Discourses and Enchiridion

It is bad to have the reason hardened, but still worse when the moral sense is dead.Now there are two ways in which a man may be thus hardened: one when his reasoning faculty is petrified, and the other when his moral sense is petrified, and he sets himself deliberately not to assent to manifest arguments, and not to abandon what conflicts with them. Now most of us fear the deadening of the body and would. take all possible means to avoid such a calamity, yet we take no heed of the deadening of the mind and the spirit. When the mind itself is in such a state that a man can follow nothing and understand nothing, we do indeed think that he is in a bad condition; yet, if a man's sense of shame and self-respect is deadened, we even go so far as to call him 'a strong man'. Do you comprehend that you are awake? This is not 'strength of mind', but mere weakness.'No,' he says, 'no more than I comprehend it, when I seem to be awake in my dreams.' Is there no difference then between the one sort of impression and the other? 'None.'

Can I argue with him any longer? What fire or sword, I say, am I to bring to bear on him, to prove that his mind is deadened? He has sensation and pretends that he has not; he is worse than the dead. One man does not see the battle; he is ill off. This other sees it but stirs not, nor advances; his state is still more wretched. His sense of shame and self-respect is cut out of him, and his reasoning faculty, though not cut away, is brutalized. Am I to call this 'strength'? Heaven forbid, unless I call it 'strength' in those who sin against nature, that makes them do and say in public whatever occurs to their fancy.

CHAPTER VI On Providence.

There is reason to praise Providence in everything.Each single thing that comes into being in the universe affords a ready ground for praising Providence, if one possesses these two qualities—a power to see clearly the circumstances of each, and the spirit of gratitude therewith. Without these, one man will fail to see the usefulness of nature's products and another though he see it will not give thanks for them. If God had created colours and, in general, all visible things, but had not created a faculty to behold them, of what use would they be? None at all. If on the other hand He had created this faculty, but had not created objects of such a nature as to fall under the faculty of vision, even so of what use would it be? None at all. If again He had created both these, and had not created light, even so there would be no use in them. The hand of the craftsman appears in the works of nature no less than in those of art.Who is it then that has adapted this to that, and that to this? Who is it that has fitted the sword to the scabbard and the scabbard to the sword? Is there no one? Surely the very structure of such finished products leads us commonly to infer that they must be the work of some craftsman, and are not constructed at random. Are we to say then that each of these products points to the craftsman, but that things visible and vision and light do not? Do not male and female and the desire of union and the power to use the organs adapted for it—do not these point to the craftsman ? But if these things are so, then the fact that the intellect is so framed that we are not merely the passive subjects of sensations, but select and subtract from them and add to them, and by this means construct particular objects, nay more, that we pass from them to others which are not in mere juxtaposition—I say are not these facts sufficient to rouse men's attention and to deter them from leaving out the craftsman? If it be not so, let them explain to us what it is which makes each of these things, or how it is possible that objects so marvellously designed should have come into being by chance and at random?

Man, created for self-contemplation, has higher faculties than the irrational creatures.Again, Are these faculties found in us alone? Many in us alone—faculties which the rational creature had special need of—but many you will find that we share with irrational creatures. Do they also then understand events and things? No—for using is one thing, and understanding is another. God had need of them as creatures dealing with impressions, and of us as dealing with them and understanding them as well. That is why it is enough for them to eat and drink and rest and breed, and every function is theirs which each irrational creature fulfils; while we, to whom He gave also the power of understanding, cannot be satisfied with these functions, but, unless we act with method and order and consistently with our respective natures and constitutions, we shall no longer attain to our end. For those whose constitutions are different have also different functions and different ends. Therefore that which by constitution is capable only of using things, is satisfied to use them anyhow; but that which by constitution is capable of understanding things as well as using them, will never attain its end, unless to use it adds method also. What is my conclusion? God makes one animal for eating, and another for service in farming, another to produce cheese, and others for different uses of a like nature, for which there is no need of understanding impressions and being able to distinguish them; but He brought man into the world to take cognizance of Himself and His works, and not only to take cognizance but also to interpret them. Therefore he must use them to bring his life into harmony with nature.Therefore it is beneath man's dignity to begin and to end where the irrational creatures do: he must rather begin where they do and end where nature has ended in forming us; and nature ends in contemplation and understanding and a way of life in harmony with nature. See to it then that ye do not die without taking cognizance of these things.

Every man has within his reach a spectacle far greater than Olympia, the spectacle of life.You travel to Olympia, that you may see the work of Phidias, and each of you thinks it a misfortune to die without visiting these sights, and will you have no desire to behold and to comprehend those things for which there is no need of travel, in the presence of which you stand here and now, each one of you? Will you not realize then who you are and to what end you are born and what that is which you have received the power to see? 'Yes, but there are unpleasant and hard things in life.'

Are there none such at Olympia? Are you not scorched with heat? Are you not cramped for room? Is not washing difficult? Are you not wet through when it is wet? Do you not get your fill of noise and clamour and other annoyances? Yet I fancy that when you set against all these hardships the magnificence of the spectacle you bear them and put up with them. And have you not received faculties, which will enable you to bear all that happens to you? Have you not received greatness of spirit? Have you not received courage? Have you not received endurance? If I am of a great spirit what concern have I in what may happen? What shall shake me or confound me or seem painful to me? Instead of using my faculty for the purpose for which I have received it, am I to mourn and lament at the events of fortune? The 'troubles of life', like the tasks of Heracles, are the school of man's faculties.'Yes, but my rheum flows.' Slave! What have you hands for then? Is it not to rheum wipe your away? 'Is it reasonable then that there should be rheum in the world?'

Plain English · paraphraseAre there none like this at Olympia? Are you not burned by the heat? Are you not crowded? Is it not hard to wash? Are you not soaked when it rains? Do you not suffer from noise and shouting and other annoyances? Yet I think that when you compare all these troubles with the grandeur of the spectacle, you endure them and put up with them. And have you not been given abilities that let you bear whatever happens to you? Have you not been given a great spirit? Have you not been given courage? Have you not been given endurance? If I have a great spirit, what do I care about what happens? What can shake me or confuse me or seem painful to me? Instead of using my ability for the purpose I was given it, am I to mourn and grieve over what fortune brings? The "troubles of life," like the labors of Heracles, are the training ground for human abilities. "Yes, but my rheum flows." Slave! What are your hands for then? Is it not to wipe away your rheum? "Is it reasonable then that there should be rheum in the world?"

Well, how much better it is to wipe your rheum away than to complain! What do you think would have become of Heracles if there had not been a lion, as in the story, and a hydra and a stag and a boar and unjust and brutal men, whom he drove forth and cleansed the world of them? What would he have done, if there had been nothing of this sort? Is it not plain that he would have wrapped himself up and slept? Nay to begin with he would never have been a Heracles at all, had he slumbered all his life in such ease and luxury; and if by any chance he had been, of what good would he have been? What use would he have made of his arms and his might and his endurance and noble heart as well, had not he been stimulated and trained by such perils and opportunities? 'Was it his duty then to contrive these occasions for himself and to seek means to bring a lion, a boar, or a hydra into his country?' That were madness and folly; but as they had come into being and were found in the world these monsters were of service to display Heracles' powers and to train them.

If a man use God's gifts, he will cease complaining, and show a noble and courageous spirit.It is for you then, when you realize this, to look to the faculties you possess, and considering them to say, 'Zeus, send me what trial Thou wilt; for I have endowments and resources, given me by Thee, to bring myself honour through what befalls.' Nay, instead, you sit trembling for fear of what may happen, or lamenting, mourning, and groaning for what does happen, and then you reproach the gods. What else but impiety indeed can attend upon so ignoble a spirit as yours? And yet God not only gave us these faculties, which will enable us to bear all the issue of events without being humiliated or broken down by it, but, as became a good king and a true father, He gave us this gift free from all let or hindrance or compulsion—nay, He put it wholly in our hands, not even leaving Himself any power to let or hinder us. Yet possessing these powers in freedom for your own you refuse to use them and will not realize what gifts you have received and from whose hand, but you sit mourning and grieving, some of you blinded to the giver Himself and refusing to recognize your benefactor, and some from meanness of spirit turning to reproaches and complaints against God. Yet I will show you that you have resources and endowment to fit you for a noble and courageous spirit: show me, if you can, what endowments you have for complaining and reproach.

CHAPTER VII On the use of variable premisses and hypothetical arguments and the like. Logic, like other human activities, is concerned with conduct,Most men ignore the fact that the treatment of variable premisses and hypothetical arguments and again of syllogisms that conclude by way of question, and, in a word, of all such arguments is concerned with conduct. For really, whatever subject we are dealing with, our aim is to find how the good man may fitly deal with it and fitly behave towards it. It follows then that either they must say that the virtuous man will not condescend to question and answer, and must therefore not be ignored by the good man.or that if he does he will take no care to avoid behaving lightly and at random in questioning and answering; or else, if they accept neither alternative, they must admit that we have to investigate those subjects round which question and answer chiefly turn. For what do we promise in a discussion? To establish what is true, to remove what is false, to withhold assent in what is uncertain. Is it enough then merely to learn that this is so? 'It is enough.'

Is it enough then for him who wishes not to go wrong in the use of coin merely to be told why you accept genuine drachmas and reject spurious ones? 'It is not enough.' What then must you acquire besides? Surely you must have a faculty to test and distinguish genuine drachmas from spurious. Is it not true then in He must learn to distinguish true arguments from false.regard to argument also that merely to hear what is said is not enough; a man must acquire the faculty to test and distinguish the true from the false and the uncertain? 'It must be so.' This being so, what is required in argument? 'Accept what follows from the premisses you have duly granted.'

Plain English · paraphraseIs it enough, then, for someone who wants not to make mistakes in using money to be told why you accept real drachmas and reject fake ones? "It is not enough." Then what else must you have? You must certainly have the ability to test and tell real drachmas from fake ones. Then is it not also true that, in regard to arguments, merely hearing what is said is not enough? A man must also acquire the ability to test and tell the true from the false and the uncertain. "It must be so." If this is so, then what is required in argument? "Accept what follows from the premises you have properly granted."

Here again, is it enough merely to know this? No, you must learn how a conclusion follows from the premisses, and how sometimes one proposition follows from one other, and sometimes from many together. May we say then that this faculty too must be acquired by him who is to behave with good sense in discussion, and who is himself to prove each point in his demonstration and to follow the demonstrations of others, and to avoid being led astray by sophistical arguments, posing as demonstrations? Thus it comes about that we are led to think it really necessary to discuss and to practise the arguments and moods which are conclusive. But he must not accept conclusions on premisses he has agreed to, unless he still accepts the premisses.But note this: there are cases where we have granted the premisses properly, and such and such a conclusion follows which, though it follows, is none the less false. What then is it fitting for me to do? Must I accept the false conclusion? How can I do that? Must I say I was wrong in granting the premisses? 'No, you may not do this either.' That it does not follow from the premisses granted? 'No, you may not do this.'

What then is one to do in these circumstances? May we not say that just as in order to be in debt it is not enough merely to borrow, but one must remain a borrower and not have paid off the loan, so in order to be bound to admit an inference it is not enough to have granted the premisses, but one must abide by having granted them?

Plain English · paraphraseWhat then should one do in such a situation? May we not say that just as to be in debt it is not enough simply to borrow, but one must remain a borrower and not have repaid the loan, so too, to be bound to accept an inference, it is not enough merely to have agreed to the premises, but one must stick with having agreed to them?

In a word, if they remain to the end as we granted them, we are absolutely bound to remain by our concessions and accept what follows the premisses; if, on the other hand, they do not remain as they were granted, we are also absolutely bound to abandon the concession and no longer to accept what is inconsistent with the premisses; for since we have abandoned our agreement as to the premisses, this inference which is drawn no longer concerns us or touches us. We must then examine into premisses of this sort and into such changes and alterations in them, by which they are changed in the actual process of question or answer or syllogism or the like, and so afford occasion to the foolish to be troubled because they do not see the sequence of the argument. Why must we so do? For careful reasoning is fitting for us.That in this sphere we may do what is fitting by avoiding what is random or confused in argument.

Plain English · paraphraseIn short, if they stay the same as we agreed, we must stick to our agreement and accept the results that follow from the starting points. But if they change from what was agreed, we must also reject the agreement and stop accepting anything that doesn't match the starting points. For since we have given up our agreement on the starting points, any conclusion drawn no longer affects us or applies to us. We must then look closely at these starting points and at any changes or shifts in them that happen during the course of a question or answer, or syllogism, or the like. This can cause confusion for the unthinking, who fail to see how the argument follows. Why must we do this? Because careful reasoning is what is proper for us. In this way, we can do what is proper by avoiding random or confused arguments.

The same care is necessary in regard to hypothetical reasoning.And we ought to do the same with hypotheses and hypothetical arguments. For it is necessary sometimes to assume a hypothesis as a step to the next argument. Must we then concede every given hypothesis or not? And if not every one, which? And, having conceded it, must we abide by it once for all and maintain it, or are we sometimes to abandon it, and are we to accept what follows from it and reject what conflicts with it? 'Yes.' But a man says, 'If you accept a hypothesis of what is possible, I will reduce you in argument to what is impossible.'

Plain English · paraphraseThe same care is needed when dealing with hypothetical reasoning. We should treat hypotheses and hypothetical arguments in the same way. Sometimes it is necessary to assume a hypothesis as a step toward the next argument. So must we accept every given hypothesis, or not? And if not every one, which ones? And once we accept a hypothesis, must we stick with it forever and always support it, or are we sometimes to give it up? Should we accept what follows from it and reject what contradicts it? "Yes." But someone says, "If you accept a hypothesis about what is possible, I will argue you into something impossible."

Will the prudent man refuse to meet him in argument, and avoid examination and discussion with him? Nay, it is just the prudent man The wise man will cease to be wise if he is careless in argument.who is capable of reasoning logically and who is expert at questioning and answering, yes and who is proof against deception and sophistry. Will he then consent to argue, but take no pains to avoid being careless and casual in argument? If so, will he not cease to be the man we consider him to be? But without some such training and preparation as I suggest can he guard the sequence of his argument? Let them show that he can, and then all these speculations are idle; they were absurd and inconsistent with the conception we have formed of the good man. Why do we persist in being lazy and indolent and sluggish, why do we seek excuses to enable us to avoid toiling early and late to perfect ourselves in logical theory? 'Do you call it parricide if I go wrong in logic?'

Slave, here is no father for you to kill. You ask what you have done; you have committed the one error which was possible in this field. Your answer is the very one I made myself to Rufus when he rebuked me because I could not find the one missing step in a syllogism. 'Well,' said I, 'I suppose I have not burnt the Capitol down'; and he answered, 'Slave, the missing step here is the Capitol.' Failure in logic in its way may be compared to parricide or arson.You are not going to tell me, are you, that setting fire to the Capitol and killing one's father are the only forms of wrongdoing? To deal with one's impressions without thought or method, to fail to follow argument or demonstration or sophism, in a word, to be unable to see what concerns himself and what does not in question and answer—is there no wrongdoing, I ask, in any of these?

CHAPTER VIII That faculties are fraught with danger for the uneducated. Untrained persons cannot properly handle imperfect any more than perfect syllogisms.Just as it is possible to interchange terms which are equivalent to one another, so and in just as many ways it is allowable to vary in argument the types of disputative argument and enthymeme. Take for instance this kind of argument: 'If you borrowed and did not repay, you owe me the money. You did not borrow without repaying; therefore you do not owe me the money.' And the philosopher above all others is the proper person to handle such arguments with skill. For if enthymeme is imperfect syllogism, plainly he who is trained in perfect syllogism would be equally capable in dealing with imperfect.

The reasons why we do not devote more time to such training, are (1) that we cannot spare time from cultivating character,Why then, you ask, do we not train ourselves and one another in this style of argument? Because even now, though we do not devote ourselves to training in these matters and though we are not drawn away, so far as I have any influence, from cultivating character, nevertheless we make no advance towards goodness. What should we have to expect then, if we should add this business to our other employments? And there is more—not only should we have less leisure for more necessary things, but we should give uncommon occasion for conceit and vanity. (2) Rhetorical arguments tend to puff up the ignorant.For the faculty of disputative and plausible reasoning is a powerful one, especially if it should be developed by training and gain further dignity from mastery of language. For indeed generally every faculty is dangerous when it comes into the hands of those who are without education and without real force, for it tends to exalt and puff them up. For how would it be possible to persuade the young man who excels in these arguments that he ought not to become dependent upon them, but to make them depend upon him? Instead of this he tramples under foot all we say to him and walks among us in a high state of elation, so puffed up that he cannot bear that any one should remind him how far he has fallen short and into what errors he has lapsed.

Plain English · paraphraseThe reasons why we do not spend more time on this kind of training are: (1) we cannot spare time from working on character. You might ask, then, why we do not train ourselves and each other in this kind of argument. The answer is that even now, even though we do not focus on training in these matters and even though I do not pull anyone away from working on character, we still do not make progress toward goodness. What would happen, then, if we added this task to our other duties? There is more: not only would we have less time for more important things, but we would also create a lot of opportunity for pride and vanity. (2) Rhetorical arguments tend to inflate the ignorant. The ability to argue persuasively and convincingly is a strong one, especially if it is trained and made more impressive by skill with language. In fact, every ability is dangerous when it falls into the hands of people who lack real education and strength, because it makes them arrogant. How could we possibly convince a young man who is good at these arguments that he should not rely on them, but instead let them rely on him? Instead, he ignores everything we say and walks among us full of pride, so swollen with self-importance that he cannot stand being reminded how far he has fallen short and how many mistakes he has made.

Rhetorical power is not necessary in a philosopher.'What do you mean? Was not Plato a philosopher?' I reply, Was not Hippocrates a physician? But you see how eloquent Hippocrates was. Was Hippocrates so eloquent by virtue of being a physician? Why then do you mix qualities, which are casually united in the same persons? Suppose Plato was handsome and strong; ought I also to set to and strive to become handsome or strong, as though this were necessary for philosophy, just because one philosopher was handsome as well? Will you not have the discernment to see what makes men philosophers and what qualities are accidental in them? Suppose now I were a philosopher, ought you to become lame? Such power has its value, but it is not man's end, which is disposition of the will.You ask me, do I then count these faculties as of no effect? Heaven forbid! no more than I ignore the faculty of vision. Nevertheless if you ask me what is the true good of man, I can only say to you that it lies in a certain disposition of the will.

CHAPTER IX How one may draw conclusions from the fact that we are God's kinsmen.

If we are kinsmen of God we are citizens of the universe,If these statements of the philosophers are true, that God and men are akin, there is but one course open to men, to do as Socrates did: never to reply to one who asks his country, 'I am an Athenian', or, "I am a Corinthian', but 'I am a citizen of the universe.' For why do you say that you are an Athenian, instead of merely a native of the little spot on which your bit of a body was cast forth at birth? Plainly you call yourself Athenian or Corinthian after that more sovereign region which includes not only the very spot where you were born, and all your household, but also generally that region from which the race of your forbears has come down to you. connected with Him in the great frame of things, and by our sonship raised above all fear.When a man therefore has learnt to understand the government of the universe and has realized that there is nothing so great or sovereign or all-inclusive as this frame of things wherein men and God are united, and that from it come the seeds from which are sprung not only my own father or grandfather, but all things that are begotten and that grow upon earth, and rational creatures in particular—for these alone are by nature fitted to share in the society of God, being connected with Him by the bond of reason—why should he not call himself a citizen of the universe and a son of God? Why should he fear anything that can happen to him among men? When kinship with Caesar or any other of those who are powerful in Rome is sufficient to make men live in security, above all scorn and free from every fear, shall not the fact that we have God as maker and father and kinsman relieve us from pains and fears?

For the philosopher depends on himself.'And where am I to find food to eat, if I have nothing?' says one. Well, what do slaves do when they leave their masters, or what do they rely on? Do they rely on fields, or servants, or silver plate? No, on nothing but themselves; nevertheless sustenance does not fail them. And shall our philosopher in his wanderings have to rest his confidence in others, instead of taking care of himself? Is he to be baser and more cowardly than the unreasoning beasts? For each one of them is content with itself, and lacks not its proper sustenance nor the way of life that is naturally suited to it.

Plain English · paraphraseThe philosopher depends on himself. "But where will I find food to eat if I have nothing?" someone asks. What do slaves do when they leave their masters? What do they rely on? Do they rely on fields, servants, or silver plate? No, they rely on nothing but themselves, and yet they are not without food. Should our philosopher, then, in his journey, place his trust in others instead of taking care of himself? Is he to be worse and more cowardly than the unreasoning animals? Each of them is content with itself and does not lack the sustenance it needs or the way of life suited to it by nature.

Indeed there is some fear of young men abandoning life, from pride in their divine sonship.I think that the old man who sits here to teach you ought to devote his skill not to save you from being low-minded, and from reasoning about yourselves in a low and ignoble spirit, but rather to prevent young men from arising of the type who, discovering their kinship with the gods, and seeing that we have these fetters attached to us in the shape of the body and its possessions and all that we find necessary for the course and management of our life by reason of the body, may desire to fling all these away as vexatious and useless burdens and so depart to the gods their kindred. The teacher must warn his younger hearers against this error. The pleas of the youngAnd so your teacher and instructor, if he were a true teacher, should engage in this conflict of argument:

Plain English · paraphraseThere is some fear that young men might abandon life because of pride in their divine sonship. I think that the old man who sits here to teach you should not try to save you from being low-minded or from thinking in a low and ignoble way about yourselves. Instead, he should try to prevent young men of a certain type from arising. These young men, discovering their kinship with the gods, and seeing that we have these fetters attached to us in the form of the body and its possessions, and all that we find necessary for the course and management of our lives because of the body, may desire to throw all these away as annoying and useless burdens and so depart to the gods, their kindred. The teacher must warn his younger listeners against this error. The pleas of the young. And so your teacher and instructor, if he were a true teacher, should engage in this conflict of argument: