Discourses and Enchiridion

You come saying, 'Epictetus, we can bear no longer to be bound with the fetters of this wretched body, giving it meat and drink and rest and purgation, and by reason of the body having to adapt ourselves to this or that set of circumstances. Are not these things indifferent and as nothing to us, and death no evil thing? Are we not kinsmen of the gods, from whom we have come hither? Suffer us to depart to the place whence we have come, suffer us to be released from these bonds that are fastened to us and weigh us down. Here are robbers and thieves and law-courts and so-called kings, who by reason of our poor body and its possessions are accounted to have authority over us. Suffer us to show them that they have authority over nothing.'

Plain English · paraphraseYou come saying, "Epictetus, we can no longer bear to be tied down by the chains of this wretched body, giving it food and drink and rest and medicine, and because of the body having to adjust ourselves to this or that situation. Are these things not unimportant and of no value to us, and is death not a bad thing? Are we not relatives of the gods, from whom we have come here? Let us return to the place from which we came, let us be freed from these chains that are fastened to us and weigh us down. Here are robbers and thieves and courts and so-called kings, who because of our poor body and its belongings are considered to have power over us. Let us show them that they have power over nothing."

should be answered by the master's warning not to depart without reason.Hereupon I answer: Men as you are, wait upon God. When He gives the signal and releases you from this service, then you shall depart to Him; but for the present be content to dwell in this country wherein He appointed you to dwell. Short indeed is the time of your dwelling here, and easy for them whose spirit is thus disposed. What manner of tyrant or what thief or what law-courts have any fears for those who have thus set at nought the body and its possessions? Stay where you are, and depart not without reason.' Such should be the answer of the teacher to his gifted pupils. How different is what we see! But too often there is no life in master or pupils, and you cherish idle cares for the morrow.There is no life in your master, and no life in you. When you have had your fill to-day, you sit groaning about the morrow, and how you are to find food. Slave, if you get food, you will have it; if not, you will depart the door is open. Why do you whine? What room is there for tears any more? What occasion for flattery any more? Why should one envy another? Why should he gaze with wonder on them that are rich or powerful, especially if they be strong and quick to anger? For what will they do with us? We will pay no heed to what they have power to do, The great and rich cannot touch what you really care for. The spirit of God's kinsmen, as seen in Socrates,what we really care for they cannot touch. Who, I ask you, will be master over one who is of this spirit?

How did Socrates approach these matters? Surely as one should who is convinced of his kinship with the gods. 'If you tell me,' he says, "we acquit you on condition that you discourse no longer as you have done hitherto, and that you do not annoy young or old among us", I shall answer, "It is absurd for you to suppose that, while I am bound to maintain and guard any post to which your general appointed me, and should rather die ten thousand times than abandon it, yet if God has appointed us to a certain place and way of life we ought to abandon that."' is far removed from our fleshly standards.Here you see a man who is a kinsman of the gods in very truth. But as for us—we think of ourselves as if we were all belly and flesh and animal desire; such are our fears, such our passions; those that can help us to these ends we flatter, and at the same time fear.

The true man needs no one to plead for him;Some one has asked me to write for him to Rome, one who, as the world thought, had had misfortunes; he had once been famous and rich, and had now lost everything and was living here. So I wrote for him in a humble tone. And he read my letter and gave it me back and said, 'I wanted your help, not your pity.' So, too, Rufus, to try me, used to say, 'Your master will do this or that to you'; and when I answered him, 'This is the lot of man', 'Why then', said he, 'do I appeal to your master when I can get everything from you?' for he can find in himself all that he needs—a noble and lofty spirit.for, indeed, it is true that what a man has of himself it is idle and futile for him to receive from another. Am I then, who can get from myself the gift of a noble and lofty spirit, to get from you a field or money or office? Heaven forbid! I will not be so blind to my true possessions. But when a man is mean and cowardly, for him one must needs write letters as for one that is dead. 'Make us a present of the corpse of so and so and his miserable quart of blood.' For indeed such a one is a mere corpse and a quart of blood and nothing more. If he were anything more, he would have realized that one man cannot make another miserable.

CHAPTER X To those who have spent their energies on advancement in Rome. If we showed as much zeal as men of affairs in Rome we should achieve much more.If we had been as earnest and serious about our work as old men in Rome are about their concerns, we too might perhaps have achieved something. I know what was said to me by a man older than myself who is now in charge of the corn-supply in Rome, when he passed through here on his way back from exile; he ran down his former life and made great professions for the future, saying that when once he was back he would have no other interest except to live out the rest of his life in peace and tranquillity, 'For how little I have still left me', said he. And I said to him, 'You will not do it; so soon as you sniff the air of Rome you will forget all your professions'; and I told him that if he got a chance of entering the Palace, he would thrust his way in and give God thanks. 'Epictetus,' he answered, 'if you find me putting one foot in the Palace, believe what you like of me.'

Well, what did he do? Before he came to Rome, a dispatch from the Emperor met him, and as soon as he got it he forgot all he had said and has gone on adding to his heap ever since. I should like to stand by him now and remind him of the words he used as he passed through, and say to him, 'How much more clever a prophet am I than you!'

Man is made for action, but is fettered by indolence.What conclusion do I draw? Do I say that the creature man is not to be active? Heaven forbid! But what is it that fetters our faculty of action? Take myself first: when day comes, I remind myself a little as to what lesson I ought to read to my pupils. Then in a moment I find myself saying, 'But what do I really care what sort of lesson I give to this man or that? The first thing is for me to sleep.' And yet how can their business be compared in importance with ours? If you attend to what they are doing you will see the difference. They do nothing all day long except vote, dispute, deliberate about a handful of corn or an acre of land, and petty profits of this sort. Is there any resemblance between receiving and reading a petition such as this: 'I beg you to let me export a little corn', and a petition such as, 'I beg you to inquire from Chrysippus how the universe is governed and what position the rational creature holds in it; inquire too who you are and what is good for you, and what is evil?' What have these petitions in common? Do both demand the same attention? Is it equally shameful to neglect one and to neglect the other?

The fault lies partly with the teacher himself, partly with the young, whose interest reacts on his.What is my conclusion? Are we elders alone indolent and sleepy? Nay, the fault is much rather with you young men. For indeed, we old folk, when we see young men playing, are only too eager and ready to join their play. Much more, if I saw them thoroughly awakened and eager to share my studies, should I be eager myself to take my studies seriously too.

CHAPTER XI On family affection. To an official who asked for direction,When an official came to Epictetus and inquired for special directions he asked whether he had a wife and children; and when the man said, 'Yes', he asked again, How do you get on? 'Miserably', he said. What do you mean? said he; Men do not marry and have children to the end that they may be miserable, but rather that they may be happy. 'Ah,' said he, 'but I am so miserable about my poor children, that lately when my daughter was ill and was thought to be in danger I could not bear to be near her, but fled away from her, until some one brought me news that she was well.' Epictetus lays down that the criterion in conduct is what is 'natural'.Well, do you think you were right to do it? 'It was natural', he said. Nay, said the master, only convince me that it was natural, and I will convince you that everything that is natural is right. 'All fathers,' he said, 'or most of us, at least, feel like that.'

I do not deny, said Epictetus, that parents feel so, but the real question is whether it is right. No doubt as far as that goes, we must say that even tumours come into being for the good of the body, and in a word that error is natural, for nearly all, or most of us at least, are prone to error. Prove to me then how it is natural. 'I cannot;' he said, 'rather do you prove to me how it is wrong or unnatural.' He answered, Suppose we were discussing black and white, what test should we call in to distinguish between them? 'The sight', he said. What if we were discussing things hot or cold, hard and soft, what test should we use? 'Touch.' Well then, as we are discussing what is natural and Error in conduct is more serious than in matters of taste or touch.right and the opposite, what test would you have us take? 'I do not know', said he. Look here, it is no great loss perhaps not to know the proper test for colours and smells, nay, and flavours too, but do you think it is a small loss to man not to know what is good and what is evil, what is natural and what is unnatural?

'No, the greatest possible loss.' But judgements differ, and a criterion is necessary.Tell me now, is everything right which seems noble and fitting to certain people? To-day, for instance, are the opinions of Jews and Syrians, Egyptians and Romans, as to food all of them right? 'How can they be?' No, I suppose if the Egyptians' views are right the other nations' must of necessity be wrong; if the Jews' opinions are good, other people's must be bad. 'Of course.' And where there is ignorance, there is also want of insight and education as to necessary things. 'Yes.' When once you have realized this, then, said Epictetus, you will make this your one interest in the future, and to this alone devote your mind—to discover the means of judging what is natural and to use your criterion to distinguish each particular case as it arises. The particular case is clear because here reason and affection coincide.For the present I can help you just so far as this in regard to what you wish: do you think family affection is natural and good? 'Of course.' Again, is it true that affection is natural and good, and reason not good? 'Certainly not.' Is there a conflict then between reason and affection?

'I think not.' If there were a conflict, then, as one of the two is natural, the other must needs be unnatural? 'Certainly ', he said. It follows then that whenever we find reason and affection united in an action, we confidently affirm that it is right and good. 'Granted', he said. Mark what follows. I do not think you will deny that it is not reasonable to leave one's child when it is ill and to go away. The only question left for us is to consider whether it is affectionate. 'Let us consider it then.' Was it right, I ask, for you, being affectionately disposed to your child, to run away and leave her? Is her mother not fond of the child? 'She is indeed.' Should the mother then have left her too, or should she not? 'She should not.' What of the nurse? Is she fond of the child? 'She is', he said. Ought she then to have left her? 'By no means.' Again, is not the child's attendant fond of her? 'He is.'

Ought he then to have gone away and left her? Was it right that as a consequence the child should be thus left desolate and helpless because of the great affection of you its parents and of those about it, or should die in the hands of those who had no love or care for it? 'Heaven forbid!' Once more, it is not fair or reasonable, is it, that a man should not allow others equally affectionate with himself to do what, because he is affectionate, he thinks proper for himself. It is absurd. Tell me, would you have liked, if you were ill, your relations and every one else, even your wife and children, to show their affection for you in such a way as to leave you alone and desolate? 'Certainly not.' Would you pray to be so loved by your own people, as to be always left alone by them when you were ill, because of their exceeding affection, or would you, if it were a question of being left alone, rather pray, supposing that were possible, to have the affection of your enemies? And if that is so, we are forced to the conclusion that your conduct was not that of affection.

Plain English · paraphraseShould he then have left her? Was it right that the child should be left alone and helpless because of your great love for it and the love of those around it, or that it should die in the hands of people who had no love or care for it? "Heaven forbid!" Again, is it fair or reasonable that a man should not allow others, who love him as much as he loves himself, to do what he himself, because he is loving, would think right for himself? It is absurd. Tell me, would you like, if you were ill, your relatives and everyone else, even your wife and children, to show their love for you by leaving you alone and desolate? "Certainly not." Would you want to be loved by your own people in such a way that they always left you alone when you were ill, because of their great love, or would you, if it were a question of being left alone, rather wish, if that were possible, to have the love of your enemies? And if that is so, we are forced to the conclusion that your conduct was not that of love.

The error was due, not to external causes but to wrong judgement.What reason had you then? Was there nothing which moved and impelled you to abandon the child? How is that possible? It must have been the same sort of motive, which once made a man in Rome cover his eyes when the horse he had backed was running, and then again when the horse unexpectedly won made him faint so that he needed sponges to recover him. What is the motive? This perhaps is not the moment to define it; but it is enough that we should be convinced of this—if what philosophers say is sound—that we must not look for it somewhere outside us, but that it is always one and the same motive which causes us to do or not to do a thing, to speak or not to speak, to be elated or depressed, to fly or to pursue—the very motive which has moved you and me at this moment, you to come and sit and listen to me, and me to say what I do. What is the motive? Surely it is nothing but this—that we are so minded? 'Nothing else.'

And if things had looked different to us, we should still have done what we were minded to do and nothing else. So when Achilles mourned, his reason was, not the death of Patroclus—for another man, when his comrade dies, is not thus affected—but that he was so minded. So in your case, you ran away just because you were so minded; and again, if you stay it will be because you are so minded. And now you return to Rome, because you have a mind to do so; and if your mind changes, you will not depart thither. And in a word it is not death nor exile nor pain nor any such thing which is the cause of our action or inaction, but thoughts and judgements of the mind. Whenever we go wrong then we blame ourselves.Are you convinced of this or not? 'I am', he said.

Then on each occasion the effects of an action correspond to the causes. So henceforward whenever we do a thing must wrong, we shall blame nothing else but the judgement which led us to do it, and we shall try to remove and extirpate this even more than we do tumours and abscesses from the body. And so also we shall assert that our right actions are determined in the same way; and we shall no longer blame neighbour or wife or children as though they caused evils to befall us, being convinced that, unless we make up our mind that things are such, we do not act as though they were, but that whether we judge them to be so or not depends upon ourselves and not on anything outside us. 'True', he said. That is why we must become students—to study our judgements.From this day forward then we shall not investigate or examine the nature or condition of anything else—whether it be land or slaves or horses or dogs—but only our own judgements. 'I hope so ', said he.

You see then that you must become a student—that creature whom all mock at—if you really wish to investigate your judgements. That this is not the work of an hour or a day you fully understand without my telling you.

CHAPTER XII On contentment. There are many views of the relation of gods to the world,Concerning the gods there are some who say that the Divine does not exist, others that it exists but is inactive and indifferent and takes no thought for anything, others again that God does exist and take thought but only for great things and things in the heavens, but for nothing on earth; and a fourth class say that God takes thought also for earthly and human things, but only in a general way, and has no care for individuals: and there is a fifth class, to whom belong Odysseus and Socrates, who say where'er I move Thou seest me.

and these we must examine, because of their bearing on conduct.Before all things then it is necessary to examine each of these views, to see whether it is true or untrue. For if there are no gods, how can following the gods be the end of man? If again there are gods, but they care for nothing, in that case too what good will it be to follow them? But once more, if they exist and do care, yet if there is no communication between them and men, nay what is more, if there is none between them and me, to follow them cannot be a true end. The good man submits his mind to the divine governance, and in this finds freedom.The good man then, having examined into all these questions, has submitted his mind to Him that orders the universe, as good citizens submit to the law of the city. The man who is under education ought to approach education with this purpose in his mind: 'How can I follow the gods in everything, and how can I be content with the divine governance and how can I become free?' For he is free, for whom all things happen according to his will and whom no one can hinder.

For freedom does not mean personal caprice'What then? Is freedom the same as madness?' Heaven forbid! frenzy and freedom have nothing in common. 'But', you say, 'I want everything to happen as I think good, whatever that may be.' Then you are in a state of madness, you are out of your mind. Do you not know that freedom is a noble thing, and worthy of regard? But merely to want one's chance thoughts to be realized, is not a noble thing; it comes perilously near being the most shameful of all things. How do we act in matters of grammar? Do I want to write Dion's name as I will? but implies a standard, as in all arts and sciences.No, I am taught to will the right way of writing. How is it in music? Just the same. So it is universally, in every region of art or science. Otherwise it would not be worth while to know anything, if everything conformed itself to each man's will.

Plain English · paraphraseFreedom is not the same as doing whatever you feel like. What then? Is freedom the same as madness? Heaven forbid! Madness and freedom have nothing in common. You say, "I want everything to happen as I think is good, whatever that may be." Then you are mad, out of your mind. Do you not know that freedom is noble and worthy of respect? But simply wanting your random thoughts to come true is not noble; it is dangerously close to the most shameful thing of all. How do we act in matters of grammar? Do I write Dion's name however I want? No. There is a standard, as in all arts and sciences. I am taught to write the correct way. How is it in music? The same. So it is everywhere, in every field of art or science. Otherwise, there would be no point in knowing anything, if everything had to conform to each person's will.

Are we to say then that in this sphere alone, the greatest and most momentous of all, the sphere of freedom, it is permitted me to indulge chance desires? Freedom means. conforming the will to events as ordained by God.By no means: education is just this—learning to frame one's will in accord with events. How do events happen? They happen as the Disposer of events has ordained them. He ordained summer and winter, fruitful and barren seasons, virtue and vice and all such opposites for the sake of the harmony of the universe, and gave to each one of us a body and bodily parts and property and men to associate with. We cannot change events.Remembering then that things are thus ordained we ought to approach education, not that we may change the conditions of life, that is not given to us, nor is it good for us but that, our circumstances being as they are and as nature makes them, we may conform our mind to events.

I ask you, is it possible to avoid men? How can we ? Can we change their nature by our society? Who gives us that power? What is left for us then, or what means do we discover to deal with them? We must so act as to leave them to do as seems good to them, while we remain in accord with nature. But you are impatient and discontented; if you are alone you call it a wilderness, and if you are with men you describe them as plotters and robbers, and you find fault even with your own parents and children and brothers and neighbours. Whether in solitude or in a crowd we ought to be content.Why, when you are alone you ought to call it peace and freedom and consider yourself the equal of the gods; when you are in a large company you should not call it a crowd or a mob or a nuisance, but a high-day and a festival, and so accept all things in a spirit of content.

Discontent is its own punishment and prison.What punishment is there, you ask, for those who do not accept things in this spirit? Their punishment is to be as they are. Is one discontented with being alone? Let him be deserted. Is one discontented with his parents? Let him be a bad son, and mourn his lot. Is one discontented with his children? Let him be a bad father. 'Cast him into prison.' What do you mean by prison? he is in prison already; for a man's prison is the place that he is in against his will, just as, conversely, Socrates was not in prison, for he chose to be there. Bodily defects are no ground for discontent,'Am I then to have a maimed leg?'

Slave, do you mean to arraign the universe for one wretched leg? Will you not make a gift of it to the sum of things? Will you not resign it? Will you not joyfully yield it up to Him who gave it? Will you be vexed and discontented with the ordinances of Zeus, laid down and ordained by Him with the Fates who were present at your birth and span your thread of life? Do you not know, what a little part you are compared with the universe? and in reason man is the equal of the gods.I say this of your body, for in reason you are not inferior to the gods nor less than they; for the greatness of reason is judged not by length or height but by its judgements. In reason then he must find his good.Will you not then set your good in that region where you are equal to the gods? 'Alas, but look what a father and mother I have got!'

Plain English · paraphraseSlave, are you trying to accuse the universe for just one poor leg? Will you not give it as a gift to the whole of things? Will you not let it go? Will you not joyfully hand it back to the one who gave it? Will you be upset and dissatisfied with the laws of Zeus, who set them and arranged them with the Fates who were there at your birth and who measured the thread of your life? Do you not know how small a part you are compared to the universe? And in reason, man is the equal of the gods. I say this about your body, because in reason you are not less than the gods, nor smaller than they; for the greatness of reason is not measured by size or height, but by its judgments. Then, in reason, he must find his good. Will you not then place your good in that place where you are equal to the gods? "Alas, but look what a father and mother I have got!"

Why? was it given you on entering life to choose and say, 'Let such an one marry such an one at this hour, that I may be born?' No such choice was given you: your parents had to be in existence first, and your birth had to follow. Of what parents? Of such as they were.

Plain English · paraphraseWhy? Was it given to you, when you entered life, to choose and say, 'Let this person marry that person at this hour, so that I may be born?' No such choice was given to you. Your parents had to exist first, and your birth had to follow. From what parents? From such as they were.

Well then, as your parents are what they are, is no resource left you? Reason will enable him to face everything, for he is responsible only for what is in his power.Surely if you did not know to what end you possess the faculty of vision, you would be unhappy and miserable if you closed your eyes, when colours were brought near you; but are you not more wretched and unhappy still for not knowing that you have a high and noble spirit to face each occasion as it arises? The objects which correspond to the faculty that you have are brought near you: yet you turn away your faculty just at the very moment when you ought to keep it open-eyed and alert. Rather give thanks to the gods that they set you above those things which they put out of your power, and made you responsible only for what is within your control. For your parents they left you without responsibility; and the same is true of brothers body, property, death, life. For what then did they make you responsible? For that which alone is in your power, the proper handling of your impressions. Why then do you insist on dragging in these things for which you are not responsible? That is to make trouble for yourself.

CHAPTER XIII How one may act in all things so as to please the gods. It is possible to please the gods in small things, by self-control.When some one asked Epictetus how one may eat so as to please the gods, he said, If you can eat justly, and with good feeling and, it may be, with self-control and modesty, may you not also eat so as to please the gods? And when you call for hot water and the slave does not answer, or answers and brings it luke-warm, or is not to be found in the house, is it not pleasing to the gods that you should not be angry nor break into a passion? 'How then is one to bear with such persons?' Men must bear with one another, as children of one father.Slave, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus for his forefather, and is born as a son of the same seed as you and of the same heavenly descent? You were appointed to a place of superiority like this, and are you straightway going to constitute yourself a despot? Will you not remember what you are and whom you are ruling? that they are kinsmen, born your brothers, children of Zeus?