The Theology of Plato (with the Elements of Theology)

In the next place, we must speak of the triad, which is consubsistent with this mixture. For every mixture, if it is rightly made, as Socrates says, requires these three things, beauty, truth, and symmetry. For neither will any thing base, if it is introduced into the mixture, impart rectitude, since it will be the cause of error, and of inordinate prerogative, nor if truth is at any time separated, will it suffer the mixture to consist of things that are pure, and which are in reality subdued, but it will fill the whole with an image and with non-being. Nor without symmetry will there be a communion of the elements, and an elegant association. Symmetry, therefore, is necessary to the union of the things that are mingled, and to an appropriate communion. But truth is necessary to purity. And beauty to order; which also renders the whole lovely. For when each thing in the mixture has a place adapted to itself, it renders both the elements, and the arrangement resulting from them, beautiful. Here therefore, in the first mixture, these three things are apparent, symmetry, truth, and beauty. And symmetry indeed is the cause to the mixture, that being is one; truth is the cause of the reality of its existence; and beauty is the cause of its being intelligible. Hence it is intelligible and truly being. That also which is primarily being is more uniform, and intellect is conjoined to it, according to its familiarity with the beautiful.

But each participates of existence, because it is being derived from being. That which is mixed however, is supreme among beings, because it is united to the good. And it appears to me, that the divine Iamblichus perceiving these three causes of being, defines the intelligible in these three, viz. in symmetry, truth, and beauty, and unfolds the intelligible Gods through these in the Platonic theology. In what manner indeed, the intelligible breadth consists of these, will be most evident as we proceed. Now however, from what has been said, it is perfectly manifest why Socrates says that this triad is found to be in the vestibules of the good. For that which is primarily being participates of this triad through its union with the good. For because indeed the good is the measure of all beings, the first being becomes itself commensurate. Because the former is prior to being, the latter subsists truly and really. And because the former is good and desirable, the latter presents itself to the view as the beautiful itself. Here therefore, the first beauty also subsists; and on this account the one is not only the cause of good, but likewise of beauty, as Plato says in his Epistles. Beauty however subsists here occultly, since this order comprehends all things uniformly, in consequence of subsisting primarily from the principles [bound and infinity]. But where and how beauty is unfolded into light, we shall shortly explain.

Such therefore, is the first triad of intelligibles, according to Socrates in the Philebus, viz. bound, infinite, and that which is mixed from these. And of these, bound indeed is a God proceeding to the intelligible summit, from the imparticipable and first God, measuring and defining all things, and giving subsistence to every paternal, connective, and undefiled genus of Gods. But infinite is the never-failing power of this God, unfolding into light all the generative orders, and all infinity, both that which is prior to essence, and that which is essential, and also that which proceeds as far as to the last matter. And that which is mixed, is the first and highest order of the Gods, comprehending all things occultly, deriving its completion indeed through the intelligible connective triad, but unically comprehending the cause of every being, and establishing its summit in the first intelligibles, exempt from the whole of things.

After this first triad subsisting from, and conjoined with the one, we shall celebrate the second, proceeding from this, and deriving its completion through things analogous[184] to the triad prior to it. For in this also it is necessary that being should participate, and that the one should be participated, and likewise that this one which is secondarily one, should be generative of that which is secondarily being. For every where participated deity constitutes about itself that which participates it. Thus whole souls render bodies consubsistent with their causes: and partial souls generate, in conjunction with the Gods, irrational souls. Much more therefore, do the Gods produce in conjunction with the one all things. Hence, as the first of the unities generates the summit of being, so likewise the middle unity constitutes the middle being. But every thing which generates, and every thing which makes or produces, possesses a power prolific of the things produced, according to which it produces, corroborates and connects its progeny. Again therefore, there will be a second triad unfolded into light analogously to the first. And one thing indeed, is the summit of it, which we call one, deity, and hyparxis. But another thing is the middle of it, which we call power. And another thing is the extremity of it, which we say is that which is secondarily being. This however is intelligible life. For all things are in the intelligible, as was before demonstrated, viz.

to be, to live, and to energize intellectually. And the summit indeed, of the intelligible order, is all things according to cause, and as we have frequently said, occultly. But the middle of it, causes multitude to shine forth, and proceeds from the union of being into manifest light. And the extremity of it, is now all intelligible multitude, and the order of intelligible forms. For forms have their subsistence at the extremity of the intelligible order. For it is necessary that forms should subsist first and become apparent in intellect. If therefore, being abides exemptly in the first mixture, but now proceeds, and is generated dyadically from the monad, there will be motion about it; and if there is motion, it is also necessary that there should be intelligible life. For every where motion is a certain life, since some one calls even the motion of material bodies life. That which is first therefore, in this second triad, may be called bound; that which is second in it, infinity; and that which is the third, life. For the second triad also is a God, possessing prolific power, and unfolding into light from, and about itself, that which is secondarily being. Here however also, the triad is analogous to the first triad.

But again, it is necessary to comprehend by reasoning the peculiarity of this triad. For the first triad being all things, but intelligibly and unically, and as I may say, speaking Platonically, according to the form of bound, the second triad is indeed all things, but vitally, and as I may say, following the philosopher, according to the form of infinity, just as the third triad proceeds according to the peculiarity of that which is mixed. For as in the progression according to breadth, that which is mixed presents itself to the view as the third, so likewise in the progression according to depth of intelligibles, the third has the order of that which is mixed with reference to the superior triads. The middle triad therefore, is indeed all things, but is characterized by intelligible infinity. For the three principles after the first, orderly distribute for us the intelligible genus of the Gods. For bound indeed, unfolds into light the first triad; but infinity the second; and that which is mixed, the third. It is infinite power therefore, according to which the second triad is characterized. For being the middle, it subsists according to the middle of the first triad, being all things from all. For in each triad, there is bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. But the peculiarity of the monads being respectively different, evolves the intelligible order of the Gods. The middle triad however, thus subsisting, but I say thus, because it consists of all the things of which the triad prior to it consists, yet it contains and connects the middle of intelligibles according to infinite power, and is filled indeed from a more elevated union, but fills the union posterior to itself with the powers of being.

And it is measured indeed, from thence uniformly, but measures the third triad by the power of itself. And it abides indeed, in the first triad stably, but it establishes in itself the triad which is next in order. And in short, it binds to itself the intelligible centre, and establishes one intelligible coherence; causing indeed that which is occult and possesses the form of the one in the first triad, to shine forth; but collecting the intelligible multitude of the third triad, and comprehending it on all sides. The being however, which gives completion to this triad is mixed, in the same manner as the being of the triad prior to it, and receives the peculiarity of life. For the infinity in this generates life.

It is likewise necessary that this triad should participate of the three things, symmetry, truth, and beauty. That which is primarily being however, principally subsists according to symmetry, which unites it, and conjoins it to the good. But the second triad, principally subsists according to truth. For because it participates of that which is primarily being, it is being, and truly being. And the third triad principally subsists according to the beautiful. For there intelligible multitude, order and beauty, first shine forth to the view. Hence this being is the most beautiful of all intelligibles. This however will be discussed hereafter. As there is a triad therefore, in each of the mixtures, the first indeed, symmetry especially comprehends and connects; the second truth, and the third beauty. And this induced the divine Iamblichus to say, that Plato in these three defines the whole of the intelligible [order]. For all are in each, but one of these predominates more in one of the intelligible monads than in another. Moreover, the third triad presents itself to the view after this. For it is necessary that the extremity of being should also be deified, and should participate of an intelligible unity. For beings are not more in number than the unities, as Parmenides says, nor are the unities more numerous than beings; but each progression of being participates of the one; since this universe also, according to each part of itself, is governed by soul and intellect. By a much greater priority therefore, must the intelligible in its first, middle, and last hypostases, participate of the intelligible Gods.

As the first unity therefore, after the exempt cause of all things, unfolds into light intelligible being, and the second unity, intelligible life, thus also the third constitutes about itself, intelligible intellect, and fills it with divine union, constituting power as the medium between itself and being, through which it gives completion to this being, and converts it to itself. In this therefore, every intelligible multitude shines forth to the view. For the whole of this being is intelligible intellect, life, and essence. And it is neither all things according to cause, in the same manner as that which is primarily being, nor does it cause all things to shine forth, as the second being does, but it is as it were all things according to energy, and openly. Hence also, it is the boundary of all intelligibles. For since the progression of beings is accomplished according to similitude, the first being is most similar to the one; the second, is parturient with multitude, and is the origin of separation; but the third, is now all-perfect, and unfolds into light in itself, intelligible multitude and form. Farther still, as the first triad abides occultly in bound, and fixes in itself every thing that is stable in intelligibles; but the second abides and at the same time proceeds; so the third, after progression converts the intelligible end to the beginning, and convolves the order to itself. For it is every where the province of intellect to convert and converge to the intelligible.

All these likewise are uniform [i.e. have the form of one] and intelligible, viz. the abiding, the proceeding, and the returning. For each of these is not asserted after the same manner in intelligibles. And the intelligible genus of Gods[185] is unical, simple, and occult, conjoining itself to the one itself which is prior to beings; and unfolds[186] into light nothing else than the transcendency of the one. For these three triads, mystically announce that unknown cause the first and perfectly imparticipable God. The first of them indeed, announcing his ineffable union; the second his transcendency, by which he surpasses all powers; and the third, his all-perfect generation of beings. For as they are able to comprehend the principle which surpasses both the union and the powers of all beings, so they exhibit to secondary natures, his[187] admirable transcendency; receiving indeed separately the unical power and dominion of the first God; but unfolding into light intelligibly the cause which is prior to intelligibles. For these Gods though they are allotted a simplicity which is equally exempt from all the divine orders, yet they fall short of the union of the father. Of this triad therefore, which converts all intelligibles to the first principle, and convolves the multitude apparent in itself to the stable union of the whole of things, one thing is bound, and unity and hyparxis; another, is infinity and power; and another is that which is mixed, essence, life, and intelligible intellect.

But the whole triad subsists according to being, and is the intellect of the first triad. For the first triad is an intelligible God primarily. But the triad posterior to it is an intelligible and intellectual God. And the third triad is an intellectual God. These three deities also, and triadic monads, give completion to the intelligible genera. For they are monads according to their deities; since all other things are suspended from the Gods, and also powers and beings. But they are triads according to a separate division. For bound, infinity, and that which is mixed, have a threefold subsistence; but in one place indeed, all things are according to bound; in another, all things are according to infinity; and in another, all things are according to that which is mixed. And in one place, that which is mixed is essence; in another, it is intelligible life; and in another, intelligible intellect. In this last therefore, forms subsist primarily. For the separation of intelligibles, unfolds the order of forms; because form is being, but is not simply being. Hence that which is primarily being, is being itself, and is that which is being. But that which is the second being, is power, proceeding indeed from the first being, and existing as it were a duad generative of the multitude of beings, but not yet being multitude. And that which is the third being, is itself the multitude of beings;

being there existing with separation. For being is the exempt cause of those things which forms constitute divisibly. And of the things of which being is productive collectively, of these, forms are the cause in a way attended with separation. Because forms indeed, are causes productive of separation in their effects, and also because forms are called the paradigms of beings. Being however, is the cause of all things posterior to itself, but is not the paradigm of them. For paradigms are the causes of things which are separated according to existence, and which have different characters of essence. After the one therefore which is prior to beings, that which is one-many occultly, and the united subsists. On this account, it is that which is divided into multitude, and which tends from the uniform to the splendid. But the last of intelligibles, is that from which a certain distribution into parts originates, and which is comprehensive of intelligible multitude.

Socrates therefore, in the Philebus, affords us such like auxiliaries to the theory of the intelligible triads. It is requisite however, not only to abide in these conceptions, but also to demonstrate the theology of Plato about these triads from other dialogues, and from them to point out one truth adapted to the things themselves. We shall assume therefore, what is written in the Timæus, and shall follow our leader [Syrianus] who has unfolded to us the arcane mysteries of these triads, and conjoin with the end of what has been said the beginning of the following discussion. In the Timæus therefore, Plato investigating what the paradigm of the whole world is, discovers that it is comprehensive of all intelligible animals, that it is all-perfect, that it is the most beautiful of intelligibles, that it is only-begotten, and that it is the intelligible of the demiurgus. He likewise denominates it animal itself, as being the intelligible paradigm of every animal, and of that which is the object of sense. Hence it is necessary that this animal itself, because it is all-perfect, and the most beautiful of intelligibles, should be established in the intelligible orders. For though there is intelligible animal in the demiurgus, yet it is rather intellectual than intelligible, and is not the most beautiful of all intelligibles, but is second to them in beauty and power. For primary beauty is in the intelligible Gods. In the demiurgus also, there are not only four forms of the things contained in the world, but there is all the multitude of forms.

For in him the paradigms of individual forms presubsist. But animal itself is totally constitutive of all animals by the intelligible tetrad. The demiurgus likewise is not like animal itself only-begotten among beings, but subsists in conjunction with the vivific cause, together with which he constitutes the second genera of being, mingling them in the crater or bowl, in order to the generation of souls. For of the things of which intelligible animal is effective and at the same time generative, of these the demiurgus is allotted the cause in a divided manner, in conjunction with the crater. Hence, as I have said, animal itself is exempt from the demiurgus, and is, as Timæus every where denominates it, intelligible.

Nevertheless, because forms are first separated in it, and because it is all-perfect, it subsists in the third order of intelligibles. For neither that which is primarily, nor that which is secondarily being,[188] is all-perfect. For the former is beyond all separation; but the latter generates indeed, and is parturient with intelligibles, but is not yet the multitude of beings. If therefore neither of these is multitude, how can either of them be all-perfect multitude? If however all-perfect multitude shines forth in the third triad of intelligibles, as was a little before demonstrated, but animal itself is the first paradigm (for it is comprehensive of all intelligible animals, is an only-begotten paradigm, and is not conjoined with any other principle) it is necessary that animal itself should be established according to this order. For either there will not be an intelligible paradigm, (and in this case, how will sensibles be images of intelligibles? or how will the intelligible Gods be the fathers of the whole of things?) or if there is, it is the third in intelligibles. For the natures which are prior to the triad in intelligibles, are not all-perfect; since they are exempt from the division into multitude. But the natures posterior to it are not only-begotten. For they proceed together with others; the male indeed, with the female, and those that are of a demiurgic together with those that are of a generative characteristic. Nor are they the most beautiful of intelligibles;

for beauty is in the intelligible. But animal itself is all-perfect, and at the same time only begotten. The first paradigm of beings therefore, is arranged in the third triad of intelligibles. Moreover, animal itself is eternal, as Timæus himself says. For says he, “the nature of animal is eternal.” And again, in another place he asserts, “that the paradigm is through all eternity being.” If therefore it is eternal, it participates of eternity. And if that which participates is every where secondary to that which is participated, animal itself is secondary to eternity. And if it is through all eternity being, it is filled with the whole power of eternity. If this however be the case, it subsists proximately after eternity. For that which enjoys the whole of causes, is arranged proximately after them.

Moreover, if eternity has the same ratio to intelligible animal, which time has to that which is sensible, but the universe proximately participates of time (for time was generated together with the universe) it is certainly necessary that animal itself should primarily participate of eternity. Eternity therefore is beyond the first paradigm. For eternity indeed measures the existence of animal itself: but animal itself is measured and filled with perpetuity from it. To which may be added, that we assert eternity to be the cause of immortality to all things. Hence eternity is that which is primarily immortal. For as that which is primarily being is the cause of existence to all things, but that which is effective of form is itself prior to other forms, so that which is the cause of perpetuity and immortality, is itself primarily immortal. The dæmoniacal Aristotle also rightly calls eternity immortal and divine, and that from whence the existence and life of all things are suspended. If however it is that which is primarily immortal, and not according to participation, but is as it were immortality and perpetuity, it will be life, possessing from itself the ever, and exuberantly scattering the power of perpetuity, and extending it to other things, so far as each is naturally adapted to receive it. For the immortal is in life, and subsists together with life. Hence Socrates in the Phædo,[189] after many and beautiful demonstrations of the psychical immortality, says, “God therefore, my dear Cebes, and the form itself of life, are much more immortal.” Hence, intelligible life, and the God who is connective of this life, primarily possess the immortal, and are the fountain of the whole of perpetuity. But this is eternity. Eternity therefore has its subsistence in life, and will be established in the middle of the intelligible order.

Farther still, it is necessary to assert that intelligible eternity is one of these three things, viz. that it subsists either according to being, or according to life, or according to intelligible intellect. But being, as the Elean guest says, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is moved. For if being is being to all things, and essence is a thing of this kind, much more must this be the case with intelligible essence and that which is primarily being. For they are nothing else than essence only. But being unfolds motion and permanency, and the other genera of beings, in the second and third progressions of itself. The first being therefore, as we have said, is at one and the same time exempt from motion and permanency. But eternity according to Timæus abides in one. Hence also time imitates in its motion the intelligible permanency of eternity. Eternity therefore does not subsist according to that which is primarily being, nor yet according to intelligible intellect.[190] For neither is soul time, which is moved through the whole of time. And in short, in divine beings, that which is participated is every where established above that which participates. But the eternal participates of eternity, just as that which is temporal participates of time. Eternity therefore is prior to intelligible intellect, and posterior to being; so that it is established in the middle of the intelligible breadth. And as animal itself is eternal, so likewise eternity is that which is always being. For as animal itself participates of eternity, so eternity participates of being, and is the cause of existence, of perpetual life, and intellection, and measures the essences, powers and energies of all things.

Since, however, eternity subsists according to the middle centre of intelligibles, and animal itself according to the extremity of them, and the most splendid of that which is intelligible, what is that which is the first of intelligibles, and how is it denominated by Timæus? He says therefore of eternity, that while it abides in one, time proceeds according to number; and that by motion it adumbrates the permanency of eternity, but by number, its stable union. What therefore is that one, in which Timæus says eternity abides? For it is necessary either to say that it is the one of eternity, or the one which transcends all intelligibles, or the one of the first triad. But if indeed, we say that it is the imparticipable one, how is it possible that any thing can abide in that which is exempt from all things; and which neither admits the habitude nor communion of secondary natures with itself? For every thing which abides in any thing, is in a certain respect on all sides comprehended by that in which we say it abides. It is however perfectly impossible that the first one should either comprehend any being, or be coarranged with beings. But if any one should suppose that it is the one of eternity, in which Timæus says eternity abides, in this case, eternity will be in itself. It is necessary however, that it should abide in itself, by having its subsistence in abiding in that which is prior to itself.

For to abide in that which is prior to, is better than the establishment of things in themselves, in the same manner as it is more perfect than the collocation of better in less excellent natures. If therefore eternity abides in itself, to what shall we primarily assign permanency in that which is prior to itself? For it is necessary that this being more divine, should have its generation prior to that which is inferior to it. If therefore eternity can neither abide in itself, nor in the one which is prior to beings, it is evident that abiding in one according to Timæus, it is established in the one of the first triad, or rather in the whole of that triad. For, as we have before observed, the first triad is the cause of stability to all beings, in the same manner as the middle triad is the cause of their progression, and the third triad of their conversion to their principle.

Again therefore, three orders of intelligibles present themselves to our view, according to the doctrine of Timæus, viz. animal itself, eternity, and the one. And through this one, and the firm establishment in it, eternity has fixed the intelligible kingdom. But through eternity, animal itself defines the boundary of the intelligible Gods, according to a perpetual and invariable sameness. And animal itself indeed, having proceeded tetradically, is suspended from the duad in eternity. For eternity is the ever in conjunction with being. But the duad in eternity participates of the intelligible monad, which Timæus on this account denominates one, as being the monad and principle of all the intelligible breadth. Since otherwise indeed, he very properly calls the first triad one, in consequence of its being especially characterized according to bound, denominating it from bound. But he calls the middle triad dyadically, eternity, connecting the names; because this triad is defined according to intelligible power. And he denominates the third triad animal itself, transferring the appellation to the whole of it, from the extremity of the triad. The first triad therefore is the union of all the intelligibles, being in a certain respect coordinated with them. For the union is different from this which is exempt from intelligibles and imparticipable. It is also the supplier of stable power. For all things are established on account of it. But eternity is primary being, and is that which is primarily established. Hence, with respect to the permanency of the whole of things, we say that the first triad is that on account of which this permanency is effected;

but that the second triad is that by which it is produced. For the firm establishment of beings is indeed according to this second triad, but is on account of the first. But the second triad is the proximate measure of all beings, and is coordinated with the things that are measured. There are also at one and the same time in it, bound and infinity; bound indeed, so far as it measures intelligibles; but infinity, so far as it is the cause of perpetuity, and the ever. For according to the oracle, eternity is the cause of never-failing life, of unwearied power, and unsluggish energy. Nevertheless, eternity is more characterised by infinity [than by bound.] For it comprehends in itself infinite time. And time indeed has bound and infinity in a divided manner. For according to its continuity, it is infinite; but according to the now it is bounded. For the now is a bound. But eternity establishes bound and infinity in the same. For it is a unity and power. And according to the one indeed, it is bound; but according to power infinite; which time[191] also demonstrates as from images; because the middle triad [of intelligibles] has bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. For whence is the bound of time derived except from eternal bound? For the temporal bound also is impartible, in the same manner as the bound of eternity is one. For the impartible is the image of the one.

Whence likewise is the infinity of the continuity of time derived except from the power of the infinite? For the latter is a stable infinity, but the former an infinity which is moved. And as the latter stands still according to the one, so the former is moved according to number. Since whence is the alliance of time with lives, except from the first principle [of life, eternity?]. But time proceeds through all temporal life.

Again, therefore, from these things it is evident, that eternity subsists according to the middle of the intelligible Gods. For here there is infinite life, and the cause of all life, intellectual, psychical, and that which subsists partibly in bodies. But eternity is the father and supplier of infinite life; since eternity is also the cause of all immortality and perpetuity. And Plotinus, exhibiting, in a most divinely inspired manner, the peculiarity[192] of eternity, according to the theology of Plato, defines it to be infinite life, at once unfolding into light the whole of itself, and its own being. For establishing its life in the intelligible centre, and through the one indeed measuring its being, and fixing it in that which is prior to itself, but through power causing it to be infinite, it unfolds indeed the uniform transcendency of the first triad, but defines the termination of the Gods, and extends from the middle on all sides, and to all the intelligible breadth. Moreover the third triad is filled indeed with intelligible life,[193] and on this account is an intelligible animal, and the first animal. For it primarily participates of the whole nature of this life; but unfolds into light in itself the first of forms, to which also the demiurgic intellect extending itself, constitutes the whole world, and is itself the intelligible universe, and the apparent world the sensible universe. Hence also, Plato denominates animal itself all-perfect. Or rather, if you are willing we will speak thus:

that in this third triad, there are bound, infinity, and that which is mixed, which we have called intelligible intellect. Hence the whole triad is denominated only-begotten from the father which is in it. For the cause of bound imparts that which is uncoordinated with other things, and an exempt transcendency. For that which comprehends, says Timæus, all such animals as are intelligible, will not be the second with any other; since again, it would be requisite that there should be another animal about it. Hence that which comprehends in one all intelligible animals is a whole. But every where whole is referred[194] to bound, and parts to infinity. So that if on this account animal itself is only-begotten, it will possess this peculiarity according to bound. But again, it is denominated eternal according to the power of it. For this power especially pertains to that which is eternal. For eternity is infinite power abiding in one, and proceeding stably. Animal itself, however, is all-perfect according to intellect. For that which unfolds in itself all the intelligible separation of being, is intelligible intellect. And that intellect, according to the decision of Plato, will be all-perfect, which comprehends all intelligibles, and defines the boundary of the intelligible order. The only-begotten, therefore, the eternal, the all-perfect, bound, infinity, and that which is mixed, manifest the nature of intelligible animal. On this account, Timæus also, in these three conclusions, reminds us of the paradigm, viz. in the conclusion which shews that the universe is only-begotten, and again, in the generation of time, and in the all-perfect comprehension of all animals.

If likewise Timæus says, that animal itself is the most beautiful of all intelligibles, and that this has the third order in intelligibles, it will not be wonderful. For it has been before asserted by us, that every where the cause of the best mixture is the triad symmetry, truth, and beauty. But beauty principally shines forth in the third progression of being, and exhibits its luminous nature together with intelligible forms, just as truth shines forth in the second, and symmetry in the first progression of being. If, however, truth is indeed the first, beauty the second, and symmetry the third, it is by no means wonderful, that according to order, truth and beauty should be prior to symmetry; but that symmetry being more apparent in the first triad than the other two, should shine forth as the third in the secondary progressions. For these three subsist occultly in the first triad. And truth indeed, so far as it is intelligible knowledge, is in the second triad; but beauty so far as it is the form of forms is in the third triad. For that this triad subsists there first, is evident from this, that truth is primarily in that which is especially being, prior to knowledge. But beauty, which pervades as far as to the last of beings, is necessarily in the first being, from which the last of beings are derived. And the first symmetry is in that which is primarily mixed.

For every mixture requires symmetry, in order that what is produced from it may be one certain thing. Though these three things, therefore, presubsist there, for we assume, as acknowledged universally, that symmetry is there, and the most beautiful of intelligible animals, as Timæus says, yet at present we shall dismiss the further consideration of them, as we have elsewhere precedaneously discussed them, and have especially endeavoured to enforce what we conceive to be the opinion of Plato concerning their order. For we have spoken of these things in a treatise consisting of one book, in which we demonstrate that truth is coordinate to the philosopher, beauty to the lover, and symmetry to the musician; and that such as is the order of these lives, such also is the relation of truth, beauty, and symmetry to each other.

Animal itself, therefore, may with the greatest justice, be called most beautiful, so far as it is eminently contained in intelligible beauty. For beauty is wont to be carried in forms, and is as it were the form of forms, unfolding that which is occult in the good, causing its loveliness to shine forth, and attracting to its own splendor the desire which is concealed about it. And to the good indeed, all things possess a silent and arcane tendency; but we are excited to the beautiful with astonishment and motion. For the illumination from it, and its efficacy, acutely pervade through every soul, and as being the most similar of all things to the good, it converts every soul that surveys it. The soul also, beholding that which is arcane shining forth as it were to the view, rejoices in, and admires that which it sees, and is astonished about it. And as in the most holy of the mysteries, prior to the mystic spectacles, those that are initiated, are seized with astonishment, so in intelligibles prior to the participation of the good, beauty shining forth, astonishes those that behold it, converts the soul to itself, and being established in the vestibules [of the good] shows what that is which is in the adyta, and what the transcendency is of occult good. Through these things therefore, let it be apparent whence beauty originates, and how it first shines forth; and also that animal itself is the most beautiful of all intelligibles.

Since, however, Timæus says that the primary and intelligible paradigms have their subsistence in intelligible animal, and that all these are four, unfolding themselves first into light, according to the all-perfect tetrad, - this being the case, in the first place it deserves to be considered, that as species or forms present themselves to the view in the intelligible, it is necessary by a much greater priority, that the genera of beings should pre-subsist in intelligibles. For it is not possible to admit that forms are intelligible, but that genera are intellectual only. But as forms exist intelligibly indeed, according to their first subsistence, but the pleroma, or plenitude of them shines forth in the intellectual[195] gods, and divides that which is total into more partial decrements, produces the uniform into multitude, and expands that which is exempt into coordinate causes, thus also the genera of being are occultly and indivisibly in intelligibles, but are accompanied with separation in intellectuals. And on this account the first triad indeed has essence for that which is mixed; but the second has life, where there was motion and permanency, life both abiding and proceeding; and in the third there are sameness and difference. For the all-perfect multitude indeed, is through intelligible difference, but the united and that which is comprehensive in common of parts according to genera, and according to one, is through intelligible sameness. And all these subsist intelligibly, essentially, and uniformly in these triads.

In the first place therefore, this deserves to be inferred by those who love to survey the nature of things, and it is also fit that they should attribute coordinate genera to intelligible forms. For it neither was nor will be lawful for genera to shine forth secondarily[196] after forms. Hence much more must it be admitted that genera subsist in the intelligible after the above-mentioned manner, by those who admit that there are intelligible forms. In the next place, in addition to these things we must survey how this tetrad of forms subsists, and how it shines forth in intelligible intellect analogous to the principles. For it is divided into a monad and triad. For so far as the idea of the celestial gods is arranged prior to the others, it is defined according to a divine cause. It appears however to me that intelligible intellect returning to the principles of the whole of things, according to the conversion of itself, it becomes the plenitude of forms, and is all things intellectually and at the same time intelligibly, comprehending in itself the causes of beings, and being full of the ineffable and exempt cause of all things, constitutes the monad of the gods; whence also, Plato I think calls it the idea of the gods. But receiving the intellectual causes of the three principles posterior to the one, it exhibits three ideas after this, one of them indeed, being the cause of air-wandering and volant animals, this cause proceeding analogous to bound.

Hence also it constitutes gods that are uniform, elevating, undefiled, united to the celestial gods, and which receive measures second in dignity to theirs, and have the same relation to those gods that govern generation co-ordinately, as the celestial gods have to these, according to exempt transcendency. But it exhibits the cause of the aquatic gods, coordinate with generative and infinite power, and which produces gods that are the suppliers of motion and prolific abundance, and that are the inspective guardians of life; since also this water itself which is the object of sense is under the dominion of effusion, infinite lation and indefiniteness. Hence likewise it is attributed to vivific powers. And intelligible intellect exhibits the precedaneous cause of terrestrial and pedestrious gods, in a manner adapted to the nature of that which is mixed. It also generates gods who contain the end of the whole of things, who are stable, who subdue the formless nature of matter by the last forms, and fix the seat of mundane natures in the one centre of the universe. For deriving their subsistence from the first Vesta as it were, or seat of beings, they stably define this mundane seat. Thus therefore forms first unfold themselves into light in intelligible intellect, possessing their progression and order according to the first principles. It is necessary however, in addition to these things, to infer this in the third place, following Timæus, that according to this triad, the multitude of intelligible parts shines forth, and the whole is divided into an all-perfect order of parts.

For that, says he, of which other intelligible animals both according to one, and according to genera are parts, is the first and most beautiful paradigm of the universe. But if other intelligible animals are parts of this, it is evident that it is a whole, comprehending in itself the multitude of intelligible parts, and that it is connective of all intelligible parts. It must be inferred therefore that this triad is the first cause of production and fabrication. For if it contains the primary paradigms of things, it is evident that the orderly distribution of secondary natures, originates from it. And if it is an animal constitutive of all animals, every psychical extent, and all the extent of bodies, have their progression from thence; and it will also comprehend the intelligible causes of all the vivific and demiurgic orders.

Such conceptions therefore, as these, may be assumed from what is written in the Timæus concerning the three intelligible triads, conformably to what is said of them in the Philebus, surveying in each bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. If you are willing also, we will show from what is scattered in the Sophista, that Plato had the same conception as we have concerning the first principles. The Elean guest therefore, in that dialogue, doubting against the assertion of Parmenides that the universe is one, unfolding intelligible multitude, and showing how it is suspended from the one, at first indeed, he argues from the one being [or being characterized by the one] and reminds us that this is passive to the one, and participates of the one, but is not the one itself, nor that which is primarily one. But afterwards, he produces the conception of the distinction between the imparticipable one and being, from whole. For if the one being is a whole, as Parmenides testifies, but that which is a whole has parts, and that which has parts, is not the one itself, the one being will not be the same as the one. In the third place therefore, he argues from the all-perfect. For that which is perfectly divided, and is connective of many parts, can never have the same subsistence as that which is entirety one. And having proceeded thus far he shows that what is void of multitude, is in its own nature exempt from the one being, proceeding in the demonstration of this through three arguments.

And at one time indeed, he begins from the one being, at another time from whole, and at another from all. It is better however to hear the words themselves of Plato. That the one therefore, is not the same with the one being, he proves through the following words. “But what with respect to those who assert that the universe is one? Must we not enquire to the utmost of our power what they say being is? Certainly. To this question therefore they may answer: Do you say there is one thing alone? We do say so. Or will they not speak in this manner? They will. What then, do you call being any thing? Yes. Do you call it the one, employing two names respecting the same thing? Or how do you say? What will be their answer after this O guest?” Through this therefore, Plato separating the one and being from each other, and showing that the conception of the one is different from that of being, and that these are not the same with each other, evinces that the most proper and primary one is exempt from the one being. For the one being does not abide purely in an hyparxis void of multitude and possessing the form of one. But the one itself is exempt from every addition. For by whatever you may add to it, you will diminish its supreme and ineffable union. Hence it is necessary to arrange the one prior to the one being, and to suspend the one being from that which is one alone.

For if the one and the one being were the same, and it made no difference to say one and being (since if they differed, the one would again be changed from the one being,) if therefore the one differs in no respect from the one being, all things will be one, and there will not be multitude in beings, nor will it be possible to denominate things, lest there should be two things, the thing and the name. For being exempt from all multitude, and all division, there will neither be a name of any thing, nor any discourse about it, but the name will appear to be the same with the thing. And neither will a name be the name of a thing, but a name will be the name of a name, if a thing is the same with a name, and a name is the same with a thing,[197] and a thing will be the thing of a thing. For all things will exist about a thing the same as about a name, through the union of the thing and the name. If therefore, these things are absurd, and the one is, and also being, and being participates of the one, the one and the one being are not the same.

But that whole also is not the same with the one, Plato afterwards demonstrates [in the same dialogue,] beginning as follows: “What then? Will they say that whole is different from the one being, or that it is the same with it? Undoubtedly they will and do say so. If therefore whole is, as Parmenides says, “that which is every where similar to the bulk of a perfect sphere, entirely possessing equal powers from the middle; for nothing is greater or more stable than this:” - if this be the case, it is necessary that being should have a middle and extremities. And having these, there is every necessity that it should have parts. Or how shall we say? Just so. Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have the passion of the one in all its parts, and that thus the all and whole may be one. Undoubtedly. But is it not impossible that that which suffers these things should be the one? Why? Because according to right reason, that which is truly one should be said to be entirely without parts. It must indeed necessarily be so. But such a thing as we have just now mentioned, in consequence of consisting of many parts would not accord with the one.” Through these things therefore, the Elean guest arguing from wholeness after the one being, and also from the division of the parts of wholeness, demonstrates that the all is not one. For if whole is in beings, as Parmenides in his verses testifies it is, all things will not be the one. For the one is impartible; but whole possesses parts. Whole therefore is not the one itself. For that transcends all things and wholeness; but whole is passive to the one. Hence also it is denominated whole; for it is not the one itself. Hence all things are not one void of separation and multiplication.

Moreover, the all is comprehensive of many parts. For whole indeed, consists at first of two parts; but the all possesses a multitude of parts, and participating of wholeness at the same time is all, as being perfectly distributed into parts. This therefore is not the one itself, but is passive to the one. For the one itself is impartible. But it is impartible in such a manner as to be exempt from all parts. Hence the all is not the same with the one. We therefore, have divided whole and the all, but Plato conjoins them, when he says: “Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have the passion of the one in all its parts, and that thus the all and whole may be one.” At the same time however, they are divided after the above mentioned manner. From these three arguments therefore, the Elean guest separates the one from the participants of the one, and doubts against those who assert all things to be one, viz. the one being, whole and the all; of which the all indeed participates of whole, and is a self-perfect multitude, consisting of many parts; but whole participates of being. For being is not whole, as Parmenides testifies. These therefore, having such an order as this, is it not necessary that the arguments of Plato should be made conformably to the three intelligible[198] triads? For it was requisite, since Parmenides defined the one being in intelligibles, that Plato should from thence derive his demonstrations of the distinction between the one prior to intelligibles, and the one which is in intelligibles.

For the doubts against Parmenides, evince in many places that the one which is participated derives its subsistence from the imparticipable union. The one[199] therefore is not in these triads, but the one being and whole. But with respect to the all, it is evident that it is in the extremity of the intelligible order. For that which is in every respect perfect, and all intelligible multitude, have their subsistence in that extremity. But whole is in the middle centre, and in the bond of the intelligible breadth. For whole is adapted to have a subsistence prior to the all; since the all is a whole, but whole is not necessarily all. For the all is divided multitude; but that which contains multitude in itself, and which is not yet separated is whole. And this especially pertains to eternity. For eternity is the measure of all intelligible multitude, just as whole is the coherence and union of the all. But the one being is in the first triad. For the one is especially the peculiarity of this triad, as Timæus also has demonstrated. And being which is occultly and intelligibly being, and which is the cause of essence to all other things, primarily shines forth there. Again therefore, following the Elean guest, three triads present themselves to our view; the first indeed according to the one being; the second according to whole; and the third according to the all. To which also the demiurgus of the universe looking, adorns the sensible universe, defining the visible nature with reference to that intelligible all;

but time with reference to the intelligible wholeness. On which account also time is continued. And as the intelligible whole comprehends two parts, but contains the parts in one boundary, after the same manner, time also is bounded by the now, but by its twofold parts is infinite. These things therefore, we shall shortly after more fully discuss when we speak concerning the Parmenides. For the conceptions of the Elean guest are the proteleia of the mysteries of the Parmenides. Before however we turn to the Parmenides, let us discuss, if it is agreeable to you, the three triads from the beginning, collecting the conception of Plato from his assertions that are scattered in many places.

There are three triads therefore, as we have frequently observed, and they are divided after this manner into bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. Hence there are triple intelligible bounds, triple infinities, and triple mixtures. But of every intelligible triad, the bound in each is denominated father; the infinite, power; and that which is mixed, intellect. And let not any one apprehend that these names are foreign from the philosophy of Plato. For it will appear that he uses these appellations in the before mentioned triads more than any one. For he denominates the first God father and lord in his Epistles. It is evident however, that as the first God surpasses even the paternal order, the first paternal is in the intelligible Gods. For these are they that are most eminently allied to the one, and that intelligibly unfold his ineffable and unknown union. If therefore the first God is denominated one and father from the natures that proximately proceed from him, - if this be the case, as the intelligible Gods are primarily unities, so likewise they are primarily fathers. For Plato gives names to the ineffable in a twofold respect, either from the summits of beings, or from all beings. For through these the transcendency of the one is known. Moreover, the Elean guest calls being that which is powerful and power. The first power therefore exists prior to being, and is united to the father; but it particularly accords with being, which also it fills.

Hence being as participating of power is denominated powerful; but as united to it, and producing all beings according to it, it is called power. If however both Plato himself, and his most genuine disciples, frequently call all [true] beings intellect (on which account, in many places they make three principles, the good, intellect and soul, denominating every [true] being intellect) you will also have the third in these intellect. But it is necessary not to be ignorant of the difference. For with respect to intellect, one kind is intellect as with reference to hyparxis. For when we denominate the unity in each triad intelligible, as the object of desire to being, and as filling being, then we call that which ranks as the third in the triad intellect. For it is intelligible as essence and intellect, but not as the intellect of essence, but of father and deity. For every participated deity is intelligible, as being the plenitude of its participant. But another kind is intellect which is the intellect of essence; according to which we say that the being of the third triad, is the intellect of that which is primarily being. For this is essential intellect, being allotted its own essence by energizing.[200] For all things are essentially in it, and both the more simple genera, and the primary paradigms; for it is intelligible intellect. But the third kind is intellectual intellect, which subsists analogous to intelligible intellect, is conjoined with it, and is filled from it, possessing intellectually those things which are in the other intelligibly.

And in short, it is necessary every where that such things as are first according to each series, should have the form of the things that are prior to them. Hence also they are called things first, and possess a certain transcendency of essence towards coordinate natures. Since therefore, that which is prior to intelligibles is God, the first intelligibles are Gods and unities. And since the intelligible is essential, the first intellects are essences. Since also intellect is every where according to its own nature intellectual, the first souls are intellectual. Because likewise, souls are the plenitudes of life, the first of bodies are most vital. And because the bodies that are perpetual are moved in a circle, the summits of material bodies are moved in conjunction with those bodies that are perpetual. This therefore is the cause why the unities are frequently called intelligibles, and beings intelligible intellects.

That Plato however knew this triad, I mean father, power and intellect, we shall learn by looking to the demiurgic order. For in this the triad is most remarkably apparent. Hence, on account of its union with the intelligible, it is filled with this triad, and possesses these things in a more divided manner than animal itself, or intelligible eternity. Immediately therefore, in the beginning of the fabrication in the Timæus, the demiurgus calls himself father, “Of which works I am the demiurgus and father.” But shortly after he unfolds his power, “Imitating my power in your generation.” This therefore is also wonderful, that he has delivered to us the most theological conception concerning power. For in the first place indeed, he calls it the power of the father, when he says, “Of which works I am the demiurgus and father,” and that the power is his, [is evident from the words,] “Imitating my power:” so that according to Plato power is of the father. And in the next place, he ascribes to this power a peculiarity generative of the whole of things; for this is evident from the words “In your generation.” Power therefore is the cause of generation and of the progression of beings. And in the last place, he delivers the intellectual peculiarity of the demiurgus. “Having thus spoke, again into the former crater in which he had tempered the soul of the universe, he poured mingling the remainder of the former mixture.” For to pour, to mingle, mixture, and to be productive of soul, pertain to intellect.

Though what necessity is there for asserting these things, since prior to this he calls the demiurgus intellect. “Whatever ideas therefore intellect perceived by the dianoëtic energy in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for this universe to contain.” Hence the demiurgus is father, and power and intellect. And he possesses these things as much as possible on account of intelligibles. For he is a God as father, on account of them. He is also power, and the generator of wholes, and knows beings intellectually, on account of them. For in them intelligible knowledge first subsists. Much more therefore are father, power and intellect in intelligibles; from which also the demiurgus being filled, participates of this triad. For Plato assumes each of these analogously. For as the paternal triad in intelligibles gives subsistence to intelligible eternity, so the demiurgus makes those works to be indissoluble of which he is the father. And as in intelligibles, eternity proceeding according to all power generates intelligible animal itself, so the demiurgic power gives subsistence to mundane animals that are perpetual and divine, and imparts to the junior Gods another power which is generative of mortal animals. That any one therefore may assume these names from Plato is evident from what has been said.

Since however, being has an hypostasis triply in intelligibles, one is primarily being and prior to the eternal; but another is secondarily being, and the first eternity; and another is being ultimately, and is intelligible and eternal intellect. And here indeed there is being, but there eternity, and there intellect. And eternity is more comprehensive than intellect; but being than eternity. For every intellect is eternal, but not every thing eternal is intellect. For soul according to its essence is eternal, and every thing which participates of eternity, participates also by a much greater priority of being. For with perpetuity of existence, existence is entirely consubsistent. But that which participates of existence is not universally eternally being. For bodies also participate in a certain respect of the nature of existence, but they are not eternal. Intellect therefore constitutes an intellectual essence only, so far as it is intellect; since so far as it is also life and being it constitutes all things. But eternity constitutes both the intellectual and psychical essence. For the mixture [in the second triad] was intelligible life. But being constitutes the intellectual, the psychical, and the corporeal life. For matter also is being [most obscurely,] and is capacity indeed, but formless being, and non-being, falling off from the participation of being. If, however, some one should say that it is being in power or capacity, yet it has this power from being. For capacity is the forerunning participation of energy. And thus much concerning these things.

But what sufficient argument of division does Socrates afford us in the Phædrus, concerning these intelligible triads? And how from what is delivered by him may we recur to the conception of the hypostasis of the most principal Gods? Socrates therefore in that dialogue, being inspired by the Nymphs, celebrates every thing divine as beautiful, wise and good, and says that by these the soul is nourished. But if every thing divine is a thing of this kind, this is the case with the intelligible by a much greater priority. And all these indeed are every where, but in the first triad, the good principally subsists; in the second the wise; and in the third the beautiful. For in this there is the most beautiful of intelligibles. But in the second triad truth and the first intelligence subsist. And in the first there is the commensurate, which we say is the same as the good. But Socrates in the Philebus says that the element of the good is the desirable, the sufficient, and the perfect. The desirable therefore pertains indeed to bound; for it is the union and goodness of all the triad, and the triad converges about it. But the sufficient pertains to infinity. For sufficiency is a power capable of pervading to all things, and of being present to all things without impediment. And the perfect pertains to that which is mixed. For this is that which is primarily triadic;

since every mixture has its coalition from the triad. The elements therefore of the good unfold to us the first triad; and the elements of intelligible wisdom, the second triad. But every thing wise is full of being, is generative of truth, and is convertive of imperfect natures to their perfection. The full therefore pertains to the second bound; for this is uniformly filled with the participation of the natures prior to itself. For the full is every where adapted to bound, just as that which cannot be filled is adapted to the infinite. But the prolific pertains to the second power, and to infinity. For that which does not abide in the fulness of itself, but is prolific and generative of other things, is especially indicative of divine infinity. And the convertive pertains to that which is mixed. For this as being allotted the end of the triad, converts every thing imperfect to the full, and unites itself prior to other things to the bound of the whole triad.

Moreover, the elements of beauty are the peculiarities of the third triad of intelligibles. But these are, as we have before observed, the lovely, the delicate, and the splendid. The lovely therefore, being arranged analogous to the desirable, pertains to bound. But the delicate being coordinate to the sufficient, pertains to the infinite power which is in the beautiful. And the splendid is of an intellectual peculiarity. For this is the beautiful of beauty; is that which illuminates all things, and astonishes those that are able to behold it. And as apparent beauty shining most manifestly, is seen through the clearest of the senses (for the objects of this sense have many differences according to Aristotle, and this sense pervades farther than the rest) so likewise intelligible beauty appears to the intellect of the soul shining intelligibly. Far it is an intelligible form. And on this account the splendor of beauty is apparent to intellect. Splendid beauty therefore, as Socrates calls it, shines forth at the extremity of the intelligible order. For this is the most splendid of intelligibles, is intelligible intellect, and is that which emits the intelligible light, that when it appeared astonished the intellectual Gods, and made them admire their father, as Orpheus says. Such therefore is the preparation to the science of the intelligible Gods which may from these things be assumed. And now it will appear how beauty is indeed occultly in the end of the first intelligible triad, but subsists in the third triad so as to have manifestly proceeded into light.

For in the former it subsists according to one form only; but in the latter it subsists triadically. It is also evident how each of the triads is at one and the same time a monad and a triad. For the first triad being characterized according to the good, derives its completion from the three elements of the good. But the second being characterized by the wise is contained in the triad of wisdom. And the third subsisting according to the beautiful, is all-perfect through the triad of beauty. If however the beautiful is occultly in the first triad, and shines forth triadically in the third, it is evident that intelligible intellect loves the first triad, and has love conjoined with its beauty. And this is the intelligible love of the first beauty. From these therefore, intellectual love proceeds, together with faith and truth, as we have before observed. For the three intelligible monads, the good, the wise and the beautiful, constitute three powers which lead upwards all other things, and prior to other things the intellectual Gods. Concerning these things however, we shall speak hereafter.

Let us now then direct our attention to the theory of the Parmenides. But I wish again to remind the reader of what we have before demonstrated. It has been shown therefore, that it is necessary to divide the second hypothesis into the whole progressions of the one being; and that this hypothesis is nothing else than the generation and progression of the Gods, proceeding supernally from the supreme union of intelligibles as far as to a deified essence. For the discussion is not, as some say it is, in the first hypothesis, concerning God and the Gods. For it was not lawful to Parmenides to conjoin multitude with the one, and the one with multitude. For the first God is perfectly exempt from the whole of things. But in the first hypothesis essence, and even the one itself, are taken away from the first God. That such an ablation, however, as this is not adapted to the other Gods is evident to every one. Moreover, neither does Parmenides in the first hypothesis speak about the intelligible Gods, as they say he does; for they assert that the negations are of these Gods, because they are conjoined with the one, and in simplicity and union precede[201] all the divine genera. For how can the similar or the dissimilar, or contact and the privation of contact, and all the other particulars which are denied of the one, be inherent in the intelligible Gods?

They appear indeed to me to be right in asserting that the things which are taken away are similitudes of the Gods; but they do not speak rightly when they say that all of them are similitudes of the intelligible Gods. To which it may be added, in opposition to this assertion, that the discussion is again concerning the intelligible Gods in the second hypothesis. For the things which are denied in the first, are affirmed in the second hypothesis. This therefore, as I have said, is demonstrated that the conclusions with reference to each other have the order of prior and posterior, of causes and effects. It is necessary therefore, that proceeding from the beginning, we should adapt the first conclusions to the first orders, the middle conclusions to the middle orders, and the last conclusions to the last orders, and should demonstrate that as many questions are asked, as there are progressions of the divine orders. And in the first place, we must deliver the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the intelligible Gods, of whom we have proposed to speak; since Plato speaks about these in many places, partly indicating, and partly clearly unfolding his meaning.

It is necessary however, that we should collect into one the elaborate and synoptical theory about each order, since it would not be proper now to repeat the exposition which we have given in our commentaries on that dialogue. But assuming each of the conclusions itself by itself, I will endeavour to refer it to an appropriate order of the Gods, following in so doing the divine inspirations of our leader [Syrianus]. For we also through his assistance have with a divine head pursued these sacred paths about the theory of the Parmenides, being agitated with a divine fury, and wakened as from a profound sleep to this arcane mystic discipline. And thus much concerning the mode of the whole of the conclusions. But from hence I shall pass to the narration of the things proposed. The first and imparticipable one therefore, which preexists beyond the whole of things, and not only beyond the unities that participate, but also those that are participated, is celebrated through the first hypothesis, being demonstrated to be the cause of all things ineffably, but not being defined itself in any one of all things, nor having any power or peculiarity of a kindred nature with the other Gods. But after this [imparticipable one,] that which is alone superessential and surpassing, and unmingled with all hyparxis, is a unity participated by being, and constituting about itself the first essence, and by the addition of this participation becoming more redundant than that which is primarily one.

This however is a superessential hyparxis, and the hyparxis of the first intelligible triad. As there are therefore these two things in the first triad, viz. the one and being, and the former generates, but the latter is generated, and the former perfects, but the latter is perfected, it is necessary that the middle of both should be power, through which and together with which the one constitutes and is perfective of being. For the progression of being from the one, and its conversion to the one, is through power. For what else conjoins being to the one, or causes the one to be participated by being except power? For it is the progression of the one, and its extension to being. Hence, in all the divine genera powers precede progressions and generations. This triad therefore, the one, power and being, is the summit of intelligibles. The first of these indeed producing; the third being produced; and the second being suspended from the one, but coalescing with being.

This triad therefore, Parmenides delivers immediately in the beginning of the second hypothesis, adjoining to the one the most simple participation of essence. But he calls it the one being, and says that being participates of the one, and the one of being. The participation however of these is different. For the one[202] indeed so participates of being, as illuminating and filling, and deifying being; but being so participates of the one, as suspended from the one, and deified by it. But the habitude which is the middle of both, is not with them void of essence. For neither is the habitude which is among sensibles in no respect being, and much more is this the case with the habitude which is there. But this habitude is biformed. For it is of the one, and is connascent with being. For it is the motion of the one, and its progression into being. Parmenides delivers this triad, beginning what he says about it as follows: “See therefore from the beginning if the one is. Is it possible then for it to be, and yet not to participate of essence? It is not possible.” But he ends speaking about it in the following words: “Will therefore that which is said be any thing else than this, that the one participates of essence, when it is summarily asserted by any one that the one is? It will not.” This therefore is the first intelligible triad, the one, being, and the habitude of both, through which being is of the one and the one of being, in a manner perfectly admirable;

Plato indicating through these things, that the father is the father of intellect, and that intellect is the intellect of the father, and that power is concealed between the extremes. For deity is the father of the triad, and being is the intellect of this deity. Yet it is not intellect in the same way as we are accustomed to call the intellect of essence. For every such intellect stands still and is moved, as the Elean guest says. But that which is primarily being, neither stands still, nor is moved, as he also teaches. The first triad therefore is called one being; since power is here occultly. For the triad does not proceed from itself; but subsists without separation and uniformly, being primarily defined according to divine union. Hence, this is the first participation of essence, which participates of the one through power as the middle, which collects together and separates both the one and being. And it is superessential indeed, but is conjoined with essence. We must never think therefore that all power is the progeny of essence. For the powers of the Gods are superessential, and are consubsistent with the unities themselves of the Gods. And through this power the Gods are generative of beings. Rightly therefore, does poetry every where assert that the Gods are able to do all things. For essential powers indeed are not capable of effecting all things; since they are not constitutive of superessential natures. The first triad therefore, is through these things unfolded to us by Parmenides.

But immediately after this, the second triad is allotted a progression, which Parmenides characterizes by intelligible wholeness, as we have shown in the Sophista. For the first triad being uniform, and possessing all things intelligibly and occultly, viz. hyparxis, power and being, so that power which is the cause of division, subsisting between the one and being, is concealed, and becomes apparent through the communion of the extremes with each other, - the second triad proceeds, being characterized by the first intelligible power, and having the monads in itself distinguished from each other. For all things being united and without distinction in the first triad, distinction and separation shine forth in this triad. Being also and power are more divided from each other. And that which consists of these is no longer one being [or being characterized by the one,] but is a whole, so that it has the one and being in itself as parts. For above indeed [i.e. in the first triad] all things are prior to parts and wholeness. But in this triad there are both parts and a whole, power unfolding itself into light. For as there is separation here, there are parts and the whole consisting of these. The second triad therefore is called intelligible wholeness. But the parts of it, the one and being, I call the extremes. And power being here the middle, connects the one and being, and does not cause them to be one, in the same manner as in the first triad.

Since also it is the middle of both, through its communion indeed with being, it renders the one one being; but through its communion with the one, it perfectly causes being to be one. And thus the one being consists of two parts, viz. of being which is characterised by the one, and of the one which is characterized by being, as Parmenides himself says. He begins therefore to speak about this triad as follows: “Again therefore, let us say if the one is what will happen. Consider then if it is not necessary that this hypothesis should signify the one to be a thing of such a kind as to have parts?” But he ends in the following words: “That which is one therefore is a whole, and has a part.”

Through these things therefore Parmenides defines the second order of intelligibles to be a wholeness. For as existence is derived to all things from the first triad, so whole from the second, and an all-perfect division from the third. This however will be considered by us hereafter. Wholeness therefore is triple, being either prior to parts, or consisting of parts, or subsisting in a part, according to the doctrine of Plato. For in the Politicus indeed, he calls genus a whole, but species a part, not that genus derives its completion from species, but exists prior to it. And in the Timæus he says that the world is a whole of wholes. And all the world indeed derives its completion from parts that are wholes; but each of the parts is a whole, not as the universe is, but partially. Wholeness therefore, being triple as we have said, according to Plato, the unity, and the intelligible and occult cause of these is now delivered, unically comprehending and constituting three wholenesses; according to the hyparxis indeed of itself, the wholeness prior to parts; but according to its power, the wholeness which is from parts; and according to its being the wholeness which is in a part. For the one is prior to all multitude; but power communicates in a certain respect with both the extremes, and comprehends in itself the peculiarities of them; and being in a certain respect participates of the one.

Hence the first of the wholenesses, or that which is prior to parts is derived from a unical hyparxis. For it is a monad, and is itself constitutive of parts, and of the multitude which is in them. But the second wholeness is from power. For it derives its completion from parts, just as in the power which is collective of the one and being, the extremes in a certain respect shine forth to the view. And the third wholeness is from being. For being is a part, and is the progeny both of power and the one,[203] and possesses each of these partially. After the intelligible therefore, three wholenesses are divided according to the different orders of beings. But the intelligible wholeness comprehends the three unically, and is the intelligibly connective monad of this triad, every way extending the powers of itself from the middle of the intelligible and occult order.

Immediately after this triad we may see another proceeding, in which all intelligible multitude shines forth, and which Parmenides indeed constitutes a wholeness, but a wholeness consisting of many parts. For after the occult union of the first triad, and the dyadic separation of the second, the progression of the third is generated, which has indeed its subsistence from parts, but the parts are many, with the multitude of which the triad prior to it is parturient. For in this triad there is a unity, and power, and being. But the one is multiplied, and also being and power. And thus all the triad indeed is a wholeness; but each of its extremes, viz. the one and being, as it is multitude conjoined through collective power, is again divided and multiplied. For this power conjoining unical multitude to the multitude of beings, of some of these it causes each through progression to be being characterized by the one, but of others each according to participation to be the one characterized by being. For here indeed there are two parts of the wholeness, the one and being; but the one participates of being, for it is conjoined with it; and being participates of the one. The one of being therefore, is again divided, so that the one and being generate a second unity conjoined with the part of being. But being participating of the one, is again separated into being and the one.

For it generates a more partial being suspended from a more partial unity. And being consists of more partial deified beings, and is a more specific monad. The cause however of this progression is power. For power is effective of two things, and is the operator of multitude. For the one indeed calls forth into multitude, but being converts to the participation of the divine unities. Whence therefore does Parmenides begin to teach us concerning this triad? And where does he conclude his discourse about it? The beginning, therefore, of what he says on this subject is as follows: “What then? Can each of these parts of the one being, viz. the one and being, desert each other, so that the one shall not be a part of being, or being shall not be a part of the one? It cannot be.[204]” But he ends thus: “Will not, therefore, the one being after this manner be an infinite multitude? It seems so.”

In the first place, therefore, it is proper to understand the manner of the progression of the divine genera; and that conformably to the intelligible monad, which we arrange according to the one being, the duad posterior to it which we call a wholeness [proceeds.] But we say that it consists of two parts which are separated by power, and that intelligible multitude presents itself to the view from the monad and the duad. For when all things are said to be parts of the one being, viz. secondary things, and such as become apparent through the separating cause of power, then Parmenides delivers the union which pervades from the monad to the third triad. But when power separating and conjoining the unities and beings, gives completion to multitude, then the participation of the duad becomes perfectly apparent, as I think Parmenides demonstrates when he says, “so that it is necessary two things should always be generated, and that there should never be one thing (only.)” This triad, therefore, proceeds according to both the preexistent triads, flowing according to the Oracle, and proceeding to all intelligible multitude. For infinite multitude is indicative of this flux, and of the incomprehensible nature of power. Hence, in the first place, I have said that the hypostasis of this triad is through these things demonstrated to be suspended from the triads prior to it. And in the next place, I say, that this triad, according to Parmenides, is primogenial.

For this first imparts the power of being generated; and Parmenides calls the multitude which is in it in generation, [i.e. becoming to be, or rising into existence.] For he says: “And the part will be generated from two parts at least.” And again: “Whatever part is generated, will always have these parts.” And in what follows: “So that it is necessary it should always be generated two things, and should never be one.” Does not he, therefore, who frequently uses the word generation in teaching concerning the progression of the intelligible multitude, proclaim that the natures prior to this order are more united to each other? But this order proceeds to a greater extent, unfolds the occult nature of the triads prior to itself, and is primogenial, unfolding in itself prolific power.

In addition to these things also, it is necessary to consider the infinity of multitude, not as those think fit to speak, who assume the infinite in quantity, but since in the principles of the whole of things, there are bound and infinity, the former being the cause of the union, but the latter of the separation of multitude, Parmenides calls the first and intelligible multitude infinite, because all multitude indeed, according to its own nature, is infinite, as being the progeny of the first infinity. All intelligible multitude, however, is a thing of this king. For it is the first multitude, and multitude itself. But multitude itself is the first progeny of intelligible infinity. Intelligible multitude, therefore, is on this account infinite, as unfolding into light the first infinity, and this infinity is the same with the all-perfect. For that which has proceeded to the all, and as far as it is requisite an intelligible nature should proceed, through the power which is generative of the whole of things, is infinite. For it cannot be comprehended by any other thing. But intelligible multitude is comprehensive of all intelligible multitude. For if indeed that which is primarily infinite, was infinite according to quantity, it would be requisite to admit that the intelligible is infinite multitude of this kind. Since, however, the intelligible is infinite power, it is necessary that the participant of the primarily infinite, should cause infinity to shine forth according to the power which is comprehensive of all prior natures.

And if it be requisite to relate my own opinion, as that which is primarily one is primarily bound, so that which is primarily multitude is infinite multitude. For it receives the whole power of infinity, and producing all unities, and all beings, as far as to the most individual natures, it possesses never-failing power. It is, therefore, more total than all multitude, and is an incomprehensible infinite. Hence unfolding into light all multitude, it bounds and measures it by infinite power, and through wholeness introduces bound to all things. These things, therefore, may be assumed from Parmenides concerning the third intelligible triad.

Let us in the next place speak in common about all the intelligible triads. With respect to the first triad, therefore, which is occult, and is allotted the intelligible summit in intelligibles, Plato at one time proceeding from the union which is in it, and its exempt transcendency with respect to the other triads, denominates it one, as in the Timæus. For eternity, says he, abides in one. But reason evinces that this one is the first triad of intelligibles. But at another time proceeding from the extremities which are in it, viz. that which is participated, and that which participates, he calls it the one being, considering the power which is comprehended in these as ineffable, in consequence of its subsisting uniformly and occultly. And at another time, he unfolds the whole of it, according to the monads which are in it, bound, infinity, and that which is mixed; bound indeed indicating its divine hyparxis, infinity its generative power, and that which is mixed, the essence proceeding from this power. Plato, therefore, as I have said, teaches us through these names the first intelligible triad; at one time indeed through one name, but at another through two names, and at another again through three names, unfolding it to our view. For there is a triad in it, according to which the whole is characterized; and a duad according to which the extremes communicate with each other; and a monad which exhibits the ineffable, occult, and unical nature of the first, through its own monads.

But the second triad after this, Plato denominates in the Timæus indeed, eternity; but in the Parmenides the first wholeness. How these, however, are allotted the same peculiarity we may learn by considering that every thing eternal is indeed a whole; viz. if it is perfectly eternal, and has the whole of its essence and energy at once present. For every intellect is a thing of this kind, perfectly establishing at once in itself, the whole of intellectual perception. It likewise does not possess one part of being, but is deprived of another part, nor does it partially participate of energy, but it summarily comprehends the whole of being, and the whole of intelligence. If, however, in its energies it proceeded according to time, but had an eternal essence, it would be allotted the whole of the latter, and this always stably the same, but would possess the former variably, so as to exert different energies at different times. Eternity, therefore, is every where the cause of wholeness to the natures to which it is primarily present. But whole also is every where comprehensive of perpetuity. For no whole abandons either its essence or its proper perfection; but that which is primarily corrupted and vitiated is a partial nature. For on this account also the whole world is perpetual, viz. because it is a whole, and this is likewise the case with all that the heavens contain, and with each of the elements.

For every where wholeness is connective of subjects. Hence eternity is consubsistent with wholeness, and whole and eternity are the same. Each also is a measure, the one of things eternal, and of all perpetual natures, but the other of parts and of all multitude. Since, however, there are three wholenesses, one indeed being prior to parts, another subsisting from parts, and another in a part, - through the wholeness which is prior to parts, eternity measures those unities of divine natures which are exempt from beings; but through the wholeness which derives its subsistence from parts, it measures the unities that are coordinate with beings; and through the wholeness which is in a part, it measures all beings and whole essences. For these wholenesses being parts of the divine unities, they possess partibly what preexists unically in the unities. And, moreover, eternity is nothing else than the ever shining forth from the unity which is connected with being. But whole consists of two parts, viz. of the one and being, power existing as the collector of the parts. According to both these conceptions, therefore, the duad pertaining to the middle intelligible triad, unfolds the uniform an occult hypostasis of the first triad.

Moreover, in the Timæus, Plato calls the third triad of intelligibles, animal itself, intelligible, all-perfect, and only-begotten. But in the Parmenides he denominates it infinite multitude, and a wholeness comprehensive of many parts. And in the Sophista he perpetually calls it the intelligible distributed into many beings. All these assertions, therefore, are the progeny of one science, and tend to one intelligible truth. For when Timæus calls this triad intelligible animal, he also asserts it to be all-perfect, and comprehensive of intelligible animals as its parts, both according to one and according to parts. Hence animal itself is according to this a whole, comprehensive of intelligible animals as its parts. And Parmenides, when he shows that the one being is all-perfect multitude, demonstrates that it is consubsistent with this order. For the infinite will be all-powerful and all-perfect, as we have before observed, comprehending in itself an intelligible multitude of parts, which also it generates; some of these being more total, but others more partial, and as Timæus says, both according to one, and according to genera. Farther still, as he calls animal itself eternal and only-begotten, so Parmenides first attributes the ever and to be generated, to infinite multitude, when he says, “And thus, according to the same reasoning, whatever part is generated will always possess these two parts: for the one will always contain being, and being the one; so that two things will necessarily always be generated, and no part will ever be one.”

Who, therefore, so clearly reminds us of eternal animal, and the primogenial triad, as Parmenides, first assuming in this order generation and the ever, and so continually using each of these? The same thing, therefore, is both an all-perfect animal, and all-powerful intelligible multitude. For the first infinity being power, and every intelligible subsisting according to it, and receiving from it a division into parts, I think it proper to call it all-powerful; thus avoiding the appellation of the infinite, which disturbs the multitude. That, however, which in these things is both difficult to understand, and for which Plato especially deserves to be admired, we must not omit, but demonstrate to the genuine lovers of truth. For intelligible animal comprehends four intelligible ideas, according to which it not only constitutes the genera of Gods, but also the more excellent kind of beings after the Gods, and also mortal animals themselves; for generating it extends the idea of air-wandering, the idea of aquatic, and the idea of terrestrial animals, from the Gods as far as to mortal animals. Since animal itself, therefore, comprehends four ideas, and through the same paradigms produces totally divine, dæmoniacal and mortal animals, this deservedly produces a doubt in those who love the contemplation of truth, how, the causes being the same, and the same primary paradigms preexisting, some of the natures which are constituted are Gods, others dæmons, and others mortal animals. For all these being generated with reference to one form, how is it possible they should not have the same form and nature;

since it is requisite that one idea should every where be generative of things that have a similar form? For on this account we admit the hypothesis of ideas, in order that the intelligible genus of Gods may possess and contain prior to multitude monads productive of similar natures. This doubt,[205] therefore, being so difficult, some one may solve it logically by saying, that all things which subsist according to one form are not synonimous, and that they do not similarly participate of their common cause, but some things primarily, and others ultimately. For each form is the leader of a certain series, beginning supernally, and subsiding as far as to the last of things. For according to the oracle, all things begin supernally to extend their admirable rays to the downward place. Hence it will not be wonderful that the same idea should pre-exist as the cause of Gods, dæmons, and mortal animals, producing all things totally, and delivering the more partial separation of things to the demiurgic order, in the same manner as this order delivers the production of individuals to the junior Gods. For intelligibles are the causes of whole series; but intellectuals of divisions according to common genera. Supermundane forms are the causes of specific differences; but mundane of things which are now individuals. For they are causes which are moved, and are the leaders of mutation to their progeny.

If however it be requisite to survey the thing itself by itself, and how one intelligible form is the cause[206] of Gods, and dæmons and mortals, Parmenides alone is able to satisfy us about the parts which are contained in the intelligible multitude. For he characterizes some things according to being, but others according to the one. For the one being, indeed, is absorbed by the one, but being which is one is rather absorbed by being, and the one being, and being which is one, contain in themselves each of the intelligible animals. According to the one being, therefore, Parmenides constitutes the divine genera, together with an appropriate peculiarity. But according to being which is one, he constitutes the genera posterior to the Gods. And according to the one being indeed of being which is one, he constitutes the genera of dæmons, but according to being which is one, the mortal genera. And again, according to the one being of the one being, he constitutes the first and highest genera of the Gods; but according to the being which is one of it, the second genera, and which have an angelic order. And thus all things are full of Gods, angels, dæmons, animals, and mortal natures. And you see how the medium is preserved of the more excellent genera. For being which is one is the angelic boundary of the one being which produces the Gods. But the one being is the dæmoniacal summit of being which is one, and which adorns secondary natures.

As to the unions, however, of secondary natures, it is not immanifest that they approximate to multitude, and to the progression of the natures placed above them. Nor must you wonder if being which is one is the cause of angels, but the one being of dæmons. For in one place, being which is one is a part of the one being, but in another the one being is a part of being which is one. And here, indeed, the union is essential, but there essence has the form of the one. For the summit of being which is one is a thing of this kind. Deservedly, therefore, is intelligible multitude all-powerful, and intelligible animal all-perfect, as being at once the cause of all things, and this as far as to the last of things, Plato all but exclaiming, [in the words of the Chaldæan Oracle,] “Thence a fiery whirlwind sweeping along, obscures the flower of fire, leaping at the same time into the cavities of the worlds.” For the divine unities proceeding gradually, generate the multitude of all mundane natures. This triad, therefore, is the fountain and cause of all things: and from it all the life, and all the progression of the Gods, and the genera superior to us, and of mortal animals subsist. For it produces totally and uniformly all things, and binds to itself the whole principles of the divisible rivers of vivification, and the production of forms.

Again, therefore, let us recur from the divided theory of intelligibles to the all-perfect and one science of them, and let us say to ourselves, that this intelligible genus of the Gods is unically exempt from all the other divine orders, and is neither called intelligible as known by a partial intellect, nor as comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, nor yet as preexisting in all-perfect intellect. For it transcends both total and partial intelligibles, and exists prior to all intellectual objects, being an imparticipable and divine intelligible. Hence, also, it is allotted the same transcendency with respect to all the intelligible orders, as the one with respect to every genus of the Gods. For this intelligible is imparticipable, and supernally fills the divine and intellectual orders. For if every intellect is intelligible to itself, it possesses this property through the intelligible Gods. For plenitude is derived to all things from thence. And thus the intelligible is at the same time exempt from intellect, existing itself by itself; and at the same time the intelligible is not external to intellect. For there is an intelligible which is conjoined with intellect; the coordinate being derived from that which is exempt, the participated from that which is imparticipable, that which is inherent from that which is preexistent, and that which is multiplied from that which is uniform. Intelligible simplicity, therefore, must not be defined to be such as that which we are accustomed to assert of intelligibles.

For in these the one becomes equal to multitude, and separation to the uniform sameness of essence. But intelligible simplicity is uniform, without separation and occult, excelling every divisible form of life, and intellectual multitude. Hence I do not place intelligible simplicity in the order of idea. For this form is partial, and is subordinate to intelligible union. But I consider it as the hyparxis of divine natures, and as generative of the whole of the good which is distributed to all divine natures, and in which the Gods themselves subsist. For the goodness of the Gods, is neither form nor habit, but the plenitude of divine self-sufficiency and divine power, according to which the Gods fill all things with good. In a much greater degree, therefore, are the intelligible Gods, because they are united to the good, wholly full of superessential goodness, and being established in this, they contain in it the supreme hyparxis of themselves. Very properly, therefore, do we say that the intelligible Gods unfold the ineffable principle of all things, and his admirable transcendency and union; subsisting themselves indeed occultly, but comprehending multitude uniformly and unically; reigning over the whole of things exemptly, and being uncoordinated with all the other Gods. For as the good illuminates all things with superessential light, and exhibits the Gods who are the fathers of all things, so likewise the intelligible genus of Gods, according to a similitude to the good, imparts from itself to all the secondary Gods, intelligible plenitude.

Hence, according to each distribution of the Gods, there is an appropriate intelligible multitude, just as a monad analogous to the good exists prior to each of the divine orders. And this monad indeed is the preexistent leader of union to secondary natures. But intelligible multitude is the preexistent source of beauty, self-sufficiency, power, essence, and all intelligible goods. For the Gods antecedently and intelligibly comprehend all intellectual natures, and contain in themselves all[207] things according to supreme union.

Let the discussion, therefore, of the intelligible Gods, unfolding the mystic doctrine of Plato concerning them be here terminated by us. But it entirely follows in the next place, that we should consider after the same manner the narration concerning the intellectual Gods. Since, however, of intellectuals some are both intelligible and intellectual, viz. such as according to the Oracle perceiving intellectually are at the same time intellectually perceived; but others are intellectual only; - this being the case, beginning from those that are intellectual and at the same time intelligible, we will in the first place determine what pertains to them in common, from which we shall render the doctrine concerning each order of them more perspicuous. Again, therefore, let us recal to our memory those things which we a little before demonstrated, viz. that there are three total monads which are entirely beyond the Gods that are divided according to parts, viz. essence, life and intellect. And these prior to the partial participate of the superessential unities. Essence, however, is exempt from the rest. Life is allotted the middle order. But intellect converts the end of this triad to the beginning. And all these are indeed intelligibly in essence; but intelligibly and intellectually in life; and intellectually in intellect. And as secondary natures always participate of the natures placed above them, but these prior to participation presubsist themselves by themselves; and as in each order there are these three things, the cause of abiding, the cause of proceeding, and the cause of conversion, though intellect is more formalized according to conversion, but life according to progression, and essence according to permanency; - this being the case, it is certainly necessary that the first intellectual Gods being essentialized according to life should conjoin imparticipable intellect, and the intelligible genus of Gods, and that they should uniformly connect the various progressions of secondary, but unfold and expand the stable hyparxis of precedaneous causes.

For imparticipable life is a thing of this kind, circumscribing that which is primarily being and intellect, and participating indeed of being, but participated by intellect. But this is the same thing as to assert that intelligence is filled indeed from the intelligible, but fills intellect from itself. For being is the intelligible, but life is intelligence. And being indeed is characterized according to a divine hyparxis; but life according to power; and intellect according to intelligible intellect. For as being is to hyparxis, so is intellect to being. And as intelligible power is to each of the extremes, so is life to the intelligible and to intellect. And as power is generated from the one and hyparxis, but constitutes in conjunction with the one the nature of being, so life proceeds indeed from being, and gives subsistence to a power different from that which is in being. As also the one itself which exists prior to being, imparts to being from itself a second unity, so likewise life being allotted an hypostasis prior to intellect, generates intellectual life. For true being and the intelligible which precede the rest, supply both life and intellect with union. Imparticipable life, therefore, but which participates of the intelligible monads is the second after being, is generative of imparticipable intellect, and giving completion to this medium, and containing the bond of intelligibles and intellectuals, is illuminated by Gods who are allotted a union secondary to the occult subsistence of intelligibles, but preceding according to cause the separation of intellectual natures.

For the unical, indivisible, simple, and primary nature of intelligibles, subsides, through the medium of these Gods into multitude and separation, and the inexplicable evolution of the divine orders. Whence also, I think, the Gods who connectedly contain life which is infinite, being the middle of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, and carried in the divisions of themselves as in a vehicle, are called intelligible and at the same time intellectual; being filled indeed, from the first intelligibles, but filling the intellectual Gods. For we call the intelligible Gods intelligible, not as coordinate with intellect. For the intelligible which is in intellect is one thing, and that which produces the intellectual Gods another: and we denominate the Gods that subsist according to life intelligible and at the same time intellectual, not as giving completion to intellect, nor as being established according to intellectual intelligence, and imparting to intellect the power of intellectual perception, but to the intelligible the power of being intellectually perceived, but we give them this appellation, as deriving their subsistence from the intelligible monads, but generating all the intellectual hebdomads. And because they are illuminated indeed with intelligible life, but subsist prior to intellectuals, according to a generative cause, we think fit to denominate them in common, connecting their names from the extremes, in the same manner as they also are allotted a peculiarity collective of wholes in the divine orders.

It is evident, therefore, that they subsist according to this medium, and that they are proximate to the intelligible Gods, who are both monadic and triadic. For the intelligible triads, with reference indeed to the highest union and which is exempt from all things, are triads; but with reference to the divided essence of triads, they are monads, unfolding into light from themselves total triads. Since intelligibles, therefore, in their triadic progression, do not depart from a unical hyparxis, the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods subsist triadically, exhibiting in themselves the separation of the monads, and through divine difference, proceeding into multitude, and a variety of powers and essences. For the natures which subsist more remote from the one principle [of all things,] are more multiplied than the natures which are prior to them;[208] and are diminished indeed in powers, and the comprehensions of secondary natures, but are divided into more numbers, and such as are more distant from the monad. They likewise relinquish the union which is the cause of primarily efficient natures, and variety is assumed by them in exchange for the occult hyparxis of those primary essences. According to this reasoning, therefore, the intelligible and intellectual separation is greater than the separation which is only intelligible. And of these again, the partial orders are allotted a much greater division, so as to unfold to us a multitude of Gods which cannot be comprehended in the numbers within the decad.

Their peculiarities also are indescribable, and inexplicable by our conceptions, and are manifest only to the Gods themselves, and to the causes of them. Such, therefore, are the intelligible and intellectual Gods, and such is the peculiarity which they are allotted, a peculiarity connective of extremes, and which unfolds into light precedaneous, but converts secondary natures. For they intellectually perceive the Gods prior to them, but are objects of intellection to the Gods posterior to them. Hence also Timæus establishes all-perfect animal to be the most beautiful of intelligibles, because there are intelligibles posterior to it, which it surpasses in beauty, as being superior to them, and because it is the boundary of the first intelligibles, the natures posterior to it subsisting intellectually. According to this reasoning, therefore, the first intellectual Gods are also intelligible; and we do not, deriving these things from a foreign source, ascribe them to Plato, but they are asserted by us in consequence of receiving auxiliaries from him. This, however, will be more manifest through what follows.

In the next place, therefore, we shall discuss the manner in which the Gods who illuminate the breadth of imparticipable life proceed from the intelligible Gods. Since then the intelligible Gods establish in themselves uniformly things multiplied, occultly such as are divided, and according to a certain admirable transcendency of simplicity, the various genera of beings, - hence the first intellectual Gods,[209] unfolding their indistinct union, and the unknown nature of their hypostasis, and being filled through intelligible power and essential life with the prolific abundance of wholes, are allotted a kingdom which ranks as the second after them. And they always indeed produce, perfect, and connect themselves, but receive from the intelligible Gods an occult generation; from intelligible power indeed, receiving a peculiarity generative of all things; but from intelligible life which preexists according to cause in the intelligible, receiving the nature which is spread under them. For life is primarily indeed in intelligibles; but secondarily in intelligibles and intellectuals; and in a third degree in intellectuals; existing indeed according to cause in the first, but according to essence in the second, and according to participation in the last of these. The first intellectual, therefore, proceed from the intelligible Gods, multiplying indeed their union, and their unical powers, unfolding their occult hyparxis, and through prolific, connective, and perfective causes assimilating themselves to the essential, entire, and all-perfect transcendencies of intelligibles. For in intelligibles there were three primarily effective powers; one indeed constituting the essence of wholes; another measuring things which are multiplied; and another being productive of the forms of all generated natures.

And conformably to these, the intelligible and intellectual powers subsist; one indeed, by its very essence producing the life of secondary natures, according to a certain intelligible comprehension; but another being connective of every thing which is divided, and imparting by illumination the intelligible measure to those natures that relinquish the one union [of all things;] and another supplying all things with figure, and form and perfection. The intelligible and intellectual orders of the Gods, therefore, are generated according to all the intelligible causes. From power indeed, being allotted the peculiarity of progression; but from life receiving the portion of being which is suspended from them. For life is conjoined with power; since life is of itself infinite, all motion having infinity consubsistent with its nature, and the power of infinity, is generative of the whole of things. But from the triadic hypostasis of intelligibles, they receive a distribution into first, middle and last. For it is necessary that all things should be detained by a triadic progression, and that this should be the case prior to all [other] things with the intelligible and at the same time intellectual genera of Gods. For because they subsist as the middle of wholes, and give completion to the bond of the first orders, according to their summit indeed, they are assimilated to intelligibles, but according to their extremity, to intellectuals. And they are partly indeed intelligible, and partly intellectual. For every where the progressions of the divine genera are effected through continued similitude.

And the first of subordinate are united to the ends of preexistent causes. As however, the first and the last in the middle of wholes are both intelligible and intellectual, it is necessary there should be a connective medium of these, according to which medium the peculiarity of these Gods is principally apparent. For that which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual, in one part indeed is more abundant than, but in another equally communicates with both these. From these things, therefore, the continuity of the progression of the divine orders appears to be admirable. For the extremity of intelligibles indeed was intellectual, yet as in intelligibles. But the summit of intelligibles and at the same time intellectuals, is intelligible indeed, yet it possesses this peculiarity vitally. And again, the end of intelligibles and at the same time intellectuals, is intellectual, but it is vitally so. But the beginning of intellectuals, is intelligible, and presides over the intellectual Gods, yet it has the intelligible intellectually. And thus all the divine genera are allotted an indissoluble connexion and communion, an admirable friendship, and well-ordered diminution, and a transcendency, partly coordinate and partly exempt. That which proceeds too, is always in continuity with its producing cause; and secondary natures together with a firm establishment in their causes, make a progression from them. There is likewise one series and alliance of all things; secondary natures always subsisting from those prior to them, through similitude. After what manner, therefore, the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, unfold themselves into light from the intelligible Gods, may through these things be recollected.

In the next place, let us show how they are divided in their progressions, and what difference the triads of these Gods are allotted with respect to the intelligible triads. These Gods, therefore, are also divided triply, after the above mentioned manner; being conjoined indeed to the intelligible, through their summit; but to the intellectual through their end; and through the middle bond of the extremes, being allotted the peculiarity of each equally, and extending to both the intelligible and intellectual genera of Gods, as the centre of these twofold orders, uniformly containing the communion of wholes. They are likewise divided triply, because in these all things, viz. essence, life, and intellect, are vitally, in the same manner as they are intelligibly in the Gods prior to them, and intellectually in the Gods that derive their subsistence from these. And essence indeed is the intelligible of life; but life is the middle and at the same time the peculiarity of this order; and intellect is the extremity, and that which is proximately carried in intellectuals as in a vehicle. All things therefore subsisting in these Gods, there will be a division of them into first, middle, and last genera. And in the third place, they are divided triply, because it is necessary that life should abide, proceed, and be converted to its principles; since of beings, the first triad was said to establish all things, and prior to other things the second triad.

Eternity, therefore, abides stably in the first triad. But the triad posterior to this, is the supplier to wholes [and therefore to all things,] of progression, motion, and life according to energy. And the third triad is the supplier of conversion to the one, and of perfection which convolves all secondary natures to their principles. Hence it is necessary that the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, should primarily participate of these three powers, and should abide indeed in the summit of themselves; but proceeding from thence, and extending themselves to all things, should again be converted to the intelligible place of survey, and conjoin to the beginning of their generation the end of their whole progression.

The intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods therefore are, as I have said, triply divided. And essence indeed is that which ranks as first in them, but life is the middle, and intellect the extremity of them. Since however, each of these three is perfect, and participates of the intelligible monads, I mean of the essence which is there, of intelligible life, and of intelligible intellect, they are tripled according to the participation of primarily efficient causes. And the intelligible of life indeed possesses essence, intellect, and life intelligibly; but the intelligible and intellectual of it, possesses essence, life and intellect, intelligibly and at the same time intellectually; and the intellectual of it possesses these intellectually and intelligibly.[210] And every where indeed, there is a triad in each of the sections, but in conjunction with an appropriate peculiarity. Hence three intelligible and at the same time intellectual triads present themselves to our view, which are indeed illuminated by the divine unities, but each of them contains an all-various multitude. For since in intelligibles, there was an all-powerful and all-perfect multitude, how is it possible that this multitude should not in a much greater degree, be evolved and multiplied, in the Gods secondary to the intelligible order, according to the prolific cause of them? Each triad therefore comprehends in itself a multitude of powers, and a variety of forms, producing intelligible multitude into energy, and unfolding into light the generative infinity of intelligibles.

And we indeed, being impelled from the participants, discover the peculiarity of the participated superessential Gods. But according to the order of things, the intelligible and intellectual monads generate about themselves essences, and all lives, and the intellectual genera. And through these, they unfold the unknown transcendency of themselves, preserving by itself the preexistent cause of the whole of things. There are however, as we have said, three intelligible triads. And there are also three triads posterior to these, which appear to be tripled from them, according to their prolific perfection.

But it is necessary that the peculiarity of the intelligible, and also of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual triad, should be defined according to another mode. For in the intelligible order indeed, each triad had only the third part of being; for it consisted of bound, and infinity, and from both these. But this was essence indeed in the first triad, intelligible life in the second, and intelligible intellect in the third. The natures however prior to these were unities and superessential powers, which give completion to the whole triads. But in the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order, each triad has essence, life and intellect; one indeed intelligibly and at the same time intellectually, but more intelligibly, so far as it is in continuity with the first intelligibles; but another intellectually and intelligibly, but more intellectually, because it is proximately carried in intellectuals; and another according to an equal part, as it comprehends in itself both the peculiarities. Hence the first triad, that we may speak of each, was in intelligibles, bound, infinity, and essence; for essence was that which was primarily mixed. But here the first triad is essence, life and intellect, with appropriate unities. For essence is suspended from the first deity [of this triad,] life from the second, and intellect from the third. And these three superessential monads, unfold the monads of the first triad. But again, the second triad after this, was in the intelligible order, a superessential unity, power, and intelligible and occult life.

Here however, essence, life and intellect are all vital, and are suspended from the Gods who contain the one bond of the whole of this order. For as the first unities were allotted a power unific of the middle genera, so the second unities after them, exhibit the connective peculiarity of primarily efficient causes. After these therefore, succeeds the third triad, which in the intelligible order indeed was unity, power, and intelligible intellect; but here it consists of three superessential Gods, who close the termination of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, and begird all things intellectually, I mean essence, life and intellect. They are likewise the suppliers of divine perfection,[211] imitating the all-perfect intelligible triad, just as the connectedly containing Gods imitate the intelligible measure, and the Gods prior to these, the generative cause of intelligibles. The three intelligible therefore, and at the same time intellectual triads, are thus generated, and are allotted such a difference as this, with respect to the intelligible triads.

Again however, returning to Plato, let us accord with him, and exhibit the science which preexists with him concerning each of these triads. And in the first place, let us assume what is written in the Phædrus, and survey from the words themselves of Socrates, how he unfolds to us the whole of the orderly distinction of these triads, and the differences which it contains. In the Phædrus therefore, there are said to be twelve leaders who preside over the whole [of mundane concerns,] and who conduct all the mundane Gods, and all the herds of dæmons, and convert them to the intelligible nature. It is also said that Jupiter is the leader of all these twelve Gods, that he drives a winged chariot, adorns and takes care of all things, and brings all the army of Gods that follow him, first indeed to the place of survey within the heaven, and to the blessed spectacles, and discursive energies of the intelligibles which are there. But in the next place Jupiter brings them to the subcelestial arch which proximately begirds the heaven, and is contained in it, and after this to the heaven itself, and the back of heaven; where also divine souls stand, and being borne along together with the heaven, survey all the essence that is beyond it. Socrates further adds, that prior to the heaven there is what is called the supercelestial place, in which true and real essence, the plain of truth, the kingdom of Adrastia, and the divine choir of virtues subsist, and that souls being nourished through the intellection of these monads, are happily affected, following [in their contemplation] the circulation of the heaven.

These things therefore, are asserted in the Phædrus, Socrates being clearly inspired by divinity, and discussing mystic concerns. It is necessary however, prior to other things, to consider what the heaven is of which Socrates speaks, and in what order of beings it is established. For having discovered this, we may also survey the subcelestial arch, and the supercelestial place.[212] For each of these is assumed according to habitude towards the heaven; the one indeed being primarily placed above it, but the other being primarily arranged under it.

What therefore is the heaven to which Jupiter leads the Gods? For if we should say that it is the sensible heaven, as certain other persons say it is, it will be necessary that the more excellent genera should be converted to things naturally subordinate to themselves. For if Jupiter the mighty leader in the heaven proceeds to this sensible heaven, and leads to it all the Gods that follow him, he will have a conversion to things subordinate, and posterior to himself. And together with Jupiter, this will also be the case with all the leaders, and the Gods and dæmons suspended from these; though the same Socrates in the Phædrus says, that even a partial soul when perfected is conversant with sublime concerns, and governs the whole world. How is it possible therefore, that the leaders of whole souls should be converted to the sensible heaven, and exchange the intelligible place of survey for an inferior allotment, when through these souls they preside over the universe, in order that they may illuminate mundane natures with a liberated and unrestrained power? In addition to these things also, what are the blessed intellections of the Gods within this sensible heaven, and what are the evolutions of all the knowledge of sensibles?[213] For in short the Gods know sensibles, not by a conversion to them, but by containing in themselves the causes of them. Hence intellectually perceiving themselves, they know sensibles causally, and rule over them, not by looking to them, and verging to the subjects of their government, but by converting through love inferior natures to themselves.

Neither therefore, is it lawful for the Gods who adorn the whole of heaven, and think it worthy their providential care, to be ever situated under the circulation of this heaven; nor is there any blessedness in the contemplation of the things which exist under it; nor are the souls that are converted to this contemplation among the number of those that are happy, and that fellow the Gods, but they rank among those that exchange intelligible for doxastic nutriment, such as Socrates says, the souls are that are lame, that have broken their wings, and are in a merged condition. Since therefore passions of this kind belong to partial souls, and these not such as are happy, how can we refer a conversion to the sensible heaven to the ruling and leading Gods?

Farther still, Socrates says that souls standing on the back of the heaven, are carried round by the circumvolution itself of the heaven; but Timæus, and the Athenian guest say, that souls lead every thing in the heavens by their own motions, externally cover bodies with their motions, and living their own life through the whole of time, impart to bodies secondarily efficient powers of motion. How therefore do these things accord with those who make this heaven to be sensible? For souls do not contemplate and dance round intelligibles, through the circulation of the heavens; but through the unapparent convolution of souls, bodies revolve in a circle, and about these perform their circulations. If therefore any one should say that the sensible heaven circumvolves souls, and that it is divided according to the back, the profundity, and the subcelestial arch, many absurdities must necessarily be admitted. But if some one should say that the heaven is intelligible, to which Jupiter is the leader, but all the Gods, and together with these, dæmons follow him, he will unfold the divinely-inspired narrations of Plato consentaneously to the nature of things, and will follow the most celebrated of his interpreters. For Plotinus and Jamblichus are of opinion that this heaven is a certain intelligible. And prior to these, Plato himself in the Cratylus following the Orphic theogonies calls the father indeed of Jupiter, Saturn, but of Saturn, Heaven. And he evinces that Jupiter is the demiurgus of the whole of things through the names [by which he is called,] investigating for this purpose the truth concerning them.

But he shows that Saturn is connective of a divine intellect; and that Heaven is the intelligence, or intellectual perception of the first intelligibles. For sight, says he, looking to the things above, is Heaven. Hence Heaven subsists prior to every divine intellect, with which the mighty Saturn is replete; but it intellectually perceives the things above, and such as are beyond the celestial order. The mighty Heaven therefore, is allotted a kingdom which is between the intelligible and intellectual orders. For the circulation mentioned in the Phædrus is intelligence, through which all the Gods and souls obtain the contemplation of intelligibles. But intelligence is a medium between intellect and the intelligible. It must be said therefore, that the whole of heaven is established according to this medium, and that it contains the one bond of the divine orders, being the father indeed of the intellectual genus, but being generated from the kings prior to it, which also it is said to see. But on one side of it the supercelestial place, and on the other the subcelestial arch must be arranged.

Again therefore, if indeed the supercelestial place is the imparticipable and occult genus of the intelligible Gods, how can we establish so great a divine multitude there, and this accompanied with separation, viz. truth, science, justice, temperance, the meadow, and Adrastia? For neither do the fountains of the virtues, nor the separation and variety of forms, pertain to the intelligible Gods. For the first and most unical of forms extend the demiurgic intellect of wholes to the intelligible paradigm, and the comprehension of forms which is there. But Socrates in the Phædrus says that a partial intellect contemplates the supercelestial place. For this intellect is the governor of the soul, as it is well said by the philosophers prior to us. If therefore, it be necessary from this analogy to investigate the difference of intelligibles, as the demiurgic intellect indeed, is imparticipable, but a partial intellect is participable, so with respect to the intelligible, one indeed which is the first paradigm of the demiurgus, pertains to the first intelligibles, but another which is the first paradigm of a partial intellect pertains to the second intelligibles, which are indeed intelligibles, but are allotted an intelligible transcendency, as subsisting at the summit of intellectuals. But if the supercelestial place is beyond the celestial circulation, but is inferior to those intelligible triads, because it is more expanded; for it is the plain of truth, and is not unknown, is divided according to a

multitude of forms, and possesses a variety of powers, and the meadow which is there nourishes souls, and is visible to them, the first intelligibles illuminating souls with ineffable union, but not being known by them through intelligence; - if this be the case, it is certainly necessary that the supercelestial place should subsist between the intelligible nature, and the celestial circulation. If Plato himself also admits that essence which truly is, exists in this place, how is it possible that he should not also admit it to be intelligible, and to participate of the first intelligibles? For because indeed it is essence it is intelligible; but because it truly is, it participates of being.