Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato

render matter pliant, boring, or polishing, or elaborating it with a wheel; all which operations do nut insert form, but take away the inaptitude of the recipient of form. Zhe reason itself however, or form, becomes present with the subject from artinstantancously, all the vapediments being removed. Wence if there was no impediment, form would immediately accede to matter, and would not in short be in want of any instruments. Morcover, the phantasy produces many passions about the body by its very energy alone. For a man blushes through the imagination of what is base, and becomes red ; and through the conception of something dreadful is terrified, and his body is rendered pale. And these, indeed, are the passions about the body. But the cause of these isa phantasm, which does not employ impulsions and mechanical contrvances, but energizes by being present alone. Farther still, theologists axsert that there are certain powers superior to us, who employ efficacious imaginations, and which by their very existence are effective of what they wish to accomplish, and who are also able to produce illuminations, and to exhibit certain divine forms by their motions, to such ag are able to behold the visions which they externally present to the view. If therefore human arts, the imaginations of partial souls, and the energies of diemons, effect things of this kind, why is it wonderful that the Demiurgus, by the intellectual intuition of the universe, should give subsistence to the sensible nature; generating, indeed, that which is material immaterially, that

which is tangible, without contact ; and extending impartibly that which possesses interval? And, indeed, it ought not to be considered as an admirable circum. stance, if something which is incorporeal, and without interval, is the fabricator of this universe. For human seed produces man, who is so much larger than the seed, and in each part of it contains all the diflerences of the solids; as for instance of the bones, those that are compact, and those that are hollow; of the soft parts, such as the lungs and the liver; of the dry parts, such as the nails and the hair; of themoist parts, such as the blood and phlegm; of the adipous parts, as the marrow and fat; of the bitter parts, as the bile; of the parts with. out quality, as the saliva; of the thick-set parts, as the nerves; and of the expanded parts, as the membranes. For all these, the substances of similar parts, and those that in a certain respect are composed of them, derive their subsistence from a small bulk; or rather from that which is without bulk. For reasons [or productive powers} generate these, and they are every where void of bulk. For whatever part you may take of the seed, you will find in it all things. Much more, therefore, is the demiurgic reason able to produce all things, being not at all in want of matter to their existence. But the fabricator of all things is eternally established in himself, and abiding in himself produces the universe.

* But it neither was, nor is lawful, for that which is best, to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful.” Themis’ is very properly assumed in the beginning of the fabrication of the universe. For she is the cause of the demiurgic sacred laws, and from her the order of the universe is indissolubly connected. Hence also she remains a virgin prior to the progression of the Demiurgus, according to the Oracles of Night. But she produces, in conjunction with Jupiter, the triad of the Seasons, to whom Olympus and great Heav'n are giv’n in charge, And a dense cloud to open, or to close. She is therefore the monad of all the mundane order; on which account alsa Socrates in the Repablic calls her Necessity, as is demonstrated in that dialogue. He likewise convolves the world on her knees, she preserving the order of it perpetually immutable and unshaken. Conformably therefore to this divine cause of order, the Demiurgus also, leading that which is disordered into order, imparts beauty to all things, and renders the world similar .to, and connects it ! This word which is used here by Plato, signifies both the Goddess of justice, and lawful,

334 PROCLUS ON THE (woe τι. with himself. For being himself most excellent, he very properly causes the world to be most beautiful ; because the first and intelligible beauty itself is suspended from, and is in goodness. Hence the world likewise, being most beautiful, is suspended from the Demiurgus, who is the best [of fabricative causes]. And because the good is the cause of beauty, on this account also the best of fathers gives subsistence to the most beautiful offSpring. Farther still, as ‘Themis is the guardian of the divine laws, but they make the generations of secondary from first natures to proceed in an orderly series, and preserve the connexion of divine beings, and the similitudes of things second to such as are first ;—on this account also, the Demiurgus, energizing with Themis, renders the universe most beautiful, being himself most excellent. For if Socrates, being a man, says that itis not lawful for him to concede any thing that is false, or to obliterate the truth, how is it possible we should say that the demiurgic intellect effects any thing else than what is beautiful, and that he does not exterminate deformity, being united to Themis, who is likewise always present with bim? And thus much concerning this particular.

But the words, “it neither was nor is,” are very appropriately assumed with that which ts best: for before this, he had called the Demiurgus good, and then also the term zas, was added. For Timeus says; he was good. For the simplicity which is above intellect, and the peculiarity itself of deity, are more adapted to the term twas, as being super-eternal, and better than all intellectual perception, Now! however he calls him the most excellent, as being a deified intellect. For that which participates [of deity] is most excellent. The terms also was and is, are adapted to the Demiurgus ; as to a God indeed, the term was ; but as to an intellect, the term ἐς, in order that at one and the same time his divine union and eternal hypostasis may be rendered manifest. “ By a reasoning process, therefore, he found that among the things which are naturally visible, no whole work destitute of intellect: would ever be more beautiful than a whole work which possesses intellect.” Amelius in a wonderful manner endeavours to prove that Plato knew the different demiurgic causes, and continually passes in a silent way from one of these causes to another; exhibiting, on account of their connexion, no one of the

* Novy 1s erroneously printed here for νυν. δοὺκ 11. TIM.E@S OF PLATO. 335 divine causes themselves, but discoursing about them as if they were one and the same, through the union of the demiurgi with each other. For all of them are one, and oneis all. Since now also he who wills is one Deimiureus, he who reasons is another, and he who assumes or receives is another. And the first, indeed, makes by his wilt alone, the second by intelligence and intellectual perception, but the third by [as it were] manual operation, For they placed intellect in soul, but soul in body, and thus together fabricated ' the universe. The divine lamblichus however reprobates all such interpretations, as very superfluously devised. But he defines Ἀογίσμος, OF a reasoning process, to be that which causally precedes beings, Which is fabricative of essence itself, and which is according to energy invariably the same; from which all reasonings are connected, and have their existence. We indeed have already observed, that Timieus discourses about one and the same Demiurgus, and shall now remind the reader that this must be admitted. Por if there isa multitude in the demiurgi, (i.e. if there are many demiurgi,] it is necessary to arrange aimonad prior to the multitude. Moreorer, we think it fit that the divine Lambiichus should consider, whether the one and whole Demiurgus, being an intellectual world, is not multipotent, and does not by different powers fabricate diferent things, in addition to his being the father of all things ?

Por let the same Demiurgus, so far as he is good, and so far as he is a God, be the producing cause of all things; yet since he comprehends in himself the cause of all fabrications, and produces in one way the whole, but in another the parts ; the former indeed collectively and totally, but the latter in’ a distributed manner, ceiving subsistence to each thing, according to its proper cause; hence by one intellectual perception, he adorns the whole, and generates it, collectively 5 accordinz to which also, the world is one animal. But by a reasoning process, he produces the parts in the world, and these as wholes; because he is the Demiurgus of total naturcs, fabricating total intellect, and total soul, and all the bulk of body. Hence, as composing parts, he is said to make them by a reasoning process. For λογισμὸς isa distributed or divided evolution of parts, and a distinctive cause of things. For it does not pertain to one who doubts; since neither does art, nor science doubt; but artists and scientific men then doubt when they are indigent of the habits by which the former become artists, and the latter men of science. If however these do not doubt, ng reason can be assigned why intellect should

' For ovvecrecverac in this place, it is necessary to read ovvrecraiveras, 336 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 11. doubt. Hence this λογισμὸς is not through the want of that which is fit taking place. But the Demiurgus produces the whole world by intelligence. For intelligence is collective of multitude into one; just as λογισμὸς is distributive of the one into multitude. Such therefore is the meaning of “ by a reasoning process.” With respect however to the things which are naturally visible, to say that they are sensibles is perfectly absurd. For these are not yet arranged in the discourse of Timeus, and it is among the number of things impossible, that the less excellent, or what kind of representation can he receive of material things, to which it is not fortunate even for a partial soul to incline? Itis better therefore, as the divine Tamblichus interprets the words, to think that things of this kind are intelligibles. For that these are visible is evident from the things which ‘Timwus shortly after says the Demiurgus perceives. For his words are, “ As many therefore, and such tdeas, as intellect perceived to be inherent in that which ts animal, &c.” That they are also naturally visible, will be evident if we consider, that some things are visible with relation to us, but others according to nature. And the things indeed which are visible with relation to us, are in their own nature dark and immanifest;

but those which are naturally visible are truly known, and are resplendent with divine light. But intelligibles are things of this kind. Perhaps too, as he had ealled that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner visible, and which subsists preternaturally as with reference to fabrication, he now calls the intelligible paradigms of the Demiurgus, naturally visible. Hence, in the introduction he inquires, whether an eternal or a generated paradigm of the universe must be admitted; these two things existing prior to the generation of the universe, being and generation. And where else can the Demiurgus find the causes of generated natures, than in intelligibles? Por invention with him is not a fortuitous thing, nor a syllogistic process 3 since this pertains to partial souls; but a union with the intelligible causes of the parts of the universe, and a survey and plenitude from thence derived. For all things exist paradigmatically in the natures prior to him, both such as are the objects of intellection, and suchas are deprived of intelligence ;' since truly existing being comprehends uniformly the cause of intellectual natures, and of those that do not participate of intellect. And the intellectual beings which are there, are

Yor vonrwy here, it is necessary to read asonruy. of a superior’ but the rest, ofan inferior order. For though all things there are objects of intellectual perception, and intellects, yet in some of them, the cause posecsses the intellectual nature of the things caused, but in others, the privation of intellect and the irrational; the causes themselves being intellectual, but the things which proceed from them, deprived of intellect. Hence the Demiurgus looking thither, very properly admits that what possesses intellect is more venerable than that which is without it, the genus of the one, than the genus of the other, and the individuals of the one, than the individuals of the other. For manis better than horse, and a certain man than all horses, according to the possession itself of intellect. If however, you assume a certain part of man and a certain part of horse, it does not entirely follow that the one is better than the other. Norif youassume man fashioned by nature, and the man made by the art of the statuary, is the former in every respect more venerable according to figure than the latter. For art is in many respects more accurate [in this instance than nature]. One whole therefore, is every where better than another, when the one possesses intellect, but the other is deprived of it. For through what other thing can body be able to participate of intelligible beauty [than intellect]!

Let no one therefore fancy that Plato makes the division of forms to be into those that possess and those that are deprived of intellect. For all things there (i. e. in the intelligible world] are, as we have said, intellects, where also Plato calls all things in every respect Gods. But extending himself to the natures which are there, he likewise perceived the separation which is here between the beings which possess, and those that are deprived of intellect. Hence he thus says, that nothing destitute of intellect, will be better than that which possesses it, the difference of these existing as in works, but there pre-existing according to cause.

Again however, let us survey how Plato says, that secondary energize on account of more principal causes, the latter being more perfect than the former, bul the former being suspended from the latter. Because indeed, the Dewmiurgus is good, on this account, he made the world to be most beautiful. For goodness is the cause of beauty. But because he made the universe to be most beautifal, he rendered it endued with intellect. And beauty fills the first intellect with its own power. Because also he made the universe to be endued with intellect, he imparted to it soul. For soul proceeds from intellect. Because likewise he rendered the world animated, he inserted life in that which was before moved in ' For uxeprepoy read νπερτεέρων. Tim. Plat. | Vou. I. 2U a confused and disorderly manner. For this being well arranged, is able to participate of soul, soul of intellect, and intellect of beauty. The whole world however, becomes most beautiful trom the good, and after this manner may be said to be a blessed God. The Demiurgus likewise, seems, in what is here said, to behold all the paradigms, which Plato calls naturally visible, not those only Which are in animal itself, but also such as are more partial than the four ideas which are there. Or how does he see some things which are the paradigms of intellective, but others which are the paradigms of unintellective natures, which are hot separated in animal itself?

But he mentions the forms of this animal itself, When be causes the universe to be an animal. For so far as it is an animal, iis the image of anunal itself, and so far also as it consists of four parts [i. e. of the four elements}. So far however, as it is now divided into intellectual, and non-intellectual beings, so far it entuely derives its subsistence from other paradigms more partial than those which exist according to the four ideas in animal itself, So that animal itself indeed, is a paradigm,\but every " paradigm

isnot *animalitself, Taving discussed these particulars however, let us proceed * It as impossible however, for intellect to accede without soul.” The intellectual essence indeed, is impartible, uniform and eternal, but the essence of bodies is partible and multiplied, and is consubsistent with temporal representation, These therefore, exist contrarily with reference to each other, and are in Want of a medium which may be able to collect them together; a medium, which is at one and the same time partible and impartible, composite and simple, eternal and generated. But according to Plato, the psychical order isa thing of this kind, intelligible, and atthe same time the first of generated natures, eternal and temporal, impartible and partible. If therefore, it is necessary that the universe should be endued with intellect, it is also necessary that itshould have a soul. For soul is the receptacle of intellect, and through it mitelicet: exhibits itself to the masses of the universe. Not that intellect is in wantol soul: for thus it would be less honorable? than soul; but that bodies * Tustead of τὸ δὲ παράδειγμα in this place, it seems necessary to read ray δὲ παραδειγμα, > Por os τὸ avrezwow here, it isnecessary to read vv τὸ avrozwor.

* Por cyryswreoos here, it ts necessary to read ariyuwrevos. pooK 11} TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 339 require soul, in order to their participation of intellect. For the last, and not the first of things, are in want of secondary ' natures, For the first of things are every Where present without a medium.’ Hence it is necessary to understand, thatthe soul which connects intellect witha sensible nature, ought to be intelleetual, and not deprived of intellect. For how can that which is destitute οὔ intellect be suspended from intellect?) But to these another medium will be requisite. The medium however, being a thing of this kind, will wisely and orderly govern every corporeal-formed nature. But it will imitate intellect, dancing as it were round it. If therefore, wholes are better than parts, things eternal, than such as subsist in time, and efficients than effects, it is necessary that the whole universe should be more divine than all the parts it contains. If therefore, certain animals in the world, which are partial, material and mortal, are naturally adapted to participate of intellect, what ought we to say of the whole world? Is it not, that the whole of it exhibits through the whole, the presence of intellect? For its figure, its order, and the measure of its powers, may be said to afford clear indications of intellectual inspection. If however, intellect presides over wholes, and governs the universe, it is necessary that there should be an intellectual soul in the middle of it, adorning and ruling over bodies, and at the same time separate from the subjects of its government, and filling all things with life, in order that the world may through it, be firmly established in intellect, and that intellect may illuminate the world. .

If you are willing, we will also recall to your recollection ’ what is written in the Philebus, where Socrates shows that the world possesses intellect and is animated, because that which is terrestrial in us is from the universe, and the fire which is in us is from the mundane fire, and in a similar manner the air and the water which we contain; and that it would be absurd that things less excellent in us should pre-exist in the whole, but that things more divine should not analogously pre-subsist in it, and that total intellect and total soul should not be contained in the universe. For either it must be said that no animal possesses intellect, or ifthere is a certain animal of this kind, it is absurd that it should * Instead of σωμάτων in this place, it is requisite to read δεντέρων. * viz. They are notin want of a medium inorder to be present every where: but the last of things require secondary natures as media, by which alone they can receive the illuminations of the first of things. 3 For ἀναμισθωμεν here, it is necessary to read avaprnobwyer. 340 PROCLUS ON THE [Book τι.

participate of intellect prior to the universe." For the universe is always arranged, and through the sameness of its subsistence, is nearer to an intellectual essence. But much of the disorderly and confused is inherent in partial animals. Much more therefore, must it be said, that soul is in the universe.” Hence Plato very divinely admits that there is a twofold intellect, the one being imparticipable and demiurgic, but the other participable, and inseparable ? [from its subject]. For from things which are in themselves, those which are in others, and are co-arranged with inferior natures, are derived. He also gives to the universe a twofold life, the one connascent, but the other separate; in order that the world may be an animal through the life which is in it, animated through an intellectual soul, and endued with intellect through much-honored intellect jisclf, But Aristotle only admits the half (of this doctrine of Plato}, since he takes away * imparticipable intellect from his philosophy.’ For the first: intellect with Jum, 15 the intellect of the inerratic sphere; but he cuts off the intellectual soul, which is the medium between intellect and the animated body of the universe 5 and immediately conjoins intellect with the living body. In addition to these things also he appears to me toerr in another particular, Por having placed intellect over the spheres, he does not establish the whole world in any intellect; but this is the most absurd ofall things; for how is the world one, unless one intellect hasdominion init?) What co-arrangement likewise is there of intellectual mulutade, unless it 1s suspended from a proper monad? Aud how are all things co-ordinated to an excellent condition of being, unless there isa certain common intellect of all mundane natures? For the intellect) of the inerratic sphere is the intelleet of that sphere

falone}; and this is also the case with the intellect of the solar, and of the lunar sphere, and in a similar manner of the Other spheres. Against Aristotle however, we have written a peculiar treatise about these particulars. With respect to Plato however, Is not his method admirable? For receiving the world, dividing it into parts, and surveying by itself that which js moved in " Tu the original ἢ ec ἐστι re wow τοιουτῶν, ατόπον. ἀλλ᾽ ore πρὸ τὸν παντὸς vou μέτεχειν. But it ts necessary to eapuage ad\, and by altering the punctuation, to read as follows: ἢ ecegrert ἔωον rowvror, arroy ore πρὸ τὸν παντος, KX. * The words ev τῷ marre εὐλ αι, are omitted inthe original, § Vor aywpnrus here, it 1» necessary to read aywperrer. 4 Forvoede here, read ἀφεῖλε. § Por an explanation of the intellect: to which Aristotle asceuded, also why he says nothing about that which is beyvnd intellect, and why he appears to dissent in many things from Plato, but does not in reality, see my Diasertation On the Philosophy of Aristotle. nook 11} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 311 a confused and disorderly manner, he stops it in his discussion, Just as in the Laws, wishing to show that the self-motive nature is the cause of all motion, he stops the whole heaven, and having stopped it, introduces soul into the universe, in order that by pouring forth an abundance of life, she may animate the world.

He likewise introduces intellect to soul, which governs the world, being converted to itself; through which the universe is moved in a circle, the whole is arranged, and the whole world is immovable. Since however, all these particulars give completion to one animal, and one nature, it is requisite that a collective and uniting cause of them should have a prior existence, and that this should be intellectual. For to comprehend wholes collectively and at once, and to bring them together, to the completion of one thing, is the work of an intellectual cause. Hence, Plato establishing imparticipable prior to participable intellect, and placing the causes of all things in it, he produces from thence, intellects, souls and bodies, from which he gives completion to the sensible world. ‘That it is necessary therefore, that the universe should participate of an intellectual soul, if it participates of intellect, is evident from what has been said. For this soul is the bond of the extremes which are contrary to each other.

But it must also be demonstrated that the converse is true; viz. that an intellectual soul existing in the universe, it is necessary that there should be an intellect of the universe. For since it is said that this soul is intellectual, it is likewise necessary that it should participate of intellect. Whether therefore, does it alone participate of the whole of intellect, or does it participate of it through a certain thing in itself derived fromit? But if indeed, that which is corporeal immediately participates of the fountain of souls, and not through that which is in itself, it will be also requisite to admit, that the same thing takes place in the whole soul (of the universe]. If however, there is in the Demiurgus the fountain of souls, and there is also the fountain of the soul of the universe, and the universe participates through the latter of the former, it is likewise necessary that the soul itself of the universe, should be entirely suspended from imparticipable intellect through participable intellects. dor as the body of the universe is to its soul, so is the soul or it to intellect. And if indeed, so far as it is soul it becomes intellectual,' it would be necessary that every soul should be the same [i. e. should be

* Instead of και et μεν abe voepa, ψνχη ywera, in this place, it is necessary to read, και εἰ μεν cabo ψνχη, voepa γινεται. 342 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 1. intellectual]. But if it becomes intellectual through the participation of intellect, it is necessary that it should participate of an intellect commensurate to it. A thing of this kind however, is not intellect itself, but that which is a medium between intellect itself and soul, which has intellectual perception adscititious. This intellect also is a certain intellect, and is essentially intellect, and not becoming to be so, like soul; for it is better than soul. But by being! a certain intelleet, itis co-ordinate with soul. For intellect itself is intellect by eristing, and not by becoming to be, and intellect which is simply so by its very being, is superior to a co-ordination with soul. Ifalso you consider, that every monad constitutes a multitude similar to itself, a divine monad, a divine multitude, a psychical monad, a psychical multitude, just as an intellectual monad produces an intellectual multitude, and that secondary orders always participate of the natures prior to themsclyves, it is necessary these things being admitted, that there should be a certain intellect of the whole world. For it is necessary that an intellectual soul should participate of intellect. But if some one should say, it’ participates of the intellect which ranks as a whole, it is absurd. For this intellect will not be the Demiurgus of all things And if it) parUcipates of a certain other intellect, this is the intelleet of the universe, and that which is properly participated, as giving completion to the universe in conjunction with soul. But the intellect which ranks as a whole, is so participated by, as illuminating the soul of the universe. Mf therefore intellect presides over Wholes, the universe is animated ; but if the universe is animated, it is also

“Through this reasoning process therefore, placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, he fabricated the universe.” In the first place, it is requisite to sce what this intellect is, and whether it is essential, established above soul, or a certain intellectual habit of soul. From analogy however, it may be inferred that it is essential. For as intellect is to soul, so is soul to body, But soul does not so subsist with reference to body, as tobe ahabit ofits and therefore neither is intellect a habit of κοι], This like- ' For ro δε ris είναι, read τῳ δε res εἰναι. , * viz. The intellect participated by soul, will not be the Demiurgus of all things. For the demiurgic is an imparticipable intellect, or in other words, is not consubsistent with soul, wise, may be inferred from the final cause. For Plato says that soul was constituted on account of intellect.". But the converse is not true. If however. soul is for the sake of intellect, but intellect is that for the sake of which soul subsists, intellect is not a habit; for no where*® does essence subsist on account of habit. And inthe third place, the Demiurgus constitutes this intellect; but the soul as Plato says, gives subsistence to the intellect which is according to habit, throneh the motion of the circle of sameness about the intelligible. For fas he adds] through this motion, imtelleet and scicnce are necessarily produced, Liow therefore does the Demiurgus constitute prior to soul, that to which soul herself gives subsistence?

To which we may add, that it is right to assume, that in the Demiurgus there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect, as Socrates says in the Philebus, subsisting according to the reason of cause [or causally]; and that according to these fountains of these two-fold genera, the Demiurgus now places intellect in soul, and soul in body, not because better are in less excellent natures, nor that intellect is in want of a certain seat, or that the soul of the universe is in a certain thing, For these things are unworthy of wholes and divine essences; through which the world is called by Plato, a blessed God. Because however, we conceive of the nature of things in a two-fold respect, either according to their progression, or according to their conversion; hence, when we survey their progression, we begin from first natures, and say that causes are in their effects. But we assert the converse of this, when we survey their conversion. For then we say that the things caused ’ exist in their causes. This second mode therefore, Plato delivers to us shortly after, when he places body in soul, and analogously soul in body. Now, however, treating of tie mode of progression, he places intellect in soul, because the whole of it has the form of intellect, and nothing pertaining to it can be assumed, which is not under the dominion of an intellectual nature.

But soul in body, because this according to the whole of itself participates of soul, and no part of it can be assumed which is inanimate; but even that which is deprived of its proper life, so faras it isa part of the universe, is animated, For as we say that providence proceeds every where, and is every where because itis present with all things, and leaves nothing destitute of itself; after the same manner likewise, we say that intellect is in

' For δια νὸν here, it is necessary to read δια your, * After ovsapou in this place, it requisite to supply yap. 7 For ra aria here, it is necessary to read ra acriara. 344 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 11. soul, as circularly illuminating the whole of it, and soul in body, because it is present with the whole of it. Nor docs Plato speak after this manner, and Orpheus after another; but fit be reyuisite to give my opinion, the conceptions of the theologist become manifest through what is here said. For Ippa who is the soul of the universe, and is thus called by the theologist, perhaps because her intellectual conceptions are essentialized in the most vigorous motions, or perhaps on aceount of the most rapid lation of the universe, of which she is the cause,—placing a testaceous vessel on her head, and encircling the fig leaves that bind her temples, with a drazon, receives Dionysius (or Bacchus}. For with the most divine part of herself, she becomes the receptacle of an intellectual essence, and receives the mundane intellect, which proceeds into her from the thigh of Jupiter. For there it was united with Jupiter, but proceeding from thence and becoming participable by her, it clevates her to the intelligible, and to the fountain of her nature. For she hastens to the mother of the Gods, and to mount Ida," from which all the series of souls is derived, Hence also, Ippa is said to have received Dionysius when he was brought forth from Jupiter.

For as Plato before observed, it is impossible fur intellect to accede to any thing without soul, But this is similar to what is asserted by Orpheus ; by whom also Dionysius is called the sweet offspring of Jupiter. This however, isthe mundane intellect, which proceeds into light conformably to the intellect: that abides in Jupiter. hus too, the divinely-delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] says, that the world derives its completion from these three things (viz. from intellect, soul amd body}. Soul therefore says [in the Chaldean Oracles,] concerning Jupiter fabricating the universe : +} soul reside after the paternal conceptions, hot, and animating all things.’ For the father of Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul he deposited in sluggish body.” Plato likewise, bears testimony tu the Oracles, when he calls the Demiurgus father, and represents him yvenerating souls, and sending them into the generation of men according to the first life. And thus much concerning these particulars. Since however, us we have said, both soul and intellect give completion to one animal, Plato appears tome to use very appropriately the words to constitute and co-fabricate, through the common preposition σὺν in both,

* For Aawy in this place, 1 read Aueor. 2 je. To the region of ideas, and an intelligible nature, 3 For θερῴηχόνσα here, read θερμὴ ψυχώνσα. soon kl TIMEUS OF PLATO. 519 exhibiting the union of the universe. For by always making diviner to be more comprelensive than less excellent natures, he causes the world to become one ; but through the forms in each he manifests in the one composition, but in the other “Tn order that itmight become most beautiful according to nature, and the most excellent work.” In what is here said, Timeus recurs to the principle from which all the beforementioned particulars were deduced. For the world has arrangement on aecount of soul, soul subsists on account of intellect, but intellect: proceeds into the universe on account of intelligible beauty, and the world participates of this in order that it may also participate of the one ; and this is the end to it of its composition, that it may be rendered most beautiful and the best. But it becomes most beautiful indeed, on account of the beautifying cause which subsists in the intelligible, but the best, or most excellent, on account of the fountain of good. For the good is the most excellent of all things. And through all these, the world becomes most similar to the Demiurgus. For he was called by Timaus most excellent. IIe however, is the best of demiurgic causes, just as the good is simply most excellent, existing beyond all the divine causes.

But the world is the most excellent work, for itis a fabrication. Vor here also the world participates of deity ; since the goodness which is above intellect is deity ; and on this account the world ts denominated most excellent. In an admirable manner Plato likewise, does not -peak of the deity of the world in the same way as concerning intellect and soul, viz. as acceding after intellect. For the union of intellect with its proper deity is ineflable, and itellect itself being divine proceeds from the father, which also is the peculiarity of total production. For as intellect indeed, it derives its subsistence from the total fabrication, but as a divine intellect, from deity.’ Plato therefore, does not make a division into deity and intellect, in consequence of constituting the intellect of the world from the father. What however, is the ~ meaning here of according to nature? Perhaps this is significant of order, according to which the universe is likewise enabled to participate of divine beauty ; and therefore will be the same with according to order. Perhaps also it manifests to us, that

* Instead of axo rns odns hicre, I read axorys Ocoryros. Tim. Plat. Vou. 1, +e ξ ; the Demiurgus makes by his very being, and produces both intellect and soul from his essence. And it is not improbable that it is used, because this fabrication, the universe, is complicated with nature, and the most beautiful here is not of such a kind as that which 15. better than nature ; but that which is above nature, is as it were mingled with nature, and intellectual with physical entities. ‘Thus therefore, it is necessary to say, according to assimilative reasoning, that this world was gencrated an animal, possessing in trath for reality) soul and intellect through the providence of God.” As the world itself is mingled, being composed of images and divine essences, of physical and supernatural things, thus also Plato calls the discussion of it assimilative, and again truth. For according to that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, it requires assimilative reasoning, but according to the intellectual essence which is init, it requires truth, and also according to the divine cause from which it proceeds. Hence Plato, when about to speak con- cerning the world adds the word assiuilative, or probable, but the word truth,

when about to speak concerning the providence of divinity, Farther still, you may perceive both assimilation and trathin the speaker himself; not only dividing these conformably to the nature of things. For he frequently apprehends the fubrication of things in a partible manner, assuming reasonings, divisions and com- positions, though all things subsist at once in divine production, And frequently, ᾿ he recurs to the whole intelligence of the father, asin the axioms, ‘de was good,” and “it netther was nor will be lawful for that which is most excellent to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful.” Vor in the former of these his apprehension is assimilative [but in the latter, comes into contact with truth). For from the multiform knowledges that are in us, he indicates what pertains to divine and demiurgic intelligence. But how, say they, dues he detine the universe to be an animal animated, or possessing soul, and endued with intellect ; for it seems indeed, that ἀνέρα is a certain part, but anated agenus? In answer to this, it is necessary to recall to our memory those Platonists who say, that animal extends as far as to plants themselves, and to sce how, according to. this ductrines every thing animated is an animal, but not every animal is animated. For intelligible animal is beyond the causes of soul. For as Plato calls the rational soul an aninal! but also arranges lite after the rational soul, he very pro-

* Zwov is omitted here in the original, ee a Sea ita renner ieee ROOK 11. ΤΙΜ δ OF PLATO, 347 perly denominates every thing animated an animal, but not vice versa. If however, this be the case, having said that the world is an animal, since there is an intelligible animal, and also a sensible animal participating of a rational soul, he properly adds, that itis animated. And since of souls, one kind is endued with intellect, but another is deprived of it, in addition to the universe being animated, he likewise asserts that it possesses intellect. For it seems, that animal indeed, accedes from the first intelligible," and thus also from the intelligible father, who is prior to the intellectual Gods. But the animated accedes from the middle cause, both the triadic and the hebdomadic.’ And the possession of intellect accedes from the intellectual father Jupiter]. For if you survey these as with “reference to the Demiurgus alone, according to the paradigm which is in’ him, the universe is rendered an animal; but according to his royal soul, animated ; and according to his royal intellect, endued with intellect. All these however, Plato comprehends unitedly in the words, “ through the providence of God.” For from thence the universe is rendered an animal, anda blessed God,‘ becoming perfect through the providence of divinity. You may also sce how the discourse proceeds from goodness through will, and ends in providence.

For will indeed, is suspended from goodness, and providence from will. And the universe is generated, on account of the providence, the will, and the goodness of the father ; the last of these being essence prior to essence [i. e. being superessential essence], the second, being as it were power prior to powers, and the first, energy prior to energies, Tor these pertain to the Gods so far as they are Gods. For goodness indeed is unific of essence, and is the flower of it ; but willis the measure of power ; and providence is an energy prior to intellect. For this I think, the very name itself manifests... We therefore thus distinguish animal and animated.

lamblichus however, arranges animal, with every thing that has life, but animafed, with the peculiar participation of souls. And perhaps he also, through the ‘i.e. Fromro er ov, or from being characterized by the one, and which is the summit of the intelligible order. * ice. From animal itself or Phanes, the extremity of the intelligible order. dice. The animated accedes from the life, which is in the order called intelligible, and at the same lime intellectual, and also from the life which is in the intellectual order, which life is the middle cause ia both these orders. * For καὶ δαιίμὼν in this place, read ευδαιμων. S ice. ilporoa providence, is au energy πρὸ νὸν prior to intellect. 448 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 11. possession of life indeed, comprehends intelligible animals, but through the animated sensible animals alone. But it may be inferred, that the world is an animal from its sympathy; that it is animated, from its perpetual motion; and that itis endued with intellect, from its excellent order. Lor if according to this, mortal’ are co-passive with celestial natures, and the latter impart an effluxion to the former, the universe is one animal connected and contained by one life. For if this life were not common there would not bea sympathy of the parts in it. Jor sympathy is effected through a participation ef the same nature. And if the world is perpetually moved, itis governed by soul. For every body which is itself moved inwardly by itself, is animated; but the body which is moved externally, is inanimate. If therefore, the universe Is always moved, what is it which moves it? For this is either immoveable, or self-motive. Butitis not lawful for the immoveable cause of motion to approach without a medium to things which are moved by something different from themselves. Hence, it remains, that the selfmotive nature is that which always moves the world. But this is soul. The world therefore is animated.

Moreover, in the third place, if? the universe is always arranged, and if all things are co-ordinated to well-being, and there is nothing adventitious in’ the polity of the world, intellect governs the world. For the connexion, the order, and the sacred Jaws of the natures contained in it, bring with them manifest syinbols of intellectual government. Aristotle also, in another way shows this, when he says that of animated natures, animals have the left hand and the right, but plants have the upwards and downwards, and also the meht hand and the left, so that the world is animated and an animal. But it is likewise endued with intellect. Por that which moves itis intellect. According to both plilosophers therefore, the world is an animal animated and endued with intellect ; except indeed, that according to Aristotle, it is animated, as having an inseparable lite; for he does not admit that 1 has an intellectual soul, bat that it has an intellect above soul, and which is essentially suspended from another intelli gible animal For what) Plato calls animal itself, he calls eternal animal, as an his Metaphysics, when he says, “ We say that God ts an eternal animal.” And in short, since there are in the world things that are moved, and things that are immoveable, things which are always one or the other of these, and things which

are sometimes in motion, and sometimes are tmmoveable, itis necessary that the ' Ttis necessary here, to supply ra Oynra. * Fe is omitted here in the orginal. causes of both these should preside over the world. Soul therefore is the cause of motion; on which eccount also Plato in the Laws admitting [for the sake ot arument] the universe to be immoveable, gives motion to it by the introduction of soul, Andinthe Phaedrus taking away soul, he makes all things to stand still. But itis evident that intellect belongs to immoveable natures. And beings that are always moved, are moved about those that are immoveable, and on accomnt of the permaneney of the latter, the former are perpetually moved. Hleuce it entirely follows, that there is a mundane intellect above soul. By no means therefore, must that which Chrysippus devised, be ascribed to the world. For he confounded imparticipable with participable * causes, by supposing them to be the same with each other, and also the divine, and the intelleetual, the immaterial and the material. For the same God, and who according to him is the tirst God, pervades through the world, and through matter, and is both soul and nature inseparable from the subjects of his government. Plato however, establishing prior to the whole world three causes, goodness, intelligible animal, and the demiurgic intellect, imparts from these to the world in the first place, a perfect intellect always fixed in energy, exempt from matter, and full of undefiled intellections.

In the second place, a divine intellectual soul, evolving the essence of this one intellect, dancing round it, and convolving the universe. In the third place, a union of the total essences in the world, and one deity and eoodness, connecting all the mundane multitude, and causing itto be one. And in the fourth place, a providence extending to all things its inspective care, subsisting likewise from itself, and causing itself to be exempt trom all the subjects of its government.

Since however, as we have before observed, it is necessary to survey the procressions and the conversions of wholes, both these are accomplished by Plato. For he delivers the progressions of them when he says that the Demiurgus placed intellect in soul, and soul in body ; but their conversions, when beginning from the world, he calls itan animal animated, and endued with intellect, and connects it through soul with intellect, which is the peculiar work of conversion. And in the last place, he reiers the composition of the world to the demuiurgic providence, through which conversion is imparted to all things. For goodness indeed, unites the Demiurzgus to te exe. But will supplies wholes with good. And providence converts all things to de good. For, as we have said, goodness is * [tis necessary liere to supply καὶ peGexras. 450 PROCLUs ON THE [Βοοκ lt, analogous to essence, will to power, and providence to energy ; because the first indeed, establishes all things; the second moves them to progression; and the third recalls them according to the retrogression of all things to that which is prior to intellect. If however, the Demiurgus adorns the universe on account of coodness, but through adorning it causes it to possess intellect, and to be animated, and doing these things, eflects them on account of providence, (for these were generated through the providence of God)—if this be the case, itis necessary that it should be the same thing to produce onaccount of goodness as on account of providence.

And this very properly, because providence is the energy of goodness. So that according to Plato, providence is nothing else than an energy conformable to good, For in our concerns also, we say that to provide for some one, is to be the cause of good to the object of our pros idential care. Not only, therefore, must providence be detined to be that which converts all things to the first, but also to be that the energy of which extends to all things, and which adorns all things according to one union. And this is in reality providence, the communication of good to all things, the conversion of all things to and the participation of the wiver (of every good), who imparts to every thing that which it is able to receive. It is requisite likewise to remember what the Cheronean (Plutarch) says about the name of providence, as that which Plato exhorts us to conceive of as something divine. If also the Demiurgus is intellect, and providence so far as he has something which is better than intellect, he has deservedly this name, on account of an energy which is above intellect. For all things aspire after good, but all things do not aspire after intellect. For such things as are perfectly destitute of intellect do not desire it, lest their desire should be in vain, or they should be deprived of the end [which is their proper good}.

And because he is providence indeed, he is suspended from the good itself; but because he is intellect be is suspended from the first intellect, For the first intellect (i.e, Saturn] is not that which intellectually sees and fabricates, but that which alone intellectually perceives; and on this account, it is a pure intellect, as we learn from the Cratylus. Hence also, according to Plato, the latter may be said to be orice," as having one energy directed to himself: bat the former Gece, dogethor with ΠΝ energy ΘΟ ΟΝ ing also w power fabricative of the universe, and not: only lovinhatively regulating: things, posterior to himself, but also abiding in his own accustomed manner, as Plato says shortly after.

* Proclus says this, alluding to the Chaldean oracles, in which Saturn is called ence beyond, and Jupiter twice beyond. “This being determined, let us consider what is consequent to these things; viz. according to the similitude of what animal, the constituting artificer constituted the world.” Plato clearly exhibits to us through what is here said the connexion of the problems, and the suspension of secondary from primary natures. For the words, “ this being determined,” and ‘ let us consider what is consequent to these things,” indicate the connexion of what has been with what will be said; and that through the truth of the former, the latter receive the principle of investigation. For since it has been shown that the universe was rendered an animal conformably to the providence of God, it is necessary that it should be assimilated to intelligible animal. For where did the Demiurgus look when he made the world to be an animal, except to the intelligible? Por it was one of the things pre-demonstrated, that the world being most beautiful, was generated according to an eternal paradigm. If therefore, the Demiurgus making it to be an image of the intelligible, constituted it an animal, the paradigm itself will be an intelligible animal, For if that was not an animal, how could that which was generated an image of itt be rendered an animal? For so far as it is similar to that, it was generated an animal.

For it is sensible indeed, not as similar and separate [but as visible and tangible}. These however, (i. e. visibility, and tangibility,] it obtains through a corporeal nature. But it is an animal, as being similar to intelligible animal. And if itis similar, it is from thence allutted the morphe of animal. For images also, have not only their forms, but their appellations, so far as they are formalized, from their paradigms. So that if life 15 imparted to the world through the paradigm, it is also similarly called an animal and animated from it, because the cause of its whole animation pre-exists in intelligibles. For the same reason likewise, itis endued with intellect. It may however, in a greater degree be called an animal, on account of the most principal cause, because the paradigm is the cause of animation, of the supply of intellect, and as I may say, of all life. For every thing enducd with intellect, is also animated, and every thing animated ts also an anunal ; but the converse is not true. For every animal is not animated. For that

* Instead of πως τον ro exewo yeyovos εἰκων in this place, it is necessary to read πων τὸ κει ον yeyorns «ιλων. * The words αλλ᾽ ws eparov καὶ axroy are omitted in the original, but, as it appears to me, ought to be inserted, 452 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 11. which participates of a rational soul is animated. Nor ts every thing which is. animated endued with intellect. For the genus of men that participate of intellect, is small ; so that animal 1s more comprehensive than all the rest. And with those things indeed, with which the rest are present, animal also is present; but it is not necessary that the rest showld be inherent in those things with which this is present, That however, which iy more comprehensive, is nearer to the first prin- ciple. But that which is nearer? to it, is of a more causal nature, since the first principle 15 the cause of all beings. That Plato also? not only knew intelligible animal, but also the intelligible animated, ἰδ manifest from what he says in the Sophista, Por placing tite and soul in being, and wishing likewise to give to it motion, he adds, * But that which hay intellect and soul, if it ts not animated, must

remain entirely immoveable.” Wence there are, intelligible life, and intelligible animal; the cause of soul, and the animated ; the cause of intellect, and that which is endued with intellect. And animal itself is beyond all the intelligible paradigms. Hence, Plato says, that the discussion of the similitude of the world to intelligible animal, is consequent to the problem concerning the composition of it. For because the universe being assimilated according to the form itself of similitude, was rendered an animal by the Demiurgus, ἐλ may more properly be called an animal, with reference to which the aniverse was generated an animal. For it exists as an animal on account of the intelligible, and not on account of that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner. [1 ts necessary however, that animal should be present with the universe, either from matter or from form; so that if the world is not an animal from its subject matter, itis so from form. If however from form, that which is primanly animal is the cause to it of form. It remains therefore, to survey in the next place after this problem, to what animal the universe is assimilated. For that it is assimilated, is evident from what has been already said, but to what it 15 assimilated, must next be considered. For there is a multitude of intelligible animals, which Plato also indicating, inquires to what animal the Demiurgus constituted the world similar. Por beginning supernally from intelligibles, animal proceeds through all the middle

orders τ in one of these orders, subsisting intelligibly alone; in another intelligibly " For avOpwxwe yap yevos, poayyu ἐστιν οὐ μετέχον, it is necessary to read, αὐ flpwawy yap 7Ev0s, ἤραχυ ἐστιν του vou μετέχον. Vor Plato says this in the latter part of this Dialogue. * For αλλον here, it is obviously requisite to read ey yurepor. nook We] TIMEUS OF PLATO, 353 indeed, but as in intelligibles and intellectuals ; and) in another intellectually alone. And in one of these orders indeed, animal subsists intellizibly alone, but as in intellectuals; but in another vitally. And thus in each of the intellects there is intelligible animal, subsisting appropriately in each. For every intellect has a conjoined intelligible. Very properly therefore, does Plato investigate what kind of animal is the paradigm of the universe, whether it is super-mundane, or intellectual only, or intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, or intelligible only. For the nature of animal’ proceeds according to all the orders of intellect. But Plato admits that the differences always subsist in the first animal itself: according to union, and gives a progression to them according to appropriate numbers. For as the first animalis tetradic, thus a different animal is defined

according to a diflerent number. And in those things in which there is the same number, in these there is a variety of subsistence according to the peculiarities of animals, Lor itis necessary that in animal also, there should be the monadic prior to the multiplied ; because this * is more allied to (he onc. And universally, every divine multitude begins from a monad. As therefore, the Demiurgus is the monad of all eflective causes, though the effective peculiarity is in many Gods, thus also animal itself is the monad of all animals; in which Tihewise the most total paradigms of mundane natures, and the one cause of the whole world pre- Whi. however, some one may say, does Plato call the intelligible paradigm animal? Because itis the supplier of life, as T have before observed 5 and because it generates the causes of the whole vivilie series, and the fountains themselves of lite. Because likewise, itis replete with the first and intelligible life. For the one being, or being characterized by the one, is beyond life. But the middle order of intellizibles is the first life, and is one and infinite. Animal itself) however, being full of intelligible life, is very properly called animal. For as it is eternal, on account of being filled from eternity, thus also it is aw animal, on account of its reception of life. For it ts intelligible, as being arranged [immediately} after intelligible lite. Tt is therefore called an animal, not as sensitive, nor as having impulse, but as being vital. For every thing which lives, is according to Plato, an animal.‘ For because it has life, says Timeus, it may be justly called ananimal.” Hence also, Plato calls plants and seeds animals, characterizing the

' For ἢ τὸν vow gums here, it is necessary to read ἡ τὸν ὥνου peas. * For roury here, read τοῦτον Zim. Plat. Vor. J. Ye ὦ animal by vitality. If therefore, the intelligible paradigm lives, as being eternal ; for eternity, as Plotinus says, is the life of all things, so that the eternal lives κα and if every thing that lives is an animal, hence the intelligible paradigm is an animal. And you may from hence assume that this paradigm is in the third trad of intelligibles. For it ig not in the first triad; for this is prior to life. Nor is it in the second ; for this is life. Hence it isin the third. For it does not exist out of intelligibles; since Plato on this' account alone calls the paradigm intelligible, though he knew the super-mundane demiurgic intellect. But neither does he call the latter intellizible, nor the former intellectual. Before therefore, he assumed every thing which perpetually exists as the paradigm of all generation ; among which eternally existing beings, animal itself and the Demiurgus are included ; for each of these always is. Eternity likewise, which is the first thing that always is, and the one being itself, which is eternal being according to cause, are in the number of eternally existing beings. Now, however, he calls animal itself the paradigin of the world considered as living. Fur perpetual being was the paradigm of disorderly generation ;

since from thence, forms without distinction, were present with the disorderly nature, prior to the generation of the universe. But though we should assume animal itself, which has the forms of the elements, this also is te paradigm of the vestizes of the elements. So far, however, as it 1s animal, it is the paradigm of this universe now possessing life. So that simply considered, animal itself, and the intelligible paradigm are not the same. For eternity likewise, which always exists, is the paradigm of time, but is not an intelligible animal 5 since not every paradigin is an animal belonging to the intelligible order. But if animal itself is eternal, eternity is prior to it, whichis not an animal, For prior to animal itself, there is no other animal ; since neither prior to any other of those things to which we apply the term itself, is there a certain -form prior to it. As therefore, eternity is prior to animal itself, not being yet an animal, so hkewise, being itself is prior to eternity. Hence also eternity is that which is being, and is a certain being, Animal itself therefore, is the third intelligible triad, concerning which the (Chaldean] Oracles say, “ It is the operator, and the giver of life- bearing fire. It fills the vivific bosom of Hecate,? and pours on the Synoches the fertile strength (in fireendned with mighty power.” For all these assertions in no respect differ frorn saying that all-perfect intelligible animal is the fountain of all intellectual

’ For δια re here, it is necessary to read δια rovro. ? For exaorns here, read Exarns. nook 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 335 lite, and the cause of every paradigmatic hyparxis, And thus much concerning this particular. With respect to the words of the text, “fo constitute in the similitude,” manitests that the universe is in the highest degree assimilated to its paradigm. For not every image is constituted in similitude, but that alone which is perfectly similar ; since this is not the case, where dissimilitude predominates. Vor then similitude is not the end. But the words, “the constituting artificer constituted,” clearly demonstrate to us, that the Demiurgus of the universe makes by his very being, and. possesses energy essentially, For Plato does not call him in one way, and the effective energy proceeding from him in another, but he calls both by one name. Farther still, the words likewise appear to signify, that the Demiurgus always produces, and that he always produces perfectly. Tor the word constituting, Manifests an ever-present making; but the word constituted, an all-perfect making, and which is suspended from its cause. But by the conjunction of both these expressions, itis very manifest that the maker of the universe generates eternally all things, his productive energy neither commencing, nor ending at

“ We must not therefore assert, that he thought it would be adequate to its dignity, to assimilate it to any one of the animals which naturally exist in the form of apart. For that which is similar to an impertect thing, can never at any time become beautiful.” As there are many intelligible animals, some of which are more total, but others more partial,’ some of which are united, but others disided, and some are detined according to bound, but others according to infinity; Plato inquiring what the all-perfect paradigm of the universe is, and from what intelligible animal the world is suspended, thinks that no partial animal ought to be placed in this order. For each of these is imperfect as with reference to the whole. For it is possible for the imperfect to be so called in a twofold respect, either with reference to its own nature, or with reference to that which is better and more causal, And the former indeed, it is not even lawful to conceive of divine natures. For each has the measure of itself eternally, and its own proper good always exerted. For, as Socrates says in the Republic, each of them is most excellent in its own

‘It is obviously necessary in this place, to supply the words, των δὲ μερικωτερων. order. But the latter ranks, as it is said, among the things that are usual. For as in the Banquet, Plato calls that which is not primarily beautiful, but participates of beauty, indigent of beauty, thus also he calls that an imperfect animal which is not the first animal, nor animal itself, but is such by participation, and subsists according to a progression from that which is first. If therefore, every partial animal is imperfect, but the paradigm of the world is all-perfect, the paradizm of the world will not be a partial amimal. Por whether does the Demiurgus intelleetually perceive this all-perfect and first animal, or not? It is impossible indeed, that he should not intellectually perceive those things which we perceive when our soul energizes intellectually. But if he thus sees it, and all intellectual perception of the Demiurgus is production or making, it is necessary that he should make: δ; by intellectual perception itself. What therefore can he make more divine than the universe? For he will not make any thing of a less excellent nature, when looking to that which is more excellent. Very properly therefore, does Plato when investizating the paradigmatic principle of the world, recur to all-perfect animal,

What then, some one may say, are not the sun and moon and each of the stars beautiful? But how is this possible? For each of these is assimilated to a partial animal. To this we reply, that each of these is beautiful, when surveyed in conjunction with the whole, and co-arranged with the whole: just as the eye and the chin are beautiful, in conjunction with the whole face, and while in the whole ; but surveyed by themselves apart from the face, do not extibit the beauty which is adapted to them. For in subsisting as a part and not as a whole, cach when essentially divulsed fromthe whole, sutters a diminution of its own proper beauty. The pertect therefore, and the beautiful are present with these which are parts, on account of the whole. ‘The cause, however, of this, says Porphyry 15, that in intelligible forms the part isa whole.t | For all such things are in each partially, as are in the whole all-perfectly, on account of the union of intelligible forms. And the asseruon is indeed true, that each of the parts in them is in a certain respect a whole, each receiving the form of whole, and becoming essentially united on account of its Communicating with all, and being all things according to participation. Nevertheless the wholeness of it subsists partially, and not like that wholeness which is simply a whole. For itis one thing to be alter a solar manner a whole, or to be so after a lunar manner, in consequence of cach.

* Instead of ro cNoy μέρὺς ἐστιν, it is necessary to read ro pepos ὑλὺν Core. - -τοτοτεςσσ σα καιοαταξυς intellect possessing all things ina way adapted to itself, one form having dominion, which makes the intellect to be such an intellect, and a certain intellect; and another thing to be all things, without a partial peculiarity, being all things so far asintellect, and not so far asa particular kind of intellect. What) then, are not these also generated according to intelligible paradigms, viz. the san and moon and each of the stars? How therefore, are these beautitul? To this we reply, that these are beautiful, but not most beautiful. Butthe world is that which is truly most beautifal. As therefore each of these is perfect, but not all-perfect, so likewise each is beautifal, but not ke the universe most beautiful. For that each of these is perfect, Plato manifests farther on, when he says, “ that the world was generated perfect from things perfect, anda whole framwholes.” Uence the perfection of the whole is one thing, and ofthe part another. And the wholeness of the all-perfect is different from the wholeness of that which is only perfect. The beauty likewise which is in the most beautiful is one thing, but that which receives a more partial partictpation of beauty, is another. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

The words however, {in the form of a part,” may be easily understood, if they are considered as signifying the same as, in the order of a part. And this is the same with, fecoming a part. But the divine Tamblichas thinks fit to add the conjunction «sto the words inthe form, and to understand the whole as implying that every partial animal in intelligibles, naturally exists as in the form of a part. For since part in them is not such as it is in sensibles 3 since each is there according to its own order all such things as the whole is; on this account the philosopher adds, asin the form, in order that surveying the appellation of part ina manner adapted to forms, we may not understand it as a thing attended with interval, and susceptible of division, and thus relinquish the union of united and impartible essences. For these according to the philosopher himself are impartible and united. But with respect to the word “ naturally,” we wust not now understand by it according to nature, but the being cssentalized. For all essences ure Sroquently called natures, as by Socrates in the Philebus, when he says,“ hence, in the nature of Jupiter you may say, that there isa royal soul, and a royal intellect, according to the reason of cause.” But the words, “ he thought it would be adequate touts divnity,’ are said as if spoken in conjunction with the Demiurgus, and as truly apprehending the dignity of a divine cause. For he who mystically narrates the evempt and all-perfect intellectual conceptions of a divine nature, has an arrangement in conjunction with him. And the words, “ for that which is similar to an imperfect thing can never be beautiful,” is indeed true, but is attended with a doubt.

For if in that whichis a whole one thing 15 more, but another less excellent, must not the whole become inferior to its more excellent part, by the addition of that which is less excellent? But the doubt may be solved by observing, that the co-arrangement of the less with the more excellent makes the whole to be one and perfect, but when they are not conzlomerated with cach otber, then the mixture of the less diminishes the power of the more excellent nature, If however, some one should make a syllogism from opposites, through what is here, and what has been before said, so as to infer that every thing which is generated according to an eternal, is not generated according to an eternal paradigm, we may solve the objection by observing that what 15 employed by the objector as the middle term, isnot so. For in one place, the words “in order that it might be beautiful,” manifest that which is beautiful, whether ina certain respect, or simply ; but in another place, they manifest that which is most beautiful. For a part has indeed the beauty of a part, but simply considered, is not beautiful. But that alone is absolutely beautiful which is a whole, to which also the beauty of the parts contributes 5 this beauty pertaining to certain things, and being itself a cerfain (and not atoiversal) thing. For every part is for the sake of another thing, 1.

δὶ the whole, and the beauty which it possesses has the order of matter with reference to the beauty of the whole. Hence itis not so beautiful as to be most beautiful. From what has been said, those assertions Likewise may be confuted, which mnake the good to be a certain intelligible form and not prior to all intelligibles. For if it is a certain form, itis also a part of the whole intelligible profundity in which it subsists. But every part, as it is here said, is imperfect; so that the good likewise is imperfect. How therefore being imperfect is it the most happy of all things? In reality also that which is sinjjlar to it is not beautiful. Nor are all beings similarly with reference to it, either more good, more beautiful. “Uf therefore the good being a part, will suffer things of this 7 it will not be a part of the intelligible. Moreover, neither 15 it the whole of the intelligible. For being the whole of the intelligible, over what will it still reign? = Since neither is the sun which has an arrangement analogous to the good" the whole of that which is visible. It is necessary therefore, that the good should be beyond the intelligible, and be neither a part nor the whole of it. Neither therefore, will either animal itself, or the Demiurgus be the same with ¢he good ; since each of

these is a certain whole comprehensive of all forms. * For τ᾽ ἀγαθὸν bere, read τ᾽ αγαῦφ. een] TIMEUS OF PLATO. 359 “ But we should admit it to be the most similar of all things to that animal of which other animals, both according to one, and according to genera, are parts.” Some, as Atticus, assert that this “ according to one, andaccording to genera,” gives a division to individual opposite to that of more common forms. But they call individual forms those that are proximate, and the causes of individuals; such for instance as man itself, horse itself, and each of such-like forms. And they denominate genera the more total and comprehensive paradigms of these. Others again, as Amelius, say that Plato by these words, distinguishes that which is particular from things that are more common. For some things are paradigms of parts, but others of forms, Theodorus also, following Amelius, says there are twofold intellects, one of these being divided into wholes, but the other into parts. And that these are the same with, “ according to genera, and according to one.” But others, as Nenarchus, assert, that according to genera inanifests the pre-existent intelligible causes of animals; such for instance as the celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial, which are shortly after mentioned by Timeus. And that by “ according to one,” the formalizing principles in each of these many are indicated. For in celestial natures, the paradigm of the sun is different from the paradigm of the moon.

In terrestrial natures, the paradigm of men is different from that of ions. And in a similar manner in the natures which have an intermediate subsistence. The divine Iamblichus however, turns into a path of interpretation contrary to all these. For they indeed make the “ according to one,” subordinate to, and more partial than, “ according to genera ;” but he, on the contrary, makes it to be more venerable, as it is fit that in intelligibles unity should precede multitude. He says therefore, that all other animals are the parts of animal itself, both according to one, and according to genera. For they are comprehended and perfected by animal itself, both according to the multitudes they contain, and according to their unities. Nor is there any one of them which does not proceed from the intelligible. For intelligible animal is comprehensive of all the things posterior to it, not as deriving its completion from them. For itis a whole prior to,’ and does not derive its subsistence from parts. Nor is it a whole, as being predicated of parts; for it is the cause of the many. But it is

* Intelligible animal, or animal itself, isa whole prior to parts, because it comprehends parts in itself causally, 360 PROCLUS ON THE [rook 1. a whole, as a primordial principle, and as filling all things posterior to itself with itself. Hence it comprehends what are called parts tinpartibly, many species uniformly, and exists in an all-perfeet manner prior to secondary paradigms. For this principle indeed, is the universe intelligibly ; but of the natures posterior to it, one is all things celestially, another atter a solar, another after a terrestrial manner, and another in some other way, according to the different causes of mundane natures. So that this principle comprehends all things all-perfeetly, but all things are comprehended by each of the natures posterior to it partially, as with reference to the intelligible allness. The world therefore, is also similar to these partial animals ; since itis likewise similar to the Demiurgus ; but it is most similar to animal itself, so far as it is an animal. For animal itself was primary intelligible animal. Henee, that which is most similar is so ina twofold respect; either because it is similar to other things, or because other things are similar to it. But this is especially the case with the universe, and it is espeGially similar to animal itself.

* For this indeed, has all intelligible animals comprehended in itself, just as this world contains us, and such other animals as are the objects . μὲ ” of sight. Plotinus supposes animal itself to exist ina twofold respect. For atone time he considers it to be more excellent than intellect, as in his treatise intitled Different Considerations, but at another, aa inferior to it, as in his treatise Coucerning Numbers, when he says that being ts first, afterwards intellect, and afterwards animal itself. But Theodorus, who says, that each of the demiurgt has a triples hyparxis, thinks fit to call the third in each, animal itself. From both, however, the truth may be assumed. From the admirable Theodorus indeed, that it has the third order in intelligibles; but from the most divine Plotinus, that it is inferior to one intellect, but beyond another. And it must be said, that unfolding itselfanto light at the end of intelligibles, it generates from intelligible life all the number of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane animals, supernally as αν ἀν τὸ the last of things. Tt is likewise comprehensive of all things, being exempt from, and uniformly and antecedently containing ta itsclf{ the causes of them, For Orpheus also indicates things of this kind about it, when theologizing

* For τρίτην here, it is necessary to read rpm Nyy. Βοοκ 1] TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 361 concerning Phanes. The first God therefore, with him, has the heads of many animals, viz. of aram, a bull, a serpent, and a fierce lion." He also proceeds from the primogenial egg, in which the animal exists spermatically ; and Plato knowing this calls this mighty God animal itself. For what difference is there between calling an occult cause an egg, or that which is unfolded into light from it, an animal? For what can be generated from the exg of all things, but an animal? This egg however, was the offspring of ether and chaos, the former of which is established conformably to the bound, but the latter to the infinity of intelligibles. For the former is the root of all things, but the latter has not any boundary. If therefore that which first consists of bound and infinity is that which is primarily being, the being of Plato will be the same with the Orphtc egg. And if Phanes is from this, who is arranged according to animal itself, it is necessary to investigate it as sitnated next to eternity according to Orpheus, which is a medium between animal itself, and that which is primarily being.’ And thus it will be more clearly evident, that animal itself is no other than the Phanes of the theologist. For if Phanes first proceeds from the egg, which is manifestly with Orpheus the first intelligible intellect, but that which first and alone proceeds from an egg, is necessarily nothing else than an animal, it is evident that the most mighty Phanes is nothing else than the first animal; and, as Plato would say, animal ttself. This therefore is demonstrated.

Let us however, in the next place, survey what is consequent to this. Phanes, therefore, thus unfolding himself into light from the occult Gods, antecedently comprehends in himself the causes of the secondary orders, viz. of the effective, connective, perfective, and immutable orders; and also contains in himself according to one cause, all intelligible animals. For he excites himself to the most total ideas of all things. Hence also, he is said (by Orpheus] to be the first of the Gods, and to have a form. But he produces all things, and unfolds the intelligible and united’ causes of things, to the intellectual Gods. Hence too, the Demiurgus being filled from these causes, gives subsistence to this visible * This is an Orphic line, which is not noticed cither by Gesner or Hermann in their collection of Ormhic fragments. It is however in the printed original in a defective state: for it is, cae cas Tarptovs opias, χαροπον re λέοντος. But from Eschenbach, who quotes it from ἃ manuscript, it may be amended as follows: κριὸν καὶ ravpov, opios, yaporow re eovros. * Itis here necessary to supply the words τὸν xpwrws ovros. Σ For ηνωμενὼν in this place, it is obviously necessary to read ἤνωμενα, in order to agree with acria.

sim, Fisk , Vo. I. 2Z 362 PROCLUS ON THE {[BooK 1, world, and causes it to contain all sensible animals, both such as are more divine, and such as are mortal, which are properly Gzqzuara’ thremmata, or things which are nourished, as entirely participating of the nutritive soul. All bodies likewise, may properly be called Sesupara, ts being the progeny of nature, and as ulways living from, and being connected by it, even though: they should be perpetual bodies; but not as requiring externally adventitious nutriment. Unless indeed, it be requisite to call all things in the world Szeumara, us being nourished by the hing of visible natures through the communication of ight, Por Socrates in the Republic says, that the sun is the cause of nutroment and generation to all such things as he illuminates, Por every visible thing is notished bem perfected: by light, Poras we learn inthe Politious, itis possible to he nourished externally, and not only internally, Phe Demiurgus therefore, comprehends all that) the world contains, in order that this sensible world may be ἐδ πα pertect trom the parts that are in it, conformably to a sitmilitude to him, Hence, this world is a Various animal, according to a different part of itself emitting a different voice, and from all its parts one voice. For it is also one, fas well as many}. By a much greater priority however, the intelligible world is one animal and a multitude fof animals], contracting multitude in the one, just as this visible world also, exhibits the one in multitude.

And the latter indeed, is a whole from parts 5 bat the former is a whole prior to parts, cxemptly, uniformly, and according to cause, comprehending intelligible antinals. Por from it the fountains of divine natures, and all the most total genera proceed. Flence also, the theologist represents it as a most tutalanimal, surrounds it with the heads of aram, a buli, a lion, and a dragon ; and ascribes to it primarily the female aud the mate, as lo the first animal.

Female and father, strong and mighty God, ry bi ve. 4 2 Enicapxus, says the theologist. He is likewise the first God that is represented with wings. And what occasion is there to be prolix? For if he has his progression from the primogenial egg, this fable manifests that he is the first animal, ifit is fit to preserve the analogy. Vor as the egg’ antecedcntly comprehends the spermatic * The word used by Plato here for animals. * In the origival erroneously npuxe xpos. + For ro ev ον here, it is necessary to read ro wor. πον τ TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 303 cause of the animal, thus also the occult order,‘ uniformly comprehends the whole of the intelligible. And as the animal now possesses in ἃ distributed manner, such things as were in the egg spermatically, thus likewise this God produces into a visible subsistence that which is ineffable and incomprehensible in first causes, Concerning these things however, what has now been said may suflice for the present. If however, as this world comprehends in itself all visible natures, so its paradigm comprehends all intelligibles, and the mode of comprehension, as we have said, is different in each, yet at the same tine the visible in the former is analogous to that of the latter. For Phanes supernally illuminating intelligibles with intellivible light, causes all of them to be visible, and exhibits all things [in the intelligible] generated from invisible causes ;

and the world imparts visibility to bodies through the light of the stars. Farther still, this also may be considered as admirable in the doctrine of Plato, that at the same time that he preserves the union ofintelligibles unshaken, he imparts to them an unmingled purity. For if all of them were so united to each other as to be confused, and so as not to permit the peculiarity of each to remain undefiled, there would have been no occasion to enquire, according to what kind of paradizm the universe was generated, Por in things confused there is no distinction of quality. And if these were so divided from each other as to be without any communion, some intelligibles would not comprehend, but others be comprehended. For to comprehend and be comprehended pertain to order and communion of powers, and to the -rapld conspiration of all secondary natures to become one. Moreover, for the union of them to subsist from essence, bat their separation to be rendered apparent from externally proceeding energies, will be the peculiarity of incorporeal and immaterial eflects. For if they are surveyed, themselves by themselves, all will be found to be in each other, on account of their being, as it were, of the same colour, and especially if the unitics of them are seen with the eye of intellect. But from secondary natures, and from their participants, we collect their unconfused union. Vor whence is the separation of these derived, except from the unmingled purity of their, efficient causes? For things which are confused with each other, give subsistence to other such-like natures, [i. e. to natures which ‘are similarly contused.]

* ile. The first triad of the intellicible order, which is called by Plato in the Parmenides το ¢r 11, the one being, or being characterised by, and absorbed as it were in lhc one. 404 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1f. “ For the divinity wishing to assimilate this universe, in the most exquisite degree, to that which is the most beautiful, and in every respect perfect of intelligible animals, he constituted it one visible animal, containing all such things within itself, as are allied to its nature.” Atticus, in what is here said, doubts whether the Demiurgus is comprehended by intelligible animal. For it would seem, if he were comprehended, that he is not perfect. For partial animals, he says, are imperfect, and on this account things which resemble them are not beautiful. But if he is not comprehended, animal itself will not be more comprehensive than all intelligibles. And having doubted, he easily solves the doubt, by supposing that the Demiurgus is above animal itself. On the contrary, Porphyry gives an order to the Demiurgus inferor to the intelligible. Bor establishing a supercelestial soul to be the inaker of the world, he places in intellect the paradigm of cenerated natures. Phe divine Iamblichus, as a medium between both these, connects and unites the paradigm to the Demiurzus, through the union of intellect with the intelligible, But Amelius makes the intelligible, which is detined according to being, to be the same with the Demiurgus."| We however say, that ammal itself is prior to, subsists in, and is posterior to the Demiurgus.

For it proceeds to every intellectual order both total and partial, The Demiurgus himself likewise, sees himself, and the natures prior to himself: for it is not lawfal fur him to look to natures posterior to himself. Beholding therefore, Uhese superior natures, he produces all things, and makes the universe, so faras it is the universe, or the all, to be the image of the whole intelhieihle world. The Demiurzus however, is comprehended by the intelligible, accordine to the cause of the intellectual Gods which there subsist 5 not as beng a part, vrone species of it; but as a second order inthe order which is prior to it. Fora divine intellect is in one way said to be comprehensive of forms, and in another way to comprehend partial intellects. Foreach of the latter indeed, is all things ina self-perfect manner 5 but each of the former is united to other forms,” but is not all things. For each is itself preserving its own peculiarity, unmingled and unconfused. According to the same reasoning also, the intelligibles which are in intelliible intelleet, are comprehended by it in one way, but in another way the

intellectual orders which proceed from it. For you may say, that each of these ' Por τῷ μὲν τὸν δημιονογον in this place, itis necessary to read ry μέντοι δημιυυργῳ. 2 Por τῶν αλλων ceo here, read τοῖς ἀλλοῖς εἰδέσιν, “being self-perfect, is comprehended in all-perfect animal. All such things therefore, as are in the paradigm, are likewise in the Demiurgus ; and in making the world with reference to the paradigm, he also makes it with reference to himself. With respect to al/ness (παντοτης) however, one is intelligible, but another intellectual. For both the tetrad and the decad contain all things in themselves; but the former unitedly, and the latter distnbutedly. The decad likewise, though it contains all such things as the tetrad contains, yet because it contains them in a more divided manner, itis more imperfect than the tetrad. For the tetrad being nearer to the monad is more perfect; and in proportion as quantity is diminished, the Inagnitude of power is increased. So that the Demiurgus possessing ἈΠῸ such things as intelligible animal possesses, yet at the same time, he has an allness inferior to that which is intelligible. In short, as comprehension is twofold, the one being such as that of parts in their wholeness, but the other, as that of effects in their causes, Plato now assumes the former of these, and says, that the genera and species ofanimals, are comprehended as parts in their whole, i.

ον in animal itself ; all which likewise, he denominates imperfect, as with reference to the whole. But the Demiurgus indeed, proceeds from thence as from a cause, yet he likewise possesses all things intellectually. The Demiurgus therefore, is comprehended by intelligible animal according to the reason of cause, and is not so comprehended as a part, so as to be also imperfect. Hence likewise, Timzus in a certain respect thus speaks. For the Demiurgus has all intelligible animals comprehended in himself. For in reality, these are contained in him as parts, which remain in unproceeding union with their proper wholeness, and give completion to it, as a whole which is not prior to parts, but is from parts. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

In the next place, this also deserves to be surveyed, viz. in what an admirable manner Plato, at one time ina way known to us, passes from images to paradizms, and at another time, from paradigms to images; at one and the same time indicating the connexion of things, and their progressions and conversions. For when he says, that as this world comprehends us, thus also animal itself comprehends intelligible animals, he recurs from sensible animals to the causes of them. But when he says, that divinity wishing to assimilate the world to the most beautiful of intelligibles, rendered it comprehensive of all things, he is willing to pass from causes to their effects, imitating the progression of secondary natures. He is led however, to such a transition as this, through analogy. For as effects are to each other, so are the paradigms of them. And the more total and the more partial, 366 PROCI.US ON THE [Βοοκ 11. subsist in both according to the same ratio. Why however, does he call animal itself the most beautiful of intelligibles, though it is the end of intelligibles? May we not say, that though there are intelligible orders prior to it, yet the most beautiful is inferior to them?) For they do not participate of beauty ; but the producing cause of beauty, and the first beauty and elegance subsist in them. Hence also animal itself is according to Orpheus, intellectually unfolded into lightin this order.

And as beauty had a prior existence in che first intelligibles, unitedly and without intermission, hence Phanes is called by Orpheus, “the very beautiful son of ether,” and * delicate Love.” Because therefore, this God is the first that is filled with oceult and ineffable beauty, hence also he is denominated most beautiful, being the first of participants, though all intelligibles are united to each other. For it is not proper to divide them from each other, after the same manneras the intellectual orders, but survey one and an indivisible union of them. These things therefore, are beautifally asserted (by Orpheus and Plato.

That however, which is most synopucal' in the words of Plato, is this, that he says animal itselfis the most beautiful, not of all intellgibles simply, but of mtelhgible animals. Por comparing all-pertect animal with more partial animals, he says, itis the most beautiful of all intelligible animals ; so that if there is something more excellent: than the nature of animal, it has nothing to do with the present assertion. Tt as necessary however, that there should) be a thing of this Kind, because bemy itself, and beauty itself are more simple than the nature of animal, on which account also they are participated by things which are not animals, Moreover, the interpreters say, that the word asysinilation is appropriately assumed by Plato. For he is frequently dubious ccncerning the mode of parteipation, Whether itis from: forms themselves being present with sensibles, or from their communmeating with them im some other way: but he is not dubious whether or not it is stmilitude which makes the sensible world to be the image of the intelligible. Dividing however, they say, that of physical forms indeed, the sensible world participates as of impressions in wax, but that it receives the representations of psychical, and the sunilitudes of intelligible forms.* So that since Plato is speaking concerning intelligible paradigms, he very properly, as they say, assumes similitude, Parther still, the world is an animal, as the image

1 Por συνεκτικωτατον here, Tread σννοπτιλωτατων.ς * Concerning the mod > in which forms themselves are participated by sensibles, see the Notes to my translation of the Parmenides of Plato. of this intelligible animal, and of intelligible allness. But it is visible as being assimilated to the splendour of its paradigm. For what colour is there, that the visible is here. ‘The Gods adinir'd, mv ether when they saw A light unlook’d for, bursting on the view, Prom the immortal Phanes’ glittering skin ;" fsays Orpheus}. And the world comprebends all kindred natures, because it is comprehensive of all sensibles. But Plato adds, “as are allied to its nature,” because intelligibles are paradigms to the world of things which are according to nature, and not as some Platonists are accustomed to say, of things preternatural, Torin short, mundane things being divided into such as are according to nature, and such as are preternatural, into universals and particulars, and into essences and accidents, we always admit that there are formal causes of the more, hut by no means of the less excellent. For that which is produced from ideas, proceeds through nature. But if this is the case with that which is according to nature, but not with that which is preternatural, that which is generated from ideas is a certain whole, and is perpetual, For if this is not admitted, one of two things must take place, either that things contingent will have no existence, or that of forms some will necessarily produce, but it will happen that others may either produce or not produce.

And in the third place, every thing whieh proceeds from ideas is essence... Vor since they produce by their very being, each is productive of essences. For it would be ridiculous to say that a partial nature is effective of essence, but that intelligible form gives subsistence to accident? These things however, we shall elsewhere more copiously discuss. Bat what- -eyer the world contains is allied to it, because all things in it subsist according to intelligible causes. Plato likewise appears in this place to have given a definition uf the world, viz. “one visible animal, comprehending in itself all animals.” For intelligible animal also is one, but is not visible. And the sun, and each of the monadic natures, [or those natures of which there. is only one,jis one visible animal, but does not comprehend all others. So that it is evident that the above is the detinition of the universe. Let us however proceed to the words of Plato. |

* For ro ov «πεστιλβε in this place, it is necessary to read ry μὲν αἀπεστιλιβε. Ὁ For συμιλεβήκοτος evos νποστατικον, read ovp/3e/3qxoros εἰναι νποστατικον. 368 PROCLUS ON THE [oon τι. “ Whether therefore, shall we assert that there is one world, or is it more right to say that there are many and infinite worlds ?” This problem follows indeed logographically what has just now ' been said. For because he had detined the world to be one visible animal, comprehending within itself all such animals as are naturally allied to it, it is necessary that he should think this to be worthy his attention and discussion, whether the world is one certain thing, or not. For of physiologists, some make the world to be one; but others assert that there are many worlds; and others contend that there are not only many, but also infinite worlds. The consideration of this likewise, has a connection with what has been before said, derived from the things themselves. For since it has been shown that the world is the image of animal itself, and is an animated animal, endued with intellect, it was requisite to add a summit to the discussion of it, by showing that itis also one, For thus he will demonstrate that it isa God, in consequence of participating a unity which is above intellect. For it was not only possible for him to say that it is an image because other things also are images, some being fashioned by nature, but others by art.

Nor an animal alone, because there is a multitude of partial animals, Nor alone animated; for man likewise is an image, and an animated animal. Nor alone endued with intellect; for both a demon and an angel are amimnated animals possessing intellect. But this which especially and primarily pertains to divine natures, he before suflered to be ineffable, through the cause which we have already assigned. Now, however, he adds the one, and the alone. For every thing which ts monadic in the world is divine, as being an image, if it be. lawful so to speak of ἐμὲ one. But I denominate divine, that which is such as the anzelic, as the dwemoniacal, and as that which is in partial souls. For each of these is divine, so far as it 1s suspended from its proper deity, and cach of these ts monadic. Such monadic natures however, as have generation and corruption, and are expelled into the mortal abode, are opposed to every thing divine. Hence this problem 1s suspended from what has been before said. For since the paradigm of the universe is indeed a God, and 15 intelligible, is the suppher of lite, and is also intellect ; according to that which is divine in him, he makes the world to be one; according to the one and the intelligible, he causes it to be sensible; but according to the one, the intelligible, and life, he makes it to be

* For ra νὸν here, read ra νυν». nook 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 369 animated and an animal; and according to all these and intellect, he causes it to be endued with intellect. For union accedes prior to other things, and posterior to other things. Animal energizes prior to, and in conjunction with other thaigs, And the gift of life generates and proceeds together with, and prior to intellect. From what however is now siown, and from what has been before demonstrated, you may assume, that at the same time, the paradigm of the universe is unical, and the whole multitude of intelligibles. And neither is the simplicity of ewithout multitude, nor the multitude of it divided; but it has the all-various at once consubsistent with ¢he one, the monadic with the all-perfect, and the uniform with the multiform. For because it proceeds indeed from the good it is united. But because it pre-establishes in itself the order of intelligible ideas, it is ἃ}}- perfect. And as infinite, it unfolds the multitude of intelligibles ; but as contained by bound, it is only begotten. As proceeding likewise from being characterized by unity, it has the relation of a monad ; but as being the third from it, it produces in itself all the intelligible Gods, and on this account is demonstrated to be allperfect. These things, however, we shail more fully unfold as we proceed.

But there is a controversy with the interpreters about the text. For to some of them it appears that two things are now distinguished by Plato, the one, and all multitude. And the word whether being applied by the ancients to two things, seems to testify in favor of their opinion, But to others, it appears that there is a division into three things, the one, finite multitude, and the infinite. And the patrons of this interpretation are Porphyry and Jamblichus, who speak conformably both to the things themselves, and to the doctrine of Plato. For shortly after he takes away two things, but assumes one thing from division. But from three things, an ablation of two and the position of one is eflected, and not from two things alone. Nevertheless the word whether’ seems to contradict what they assert. It may be remedied however by saying that cither whether signifies the same as shall we therefore ; (zw ap ow τὸ πότερον orci ταυτον) for it is frequently thus assumed by the ancients; or that the words, or not (ἢ ov) are wanting to the sentence; and that it will be perfect by reading, whether do we rightly assert that there is one world, or not? And if not, whether there arc many, or infinite worlds ? Plato omitting to ‘say this through conciseness. Perhaps too; you may say, it is not without design that he omitted the words much and finite.

* For πρότερον here, read sorcpor, Tim. Plat. | Vou. i, ZA 870 | PROCLUS ON THE (wooK 11. For to say how many, or so many, is to speak in a way that gives completion to what is said. And as ifthe paradigm is not monadic, s0 as to be the cause of one thing, the things generated are intinite 5 after this manner itis probable that there are infinite worlds, if there is not only one. For the vacaum being infinite, will be the recipient of infinite worlds. “ One [i. e. there will be but one world,] if it be admitted that it is fabricated according to the paradigm.” Again Plato in concord with himself, announces the whole of the conclusion prior to the demonstrations, previously to beltef, dissolving the doubt. For the word one is uttered analogously to, if seas generated, and to he was wood,‘ and the demonstration on account of it, is conformable to the proper method. | For it is himself who doubts, himself who dissolves the doubts, and himself who demonstrates. Through the doubt, indeed, converting himself to intelleet; but through the concise solution of the doubt, energizing according to intellect. For to comprehend the whole of a sentence in one word, is animage of intellectual projection, And through the demonstration descending from intellect to dianoia, For every one who demonstrates, receives the principles of lis demonstration from intellect. Butitis intellect, says Aristotle, by which we know terms 3 for through this we apprehend (true) beimes by simple projections, Such therefore throughout is the form of the words.

Let us, however, if you think fit, in the first place, svilogistieally survey the trath of the words themselves. The whole sentence, therefore, is of the following kind, If the world was generated according to a paradigm, and the paradigm is one, then the world is one." Bat the antecedent is true, and) therefore the consequent also is true, That the world, however, was generated according to a paradigm, was asserted before, and was mentioned both by Plato and ous. But that the paradigm is one and monadic, Plato asserts as he proceeds, ‘The assumption therefore being true, it remains to see how that which follows from it is true. He says then that if the world imitates especially and accurately the paradizm, it ought to imitate it ino all thines, and ought to resemble the essence of it. For if it imitates the paradigin in some things, and not in’ others, * Instead of ro ἀγαθὸς ἣν in this place, it is requisite to read rw az ules ny. * The words ὁ κόσμον apa ἐν ἐστιν, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted. it will not be the imare of ἃ certain whole. For the paradigm making by its very being, it makes a certain image of the whole of itself. But this being the case that which is generated with reference or according to. the whole paradigm itself, is monadic, is perpetual, and is an animal. For as he who imitates the whole of Socrates expresses the whole of his life, after the same manner, the world being fashioned in the resemblance of animal itself, imitates all things mit, so far as itis naturally adapted to such an imitation ; possessing all things sensibly which animal itself possesses intelligibly,

Some however oppose what is here said, by adducing the multitude of men and of horses, Por man itself is the cause of many men, horse itself of inany horses, and this is the ease with every other form or idea of the like hind. But if some one should say, that these beeause they are parts of other things, are on this account monadic, the oljector will not cease adducing tous the sun and the moon, and all the parts of the world which are monadic. Tence more profound solutions of the objection are requisite. The philosopher Porphyry therefore striving to solve the didiculty, says, that forms as they proceed, always descend into mulutude and division, and pass into balk, and an all-various distribution into parts. Tfenee an intelligible essence, procceding into the world, terminates ina divided, gross, and material multitade, though on high itis united, impartible, and monadic., To every thing, therefore, which is intelligible, nothing else imparts the whole, for the intelligible itself gives subsistence to it. Hence it constitutes it as great as it is able to become. But this universe supplies man itself with matter. And on this account the matter of one form receives many Impressions of that form. "The world, therefore, is one from one (paradigm), and a Whole froma whole. But man is numerous trom one torm, the world supplying the matter of it. Why, therefore, says he, are there not many suns and moons? For the matter of these is from the universe. To this he replies, that to incorruptible natures in the world, though they may be parts, the monadic is appropriate; but to corraptible natures, multitude. For if there were not many participants of the same reason (or form) but only one corraptible participant, the form would perish, this being corrupted. It is necessary, however, that all [materialj forms perishing, the full perfection of the world should still remain. Such therefore is the solution of Porphyry. |

The divine Tamblichus however reprobates this solution, as dissolving no one of the doubts, For let, says he, the whole sensible world possess impartible natures partibly, indivisibles divisibly, and monadic natures multitudinously, yet 372 PROCLUS ON THE [Rook τι, why do some things in it still remain monadic, but others not? For this is what was dubious from the beginning. He therefore adduces a certain solution of the doubt, which is indeed admirable yet is inwant of assistance. For he says that of forms some rejoice in sameness and permanency, but others in motion and difference. And that some, indeed, are the causes of monadic and perpetual natures, but others of such as are mutable and multitudinous. And this indeed is very admirably asserted, but requires a certain admonition, which it is necessary to make, by considering that atter the one two principles proceed, bound and infinity, as Socrates asserts inthe Philebus. And as of numbers, some are more monadic but others are dyadic, though all numbers derive their subsistence from the monad and at the same time from the duad, thus likewise, though all forms subsist according to these two principles, yet at the same time some are the progeny of bound, but others of infinity. And what occasion is there to speak of forms; since of the Gods themselves, some belong to the co-ordination of bound, but others to that of infinity, both according to their whole orders and according to parts?

According to total orders indeed, because every paternal, connective, and demiurgic series is defined according to bound; but every vivitic and effective series, according to infinity. But according to. parts, because of the paternal and of the vivilic series, some belong to the order of bound, but others to that of infinity. If, therefore, this is the case with the Gods, why is it wonderful that of forms some are more than others allied to bound, but others to infinity? And according to this analogy some forms give subsistence to monadic things, but others to those that proceed into multitude. After this manner, therefore, it is requisite tu assist this solution.

Our preceptor, however, dissolves this doubt after another manner, multifarious. ly. Tle says, therefore, that every intelligible nature is uniform and_ eternal, but that of mundane things, some are able to be more, and others less assimilated to the essences of intelhgibles. For such things as are more 1mmaterial and pure, are capable of being assimilated ina greater, but such things as are more material and gross, in a less degree. As all paradigms therefore subsist in monadic and eternal essences, the more excellent natures in the universe especially imitating the causes of themselves, are generated in all things most similar to their paradigms, viz. according to the monadic, the essenual, and the perpetual; but the less excellent, being allotted a secondary form of similitude, are in a certain respect assimilated to their causes, and in ἃ certain respect not. Hence, as there are these three things in intelligible forms, viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal, whether do mundane natures imitate the monadic and perpetual peculi- BOOK τι. TIMAEUS OF PLATO 373 arity of intelligibles, but not the essential? By no means.’ For it has been demonstrated that it is requisite the things which proceed from them should be essences, since they produce by their very being. Will mundane natures therefore be imitations of them according to the monadic and the essential, but not according tothe eternal?) This however is impossible. For each of them will perish ;

being monadic indeed, but not perpetual. For because not perpetual, it will vanish into non-entity ; but in consequence of being monadic, there will not be that from which it may be generated. Besides, every thing which subsiste from immoveable causes, is immutable in essence. But forms are immoveable, for they are intelligible. Either therefore itis possible for all things to imitate them in all things, or in certain things. But it is impossible for all things to imitate themin all things. For the natures which are more remote from their principles are in a less degree assimilated to them. Just as with respect to Pythagoras, who possesses all sciences, he who is nearer to him, receives all his knowledge secondarily, but he who is more remote from him, learns some of his sciences, but is unadapted to the reception of others. Ifitis impossible therefore, for all things to imitate them in every respect, it remains that this must be effected by them in certain things. And ifin certain things as there are three peculiarities which are characteristic of intelligible forms,’ either imitating the extremes, they become destitute of the middle, or receiving the two first, they will appear to have resinquished the third, or not partaking of the first, they will participate of the two which are posterior to it. It has however been shown, that neither the first nor second is true. T/ence it is necessary that they shoulg not express the monacic peculiarily of forms, but only the essential and the eternal.

On this account all mundane Sorms indeed are essences, and are always invariably the same, but all of them are not monadic. For all mundane forms do not subsist commensurately to ali the powers of their paradigms. But that every intelligible form, and whole paradigTaatic cause having a primary subsistence, is monadic, eternal, and essential, is evident. For whatever is not essence, will be an accident. Every accident, however, subsists about matter, and is conversant with things which are in matter, but not with those which are in separate causes. If likewise an intelligible form is not eternal, neither will the image of it be perpetual. It is necessary however that it should, if the world always consists of allforms. But the principle perish-

‘Instead of ro δὲ ovewées ov, ovdayws; in this place, it is necessary to read ro δε ουσιωδε: cv, ovdapws; : * Viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal. 374 PROCLUS ON THE [noox 11. ing, that which is derived from it can by no possible contrivance be preserved. And if an intelligible form is not monadic, it will be no longer primarily a paradigm. For it is impossible for any thine to be two things primarily, as Socrates says in the Republic. Vor whence is allness derived to these mundane forms, except from one certain common form? These three things therefore are present with all first paradigms. And it seems that the monadie Is present with them from bound, the perpetual from infinity, and the essential from the first essence. Farther still, it is also possible for us after another manner to solve the doubt. Vor of the things contained in the world, some indeed subsist from the first fabrication fice. the fabrication of the Demiurgus}] alone; but others from the tirst and also from the second Cor the fabrication of the junior Gods]. Those, therefore, that subsist) from) the first fabrication, are invariably the same, and are monadie, imitating the onlyness of their producing ‘cause. Por the sapermundane fabrication is immoveable, one, and eternal. Bat things which proceed from the second fabrication are mutable, are borne alone In multitude, and subsist differently at diffrent times. — Por the second fabrication is multiform, makes that which it makes with motion, and has time but not eternity connascent with itself.

Henee the things which proceed from it are very inutable, and inultiplied, and entirely moved. For things which proceed from causes that are moved, are naturally of this kind. Whence also ΤΠ think the Demiurgus, having constituted all the monadice and perpetual natures in the world, excites the junior Gods tu the fabrication of mortal natures ; ino order that these, so far as they have something perpetual, may derive their subsistence from hin, but so far as they are mortal, fromthe junior Gods, And that so far as one thing participates of one form they might be constituted by hin, but so far as this one is multiplied, they might derive their subsistence fromthem. For the mutation and multiplication of mortal natures are from many canses, and such as are moved.

Aeain, therefore, this also may be said, that the only-begotten is threefold. Por it either signifies the monad of its proper series τ according to Which signification, the form of man is monadic, and the form of horse, and every form of things of this kind. Orit signifies one thing participated by one thing, according to which signification man and horse are not monadie, but the form of the sun and the form of the moon. Or it signifies that which has no other thing co-ordinate with itself, according to which ineaning the above-mentioned natures are no longer only-begotten, since they are co-ordinate with each “other bat whole auinal [or Por xpayparos here, it is uccessary ty read nupayorros. wooK 1] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 375 animal itself} is only-begotten, in consequence of not being co-ordinate with any other animal, As the only-begotten, therefore, has a threefold subsistence, if you assume that which is truly: only-begotten, it is the third, as the cause of all animals, having the relation of a monad to all of them, being participated by one thing, and not being co-ordinate with any animal, but being truly monadic. This, however, being assumed, that which is conjoined with it now necessarily follows. For if the paradigm is only-begotten, that also which is generated according to itis only-begotten, imitating the only-begotten nature of the paradigin, and nothing else besides the world is a thing of this kind. For no other thing besides animal itself, is according to this signification, only-begotten, Farther stll, it is requisite to solve the doubt after another manner, by considering as follows:

Every form is gencrative of onc thing, and of a multitude. Of one thing, indeed, because it constitutes a monad similar to itself, prior to the multitude which 1 produces. But it produces a multitude, because every monad has a number co-ordinate with itself. Animal itself, therefore, as a monad, constitutes the whole world. But according to each order, it gencrates a number! analogous to the whole, and Which is able to preserve the similitude to the universe contorinably to that series, Hence the solar paradigm, generates Indeed the visible sun itself, but it likewise zenerates a number of solar animals possessing the same form, according to a similitude to their proper form, And of animals of this kind, some are celestial, but others sublunary, so that such a number as this extends as far as to the earth. Man itself, therefore, does not gmncdiately produce this infinite multitude of men; for progression is no where without a medium; but through numbers proximate to the monad and appropriate. lence, since an intelligible form is one, itis necessary thatit should not immediately produce the infinite, but ins the first place a monad, afterwards an appropriate number, aud so on in suceession. For between the intellizible form which is one, end the sensible wich is multiplied, the medium is the form which is sensthle indeed, but monadte 3 through proceeding becom= ing sensible; but through preserving the similitude of its paradizm, having a monadic subsistence. For it may be said to be {ταν absurd, that divine, intelligible, and immoveable causes, should not be primarily the causes of things essentially immutable, but of things matenal and mutable. For how is it possible that things which are in the profundity of the universe, cau be conjoined with those super-

ἡ Ap Opoy is omitted in the original. * In the original δία τῶν ενυλων, καὶ μεταβλητων; but δία ought evidently to be expunged. 376 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 11 mundane natures ; things deprived of intelligence, with intellectuals ; perfectly sautable, with eternal natures; very composite things, with such as are simple; and things which in their own nature are dissipated, with united essences? It is necessary, therefore, that man itself, and each of such-like forms, should generate stable monads prior to a dispersed multitude; from which the progression of each to its appropriate number is derived. It is likewise necessary that these monads should exist in the second fabrication. Hence they remain invariably the same, as being alone produced by an immoveable cause. You must not wonder, therefore, #f some one should call man immortal, a brute rational, and a plant intellectual. For each of these is primarily a thing of this kind. But progression producing a diminution of the all-various imitation of the paradigm, exhibits some things sensibles, others irrational, and others intellectual im capacity. For as the water, which primarily proceeds from its wuntain, is most similar to the fontal water, and preserves its proper purity undefiled; thus also the natures Which are first unfolded into hight from intellyible forms, genuinely preserve the similitudes of their paradigms ; batas they proceed, dissolve the perfect sumilitude, and are filled from their subjects with composition and inelegance.

In another way, likewise, the solution of the things investigated may be attempted. For of fabrication the first is total, one, and impartible; the second is partial and multiplied, and proceeds according to a distribution into parts; and the third is not only partible like that which precedes it, but comes into contact with generated natures, and with the forms they contain, Vou have also these three fabrications in Plato, viz. the Jovian, the Dionysiacal, and the Adonaical (or pertaining to Adonis), conformably to which he divides his three polities, as we have elsewhere shown. The third fabrication, therefore, ts the cause of wholes’ and parts, and of things which are not monadtc. The second is the cause of things which are monaaic indeed, but are not wholes. And the first 1s the cause of the whole and the monadic. For such is the universe, which is not a part of any thing, as the sun and moon are, and each of the peculiar parts of the world. If therefore Plato had now spoken concerning cyery fabrication, it would have been requisite to annex the extensions of forms into multitude, and their divisions. But since the present discourse is alone concerning the whole fabrication, or the fabrication which has a total subsistence, what occasion is there to disturb ourselves, in consequence of not remaining in the first fabrications, which are eflected by an

* For edwy here, it is necessary to read odwy, mmoveable and total cause? For the whole Demiurgus is a fabricator totally and monadically ; since also producing many Gods, he produces them monadically. Por each of the Gods belonging to the inerratic sphere, is constituted according to one form; since the form of earth is different from that of water, and the form vs water from that of fire; the parts of which have a temporal generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, do such perpetual natures as the stars, and also partial souls, differ in form from each other, For every individual and at the same time partial nature, is material. If also partial souls produce different peculiar lives, from exerting the reasons they contain, it is evident that they possess the reasons of all things universally, and subsisting in forms alone, so that the progressions of each of them are according to different forms. This number too of forms must be placed in the fountain of souls unically (or having a subsistence characterized by unity), but distributedly in the principle* of souls. For how is it possible it should not be necessary, souls being finite, that the number of them should pre-exist in the causes from whence they are derived ? Since even nature comprehends the numbers of the things which she produces according to numbers. If, however, the Gods are monadic, and souls, the genera between these, are likewise monadic ; so that each thing which the Demiurgus constitutes, is entirely monadic. "This likewise appears to be the cause of the perpetuity of the things which he produces, that each receives the whole form of the paradigimatic cause, Ilence every thing which proceeds from the whole Demiurgus has a nature of this hind,

It, therefore, he gives subsistence to the world, the world is one; both on account of the demiurgic monad, and the onlyness of the paradigm; which Plato, as it appears to me, knowing, says, “if it be admitted that itis fabricated according to the paradigm.” For by not saying if it was generated, but Wit was fabricated, according to the paradigm, he indicates the onlyness both of the paradigmatic and the demiurgic cause. For the Demiurgus is a monad, and the paradigm also is a monad; and therefore this universe being generated by a monad, with reference to amonad, is monadic. Why, therefore, you may say, is he satisfied in what follows, with the demonstration from the paradigm? We reply, because the “i.e. In Rhea, or the vivitic Goddess, considered according to her first subsistence in the intellectual order of Gods. : >i. δ. In Proserpine, who subsists in the vivific triad of the super-mundane order of Gods, which order consists of the Gods who are called apyac or Principles. See the 5th and 6th Books of my Translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, for an account of the deities called fountains and principles. Tim. Plat, Vou. I. 3B

478 PROCLUS ON TIE [8οοκ τι. paradigm is more united than the Demiurgus. For the Demiurgus himself is a monad, through his similitude and analogy to the paradigm. This however is evident. For among the kings, he is analogous to it ; and both the Demiurgus and the paradigm are analogous to the intelligible monad.' Hence, since the monadic nature is from thence derived to the Demiurgus himself, what ought we to think concerning the universe? Js it not, that it primarily possesses its onlyness from the paradigm? The paradigm, therefore, is a more principal thing, for the purpose of demonstrating the onlyness of the world. And again, you may see, that these are three monads, viz. animal itself, the demiurgic cause, and the universe. But the first, is an intelligible monad, the second, an intellectual monad, and the third, a sensible monad. “ For that which comprehends all such animals as are intelligible, can never be the second, [or co-arranged] with* any other thing.” The necessity of these demonstrations is admirable, showing that all-perfect animal is one and monadic,' similar to those methods through which in the Sophista, he demonstrates that the multitude of beings is to be referred to one truly existing being. For if there are two principles of beings, either each of them is primarily being, or only one of them. But if only one ofthem, the other will proceed from this. And if each, itis necessary there should be another being, from which both of these are beings.

For cach of these is a certain being, and not simply being. After the same manner likewise, he now shows, that all- perfect animal is one. So that according to all the orders of things, that which is said to exist primarily, will be only-begotten. For being itself is primarily being, Just as anima! itself is here demonstrated to be primarily animal, or only-begotten. For how is it possible this should not be only-begotten? For if there is another animal co-arranged with it, either each has all things, or one of them has all things, but the other not, or neither of them has all things. For besides these, there are no other consequences. If, therefore, it should be said that neither of them is all things, each of them is imperfect. We however are speaking of that which is allperfect, and we investigate whence it possesses all things. For it must not be

ice. To the summit of the intelligible order, or being itself. > In the text of Proclus μεθ᾽ erepoy erroneously instead of μεθ᾽ ἐτέρον. > Τὰ the original ἐν ov καὶ pevoy. But for μενον Tread μοναδικον. nook 11.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 379 said, that the sensible universe has indeed all things according to its own order, and that the soul possesses all reasons, as is evident from the things to which it applies itself, and from assigning to every thing its appropriate reason; but that there is not a certain intelligible, which is truly comprehensive of all intelligibles, Just as soul contains all things dianoetically, and the universe sensibly. For whence is allness derived to these, except from intelligibles? If, therefore, the intelligible is all- perfect, that will be the paradigm of the universe which is primarily all. But if one of them is all things, and the other not, these will neither be co-arranged with each other, nor con-numerated 3 but that which has not all things will be inferior to the other, and that which is all-perfect’ will have a more comprehensive power. Hence the one will be a part, but the other a whole; and both will not be all-pertect animals, but one of them will be more perfect than the other. For that which has a diminished perfection is not all-perfect. But if each of them is all things, whence did they obtain all things?

— For it is necessary that they should reccive this allness from something. For as participating of one form, they subsist from one cause, And thus the natures which similarly participate of all things, possess this allness from one cause. There will therefore be a cause prior to them ; since it is necessary that where there are two things there should be an antecedent cause, which conducts them together. This cause, therefore, which is prior to them, is either all things indivisibly, or divisibly. But if indivisibly, another cause will be requisite as amedium. For the medium between that which is perfectly indreisible, and the duad which possesses all things divisibly, is the monad whieh has all things indivistbly;' this indeed being itself united by an indivisible cause, but uniting the allness which is in the duad. Hence that which primarily comprehends all things ts the monad which is prior to the duad. But in that which subsists indivisihly, the sced and cause are contained of an allness which is characterized by unity. Deservedly, therefore, is all-perfect animal said to be monadic, and incapable of being the second with another thing, not only as the words appear to say, because it is not conjoined with another, but because if it were arranged with another, it would be secondarily, and no longer primarily all things. For after all-perfect animal, there are causes which are co-arranged with other kindred natures, but which have not primarily all things. hat, however, which primarily possesses all things is monadic. But if it is comprehensive of all things, there will