are superior. Zhe one, therefore, is better than that which is self-subsistent. For it is necessary that it should be exempt from all multitude. Perpetual being, however, 15. self-subsistent indeed, but possesses the power of being so through the one. But that which is posterior to it, such as is our nature, ts self-subsistent, and at the same time derives its subsistence from another producing cause. And the last of things proceed ' indeed into existence from amore excellent cause, but are not. self-subsistent. It is not however yet time for these observations.

But with respect to perpetual being, it must not be supposed, that it is partly being, and partly non-being ; for if it were, it would be a composite, and consisting of things of this kind, it would be dissimilarly a composite. Nor is it at one time being, and at another non-being ; for itis said to be advays being. But it is simply and eternally being, and is unmingled with every thing whatever it may be, thatis of a contrary nature, For it appears to me that the addition of the words, “ but not having generation,” indicates the unmingled and undefiled purity of perpetual being, according to which it is exempt from every hypostasis which is borne along in the images of being, and is changed by time. Not as some assert, that perpetual being is said, for the sake of perspicuity, to be without generation ; nor according to others, that Plato was willing to speak of it both affirmatively and negatively ; but that it is necessary perpetual being should be intellectually perceived subsisting by itself, remote from al! temporal mutation. For soul * For wapeco: in this place, it is requisite to read xpoecm.

198 PROCLUS ON THE [RmooK 11. participates of time, and the heavens are allotted a life which is evolved accoding to time; but the intelligible nature alone is, according to the whole of itself, eternal. Hence, some of the ancients call the intelligible breadth truly existing being; the psychical truly evisting and at the same time not truly evisting being ;* the sensible not truly existing being ; and matter, truly non-being. After what manner, however, they made this arrangement, we shall elsewhere investigate. But that the addition of “ sot having veneration,’ is for the sake of indicating the separate essence of perpetual being, is 1 think evident from what has been said. > Inthe next place, with respect to that which is generated, whether does 1 signify the whole world, or a material and perfectly mutable composition? For some of the ancients explain this in one way, and others in another. But we understand by it every corporeal formed nature, and not the soul of the universe 5 so faras this nature is of itself indeed unadorned, but is always or at a certain time, arranged by another. For the soul of the universe ts, in acertain respect, perpetual being. Much less is intelleet that which is generated: for this ts immediately perpetaal being. But body alone is that which is generated, and is truly never real being. For body is always in) want of the world-producing cause, and is always deriving from it the representation of existence.

Why then it may be said, did not Plato add, always, and that which is generated, in the same manner as dei, or at a certain time, in order that he might have whatts generated entirely opposed to perpetual being? May we not say that Plato devised this mode of expression, Jooking to the various nature of that which is) generated, and taking away from eternal being the existence ata certain time, and the perpetuity ofa generated nature? Lor the wholes of such a nature are generated always, but the parts ata certain time, Aud atter another manner of considermg the ΠῚ with respect to forms, seine are inseparable from matter, and are always generated from that whichis truly always ybut others are in time, and depart from matter. Lor corporicty, indecd, is aleays generated and its always about matter ; but the form of pure, or of air, enters tntoand departs from matter, becommg separated from it and perishing, through the domination of a contrary nature, Vout ifthe perpetuity which detams matter is always generated, it never therefore is ; and if the existence ata certain time is generated, it ts never being, νοῦν thing

* After ovrws pew ον καλευσιν τὸ γεητυν πλατοι, instead Of Cua οὐτῶν δε cy τὸ ἐυχίκον, it ts neces: sary to read ores καὶ μὰ cvs orrws or. however, which is generated, is either always generated, or at a certain time. Hence, every thing which is generated, is never {real} being. These things, therefore, having been said, let us, recurring to the discussion from the beginning, show whether perpetual being in this place is asserted of all. beings, or not ofall. For if, indeed, we admit that perpetual being indicates an eternal nature alone, having the eternal according to the whole of itself, it is not asserted of all bings. For neither the being prior to eternity, nor the order of eternity, nor again, such things as have indeed an eternal essence, but produce energies according to time, ean be arranged under this being. But if we assume every thing whatever that is eternal, and which always is, either according to the whole | of itself, or partially, then soul also ranks among eternal natures, and also that / Which contains in itselfthe causes ofall things, unically, as itis said, and universally. For the ease is as follows: one thing (i.e. being itself] is super-eternal ; (another thing is eternity 3") another is simply eternal, and another is in a certain respect eternal, With respect, however, to each of these perpetual beings, the first is as the power and fountain of the ever ;

the second, as that which is primarily always being, and the ever tse/f, and not according to participation ; but the third is always, as participating of the ecer, and as primarily wholly eternal; and the fourth, is as that which in a certain respect participates of a peculiarity of this hind, For each thing subsists triply, either according to cause, or according to hyparnis, or according to participation. And the one being, indeed, is being alone according to hyparxis, but is perpetual being according to cause. Eternity is perpetual being according to hyparxis, but: δοίη, according to participation. And the eternal is perpetual beng according to participation, but according to hyparxis isa certain other intelligible, or intelligible and intellectual, or intellectual fonly). And if the last of these, it is either total or partial; and if this, it is either supermundane or mundane, and if this, itis ether divine, or is posterior to the Gods, and is each of these either according to existence alone, or according to power and energy, and as far as to the perpetual being of things which are in a certain respect eternal,

Again therefore, with respect to that which is generated, if we assume the universal, we must assume generation all-variously changed τ but ifevery thing generated, in whatever way it may be, we shall find that the heavens also are gene. rated, so far as they partake of motion and mutation, and that soul is the first of generated natures, so far as it ives in time, and time is connascent with its ener- " The words ro δε aw», are wanting in the original, but must necessaiily be supplied. 198 PROCLUS ON THE (Book τι. gies. And thus ascending froin beneath, we shall end in soul as the first of things that are generated ; and descending from above, we shall again terminate our progression in soul, as the last of eternal natures. For though a certain person’ rightly says that the heavens always exist, yet their being is always generated by something else; but soul possesses its own essence from itself. Hence also, Socrates in the Phwdrus says, that it is unbegotten, and at the same time self moved, as being indeed the principle of all generation, but generating and vivifying itself. If therefore we say, that itis both unbegotten aud generated, eternal and not eternal, we shall speak rightly. Hence too the Athenian guest® thinks fitto call the soul indestructible, but not eternal, because it is in a certain respect oniy eternal, and not according to the whole of itself, in the same manner as truly existing being.

Por it is one thing to de always, and another to be generated always. And the heavens, indeed, are generated always ; for they do not possess being from themselves. Butsoul is always ; for it possesses being from itself. And every thing prior to soul is not venerated from a cause, butiy froma cause, Por generation Is alone in things which derive their subsistence from others. Through these things therefore it will be manifest after what manner there Is a comprehension of all beings in the before-tmmentioned portions of division, and after what manner all beings are not comprehended in thei. There is not a comprehension ofall beings, because that which is eternal only, and that which is generated only, are assumed ; one of which is prior to, but the other is posterior to soul, And there is a comprehension of all beings, because the extremes being assumed, It is possible from these to find the middle, which is at one and the same time both being and that'which is generated. «

That these distinctions, however, of that which always is, and of that which is generated, ,are necessarily made prior to all other axioms, it is easy to learn; by observing that this is the first of the problems which it is requisite to consider about the universe in the beginning, i.e. whether it always was, having no bexinning of generation, or whether it was generated, For if this is the first of the things to he investigated, then what that is which is generated, and what that is which is eternal, have very properly the first order in’ the axioms, Por the other axioms follow these, just as the remaining problems follow the problem respecting the geueration of the world. And if it be requisite that resuming the discussion about the hypotheses, 1 should more fully explain what appears to me on the pulyect, * i.e. Aristotle. > In the 10th book of the Laws. ποοκ 11.} TIMEUS OF PLATO. 199 Plato in the same manner as georetricians, employs definitions and hypotheses prior to demonstrations, through which he frames his demonstrations, and antecedently assumes the principles of the whole of physiology. For as the principles of music are different from the principles of medicine, and ina similar manner there are diferent principles of arithmetic and mechanics ; thus also there are certain principles of the whole of physiology, which Plato now delivers to us; [and these are as follow :] Zrulu existing being ts that which may be comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. That which is gencrated is to be apprehended by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. Every thing generated, is generated by a cause. That which does not derive its subststence from a cause, is not generated. That of which the paradigm is eternal being, ts necessarily beautiful. That, of which the paradigm is generated, is not beautiful. Let the universe be called heaven or the

world. Vor from these principles he produces all that follows. And it appears to me, that on this account he shows what perpetual being ts, and also whae that is which is generated, but does not show us that each of them is. For the geo- metrician informs us wat a point is, and what a line is, prior to his demonstra-‘ tions, but he by no means teaches us ¢hat each of these is. For how can he bea geometrician, if he discusses his own principles? After the same manner also, the physiologist says what perpetual being is, for the sake of the demonstrations he is about to make, but he by ne means shows (fat it is; for in so doing, he would go beyond physiology. But since, as we have before observed, Timeus does not resemble other physiologists, being a Pythagorean physiologist, and Plato exhibits in this dialogne the highest science, hence he afterwards very divinely proves ¢hat truly existing being is. For his present purpose, however, it is sufficient for him to admit (hat itis, preserving the boundaries of physiology. He appears also to investigate the definition of perpetual being and of that which is generated, in order that he may discover the causes which give completion to the universe, viz. form and matter: for that which is generated is in want of these. He assumes, however, the third hypothesis, in order that he may discover the producing cause; butthe fourth, that he may be able to infer that the universe was generated according to a paradigmatic’ cause; and the fifth, which is concerning the name of the universe, in order that he may investigate the participation of the good and the ineffable by the world, as will be shown in what follows.

It appears also to me, that Aristotle in his Physics, imitating Plato, assumes one * For παραξειγμα airioy here, read παραξειγματικον αἰτιον. 200 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ τι. - hypothesis, when he says, it is supposed by us with respect to things which have a natural subsistence, that either all or some of them are moved. For it is entirely necessary that there should be motion, if the discussion of the physical theory ts to proceed with success ; since nature is a principle of motion. But in his treatise On the Heavens, prior to every thing else, he assumes those hypotheses concerning which Plotinus says, that Aristotle will tind no ditiiculty in his discussion if his hypotheses about the fifth body are admitted, meaning these five 3 that the motion is simple of a simple body ; that a simple body has a certain simple motion according to nature ; that there are two simple motions ; that one motion is contrary to one ; and that the thing which has not a contrary, has not that which can corrupt it. From which hypotheses, he frames bis demonstrations concerning the fifth body. Aristotle, however, shows that the universe is unbegotten, from the hypotheses ς but Plato that it is generated. Whether therefore, they are discordant or not, will shortly atter be manitest to us. And this, indeed, will again be considered, Why, however, does Plato, who is accustomed to employ, when speaking of intelligibles, the terms αὐτὸ ἐπεί, and ὁπερ that which, now assume neither of these, but rather prefers the term ass aleays, as connascent with being.

Vor this also is attended with a doubt, through what cause he employs the third of these terms, 1. e. always, ax better adapted to signify the nature of truly existing being. In answer to this it may be said, that the term itself manifests the simplicity of mitellisibles, a subsistence according to hyparais, and an evistence which is pronary, which is asserted conformably to the peculiarity, according to which imtellizibles are primarily that which they are, and jill secondary natures with the participation of themselves. But the term that which ws, indicates purity, the unmingled, and the not being filled with a contrary nature. And the ever manifests the eternal, the immutable, and the invariable, according to hypostasis. Thus for instance, when we say the beaatiful ‘vse/f, and the just σεν, we survey beauty which is not so by the participation of the beautiful, and justice which is not so by the participation of the just; but that which is primarily beautiful, and that which is primarily just. But when we say that which is beautiful we mean that whieh is not mingled with deformity, nor contaminated by its contrary, such as is material beauty, which is situated in deformity, and is itself replete with its subject nature, And when we use the term cver or a/ways)we indicate beauty which is not at one _tme beautiful, and at another not, but which is eternally beautiful. So that the “first of these terms manifests the simplicity of intelligibles, and the sepplyimg all other things from themselves. For such is the beantifal ἠδ by which

BOOK 11.j TIM.£2ZUs OF PLATO. 201 all beautiful things are beautiful, and the equal itse//, by which alLequal things are equal, and in asimilar manner in other things ofthis kind. But the Second of these terms, indicates onlyness and purity, the unmingled and the undefiled. For the that which is this, i, e. itis something which is not various, and which does not attract to itself any thing of a foreign nature. And the erer manifests immutability, for the ever is this. Yet it does not simply indicate immutability, but a permanency in eternity. Fora ¢emporal ever is one thing, and an efernal ever, another ; the latter being every thing collectively and at once; but the former being co-extended with the whole continuity of time, and being infinite. And the latter subsisting in the now, but the former, in interval, the interval being unceasing, and always in generation, or becoming tobe. The term therefore itself, is derived to > beings from the paradigm. For that is the cause of simplicity to beings, and ot! imparting to other things that which it primarily possesses. But the term that)” which is, is derived from the one being. For that is primarily exempt from nonbeing, and privation ; because it is primarily being, and all things subsists in it occultly and indivisibly. And the term ever, is derived from eternity. For as the one being is the supplier of existence,‘ so eternity imparts perpetuity to intelligibles.

Tleuce, if Plato had been speaking about participants and things participated, and: for this purpose had required being, he would have inquired what being thself is. And αὐ he had been discussing things unmingled, and things that are mingled, he would have used the term that which is. But since he discourses about) generation and the unbezotten, and for this purpose requires these definitions, he very properly inquires what that ts which is always being. For this! distinguishes the eternal from that which is temporal, in the same manner as the > unbegotten distinguishes eternity. Hence also the nature of animal itself, which. is comprehensive ofall intelligible animals, is eternal; but time was generated together with heaven, as Plato says in the course of the dialogue.

Moreover, though perpetual being is said to proceed from a cause, yet it must - \ Se not beasserted that it is generated according toall causes, but that it is according to } them. For itis δὲ ο, that onaccount of which, and προς 0, that with relation to which, and υφ᾽ ov, that by which. For perpetual being is self-subsistent, and is not generated by itself, lest not existing at a certain time, it should be geuerated. For that which is generated, when it is becoming to be is not. Nor is it generated with relation to itself, lest it should be a composite. Nor on ac- ‘ Instead of ws yap πον εἰναι ro ev ov, it is necessary toread ws yap rov εἰναι κ. A. Tim. Plat. Voi. τὺ 209 PROCLUS ON THE [ποοκ i- count of itself, \est it should be imperfect. But that which is generated is suspended from another thing, and has its progression from other causes ; and such is every corporeal-formed nature. After what manner however, js that which is generated never being, concerning which Plato speaks clearly in the Sophista? Not that it is non-being,’ but that it is never ¢ru/y being. Now, however, it is said to be never at any time being, because being has a prior arrangement In an eternal nature; but that which is generated, is never that which always ts. Mf, therefore, existence, so far as it is being, is unreceptive of non-existence, itis evident: that what is generated, since it has the being which is init, of Whatever kind it may be, mingled with non-being, is never at any time being, soas to be genuinely being 5 and being which subsists by itself, since this pertains to real existence alone, which has notin a certain respect non-existence in conjunction with existence, at one

and the same time being and not being. “ The former of these, indeed, is comprehended by intelligence in cone junction with reason, since it always subsists with invariable sameness, But the latter is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense, since it is generated and corrupted, and never truly is.” “#9? To theseit happens, that they err in tiany otherrespects, and that they coimprehend in the definitions the things defined. Por what perpetual being is, which the first definition assumes is explained, and is said to be that which always subsists with Invariable sameness; and this the second definition assumes, saying it is that which is generated and corrupted, but never truly is. This, however, ix to accuse both themselves and Plato of unskilfulness in) dialectic. But others dividing the sentence, show that imeach of the colons there are definition, and the thing defined. For in’ the former colon, the words, “ ¢hat which is (0))}}- prehended by intelligence in conjunction wth reason, are ἃ deimition ; but) the words, “ since it always subsists with invartable sameness,’ are the thine defined. And in the second colon, the words ‘is perceived by opanion in conjunction with irrational sense,” are given as adetinition; but the remaiming part ofthe sentence, is the thing defined. To these men it will be found our preceptor vas well replied. For by a little transposition of the words, the whole will be immediately apparent as follows: That which aleays subsists with. invariable sanieness, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason: but that which is generated and cor-

Me Porcuy ore τὸ μὲν ον ἐστιν, i this place, itis requisite to read οὐχ ore τὸ μὴ ov ἐστιν. The beginning of this commentary, ts unfortunately wanting. Book 11} TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 203 rupted, and never truly is, is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense. For these things are consequent to what was before said, “what is that which ts always being but is without generation,” and “ what is that which is generated, but is never [real] being 3” that which always subsists with invariable SAMENCSS, signifying the same thing as, that which is without generation ; and that which is gencrated, but is never (reall, being, having the same signification as, that which never truly is, though they are more obscurely announced. And through the addition of ¢ru/y Plato indieates that so far indeed as it is generated, it is not; but that so far as it brings with it an image of being, so far it is not generated. For in the definitions, he renders the things defined more clear through the additions. Thus, one of the definitions says, “which is aleays being,” in order that by the term akeays we may not understand temporal perpetuity, but the elernal. For this is all at once, and subsists with invariable sameness. But temporal perpetuity, is co-extended with the infinity of time. Thus, too, the other definition has, “ that which is generated,” and together with it also says, “and is corrupted,” in order that we may not understand by generations simp/y progressions, which are also aseribed to the Gods who are beyond being, but progressions which are co-ordinate with destruction. The assigned definitions, therefore, are such as. follow: Perpetual being, is that which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, That which is gencrated is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense.

Por these detinitions, however, it is usual to accuse Plato, in the first place, indeed, that he does not assume genus, as the rules of definitions require. In the next place, that he does not manifest what the nature is of the things defined, but It is necessary, however, prior to this distinguishes them by our knowledge. But [in defence of Plato] habitude, to consider things themselves by themselves. we shall demonstrate the very contrary, viz. that those who are accustomed thus to doubt perfectly err. For what kind of genus has a place in being, which comprehends every intelligible essence? For if essence has no genus prior to itself, nor definition, since it is most generic, what can you say respecting being which is comprehensive of every essence, and of all powers and energics? Neither, a fore, is being the genus of eternal being: for if it was, it would not be simply | being, but a certain being. Nor is non-being the genus of eternal being lest we / should ignorantly make eternal non-being. For every where genera are predicated of species. Hence, there is not a gents of being. Besides, is not a definition derived from knowledge adapted to theory, and to the proposed definitions? For if,

as we said before, Plato wished to use these axioms and hypotheses in the demonstrations which he intended to make, it was necessary that they should be known and manifest to us. If, indeed, he had exhorted us to mvestigate the nature of things, itselfin itself, he would have ignorantly filled the whole of his doctrine definitions with obscurity. But as he wished to make known through definitions being and that which is gencrated, he produced the demonstri ions through things that are known, and clearly represents to us the peculiarity of them, in order that being excited and perfected, we may more manife stly survey what each of them is. Forsince every thing gnostte, is either the thing known itself, or perceives, or possesses the thing known ; for intellect, indeed, is the intelligible, but sense perceives what is sensible, and dianoia possesses in itself the dianoetic object ; aud as we are not naturally adapted to become the intelligible, but know itthrough the power im us which is conjoined with it; this being the case, we require this power, and through this the nature of being ts macs ntous. After this manner, therefore, we answer the doubts. ᾿

Itis requisite, however, to observe how Plato proposing to himself the problems, renders each of them manifest, both affirmatively and negatively. But viving an answer to each, in perpetual being, indeed, he assumes the affirmative alone, but in that which is generated, the negative, adding to italso, * ad which is destroyed.” He, also, explains the words, * but which is never being,” through the assumption of, “ never truly is.” For since being is characterized by existence alone, but that which is generated by non-existence, he assumes the one, alone defining it, and says, subsisting invariably the same; but he assumes the other together with hegation, yet not with negation alone, because definitions respect affirmations, and signify that which in each thing is inherent. Itis not, however, wonderful, if he not only says * which is generated,” ut also, “ and corrupted.” Vor as he adds to beimg, the words, “ subsisting with meariable sameness,” and not only says, if is akeays ; 50. likewise to that which ty venerated he adds, “ and corrupted.” For this so faras it is generated, is different from perpetual bemg; but so far as it is corrupted, it differs from that which is invariably the same, Por that which is generated, so far as it is generated and corrupted, is incapable of connecting itself; since if it were, it would also be able to produce itself. Assuming therefore each by itself, i.e. being and that which is generated, he assumes the former as that which is above generation, but the latter, ἀπ. that which is not indestructible. So that when the representation of being accedes to that which is generated, it is able after a certain manner to abide in a condition of always becoming to be.

voox tt] TIMAUS OF PLATO. 205 Let us however, consider each of the words by itself, through which he ccmposes the propositions ; and in the first place, let us see in how many ways intelligence subsists, and collect by a reasoning process the other progressions of it. The first intelligence therefore, is the intelligible, which passes into the same with the intelligible, and is not any thing different from it. This also is essential intelligence, and essence itself, because every thing in the intelligible subsists after this manner, viz. essentially and intelligibly. The second intelligence is that which®onjoins intellect with the intelligible, possessing a peculiarity which is connective and collective of the extremes, and existing as life and power, filling indeed intellect from the intelligible, but establishing it in the intelligible. The third is the®eonjoined intelligence in a divine intellect" itself, being the energy of intellect, through which it comprehends the intelligible it contains, and according to which it intellectually perceives, and is what itis. Por this intelligence is energy, and intelligence itself, but is not intelligible intelligence. Nor does it exist as power, but (as we have said), as energy, and intellectual intelligence. The Yntellige ‘nce of partial intellects has the fourth order. For each of these

and entirely contains in itself a certain conjoined intelligible and intelligence. Or rather each has all these partially, viz. intellect, intelligence, and the intelhetble, through which also it is conjoined to total intellects, intellectually perceives each of these, and likewise the whole intellizible world. The fitth : intelligence is that of the rational soul. For as the rational soul is called intellect, thus also the knowledge of it is intelligence, and transitive intelligence, and has time connascent with ᾿ self. But the sixth intelligence, if you are willing also to connumerate this, isphantastic knowledze, or the knowledge of the imagination, which by some is denominated intelligence; and the phantasy is called by them passive intellect, δ because it knows such things as it does know, inwardly, and accompamed with resemblances and figures. For itis common to all intelligence lo have the chjects of tts knowledge inward. For in this also intelligence diflers from. sense. In one order however, intelligence is the thing known itself. In another it ranks asx the second, but sees that which is first totally. In another it is partially the thing Known, but sees wholes also through that which is partial. In another it sces indeed wholes, but at the same time partially and not at once, And in

* Ta the original, τρίτη δε ἢ ev avty Geup συξυγος vonoes, But it is necessary alter θείῳ to supply oy. * For τοῦτον here, it is requisite to read ravrny. ὁ The phantasy is thus called by Aristotle. 206 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 1}. another, the vision is accompanied with passion. So many therefore, are the differences of intelligence. Now, however, phantastic intelligence must not be assumed ; since this is not naturally adapted to know truly existing being. For it is indefinite, because it knows the object of its perception accompanied with figure and morphe. But perpetual being is unfigured. And in short, no irrational knowledge is able to survey being itself, since neither is adapted to perceive that which is universal. Nor must the intelligence in the rational soul be assumed. For it does not possess the at-once-collected, and that which is co-ordinate with eternal natares ; but it proceeds according to time. Nor must we assume total intellections ; for these are exempt from our Knowledge. But Timwus co-arranges intelligence with reason. The intelligence, therefore, of a partial intellect, must now be assumed. Por it is in conjunction with this, that we some tine or other perceive real being. Por as sense is in the second duad betow the rationel soul, so intelligence is inthe duad above i. Por @ partial inteliect ts proximate’y established above our essence, elevaling and perfecting it, townich we are converted when purifed through philosophy, and when we conjoin our own mitellectual power with the intelltgence of this intellect.

But what this partial tntellees ts, and that it ty not as one to one rational soul, but is participated through souls which akeays energize according to tt, through which also partial sows sometimes partuctpate of intelectual light, we have elsewhere aistinctly and coptousyy discussed. Now, however, Uius nuch must be assumed, thatit is participated indeed by ad other proammate damontacal souls, but tllumimates ours, when we convert ourselves tott, and render the reason whichis inus intellectual, And as tn the Phadrus Plato calls thts the governor of the soul, and says that tt alone intel. lectually perceives real being, but that the soul percetves tt together with thas mtellect, when she is nourished by intellect and science ; thus also it must be satd that this mtelligence 1s prior to soul, and is truly that intelligence (mentioned by Plato) but that itis participated by soul when reason energizes intellectually, Hence Plato says in the following part of this dialogue, that intellect ts indeed in the Gods, but that a certain small genus [ο΄ πιο] participates of tt. And it seems that in what he says unfolding the Anowledge of perpetual being, he first calls it intelligence ; but that we may not apprehend it to be that alone, he adds to intelligence reason, distinguishing by a transitive energy the latter from the former, So that when reason intellectually perceives perpetual beans, as reason tndeed, tt energizes transitively, but as perceiving intellectually, with simplicity ; undcrstanding cach thing as simple at once, yet not all things at once, but passing from some to

nUOK 11 TIMAELS OF PLATO. | 207 others. It transitively however perceives intellectually cvery thing which it perceives ay one thing, and avy simple. After the definition of intelligence however, let us see what reason is, and how itis connascent with intelligence, In the Theatetus therefore, rsyos, reason, 18 said to havea three-fold subsistence ; for itis either enuneiative, ora discursive procession through the elements (of speech]; or that which exhibits the differences of each thing with respect to ethers. All these signitications however, are conversant with compositions and divisions, and are unadapted to the comprehension of eternal being. For the similar is naturally adapted to be apprehended by the sinilar, But eternal being is simple and indivisible, and is exempt from every thing which is contrary to these. Again, after another manner, one kind of reason is said to be doxastic, another scientific, and another intellectual, For since there are in us opinion, dianoia, and intellect; but 4 call intellect here, the summit of dianoia ; and since the whole of our essence is reason, in each of these reason must be diflvrently surveyed. Opinion however, is not naturally adapted to be united to the intelligence of intellect in energy + for on the contrary it is conjoined to irrational kKnowledze. Noris dianoia, so far as it proceeds into multitude and division, able to recur to intellect; but on the contrary through the Variciy of its discursive energies, it is separated from intellectual impartbility.

It remains, therefore, that the summit of the soul, and that in it which has most the form of ¢he one, is established in the intelligence of a partial intellect, being threweh alliance united to it. Hence this is the reason which intellectually perceives the intelligibles co-ordinate to our nature, and the energy of which’ Soerates in the Republic says is intelligence 3 just as dianoia ts the knowledge of Uungs which subsist between intellizibles and the objects of opinion. It, however, intelh-~ gence is the energy of this reason, it will be a certain intellect. Plato in the following Mart of this dialogue says, that ¢his reason in the same manner as science, ts mgencrated in the soul, when it is moved about the intelligible. But that science has amore various energy, apprehending some things through others, and intellect a more simple energy, intuitively surveying beings themselves. This highest therefore, and most impartthle portion of our nature, Piato now deneminales reason, as unfolding to us intelicct, and an intelligthb’e nature. For when the soul abandons phantasy and opinion, and various and indefinite knowledge, but recurs to its own impartibility, according to whieh it is rooted ina partial intellect, and having run back to this, conjoins the energy of itself with the intelligence of that intellect, then

* Instead of καὶ ov ὁ εν coreg Σωκράτης, γοησιν εἰπε τὴν ἐνέργειαν iv this place, itis uecessary to ἃ ᾿ ecad καὶ οὗ o ἐν πολιτείᾳ Lwaparns vonow εἰχε τὴν Evepyetay, 208 PROCLUS ON THE | [Book τ". it intellectually perceives eternal being together with it, its energy being both one, and twofold, and both sameness and separation being inherent in its intellections, For then the intelligence of the soul becomes more collected, and nearer to eternal things, in order that it may apprehend the intelligible together with intellect, and that the reason which is in us may like a less light, energize in conjunction with one that is greater. For our reason in conjunction with intelligence, sees the intelligible ; but the intelhgence of intellect always sees it, and always is; and \conjoins reason to if, When reason acquires the form of intellect. After what manner however, 15 truly existing being comprehended by a partial intellect, or by reason? For this is still more admirable. May we not say, that though the intelligible itself cannot be comprehended by intellect and reason, because itis superior to all comprehension, and comprehends all things exemptly, yet intellect possessing its own intelligible, 15 also on this aceourt said to compre-

“hend the whole fof an intelligible nature}. But reason through the intellect which is co-ordinate to itself, receiving the conceptions of real beings, is thus through these said to comprehend being. Perhaps also it signifies, that reason running round the intelligible, and energizing and being moved as about a centre, thus surveys it; intelligence indeed knowing it intransitively and impartibly, but vreason dancing as it were round the essence of it in a circle, and evolving the united hypostasis init of all things, In the next place, letus direct our attention to opinion, and consider what it is. That itis therefore the boundary of the whole rational life, and that it is conjoined to the summit of the irrational life, is frequently acknowledged. But we shall now unfold such things as are the peculiarities of the Platonic doctrine; and which are as follow: That the doxastic part comprehends the reasons ' [or productive principles] of sensibles; thatit this is also which knows the essences of them; and that it knows the ors, or that a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it. For since dianoia knows at one and the same time both the essences and the causes of sensibles, but sense knows neither of these; for itis clearly shown in the Thewtetus that sense does not know the essence of a thing, and that it is perfectly ignorant of the cause of the objects of its knowledge 5 it is necessary

that opinion being arranged between sense and diangia, should know the essences fon) > ’ * These reasons in a divine soul, subsist both gnostically and fabricatively, and inthe human soul also, taey thus subsist, when it revolves on high in conjunction with the Gods; but during tue union of the soul with this outward body, they subsist in it gnostically onls. of sensibles, through the reasons which it contains, but should be ignorant of the causes of them. For thus right opinion will differ from science in this, that it alone knows that a thing is, science being able to survey likewise the cause of it. But sense adheres to opinion, being also itself a medium between the instrument of sense and opinion. For the instrument of sense apprehends sensibles accompanied with passion, TTence also it is corrupted through the excess of sensibles. But opinion possesses knowledge undefiled with passion, Sense however participates in a certain respect of passion, but has also something gnostic, so far as it is established in the doxastic part, is laminated by it, and) partakes of the form of reason, since it isin itself irrational. In this, therefore, the series of gnostic powers is terminated, of which indecd intelligence is the leader, which is above reason, and is without transition. But reason has the second order which is the intelligence of our soul, transitively coming into contact with real beings. Opinion has the third order, being a knowledge of sensibles conformable to reason. And sense has the fourth order, being an irrational knowledge of sensibles. For dianoia, being a medium between intelligence and opinion, is gnostic of middle forms, which require a more obscure apprehension than that of intelligence, but a clearer pereeption than that of opinion; as Socrates said on the preceding day, when he defined the ditferent kinds of knowledge by the objects of knowledge.

It must be said, therefore, that opinion is according to reason, because it possesses gnostic reasons of the essences of things, but that it is otherwise irrational, as being ignorant of causes. For Socrates in the Banquet, speaking of it says, “since it is an irrational thing, how can it be science?” But it must be admitted that sense is entirely irrational. For in short, since each of the senses knows the passion produced about the animal by the object of sense, hence intelligence is an intransitive, but dianoia and reason a transitive knowledge ; opinion a knowledge in conjunction with reason but without the assignation of cause; sense an irrational Knowledge of passions; and the instrument of sense passion enly. Thus, for instance, when an apple is presented to us, the sight indeed knows that it is red from the passion about the eye, the smell that it is fragrant from the passion about the nostrils, the taste that it is sweet, and the touch that it is smooth. What then is it which says that the thing presented to us is an apple? For it is not any one of the partial senses; since each of these knows one certain thing

only about the apple, and not the whole of it; nor does even the common sense know this. For this alone distinguishes the differences of the passions; but it does not know that the thing which possesses an essence of such a kind is the Tim. Piat, Vou. I. 2D whole thing. Hence, it is evident that there is a certain power superior to the senses, which knowing the whole prior to the things which are as it were parts, and surveying the form of it, is impartibly connective of these many powers. This power, therefore, Plato calls opinion, and on this account, he denominates that which is sensible doxastic. ‘ Farther still, since the senses frequently announce various passions, and not such as things of this kind are in themselves, what is it in us which judges and says, that the sight is deceived when it asserts that the sun is but a foot in diameter, and that the taste which pronounces honey to be bitter, is the taste of those that are diseased?) For it is entirely evident that in these, and all such-lke particulars, the senses announce indeed their own passions, and are not perfectly deceived. For they say what the passion is ubout the instruments of sense, and itis athing of such a kind as they assert it to be; but that which says what the cause is of the passion, and forms a judgment of it, is something different from sense, Hence, there is acertain power of the soul superior to sense, which no longer knows sensibles through an instrument but through itself, and corrects the wrossness of sensible information, And this) power indeed which is reason as with reference to sense, is irrational as with reference to the knowledge of trily existing beings.

But sense is simply irrational, On this account, Plato in’ the Republic calling this power opinion, shows that it is a medium between hnowledge and ignorance: for it is indeed a rational knowledge, but it is mingled with irrationality, knowing sensibles in’ conjunction with sense, But sense is alone irrational, as ‘Timwus also denominates it; i the first place, because it is also inherent in irrational animals, and is characteristic of every irrational life; for by these things, what is said in the Theatetus distinguishes it from science. In the second place, because in contradistinction to all the parts of the irrational soul, it is disobedient to reason. For the irascible and epithymetic parts, are obedient to reason and its mandates, and receive from it erudition. But sense though it should hear reason ten thousand times asserting that the sun is greater than the earth, yet would) still see it to be a foot in diameter, and would not otherwise announce itto us. In the third place, because neither does it [accurately] know that which it knows. For it is not naturally adapted to see the essence of it. For it does not know what a white thing is, butit knows through passion that it is white. It likewise is not separated from the instrument of sense,’ and is therefore on this account irrational. For thus in the Georgias,

* Instead of διακέκριται δε ro acaOnrnpior in this place, it is necessary to read ov &caxexpiraa δὲ τὸν αισθητηριον. irrational knowledge is defined to be not scientific, but conjectural. [n the fourth place, sense is alone irrational, because it is the boundary ofthe whole series of knowledge, possesses an essence most remote from reason and intellect, pertains to externals, and eflects its apprehension of things through body. For all these particulars demonstrate its irrationality. Every thing generated therefore is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense; the latter announcing passions, but the former producing from itself the reasons of them, and knowing the essences of sensibles. And as reason when in contact with intelligence sees theintelligible, thus also opinion co-arranged with sense, knows that which is generated. For since the soul is of a middle essence it gives completion to a subsistence between intellect and irrationality. For by its summit it is present with intellect, but by its ultimate partit verges to sense. Hence also Tiinwus in the former conjunction, arranges intelligence prior to. reason, as being more excellent; but in the second he places opinion before sense. For there indeed, reason is posterior to intelligence, as being a less intellect; but) here opinion is prior to sense, as being rational sense. Opinion however, and reason circumscribe the whole breadth of the rational essence. But intellect is our king, and sense our messenger, says the great Plotinus. Reason indeed, togetuer with intellect, sees the intelligible;

bat by itselfit: surveys reasons or forms that have a middle subsistence, And opinion in conjunction with sense, sees that which is generated ; but by itself it contemplates all the forms it contains, concerning which we have elsewhere spoken, have shown how these forms subsist, how the place of them is the doxastic part of the soul, and that the intelligible ix apprehended by reason, but by opinion, the intelligible is seen as a doxastic object. For the object of its knowledge is external to, and not withinit, as the intelligible is within reason. Hence the object is not comprehended by it, but is called epinable aud not sensible; because opinion knows indeed the essences of things, but sense does not. [lence too, it receives the appellation of a clearer knowledge, which knows wha¢ a thing is, but not alone ¢hat it is, which latter we say is the employment of sense; and in’ consequence of this Timieus very pro - perly calls that which is generated the object of opinion. For this is Pythagoric ; since Parmenides also considered the discussion of sensibles, ἡ as a discussion according to opinion; sensibles being in their own nature perceptible by this

' Instead of exec και o ev Llappercder, την περι των αἰσθητων xpayparcwy in this place, it is necessary to read eres caco Παρμενίδης, την πέρι των αἰσθητων πραγματειαν. 412 PROCLUS ON TITE [βοοκ 11. power of the saul. Hence it is not proper to call that which is generated sensihie alone, because sense is not gnostic of any essence, nor the object of opinion, without the addition of sense. Ifere however, Aristotle particularly blames the second assertion of Timzus. For where is it [universally] true that what is perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense is generated and corrupted?) — For heaven is uabegotten and indestructible, though itis perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense. And Timiwus inthe course of this dialogue, inquires whether the whole heaven was venerated. At present, therefore, it must be said by us, that generation and corruption subsist according to analogy in the heavens, not only according to the motions and mutations of figures, but also because a celestial body is not preduced by itself, but alone subsists from another cause. [ence it is generated as having the cause of its subsistence suspended from another thing (different from itself. Since, however, it not only subsists from, but is connected by another, not being able to connect itself, and is corrupted according to its own proper reason, on this account it assumes generation co-ordinately with corruption. — Por truly existing and) eternal beings generate themselves, and are connected by themselves, whence also they are said to be in their own nature unbegotten and indestructible.

Tf, however, truly existing being is unbegotten, and therefore subsists from itself, that which does not subsist from itself will not) be truly unbeeotten. And if that which is truly indestructible is naturally adapted to connect itself, that which is not naturally adapted to connect itself will not be truly indestructible. Heaven, however, but I mean by heaven the corporeal-formed nature of it alone, is neither adapted to produce nor to connect itself, ΕῸΓ every thing of this kind which produces and connects itself, is impartible, Hence it is neither truly unbegotten ' nor truly indestructible, but so far as pertains to its corporeal nature, It is generated and made. Farther still, as Aristotle himself says, and clearly and generously demonstrates, no finite body possesses an infinite power. But the eclestial body is finite, and therefore does not possess an infinite power. The indestructible, however, so far as indestructible, possesses an infinite power. Hence body, so far as body, is not indestructible. So that from the reasoning of Aristotle 11 is demonstrated to be a thing of this kind. But after what manner the heaven is unbegotten and perpetual, will be manifest to us

* Instead of ove apa οντων γενητὸς ἐστιν in this place, it is obviously necessary to read ove apa orrws shortly after. Now, however, this alone is evident from what has been sald, that every thing corporeal, is of itself, or in its own nature generated and corrupted, but never truly is, as Plato also says in the Politicus. For he there observes “ that to subsist always invariably the same, alone pertains tothe most divine of all things. But the nature of body ts not of this order. That, however, which we denominate heaven or the world, possesses indeed many and blessed prerogatives from its generator ; but, as it partakes of body, it is impossible that it should be entirely free from mutation.” We have shown, therefore, how the heaven falls under the above-mentioned distinctions, Ifhowever, the damoniacal Aristotle, should again doubt respecting what is said of eternal being, not enduring to say that every thing which always is, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason; since the most divine of visible objects always * exist; we think it fit, that he should not confound the eternal, and that which subsists through the whole of time. For he also distin. cuishes eternity from time ; and attributes the former indeed to intellect, but the latter to heaven, and the motion of heaven. That always-existing being, therefore, the eternal, is a thing of such a kind as Timiwus defines it to be.

The most divine, however, of visible objects, are afier another manner perpetual, and not according to an eternal permanency. But they are produced in the whole of time from their causes, and the whole of their existence is in becoming to be. This also is said by Aristotle, that eternity is connascent with intelligibles, possessing and comprehending in itself infinite time ; and therefore the eternal is truly intelligible.” Jf, however, that which akcays is, signifies the eternal, why is it necessary to refer the nature of heaven to this perpetual being, and why should we not say that it is always generated, or becoming to be, as being co-extended with the perpetuity of time? So that we shall thus dissolve the objections from his arguments, which he urges against these definitions. Since, however, we have replied to this inquiry, we shall dismiss it; for it will be spoken of hereafter.

But, in short, the opinion of Plato concerning criteria, may from these things be assumed. Vor diflerent persons admitting a different criterion, some asserting that it is sense, as the Protagoreans, others opinion, as he who said, Opinion is in all things fram'd; * Itis necessary here, to supply the word ae. * Instead of ro awytov vonroy ovros ἐστιν in this place, it appears to me that we should read cae TO αἰωγίον apa vonToy οὕτως €or. 214 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 11. others that it,is reason, and others that it is intellect; Plato divides the essence of the criteria conformably to things themselves, attributing intellect to intelligibles, dianoia to dianoetic objects, opinion to doxastic objects, and sense to sencibles. You must not however fancy that the criteria are on this account divulsed according to him from each other. — For the soul is both one and amultitude. If, therefore, the soul which judgesis both one ἡ anda multitude, the judicial power will also be both uniform and multiform. Some one therefore may say, what is this one power? We reply, reason. For this, when it proceeds to the survey of intelligibles, uses both itself and intelligence ; not that intelhgence indeed is the instrument, and reason that which uses it, as the Platonic Severus thought, considering intelligence as inferior to reason, but that intelligence is the licht of reason, perfecting and elecating it, and Uluminating its gnostic power.

But when it forms a judgment of middle reasons, it alone uses dianoia and itself, and through this is converted to itself. When also it decides on objects of opinion, it moves opinion ; but in judging of objects of imagination, it excites the phantasy, and in judging of sensibles, sense. For when it considers the sensible essence of forms, such as is every sensible object, it uses opinion as the co-adjutor of its speculation, Vor in this the reasons of sensibles subsist. But when it directs its attention to the position or figure of a certain thing, as for instance, to the manner in which the earth 15 posited, which has in its summit a habitude to the heavens, it then excites the phantasy, in order that it may survey the object of its inquiry accompanied with interval and morphe, as it Is. And when it considers an eclipse, it employs sense as an adjutor in its observations. At one time also, it admits the judgments of the second powers ; but at another, it blames the errors which they frequently happen to commit on account of the instruments. Concerning the criteria therefore, thus much may sutlice for the present; for we have discussed these things more copiously in our Commentaries on the Thewtetus. From what has been said, however, the great accuracy of the before-mentioned definitions is evident.

But if you are willing, we will also survey the same thing according to another method. I say, therefore, that the mature which is primarily perpetual being, is that which is eternal according to all things, viz. according to essence, power, and energy. And that the nature which is simply generated, 1s that which receives }} " its essence, power and energy in time, For itis necessary that the ‘ It is requisite here to supply the word ἐν. > For ragwy here, read πάσαν. ROOK τι TIM.EUS OF PLATO, 215 former should) be wholly eternal, but the latter wholly temporal. And that the former should be at once every thing in a self-subsistent manner, but that the latter should have its hypostasis suspended elsewhere than from itself, and consisting Inan extension’ of existence. Since these, however, are the extremes, the media are, things which in a certain respect participate of a portion of being, and ina certain respect communicate with generation. But again, there are two natures which participate of neither of these, one in consequence of being superior, but the other through being inferior to them. For matter is neither being, nor that which is generated. For it is neither comprehended by intelligence, nor is sensible. And this also is true of the one, as Parmenides demonstrates of both these, of the latter in the first, and of the former in the fifth hypothesis, Perpetual being, therefore, is the whole of the intelligible, and the whole of the intellectual genus, every supermundane intellect, every intellect participated hy divine souls, and every intellect which is called partial, and is participated by angels, and diemons ;

and by partial souls, through angels and daemons as media. And as far as to this, perpetual being extends. For every intellect enerzizes eternally, and is measured in the whole of itself by eternity. But that which is generated, is every thing which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, and which in conception is surveyed prior to the production of the world ; likewise every thing which is) properly generated and corrupted, heaven, and all these sensible and visible natures. “Timius also detines that which is simply generated, and that which is simply perpetual being, to be these. But the intermediate natures are those which communicate with both these; and on each side of them are the natures which participate of neither of these. Hence Timeus proposes hoth of them affirmatively and negatively, as for instance, perpetual being, and without generation, and again, that which is generated, and is necer real being, in order that through the affirmations he may separate them from things which are the recipients of neither, but that through the negations they may be distinguished from things which ina certain respect participate of both.

As these, therefore, are the extremes, viz. every intelligible and intellectual essence, and every sensible essence, let us direct our attention to the intermediate nature. For Timeus calls both time and the soul generated. And it is evident that these, as not being sensible, are in a certain respect beings, and in a certain respect generated, but perfectly neither of these. Porphyry, therefore, rightly observes, that Plato now defines the extremes, viz. that which is primarily being, * For xapagrace here, read παρατασει. 216 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ as and that which is alone generated, and that he omits the media; such for instance as, that which is at one and the same time deing and a generated nature, or that which is both generated and being ; of which being and gencrated are adapted to the nature of souls, but vice versa that which is generated and being, are allied to the summit of generated natures. Such as this, however, is the nature of the universe which vivifies the universe. For this nature so far as itis divisible about bodies, ts venerated, but so far as itis entirely incorporeal, is unbegotten, But it is absurd to say that matter is both generated and being. For thus it: would be superior to generated sensible natures, since these are eenerated alone, but matter would also participate of being. Andif you are willing separately to assume that whichis alone perpetual being, and that which is alone venerated, by taking away from one of the definitions intellect, and from the other sense;

you will produce the definition of the medium. For this is known by reason and opinion, For reason knows both itself and opinion, and opinion knows itself an reason 3 the former indeed both in conjunction with cause; but the latter both, without cause. Vor in this reason and opinion differ from each other. Opinion also is known by reason, and reason by opinion, And the whole [rational] soul subsists through both these which are media. Thus too, by assuming the worse of the two upward terms, viz. reason, and making it to be spurious reason, and of the two downward terms sense, and making it to be insensible sense, you will then have the manner in which Plato thought matter may be known, viz. by spurious reason, and insensible sense. Assuming likewise analogously in each, that which is the better of the two, and mahing it to be spurious according to that which is more excellent, you will Lave the manner in which ¢he one is known, viz. by a spurious intellect, and spurious opinion. Henee it is not properly simple, and is not known from cause. It is known therefore by a spurious knowledge, because it is known in a superior manner according to each. For opinion does not know from cause, and the one is not known from cause, but from not having a cause. And intellect knows that which is simple; but a spurious intellect: knows the one, because it is superior to intellectual perception.

The superior therefore, here, is spurious as with reference to intellect, as de one’ also is more excellent than that which is simple, such as that is which is intelligible to truly existing intelleet, and to which intelleet ts allied and is not spurious. It perceives therefore, the one, by that in itself which is not intellect. But this is the ove in it, according to which also it is a God.

ee Ste F : For ἐκεῖνος liere, it is necessary to read eseau. For Proclus is speaking of the τὸ Ἂν». BOOK 11.} TIMAUs OF PLATO. 217 “ Ievery thing however, which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause. [or it is pertectly impossible that it should have generation without a cause.” Timeus, in a manner truly conformable to the geometric method, after the definitions assumes these axioms. For having said what being and what that which ts gencrated are, he adds these other common conceptions ; that the thing which is gencrated, is entirely generated by a cause; but that the thing which is not generated by a cause, cannot have generation. From these axioms also it is evident that ro διαιρετον, does not signify the dividing method, but that the hypotheses are to be defined. For the assertion that every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause, and that it is impossible for it to have generation without a cause, and also the following axiom, that what is generated according to an eternal paradigm is rendered beautiful, all these being axioms, are to be considered as belonging to the term διοριστέον, and not to be parts of division. Since however one of the present axioms is more clear, but the other is less known and clear, hence Timieus places the one as the middle term, but the other as the conclusion.

For the axiom, every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause, is the conclusion. But the axiom, it is entirely impossible that it should have generation without a cause, is the iniddle, in order that the syllogism may be categoric, and may be in the first figure, as follows: It is impossible for that which is generated to be generated without a cause. But this is necessarily generated by a certain cause. Every thing therefore which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause. For it is better to collect: what is said after this manner, as the divine Jamblichus also thinks we ought, than to make, as some other persons do, the syWogism to be hypothetical. But how is the middle more known than the conclusion? For it is evident that a thing must necessarily be, which it is impossible should not be, and that itis impossible a thing should not be, which necessarily is. Or ina certain respect each of these is the same. But frequently it is not known that a thing necessarily is, but that it is impossible for it not to be, is known. Thus for instance, the physician says [to his patient] it is necessary you should be nourished, and he will in a less degree persuade the sick man. But if he says, it is impossible to live without being nourished, this will now compel the paticnt [to take nutriment}. And again, death is necessary through a certain cause: for it is impossible not to die [i 6. to avoid death}, And, it is necessary to give money

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2£ that is owing to a tyrant: for itis impossible not to give it, And in a great variety of other instances, you may in asimilar manner see, that one of these is more ubscure, but the other more known, though both may appear to signify the saine thing. How, therefore, in the words before us, is the one clearer than the other? For what if in some things this should be true, but in others not? May we not say, that here also it is easy to learn how that which is generated, when it is separated from its cause, is powerless and imbecile? For not being able tu preserve itself, neither is it connected by itself. But as it derives from its cause alone its preseryation and connexion, if it is separated from its cause, itis evident that it becomes of itself powerless, and being dissipated, departs into non-entity, which also demonstrates that what is generated, catnot be venerated without a cause. lor if it is generated, it is generated by a certoin maker. Hence it is rightly said in the Philebus, that whatis generated ts made, but that which makes is the cause to /that which is made! (of its being made]. If, however, this be the case, itis either generated by itself, or by another. Butat’ ly itself, it passes into the same with perpetual being ; and thus that which is generated, and that which always is, will be the same, and a generated nature will rank among things that have an eternal subsistence.

But if it is not generated by itself, it is entirely generated by another, For it is necessary that what is generated, should be generated by something, if it is that which is generated, and not [real] being. Por not connecting itself, nor making itself in energy, it will suffer this from something else. And being itself by itself imbecile, it will derive power from another, Farther still, though the same thing should both act and suffer, so far indeed as it is that which suflers, it suflers from another, and so faras itis ctlective it operates on another, That also which is generated, so far as itis generated: sutlers, Bat if it sutlers, it suffers from something else: for itis not naturally adapted to generate itself. For it would be before itis generated, and would bein energy prior to subsisting in capacity. For itis necessary that what operates should operate in energy on that which is in capacity. Plato, therefore, conjoining that which is generated to cause, which he does in the conclusion, very properly uses the term from necessity. Kor firmness and stability accompanied by persuasion accede to that which is venerated, from its cause: just as he says inthe Politicus, that arenovated tmmor-

ality is imparted to the world from its father. But separating that which is Por τῷ yeyropery here, it is requisite to read ry ποιουμένῳ. anok wd TIMEUS OF PLATO. 219 renerated from its cause, which he does in the middle, he uses the term impossible. For that which is generated, surveyed by itself, is inefhicacious and imperfect. Moreover, in employing the word cause, he indicates the uniform power of {πθ΄ demiurgic principle; calling the demiurgic cause, not simply that which gives subsistence to another thing ; for Socrates says that the good is the cause of intellicibles, but it is not the demiurgic cause of them. For the demiurgic is attributed to veneration as Plato says in the Philebus, “ that the demiurgic refers to that which ts gencrated.” Hence, prior to the world, there are different causes of different things, but there are not demiurgic causes of generated natures. If therefore, there are many demiurgic causes, there is also one such cause [prior to the many]. For in short, if that which is generated is one, union must accede to it from its cause, and therefore itis much more necessary that its cause should be uniform and connective of multitude, in order that what is generated may become one conformably to the union pre-existing in its cause. And thus much concerning these particulars,

It is here, however, usual to enumerate all the causes, and the differences of causes according to Aristotle ; nor is this done immethodically. For it is requisite to say that every cause is either essential or accidental, fand this proximately or remotely,] and that these subsist in a two-fold respect, either simple or complex. All these, likewise, have a two-fold subsistence ; as they are either in capacity, or in energy. For thus the multitude of them may be surveyed. For on account of the essential and accidental, there are two modes of the explication of causes. But on account of these being attributed in a two-fold respect, either proximately or remotely, there are four modes, And again, on account of all these subsisting ina two-fold respect, either as simple or complicated with each other, there are eight modes, Through these also being two-fold, either in energy, or in capacity, there are sixteen modes, But on account of causes being predicated in a four-fold respect according to Aristotle, but according to Plato, causes subsisting in a threefold,’ and con-causes also, though in a different way, in a three-fold respect,—hence according to the former, there will be sixty-four modes of causes ; [but according to the latter there will be forty-eight modes of causes,] and the same number of con-causes. For thus the assumption will become perfectly methodical ; though that of Plato is usually omitted by the interpreters, who having enumerated causes

* These causes are, the producing, the paradigmatic, and the final ; and the con-causes are, maller, matcrial causes, and form. 220 PROCLUS ON ΤῊ [ποοκ 4t. according to Aristotle, enquire how it is said that every thing which is generated, is generated by acertain cause. We, however, omitting all this superfluous discussion, say that Timeus is here speaking about the eflective cause. Hence he uses the words, by a certain cause. For the term by which, is adapted to that which is effective. But he adds a@ certain cause. For the intellect of the universe, soul and nature, are said to be producing causes, and prior to these, other causes have this dignity, yet as many things are generated, and there are many causes, thoueh not of each particular, the word certain is very properly added. | For each particular is generated by a certain cause, and not by all causes. These things therefore are manifest. This axiom, however, is entirely derided by the Epicureans, who make the whole world, and the most divine of visible natures to be the work of chance. Bat by the Aristotelians, for the name alone itis thought worthy of reverence, For they say indeed, that what is generated, is) entirely generated by a certain cause, but they undesignedly make the cause to be causeless, when they enumerate chance with causes. Por chance is this very thing, (he causeless. But Plato alone, following the Pythagoreans, rightly says that every thing which ts generated, ix generated by a cause, and places over generated natures, Fate and God.

For though generated natures are many, and separated from cach other, and which also on this account are generated from many causes, producing in ἃ different manner, yet there is one cause collective and connective of the makers, in order that there may be nothing in vain, or adventitious in the universe. Jor it is not proper that beings should be governed badly. Let there, however, be one ruler, one cause ofall things, one providence, and one chain of beings ; let there be also together with the monad an appropriate multitude, many Kings, various causes, a multiform providence, and a different order; yet every where multitude has a co-arrangement about the monad, things various about that which is simple, things multiform about that which js uniform, and things different about that which is common, in order that a traly golden chain may have dominion over all things, and that all things may be constituted ina becoming manner, For if, as Aristotle says, all things are co-arranged with a view to form, itis necessary that there should be a cause of the co-ordination, and that nothing which is in vain should have a place in the universe, but that what appears to be in’ vain to a part, should be advantageous to che whole, These observations, however, have been

* These are the words of Anstotle, in the 12th book of his Metaphysics. HOOK ti] TIM.UEUS OF PLATO. ba | But what is said in the Philecbus appears to be more universal than this axiom, viz. that every thing which is mixed, subsists froma certain cause of the mixture. ‘For if things which are mingled, are not to be mingled casually, it is necessary there should be one cause collective of the separated natures, and imparting union to the mingled form. . This cause, however, is in one mixture God, in another intellect, in another soul, in another nature, and in another a certain art, imitating nature, Indeed, every thing which is generated, is mingled, but not every thing which is mingled is generated. For the first of beings, bound and infinity, subsist mingled with each other. From these, therefore, Plato says other things, and also bodies derive their subsistence, All that is said here therefore, is analogous to all that is said in the Philebus, viz. the Demiurgus to the one, form to bound, matter / to the infinite, and that which is generated to that which is mixed. But the latter: are more universal than the former; because the latter [viz. the one, bound, the infinite, and that whichis mixed,] are beheld in all things, but the former (viz. the Demiurgus, form, matter, and that which is generated} are seen in mundane natures only, For intellect is mixed, as being knowledge, and as possessing infinite power, and also soul, as being at one and the same time impartible and partible.

Hlenee, a certain cause, is the cause of that which is generated, just as that which is generated is a cer¢ain mixture, and not every mixture; by which also it is evident that the Demiurgus is subordinate to the one, since he produces indeed a mixture, but a mixture which is generated. For since the causes of the world are these, the final, the paradigmatic, the effective, the organic,’ the formal, and the material, Timzus indeed points out to us afterwards, from reason and demonstration, the final cause, but delivers the organic, the formal, and the material eause, from the former before-mentioned axioms. For if the universe is not [real] being, but that which is generated, itis a form participated by matter, and by | the orzanie, formal, and material causes is proximately moved, But Timeus unfolds to us the effective cause from what is now said. For if the universe is ~ generated, there is an effective cause of it. And he unfolds the paradigmatic cause in what will be said afterwards. For if the world is beautiful it was generated according to an eternal paradigm. So that through these axioms investigating for us the causes of the universe, he delivers all things in order. And the hypotheses afford him this utility,

“When therefore, an artificer looking to that which possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, and always employing’ a certain paradigm * There is an omission here, in the original, of ro οργανίκον. * For xporxoperos in this place, it isnecessary to read xporxpwperos. 222 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 11. of this kind, expresses in his work the idea and power of it, then it is necessary that the whole should be a beautiful effect; but when he looks to that which is generated, employing a generated paradigm, then his work will not be beautiful.” This also is in continuity with what has been said. For the paradigmatic is investigated after the effective cause; except that the before-mentioned axioms contribute to our discovering that there is a demiurgic cause of the universe, but the present axioms do not contribute to the discovery that there is a paradigmatic cause of the world, but to the knowledge of what kind of a paradigm it is, whether eternal or generated. For from there being an effective cause, it follows that there is also a paradigm, either pre-existing in the maker himself, or external to him, and either superior, or inferior to, or of the same rank with him, For universally, that which makes, being extended to a certain form, makes that which it wishes to insert in the thing made. This therefore follows. It is necessary however to find that which is next in order, viz.

whether the mundane paradiem is eternal, or generated. But to this the proposed axioms contribute: and the whole of what is said, will be truly consentaneous to itself. If the universe is generated, there is a Demiurgus of it; if thereis a Demiurgus of the universe, there is alsoa paradigm. And ifindeed that which is generated is beautiful, it was generated on account of aneternal paradigm. But if it was not, that whichis generated is not beautiful. So that acontinued syllogism such as the following ts produced, The world was generated. Every thing generated, has a demiurgic cause. Every thing having a demiurgic, has also a paradigmatic cause. The world, therefore, has both a demiurgic and paradigmatic cause. And as in the first axioms there were two hypotheses, what perpetual being is, and what that is which is generated, and two other in the second axioms, viz. every thing which Is generated has a cause, that which has not a cause, is not generated ; thus also in these, there are two common conceptions, that which is generated on account of an ‘atelligible paradigm is beautiful, that which is generated on account of a generated paradigm is not beautiful.

Each also of these is perfectly true. For he who makes on account of the intelligible, either similarly, or dissimilarly, imitates it. And if indeed similarly, he makes the imitation beautiful: for there, that which is primarily beautiful, subsists. Butifdissimilarly, he does not make on account of the intelligible: for on the contrary, he falls off from the similitude. And he who makes any thing on account nook 1] TIMAUS OF PLATO. pa as | of that which is generated, if he truly directs his attention to it, evidently does not make that which is beautiful. For this very thing is full of dissimilitude, and is not that which is primarily beautiful; whence that which is generated on account of it, is much more separated from beauty. Hence Phidias also, who made the [eclebrated] statue of Jupiter, would not have arrived at the conception of the Jupiter in ILomer, if he had looked at a generated resemblance of the God. And if he had been able to extend himself to the intellectual Jupiter, it is evident that he would have rendered his work still more beautiful. For from the paradigm indeed, beauty or the want of beauty accedes to the image; but from the maker, similitude or dissimilitude to the archetype is derived. With reference to both however, the image is said to be the image of the paradigm, but the work an eflect of the maker. On this account also Timeus, when he speaks of the paradigm, conjoins with itits image: for he says, “ Thus therefore we must speak concerning the paradigm and its image.” But when he speaks of the Demiurgus, he conjoins with hin his work : for he then says, “ Of whom [am the Demiurgus and father of works.”

Since however paradizms are triple; for there is either an eternal paradigm of an cternal thing, or an eternal paradigm of a generated thing, or a generated paγα ταν Of a generated thing ;—hence when there is an eternal paradigm of an eternal thing, that which is entirely eternal is the paradigm of that which is so in a certain respect, as intellect of soul. But when there is an eternal paradigm of a generated nature, this paradigm also is in a certain respect eternal, i.e. according to infinite time. And when there is an entirely generated paradigm of a generated nature, this falls off from eternity. For it is not possible that what is essentially generated, should be productive of eternal natares. ‘The former, therefore, participate froin their paradigms of beauty and order, as being imitations of a stable nature ; but the latter, as deriving their subsistence from things mutable and in motion, are not beautiful, and vet are not entirely deformed, but are alone manifested through the negation of beauty. Such things, therefore, as are the beautiful progeny of art, are not beautiful when compared with the beauty which accedes from an eternal paradigm to sensible paradigms." And perhaps on this account also, ‘Timwus does not say that what derives its subsistence according to a generated paradigm, is entirely deformed, but only that it is not beautiful. For that which is constituted according to artificial reason, does not subsist confonn-

* For ονύμασι here, it scems necessary to read, παραδειγμασι. a4 PROCLUS ON THE (Book 11. | ably to an eternal form, since there are not in intellect paradigms of things artificial. Hence, they are not simply beautiful, nor yet are they deformed, because in short, they derive their subsistence according to reason, [or that productive principle which ts in the mind, of the artist.) That these axioms therefure are true, we may through these observations be reminded. Some however doubt, how Plato assumes as a thing acknowledged, that there is a Demiurgus of the universe who looks to a paradigm: for there is not a De miurgus of it say they who directs his attention to that which is invariably the same. And many of the ancients indeed are the patrons of this assertion ; among whom are the Epicureans, who entirely deny the existence of that which is perfectly eternal. The Stoics admit that there is a Demiurgus, but assert that he is inseparable from matter. And the Peripateties grant indeed, that there is something which is separate from matter, yet do not allow that it is a producing, but that itis a final cause. Hence they also take away paradigms, and place over the whole of things an intellect void of multtude. Plato however and the Pythagoreans celebrate a separate and exempt Demiurgus of the universe, a producing cause of all things, and a providence that is attentive to the welfare of wholes;

and this with the greatest propriety; for if the world, as Aristotle says, aspires after intellect, and is moved towards it, whence does it derive this desire ? For since the world is not the first of things, it is necessary that it should possess this tendeney, from a cause which excites it to desire. For he also says that the appetible is motive of that which is appetitive. But if this is true, and the world by its very being and according to nature is appetitive of intellect, it is evident that the whole of its existence is from thence, whence also its being appetitive is derived. Whence likewise is the world, since it is finite, moved ad infinitum? For every body possesses, as he says, a finite power. Whence therefore does the universe derive this infinite power, since it is not from chance, as Epicurus says it is? In short, if intellect is the cause of a motion which ts infinite, uninterrupted, and one, there is something which is productive of the eternal. But if this be the case, what should hinder the world from being perp πα}, and deriving: its subsistence from a paternal cause; for as it receives an infinite: power of being moved, from the appetible, through which it is moved ad intinitum, thus also it will entirely receive from thence an infinitive power of existing, through the proposition which says, that in a finite body there is not at any time an infinite power. Ether therefore, it has not a power through which it is connected, and

HOOK τι} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 225 how is this possible? For every thing partible, has something impartible which connects it, as Aristotle himself somewhere says, and the universe also is an animal. He therefore says that God is an eternal animal, but every animal is connected by the life which is init. Or the universe has, indeed, a power which connects it, but this power is finite, This, however, is impossible: for if it is finite, it will fail. Or it possesses an infinite power. And again, it will not have this from itself, Something else, therefore, imparts to it the power of existing, and imparts not the whole at once. For it is not receptive of the whole at one time. Hlence it imparts this power by influx, and the influx is perpetual, and always as much as the world is able to receive. So that the world is always becoming to be, and never ts. But if intellect is the Demiurgus of the world, whether does it make that which it makes, by a reasoning process, or by its very being? If indeed by consulting, an absurdity follows. For there will be a mutation about it, and the passions of a partial soul. It will not therefore consult. And if it should consult, it must entirely antecedently assume in itself the work about which it consults ; Just as every one does who consults before he energizes, But if it makes by its very being, it makes that which is similar to itself And if it does this, it will contain the paradigms of the things that are generated.

And again, we must investizate, whether these paradigms subsist: primarily init, or not, and whence it derives this paradigmatic cause of wholes. Farther still, after what manner do we see artificers that are here produce? Ts it not by possessing the reasons cr productive principles of their effects? This, therefore, the damoniacal Aristotle will also grant. But if art imitates nature, it is necessary that natnre, much prior to art, should contain the reasons of the things which she generates. And if nature does this, we must inquire whence she is moved, and whence she is perfected? For she is irrational ; and thus ascending, we must say that the causes of all things are in intellect. In opposition to Aristotle, indeed, much has been said by many ; but our business, at present, is to explore what Plato says.

In the first place, therefore, let us investigate from what cause he introduces to cenerated natures the beautiful and the not beautiful, from the paradigm, and not from the producing cause. It might then have been said, that there are two-fold demiurgic causes, viz. the generated and the intelligible, the latter being effective of beautiful things, but the former of things that are not beautiful. But Plato does: not speak after this manner, but says that intelligible paradigms are the paradigms of beautifal eflects, hut generated paradigms, of such as are pot beau- Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2F 226 PROCLUS ON THE [poo 11. tiful. It may however be said, that what is here asserted contributes to erudition, exhorting us not to reject beautiful actions. Por if he had said that what is generated, is not effective of beauty, perhaps he might have rendered us more sluggish with respect to beautiful actions. But it will be better and more physical, it we say that it is possible for the same eflective cause to look to two-fold paradigms, and to make a certain thing beautiful, and acertain thing not beautiful, Por soul looking to intellect, generates truth and science, but looking to generation, she procreates imaginations, and passive appetites, But itis tipossible for the same paradigm to be the cause of beautiful and not beautifal effects. Very properly therefore is it asserted, that from this cause beauty and deformity accede to genes rated natures.

As the paradigm however of this universe is beautiful, itis evident that it is intelheible, and always subsists invariably the same; to Which also the Demiurgus looking, adorns the universe, If, theretore, itas the supplier of beauty, it has the highest order among eternal beings, and belongs to the first intelligibles, Hence the cause eflective of beauty is there, through which all things are beautiful, intellect, soul, and the nature of body. Again, therefore, the Demiurgus, indeed, ts the cause of form, but the paradigni of beauty, and the “οὐ of union, And the last of these. supplies all things at once, but the paradigm is the suppher of beauty and form, and the demiurgic cause, so far as it is Intellectual, of torm: and essence. Moreover, the demiurgie cause looking to the intelligible ts multiform. For the whole Demiurgus fabricates in one way ἡ looking toil. He, therefore, is united to it according to supreme transcendency. But the demiurgic triad fabricates in another way. And of this triad indeed, the first (i. οὐ Jupiter) fibricates uniformly 3 the second fi. e. Neptune} generatively, and the last (i.e. Pluto} convertively.

And in one way in the ruling, in another in the liberated and in another, in the mundane order. But after this triad, we must survey fabrication proceeding after | a different manner to the many demiursie Gods, who from these receive and are allotted paternal powers. After these, also, it proceeds In one way to demiurgie angels, but in another to demiurzic damons, the attendants of this order. farther still, we must likewise survey the undefiled forms of life, which contribute to the demiurgic series, and the genera of partial souls, which follow. the demiurgic choir, For the peculiarity and the mode of production, and of looking to the intelligible, extend diflerently to diflcrent natures, as far as to these, Itis also necessary to admire this in Plato, that he does not sity that what is generated on ' Por a\\q@ here, itis necessary to read adiwo. Book 11.} ΤΊΜΕῸΝΟΕΡΙΑΤΟ. v7 account of! an eternal paradigm is Jwautiful, but that what is generated by the Demiurgus who looks to it. is most beautiful; since that which is confused and disordered is generated, for it is visible and sensible. But every thing of this kind is and was generated, as he says further on, receiving from the intelligible certain vestiges of forms prior to fabrication, and is not most beautiful, though it is ina certain respect beautiful, as with reference to the formless nature of matter. Hence that which is generated on account of an eternal paradigm, such for instance as that disorderly and confused nature, is not simply beautifal, but that which was generated by the Demiurgus looking to it.

For from that confused nature the Demiurgus was absent; but the intelligible prior to the Demiurgus, uminated that disorderly essence. So far, however, as it was generated by the Demiurgus, it was also generated by the eternal paradigm, energizing on it through the Demiurgus as a medinm. And so far indeed as it was generated by the paradigm, it was invested with form, but so far as by the Demiurgus, it was arranged, For the Demiurgus is the cause of order ; but the paradigm is simply the cause of form to its participants.

Farther still, from the paradigm itself the difference of demiurgic powers may be assumed. For some of these powers, indecd, looking to the whole of intelligibles, produce according to the whole of them ; but others produce partially. And some, indeed, survey the whole of intelligibles through union 3. but others through intelligence. Some, again, do not produce according to the whole of the intelligible; but some are divided according to the four primary causes ; others proceed into a greater number; and others make the last forms the paradigms of their productions, Hence through these, there is one shepherd of men, but another of horses, as Plato says in the Politicus, and in a similar manner in’ other forms. As the demiurgie series therefore is various, and there are different paradizins of diferent things, some of which are more total, but others more partial, Timwus very properly does not say, that he who uses this intelligible paradigm, makes that which is generated to be beautiful, bnt he who uses a paradigm of this kind. In the intelligible paradigms therefore, the part is in a certain respect the whole, on account of the union of intelligibles; and the multitude is most similar to the monad, through the domination of sameness. Since also the whole Demiurgus looks indeed to the intelligible and all-perfect animal, but employs the paradigm which is in himself, possessing intellectually the intelligible ; which paradigm also

' For προαιωνίον in this place, we must read προς awwrior. 298 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 15, is such as the intelligible through similitude to it, but is of a more partial nature ; hence Timwus adds the words a certain to a thing of this kind. Yor these intelligibles participate of the eternal paradigm, and are more partial than all-perfect animal.. Hence, too, he calls idea, τὸ, a certain thing, assimilating that which is vencrated to the paradigm. But fabrication imparts essences and powers to the things that are generated. Why, however, of eternal being does he say “ employing a paradigm of this kind,” but of that whichis generated, he no longer adds the expression ‘ of this kind,” but instead of this, adduces the term venerated? Is it not because the intelligible has something similar to itself, as having the highest rank, but that which is generated being the last of things, has nothing else similar to itself? For that which is produced on account of it, is generated, and to this the dissimilar is appropriate ; but to the intelligible, the similar, the same, and every thing of this kind, is athed. And = thus much concerning these partieilars, But) the term αὐδάν must be conjoined: to aw subsistence according to mameness, In order that there may be that whieh looks to a nature always possessIng a sameness of subsistence, For thus the plulosopher Porphyry properly decides. Por Tinwus does not say that the Deniurgus in fabricating all things, always beholds, as Atticus thought, but that the intelligible always subsists after the same manner. Untess it should be said, that on this account he assumes the beholding always, lest by seeing at one time, but at another not, he should latently introduce into his production, that which is not beautiful. The Demiurgus, therefore, looks to that whichis eternal, in order that he may produce that

which is similar to it, and beautiful. “Let therefore this universe be denominated by us, all heaven, or the world, or whatever other appellation it may be especially adapted to receive.” This is the last of the axioms, giving a name to the subject [of discussion) conformably to geometricians, When they speak about the gnomon in parallelograms, for they say any one thing consisting of two complements ts to” be called a gnomon, For since Plato intends to call the same thing both heaven and the world, in order that you may not think he disturbs the doctrine, by employing at different times different names, he previously determines something about the ' Vor ews yap hese, read eres yup. names. For it must be observed that these names had great ambiguity with the ancients; some of them calling the sublunary region alone the world, but the region above it, heaven ; but others denominating heaven a part of the world. And some defined it to extend as far as to the moon; but others called the summits of generation heaven : The wide-spread heav'n in wther and the clouds Fell to the lot of Jove." Hence Plato very properly determines concerning these names, prior to the whole theory, calling the universe heaven and the world, and saying all heaven, that you may not fancy he says, ὦ divine body alone is denominated by us the world, or by whatever other name it may rejoice to be called.

And it seems, indeed, that he calls the universe Aeaven, conformably to the opinion of all men, but the world, according to his own opinion. Tor he says, let it be called by us heaven and the world. For the name of world is adapted to it as a certain fabrication ; though itis also possible to call it both heaven and the world : Acaven, indeed, as beholding the things above,* as surveying the intelligible, and as_ participating of an intellectual essence ς but dhe world, as being always tilled and adorned by truly existing beings. It may also be called /eaven, as being converted [to its prinple], but he world as proceeding from it. For it is generated by, and is converted to real being. But as of statues established by the telestic art, some things pertaining to them are manifest,’ but others are inwardly concealed, being symbolical 4 of the presence of the Gods, and which are only known to the mystic artists themselves ; after the same manner, the world being a statue of the intelligible, and perfected by the father, has indeed some things which are visible indications of its divinity ; but others, which are the invisible impressions of the participation of being § received by it from the father who gave it perfection, in order that ° through these it may be eternally rooted in real being. Heaven, indced,

"Thad. xv. vs. 102. * This is asserted in the Cratylus. } For apavn here, it is necessary to read ἐμφανη. * Instead of cuppoduns των θεων παρουσίας in this place, it is necessary to read, σνμβολικα της των θεων rapovacas. - > Instead of της τὸν οντως μετοχῆς in this place, it is necessary to read rns τὸν ovros peroyns. 5 In the words wn μὴ δὲ ἀντων ἐρριϑωμενον ῃ διαιωνίω: ev τῷ οντι, it is obvious that μη ought to be 240 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ i. and the world, are names significant of the powers in the universe; the latter so far as it proceeds from the intelligible, but the former so far as it is converted to it. It is however necessary to know that the divine name of its abiding power, and which ia a symbol of the impression of the Demiurgus, according to which it does not proceed out of being, is ineffable and arcane, and known only to the Gods themselves. For there are names adapted to every order of things ; those indeed that are adapted to divine natures being divine, to the objects: of diangia, being dianoetic, and to the objects of opinion, doxastic. This also Plato says in the Cratylus, where he embraces what ig asserted by Homer on this subject, who adwits that names of the same things with the Gods, are different from those that

subsist in the opinions of men, Xanthus by Gods, by men Scamander σα} ὦ," And, Which the Gods Chalcis, men Cymindis call. * And in asimilar manner in many other names. For as the knowledge of the Gods is different from that of partial souls, thus also the names of the one are different from those of the other; since divine names unfold the whole essence of the things named, but those of men only partially come into contact with them. Plato therefore knowing that this pre-eaists in the world, omits the divine and ineffable name itself, which is diflerent from the apparent name, and with the greatest caution introduces it as a symLol of the divine impression which the world contains. For the words, “ or whatever other appellation,” and “it may receive,” are alatent hymn of the mundane name, as ineffable, and allotted a divine essence ; in order that it may be co-ordinate to what is signified by it. Hence, also, divine mundane names are delivered by Theurgists ; some of which are called by them ineffable, but others effible ; aud some being significant of the invisible powers in the world, but others of the visible elements from which it derives its completion. Through these things, therefore, as hypotheses, the mundane form, the demiurgie cause and paradigm, and the apparent and unapparent name of the world, are delivered. And the former name indeed is duadic, but the latter monadic. For the words “ whatever other” are significant of oneness. You may also consider the ineffable name of the universe, [as significant’) of its abiding in

‘liad xax.vs. 74 * Nliad xiv. vs, 291. > In the original in this place, σημαντικον is omitted. nook Oh] ἍΜ ΟΝ OF PLATO, 931 the father; but the name world, as indicative of its progression ; and heaven, of its conversion, But through the three, you have the final cause, on account of which itis full of good; abiding ineflably, proceeding perfectly, and converting itself to the good as the antecedent object of desire. It is fit, however, to engage in the discussion of the rest of the theory, terminating what follows by the principles, “ Tn the first place, therefore, that as an hypothesis, must be considered respecting it, which oughtin the beginning to be surveyed about every After the prayer, the exhortation to the auditors, and the delivery of the hypotheses, nothing else remains than to dispose the whole discussion conformaly to the hypotheses themselves. Of this, however, that head is the leader, whether the world was generated, or is unbegotten, having no beginning of generation. Por in what was asserted prior to the hypotheses, Timiavus said, “7? is necessary thatwe who are about to speak concerning the universe, whether it was generated or ἐκ μη οποίον, should invoke the Gods and Goddesses,” as from hence commencing the theory. And in the hypotheses, “ [hat that is which is akecays being, but is without gencration, and what that is which is generated, but is never [real] being,” were the things which were first assumed.

This therefore must first be considered, as it was the first thing supposed in the principles. It is necessary, however, as Socrates savs in the Phiedrus, respecting every thing, to consider in the first place what itis. But this is the form of the object of investigation, And the generated and the unbegotten give distinction to the mundane form, So that this is very properly thought to be the first thing that deserves an appropriate consideration, to which also Timieus immediately after this directs his attention. But since most of the Platonists understand by the words περὶ πάντοὸς, that Plato means about erery thing, conformably to what is said inthe Phiedrus, but Porphyry understands the words as signifying about the universe, it being fit to speak first concerning the universe, and to show whether itis naturally unbegotten or generated,—it is requisite to Know that the former interpretation has in a greater degree the spontancous. For to assume τὸ παντὸς for τὸ πῆι tov πάντος, is a forced assumption.

That, however, these things are simply to be investigated concerning every thing, we may previously assuine from common conceptions, and the first hypotheses. The addition also of whether the universe aleays was, having no beginning of generation, or whether it was generated,” shows that what is said is asserted more generally of ihe universe. For with reference to the world, it is demonstrated that it has a beginning of generation, and that it is visible and tangible, but not with reference to the universe. This, therefore, is manifest. But since it is also necessary to discover in the first place the mundane form, whether itis to be arranged among eternal, or among generated natures, let us see what arguments the philosopher employs, and follow him in his demonstrations whether it always was, having no beginning of generation, or was generated from a certain principle ; for we shall find that he uses all the dialectic! methods in the hypotheses, "Thus he divides being from that which 1s generated, and definitively and also analytically assigns what each of them is. For he recurs from generated natures 10. the demiurgic and paradigmatic causes of them, Moreover, having indicated to us the truth concerning ineffable and effable names, in perfect conformity to the doctrine of Pythagoras, who said that number was the wisest of things, but that he was the next in wisdom who gave names to things,—he afterw ards converts himself to the demonstrations of the problems concerning the world.

And in the first: place, he endeavours to find the form of it, and whether it: must be admitted to bea portion of perpetual being, or ofa venerated nature. And on this account he Inquires whether it has a certain principle of generation, or has none, not asking whether it belongs to eternal beings, or to generated natures 5 for he might have said that it was a mediom between both these, in the same manner as soul. But he asks whether it always was, having no principle whatever of generation, or whether it was in some way or other generated, in order that he might apprehend the medium between both these to be that which has a certain principle of generation, and yet always is. Afterwards having shown that the world is alone generated according to its body, he grants it according to a certain other thing to be unbegotten, according to which also itis ἃ God, as will be evident as we proceed,

Such therefore being the inquiry, Plutarch, Atticus, and many other of the Platonists, conceiving the generation here mentioned to be temporal, say that the inquiry is, whether the world is unbegotten or cenerated according to time, Por they assert that prior to the fabneation of the world, there was a disorderly motion, But time entirely subsists together with motion ; so that there was time prior to the universe, Time, however, was also generated together with the * As the dialectic of Plato is perfectly scientific, as we have shown in the notes on the Parmenides, and employs the dividing, defining, analysing, and demonstrative methods, it is evident that instead of διαλογιίκαις μεθοδοιν in this place, we should read διαλεκτίκαις μεθυδοι». This is also evident from what follows, universe, being the number of the motion of the universe; so that the former time was prior to the fabrication of the world, being the number of a disorderly motion. But the interpreters of Plato that follow Crantor, say that the world is said to be generated, as being produced by another cause, and not being self-begotten, nor self-subsistent. And Plotinus, and the philosophers afler Plotinus, viz. Porphyry and Tamblichus, say that the composite nature is here called that which is cenerated, and that with this,’ generation from another cause is con-subsistent. We however say, that all these assertions are most true; and that the world is gencrated, both as a composite, and as being indigent of other causes to its existence. For every thing which has interval is a thing of this kind, and that which is sensible, is allotted such a nature as this. We think it fit however, that these philosophers should look to other generated natures, I mean time and soul, survey what is common in them, and extend it to these significations, and say, that [real] being indeed is that, which eternally possesses a stable essence, power

~and energy. But that which is simply, or absolutely generated, is that which receives all these according to time. And that which is in a certain respect generated, possesses its energy In motion and extension. For it has been before observed by us, that Plato defined the extremes to be, that which 15. simply perpetual being, and that which is simply generated. But in what is here said, he comprehends the media. Hence, that which does not possess at once, the whole of its essence, or energy established in unity, is denominated gencrated. A thing of this kind also, entirely subsists through generation, and its existence is generated, or becoming to be, but is not [real] being. This sensible world likewise, time among things that are moved, and the transitive intelligence of souls, are things of this kind. But it is manifest that all motion subsists according to a part, and that the whole of it is not at once. If, however, the essence of the world has generation, and the perpetuity of it subsists according to temporal infinity, some one by considering this may syllogize as follows: First, that it is necessary between things that are eternally per petual, and things which are generated in a part of time, the medium should be an hypostasis which is generated infinitely. And that this should be two-fold, either having the whole perpetual, through the whole of time, but the parts in the parts

‘of time, as is the case with these elements, or having both the whole and the parts co-extended with the perpetuity of the whole of time, as is the case with the celestial ' For revro here, it is necessary to read rovry. Tim. Plat. Vai, 7... 2G 234 ' PROCLUS ON THE [Rook 11. bodies. For there is not the same perpetuity according to eternity and the whole of time; since neither is there the same infinity of time and eternity, because eternity and time are not the same. In the second place, that what is measured by eternity, and exists in eternity, 1s necessarily impartible. For how can that which is partible be fixed, and haye its essence established in the impartible? In the third place, that soul energizes according to time, and that body subsists entirely in time. For the energy of soul is nearer to eternal natures, than the essence of body. What is it then, by which we may infer that the essence of the celestial bodies is thus perpetual according to time? Itis this, that it cannot be separated from the cause that adorns it. For this makes it evident that it is allotted a renovated perpetuity, and is always generated from a source external to itself. For if it received the whole of its proper essence from itself, it would be sufficient to itself, sepajrate from that which makes it, and imparts to it essence.. The intention indeed lof Plato is to show, that the world is simply generated, as having its essence, power, and energy, and also its perpetuity co-extended with the whole of time. But he inquires from the first, whether it is eternal being, or belongs to things which are perfected by time. For the expression always was, signifies with Plato the intelligible, as we have before observed. If, however, he says further on, that

| the term was is not adapted to eternal natures, but the term ἐσ, we must not be disturbed. For prior to a distinct evolution, he follows the accustomed mode of speaking. Hence also, when celebrating the Demurgus he says, “he was good,” though the Demiurgus ranks among eternal natures. And speaking of the paradigm, he collects both these together at once: for he says, “Zhe nature of animal itself therefore was being eternal ;” together with αἰώνιος, ovra being eternal, assuming τὸ eruyyave was. And in addition to all that has been said, because the power of every finite body is not infinite, as Aristotle has demonstrated, but eternity is an infinite power, hence every finite body is incapable of receiving eternity. It is necessary therefore that it should not always Je, but should always be generated, or becoming to be, receiving as much as possible a flowing existence. Being, therefore, as 1 have said, and perpetual being, manifest the eternal. But “ that which was generated,” signifies the being allotted an hypostasis, measured by time, such as is a sensible nature, which also 1s apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. It has however been already said by us, that the intelligible is sclf-subsistent and eternal; but that the sensible nature is produced by something different from itself, and is con-subsistent with time. For the eternal in number is one thing, and the temporal another. And the former is in number,

but the latter iy generated in number. For to the former eternity is conjoined, but to the latter time. That which is generated likewise, thouch it is said to be perpetual, has an hypostasis co-extended with ali time, and which is always generated, and always adorned by its producing cause. If therefore, perpetual being manifests the eternal, but that which has a principle of generation signifies that which is produced by another cause ; for such is that which is always generated ; but Plato always inquires, whether the world always was, or has the principle of acertain generation ;—this being the case, an inquiry of this kind will be the same asx an investigation. whether the world belongs to eternal natures, or to things which are generated according to the whole of time; and whether it belongs to self-subsistent natures, or to things which are adorned by another cause, Farther still, that which is generated belongs to things which are multifariously predicated, For this very thing which has a temporal beginning, and is so much spoken of, is called generated, whether it arrives at being through generation, or without generation, as Aristotle says. Every thing likewise which proceeds from _ a cause, is called generated, that also which is essentially a composite, and that which has a generable nature (or which is naturally capable of being generated] though itshould not have been generated 3 such asis that which has a visible nature, thoughit should not be seen.

That which is generated therefore, being predicated multifariously, that which is generated according to time, has all the generations. For it proceeds from a cause, is a composite, and has a generable nature. Tt does not, however, entircly follow that what is generated after another manner, has all the generations. [If therefore Plato had inquired whether the universe has all the gencrations,} or not all," we should say that he investigated whether itis generated according to time, or has not a temporal principle of generation. Since, however, this is not the case, but he asks whether it has no principle whatever of generation, or has a certain principle of it, he renders it manifest to those who have the smallest degree of intelligence, that he does not doubt about its temporal beginning, but whether the universe, since there are many generations, has a certain principle of generation. For if it has no principle whatever of generation, it belongs to eternal and self-subsistent natures, in which there is not generation, because neither is there time. For though we sometimes speak of the generations of the