Questions of King Milinda (Milindapañha)

the distinguishing characteristics of ethical I. [25] Now Milinda the king went up to where the venerable Nagasena was, and addressed him with the greetings and compHments of friendship and courtesy, and took his seat respectfully apart. And Nagasena reciprocated his courtesy, so that the heart of the king was propitiated. And Milinda began by asking, ^ ' How is your Reverence known, and what, Sir, is your name ?' ' I am known as Nagasena, O king, and it is by that name that my brethren in the faith address me. But although parents, O king, give such a name as Nagasena, or Surasena, or Virasena, or Sihasena, yet this. Sire, — Nagasena and so on — is only a generally understood term, a designation in common use. For there is no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter^.' ^ There is a free translation of the Sinhalese version of the following dialogues (down to the end of our § 4) in Spence Hardy's ' Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 424-429. But it is very unreliable as a reproduction of either the Si;;/halese or the Pali, and slurs over the doubtful passages. ^ Na puggalo upalabbhati. This thesis, that 'there is no individual,' is discussed at the opening of the Katha Vatthu (leaf ka of my MS.) Put into modern philosophical phraseology it amounts to saying that there is no permanent subject underlying the temporary phenomena visible in a man's individuality. But

Then Milinda called upon the Yonakas and the brethren to witness : * This Nagasena says there is no permanent individuality (no soul) implied in his name. Is it now even possible to approve him in that ? ' And turning to Nagasena, he said : 'If, most reverend Nagasena, there be no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter, who is it, pray, who gives to you members of the Order your robes and food and lodging and necessaries for the sick ? Who is it who enjoys such things when given ? Who is it who lives a life of righteousness ? Who is it who devotes himself to meditation ? Who is it who attains to the goal of the Excellent Way, to the Nirva;^a of Arahatship ? And who is it who destroys living creatures ? who is it who takes what is not his own ? who is it who lives an evil life of worldly lusts, who speaks lies, who drinks strong drink, who (in a word) commits any one of the five sins which work out their bitter fruit even in this life ^? If that be so there is neither merit nor demerit ; there is neither doer nor causer of good or evil deeds ^ ; there is neither fruit nor result of good or evil Karma ^ [26] — If, most reverend Nagasena, we are to think that were a man

I doubt whether, even in our author's time, the conception 'subject' was common ground, or that the word puggala had acquired that special connotation. ^ Pa«/{'anantariya-kammaw karoti. See my note on A'ullavagga VII, 3, 9 (' Vinaya Texts,' vol. iii, p. 246, in the Sacred Books of the East). ^ This is no doubt said in these words with allusion to the opinion ascribed in the Sama«;7a Phala (D. II, 17) to Pura;/a Kassapa. ^ This is the opinion ascribed in identical words in the Sama;7;7a Phala (D. II, 23) to A^ita of the garment of hair. 42 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, i, i. to kill you there would be no murder ^ then it follows that there are no real masters or teachers in your Order, and that your ordinations are void. — You tell me that your brethren in the Order are in the habit of addressing you as Nagasena. Now what is that Nagasena ? Do you mean to say that the hair is Naoasena ? ' ' I don't say that, great king.' ' Or the hairs on the body, perhaps ? ' 'Or is it the nails, the teeth, the skin, the flesh, the nerves, the bones, the marrow, the kidneys, the heart, the liver, the abdomen, the spleen, the lungs, the larger intestines, the lower intestines, the stomach, the faeces, the bile, the phlegm, the pus, the blood, the sweat, the fat, the tears, the serum, the saliva, the mucus, the oil that lubricates the joints, the urine, or the brain, or any or all of these, that is Nagasena- ?'

And to each of these he answered no. ' Is it the outward form then (Rupa) that is Nagasena, or the sensations (Vedana), or the ideas {Safijla.), or the confections (the constituent elements of character, Sawkhara), or the consciousness (Viil- ;'^ana), that is Nagasena" ?' And to each of these also he answered no. ^ This is practically the same opinion as is ascribed in tlie Samaw/a Phala (D. II, 26) to Pakudha KaX'X'ayana. " This list of the thirty-two forms (a>^aras) of organic matter in the human body occurs already in the Khuddaka Vaf/ia, § 3. It is the standard list always used in similar connections ; and is, no doubt, supposed to be exhaustive. There are sixteen (half as many) aX-aras of the mind according to Dipavawsa I, 42. ^ These are the five Skandhas, which include in them the whole bodily and mental constituents of any being. See p. 80. ' Then is it all these Skandhas combined that are Ndgasena ?' ' No ! great king.' ' But is there anything outside the five Skandhas that is Nagasena?* And still he answered no. ' Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no Nagasena. Nagasena is a mere empty sound. Who then is the Nagasena that we see before us ? It is a falsehood that your reverence has spoken, an untruth ! '

And the venerable Nagasena said to Milinda the king : ' You, Sire, have been brought up in great luxury, as beseems your noble birth. If you were to walk this dry weather on the hot and sandy ground, trampling under foot the gritty, gravelly grains of the hard sand, your feet would hurt you. And as your body would be in pain, your mind would be disturbed, and you would experience a sense of bodily suffering. How then did you come, on foot, or in a chariot ? ' ' I did not come, Sir, on foot [27]. I came in a carriage.' ' Then if you came. Sire, in a carriage, explain to me what that is. Is it the pole that is the chariot ?' * I did not say that.' ' Is it the axle that is the chariot ? ' ' Is it the wheels, or the framework, or the ropes, or the yoke, or the spokes of the wheels, or the goad, that are the chariot ? ' And to all these he still answered no. ' Then is it all these parts of it that are the chariot ? ' 44 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. H, I, i.

' But is there anything outside them that is the chariot ? ' And still he answered no. ' Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no chariot. Chariot is a mere empty sound. What then is the chariot you say you came in ? It is a falsehood that your Majesty has spoken, an untruth ! There is no such thing as a chariot ! You are king over all India, a mighty monarch. Of whom then are you afraid that you speak untruth ? And he called upon the Yonakas and the brethren to witness, saying : ' Milinda the king here has said that he came by carriage. But when asked in that case to explain what the carriage was, he is unable to establish what he averred. Is it, forsooth, possible to approve him in that ? ' When he had thus spoken the five hundred Yonakas shouted their applause, and said to the king : ' Now let your Majesty get out of that if you can ?' And Milinda the king replied to Nagasena, and said : ' I have spoken no untruth, reverend Sir. It is on account of its having all these things — the pole, and the axle, the wheels, and the framework, the ropes, the yoke, the spokes, and the goad — that it comes under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, of " chariot." '

' Very good ! Your Majesty has rightly grasped the meaning of " chariot." And just even so it is on account of all those things you questioned me about — [28] the thirty-two kinds of organic matter in a human body, and the five constituent elements of being — that I come under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, of "Nagasena." For it was said, Sire, by our Sister Va^ira in the presence of the Blessed One : '"Just as it is by the condition precedent of the co-existence of its various parts that the word * chariot ' is used, just so is it that when the Skan- ^ dhas are there we talk of a * being \' " ' ' Most wonderful, Nagasena, and most strange. Well has the puzzle put to you, most difficult though it was, been solved. Were the Buddha himself here he would approve your answer. Well done, well done, Nagasena ! ' 2. ' How many years seniority have you, Nagasena ? ' * Seven, your Majesty.' ' But how can you say it is your "seven ?" Is it you who are "seven," or the number that is "seven?"'

Now that moment the figure of the king, decked in all the finery of his royal ornaments, cast its shadow on the ground, and was reflected in a vessel of water. And Nagasena asked him : * Your figure, O king, is now shadowed upon the ground, and reflected in the water, how now, are you the king, or is the reflection the kine ? ' ' I am the king, Nagasena, but the shadow comes into existence because of me.' * Just even so, O king, the number of the years is seven, I am not seven. But it is because of me, O king, that the number seven has come into existence ; and it is mine in the same sense as the shadow is yours ^.' ^ From the Sawyutta Nikaya V, lo, 6. ^ Hardy (p. 427, § 4 of the first edition) has quite missed the point of this crux. ' Most wonderful again, and strange, Nagasena. Well has the question put to you, most difficult though it was, been solved I' 3. The king said : * Reverend Sir, will you discuss with me again ? ' ' If your Majesty will discuss as a scholar (pa;/^it), well ; but if you will discuss as a king, no.'

' How is it then that scholars discuss ?' 'When scholars talk a matter over one with another then is there a winding up ^ an unravelling ; one or other is convicted of error 2, and he then acknowledges his mistake ; [29] distinctions are drawn, and contra-distinctions^; and yet thereby they are not angered. Thus do scholars, O king, discuss.' ' And how do kings discuss ? ' ' When a king, your Majesty, discusses a matter, and he advances a point, if any one differ from him on that point, he is apt to fine him, saying : " Inflict such and such a punishment upon that fellow ! " Thus, your Majesty, do kings discuss^.' ' Very well. It is as a scholar, not as a king, that I will discuss. Let your reverence talk unrestrainedly, as you would with a brother, or a novice, or a lay disciple, or even with a servant. Be not afraid ! ' ^ Ave/,^ana/« ; not in Childers, but see Gataka II, 9 ; IV, 383, 384 ; and Morris in the 'Journal of the Pali Text Society,' 1887. 2 Niggaho kariyati, as for instance below, p. 142. 3 Pa/iviseso; not in Childers, but see again (7ataka II, 9.

* Hardy, loc. cit. § 5, puts all this into the mouths of 'the priests.' 'Very good, your Majesty,' said Nagasena, with thankfulness. 'Nagasena, I have a question to ask you;' said the king. ' Pray ask it, Sire.' ' I have asked it, your Reverence.' ' That is answered already.' ' What have you answered ? ' ' To what, then, does your Majesty refer ?' But Milinda the king thought : ' This Bhikkhu is a great scholar. He is quite capable of discussing things with me. And I shall have a number of points on which to question him, and before I can ask them all, the sun will set. It would be better to carry on the discussion at home to-morrow.' And he said to Devamantiya : ' You may let his reverence know that the discussion with the kinor shall be resumed to-morrow at the palace.' And so saying, he took leave of Nagasena, and mounted his horse, and went away, muttering as he went, ' Nagasena, Nagasena !' And Devamantiva delivered his messaee to Nao-asena, who accepted the proposal with gladness. And early the next morning Devamantiya and Anantakaya and Mankura and Sabbadinna went to the king, and said : ' Is his reverence, Nagasena, to come, [30] Sire, to-day ? '

* Yes, he is to come.' ' With how many of the brethren is he to come ?' ' With as many as he likes.' And Sabbadinna said : ' Let him come with ten.' But the king repeated what he had said. And on Sabbadinna reiterating his suggestion, the king rejoined : ' All this preparation has been made, and I say : 48 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, i, 4. " Let him come with as many as he Hkes," yet Sabbadinna says : " Let him come with ten." Does he suppose we are not capable of feeding so many ?' Then Sabbadinna was ashamed. 4. And Devamantiya and Anantakaya and Mankura went to Nagasena and told him what the king had said. And the venerable Nagasena robed himself in the forenoon, and taking his bowl in his hand, went to Sagala with the whole company of the brethren. And Anantakaya, as he walked beside Nagasena, said : ' When, your reverence, I say, " Nagasena," what is that Nagasena ?' The Elder replied : ' What do you think Nagasena is ? ' ' The soul, the inner breath which comes and goes, that I suppose to be Nagasena.'

' But if that breath having gone forth should not return, or having returned should not go forth, would the man be alive ? ' ' Certainly [31] not, Sir.' ' But those trumpeters, when they blow their trumpets, does their breath return again to them ?' ' No, Sir, it does not.' ' Or those pipers, when they blow their pipes or horns, does their breath return again to them ? ' ' Then why don't they die ? ' ' I am not capable of arguing with such a reasoner. Pray tell me. Sir, how the matter stands.' * There is no soul in the breath. These inhalations and exhalations are merely constituent powers of the bodily frame,' said the Elder. And he talked to him from the Abhidhamma ^ to such effect that ^ Anantakaya confessed himself as a supporter of the Order. 5. And the venerable Nagasena went to the king, and sat down on the seat prepared for him. And the king provided Nagasena and his following with food, both hard and soft, as much as they required : and presented each brother with a suit of garments, and Nagasena himself with a set of three robes. And then he said to him : ' Be pleased to keep your seat here, and with )ou ten of the brethren. Let the rest depart.'

And when he saw that Naqasena had finished his meal, he took a lower seat, and sat beside him, and said : 'What shall v/e discuss ?' ' We want to arrive at truth. Let our discussion be about the truth.' And the king said : 'What Is the object, Sir, of your 2 renunciation, and what the summum bonum at which you aim ?' ' Why do you ask ? Our renunciation is to the end that this sorrow may perish away, and that no further sorrow may arise ; the complete passing away, without cleaving to the world, is our highest aim.' ' How now, Sir ! Is it for such high reasons that all members of it have joined the Order ?' [32] ' Certainly not, Sire. Some for those reasons, '"' I venture to think it is incorrect to put a full stop, as Mr. Trenckner has done, after akasi. ^ Plural. 'You members of the Buddhist Order.' The question is further elaborated below, III, i, 3, and above, 1. 38. 50 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. IT, T, 6. but some have left the world in terror at the tyranny of kings. Some have joined us to be safe from being robbed, some harassed by debt, and some perhaps to eain a livelihood.'

' But for what object, Sir, did you yourself join.' ' I was received into the Order when I was a mere boy, I knew not then the ultimate aim. But I thought : " They are wise scholars, these Buddhist Sama/^as, they will be able to teach me." And by them I have been taught ; and now do I both know and understand what is at once the reason for, and the advantage of renunciation.' ' Well put, Nagasena ! ' 6. The king said : ' Nagasena, is there any one who after death is not reindividualised ?' ' Some are so, and some not.' * Who are they ? ' ' A sinful being is reindividualised, a sinless one is not.' ' Will you be reindividualised ? ' ' If when I die, I die with craving for existence in my heart, yes ; but if not, no ^' ' Very good, Nagasena ! ' 7. The king said : ' Nagasena, he who escapes reindividualisation is it by reasoning that he escapes It.'^' ' Both by reasoning^, your Majesty, and by wisdom ^, and by other good qualities.' ' But are not reasoning and wisdom surely much the same ? '

' Certainly not. Reasoning is one thing, wisdom ^ Repeated below, with an illustration, Chap. 2, § 7, p. 76. ^ Yoniso manasikara. ^ Fa/lfia. See pp. 59, 64, 128. another. Sheep and goats, oxen and buffaloes, camels and asses have reasoning, but wisdom they have not.' 8. The king said: 'What is the characteristic mark of reasoning, and what of wisdom V ' Reasoning has always comprehension as its C- mark ; but wisdom has cutting off \' ' But how is comprehension the characteristic of reasoning, and cutting off of wisdom ? Give me an illustration.' ' You remember the barley reapers ? ' ' Yes, certainly.' [33] ' How do they reap the barley?' * With the left hand they grasp the barley into a bunch, and taking the sickle into the right hand, they cut it oif with that.' 'Just even so, O king, does the recluse by his thinking grasp his mind, and by his wisdom cut off his failings. In this way is it that comprehension is the characteristic of reasoning, but cutting off of wisdom.' ' Well put, Nagasena ! ' 9. The king said: 'When you said just now, " And by other good qualities," to which did you refer ?'

^ In the long list of the distinguishing characteristics of ethical qualities given by Buddhaghosa in the Sumahgala, p. 63, pa^anana is the mark of paw/Tindriya, avi^^aya akampiyaw of paz/wabala, and tad-uttariyaw^ of pa««a simply. He gives no 'mark' of yoniso manasikara. 52 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, i, 9. 'Good conduct, great king, and faith, and perseverance, and mindfulness, and meditation \ ' And what is the characteristic mark of good conduct ? ' ' It has as its characteristic that it is the basis of all good qualities. The five moral powers - — faith, perseverance, mindfulness, meditation, and wisdom — ; the seven conditions of Arahatship^ — self-possession, investigation of the Dhamma, perseverance, joy, calm, meditation, and equanimity — ; the Path ; readiness of memory (unbroken self-possession) *; the four kinds of right exertion ^ ; the four constituent bases of extraordinary powers ^ ; the four stages of ecstasy'^; the eight forms of spiritual emancipation ^ ; the four modes of self-concentration ^ ; and the eight states of intense contemplation^** have each and all of them good conduct (the observance of outward morality) as their basis. And to him who builds upon that foundation, O king, all these good conditions will not decrease ".'

' Give me an illustration.' 'Just, O king, as all those forms of animal and vegetable life which grow, develope, and mature, do so with the earth as their basis ; just so does the recluse, who is devoted in effort, develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue.' ' Give me a further illustration.' ^ Silawi, saddha, viriya?«, sati, samadhi. 2 Indriya-balani. ^ Bogg/iahg^. * Satipa///^ana. ■'■ Sammappadhana. ^ Iddhipada. '^ G/iano.. •* Vimokha. ^ Samadhi. ^° Samapatti. '^ The above-mentioned meritorious conditions are those the sum of which make Arahatship. 'Just, O king, as all the occupations which involve bodily exertion are carried on in ultimate dependence upon the earth, just so does the recluse develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue.' [34] ' Give me a still better illustration.' * Just, O king, as the architect of a city, when he wants to build one, first clears the site of the town, and then proceeds to get rid of all the stumps and thorny brakes, and thus makes it level, and only then does he lay out the streets and squares, and crossroads and market places, and so build the city ; just so does the recluse develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue.'

' Can you give me one more simile ? ' 'Just, O king, as an acrobat \ when he wants to exhibit his skill, first digs over the ground, and proceeds to get rid of all the stones and fragments of broken pottery, and thus to make it smooth, and only then, on soft earth, shows his tricks ; just even so does the recluse develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue. For it has been said. Sire, by the Blessed One : "Virtue's the base on which the man who's wise [' Can train his heart, and make his wisdom grow. Thus shall the strenuous Bhikkhu, undeceived, Unravel all the tangled skein of life ^. ^ Lahghako, not in Childers; but compare Gataka I, 431, and below, pp. 191, 331 of the text. - This verse occurs twice in the Saw/yutla (I, 3, 3, and VII, i. 6). 54 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, i, lO. "This is the base — Hke the great earth to men — And this the root of all increase in goodness, The starting-point of all the Buddhas' teaching, Virtue, to wit, on which true bliss depends \" ' ' Well said, Nagasena ! '

lo ^ The king said, 'Venerable Nagasena, what is the characteristic mark of faith ? ' * Tranquillisation, O king, and aspiration ^.' ' And how is tranquillisation the mark of faith ?' 'As faith, O king, springs up in the heart it breaks through the five hindrances — lust, malice, mental sloth, spiritual pride, and doubt — and the heart, free from these hindrances, [35] becomes clear, serene, untroubled.' ' Give me an illustration.' 'Just, O king, as a suzerain king, when on the march with his fourfold army, might cross over a small stream, and the water, disturbed by the elephants and cavalry, the chariots and the bowmen, might become fouled, turbid *, and muddy. And 1 Vara-patimokkhiyo, a poetical expression found only in this passage, and of the exact connotation of which I am uncertain. It is not in Childers; and Hina/i-kumbure gives no assistance. The whole line may mean, ' The scheme of a virtuous life as laid down in the most excellent Patimokkha.' See the use of Sa?«yutta-Nikaya-vare below, p. 36 of the text. On the whole section compare M. P. S. I, 12. 2 This section is summarised in Hardy's ' Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 411, 412 (ist edition).

^ Sampasadana and sampakkhandana. Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., does not give faith in his list, but he gives the power of faith (saddha-bala), and as its 'mark' 'that it cannot be shaken by incredulity.' * Lu/ita, not in Childers; but compare Ahguttara I, 55, and 'Book of the Great Decease,' IV, 26-32. when he was on the other side the monarch might give command to his attendants, saying : " Bring some water, my good men. I would fain drink." Now suppose the monarch had a water-clearing gem]\ and those men, in obedience to the order, were to throw the jewel into the water ; then at once all the mud would precipitate itself, and the sandy atoms of shell and bits of water-plants would disappear, and the water would become clear, transparent, and serene, and they would then bring some of it to the monarch to drink. The water is' the heart ; the royal servants are the recluse ; the mud, the sandy atoms, and the bits of water-plants are evil dispositions ; and the water-cleansing gem \ is faith.' 'And how is aspiration the mark of faith ?' ' In as much as the recluse, on perceiving how the hearts of others have been set free, aspires to enter as it were by a leap upon the fruit of the first stacre, or of the second, or of the third in the Excellent Way, or to gain Arahatship itself, and thus applies himself to the attainment of what he has not reached, to the experience of what he has not yet felt, to the realisation of what he has not yet realised, — therefore is it that aspiration is the mark of faith.'

' Give me an illustration.' 'Just, O king, as if a mighty storm [36] were to break upon a mountain top and pour out rain, the water would flow down according to the levels, and after filling up the crevices and chasms and gullies ^ Udakappasadako ma;n. Doubtless a magic gem is meant : with allusion particularly to the Wondrous Gem (the Ma;/i-ratana) of the mythical King of Glory (see my ' Buddhist Suttas,' p. 256). 56 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MI1.INDA. IT, i, lo. of the hill, would empty itself into the brook below, so that the stream would rush along, overflowing both its banks. Now suppose a crowd of people, one after the other, were to come up, and being ignorant of the real breadth or depth of the water, were to stand fearful and hesitating on the brink. And suppose a certain man should arrive, who knowing exactly his own strength and power should gird himself firmly and, with a spring, land himself on the other side. Then the rest of the people, seeing him safe on the other side, would likewise cross. That is the kind of way in which the recluse, by faith S aspires to leap, as it were by a bound, into higher things. For this has been said, O king, by the Blessed One in the Sa;;2yutta Nikaya :

" By faith he crosses over the stream. By earnestness the sea of life ; By steadfastness all grief he stills, By wisdom is he purified ^." ' 'Well put, Nagasena !' ' In the Buddha, in the sufficiency of the Excellent Way he taught, and in the capacity of man to walk along it. It is spoken of slightingly (compared with Arahatship) in Mahavagga V, i, 21 — in the Mahaparinibbana SuttaVI, 9 (of Ananda, who has faith, compared with the brethren, who have entered one or other of the stages of the Excellent Way)— and in Ahguttara III, 21 (in comparison with intuitive insight and intellectual perception). For this last comparison see further the Puggala Pa;7«atti III, 3. From these passages a fair idea of the Buddhist view of faith could be formed. Although the Buddhist faith and the Christian faith are in things contradictory, the two conditions of heart are strikingly similar both in origin and in consequence. - This verse is not yet reached in the Pali Text Society's edition of the Sa;«yutta, but it is found also in the Sutta Nipata I, 10, 4. 1 1 ^ The king said : ' What, Nagasena, is the characteristic mark of perseverance ? '

' The rendering of support, O king, is the mark of perseverance ^. All those good qualities which it supports do not fall away.' ' Give me an illustration.' 'Just as a man, if a house were falling, would make a prop for it of another post, and the house so supported would not fall ; just so, O king, is the rendering of support the mark of perseverance, and all those good qualities which it supports do not fall away.' * Give me a further illustration.' 'Just as when a large army has broken up a small one, then the king of the latter would call to mind every possible ally and reinforce his small army ^, and by that means the small army might in its turn break up the large one ; just so, O king, is the rendering of support the mark of perseverance, and all those good qualities which it supports do not fall away [37]. For it has been said by the Blessed One : " The persevering hearer of the noble truth, O Bhikkhus, puts away evil and cultivates goodness, puts away that which is wrong and developes in himself that which is right, and thus does he keep himself pure." '

^ This section is summarised by Hardy, loc. cit. p. 409. ^ Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., says that paggaha (tension) is the mark of viriyindriya. ^ Anna.ma.nndim anusareyya anupeseyya. This is the way in which Hina/i-kumburc understands this doubtful passage. Hardy has bungled the whole simile. Both the words are new, and I am not sure that the first does not after all come from the root sar, to follow. 'Well put, Nagasena !' 12. The king said: 'What, Nagasena, is the characteristic mark of mindfulness^?' /; ' Repetition, O king, and keeping up ^.' ' And how is repetition the mark of mindfulness ? ' ' As mindfulness, O king, springs up in his heart he repeats over the good and evil, right and wrong, slight and important, dark and light qualities, and those that resemble them, saying to himself: " These are the four modes of keeping oneself ready and mindful, these the four modes of spiritual effort, these the four bases of extraordinary powers, these the five organs of the moral sense, these the five mental powers, these the seven bases of Arahatship, these the eight divisions of the Excellent Way, this is serenity and this insight, this is wisdom and this emancipation ^." Thus does the recluse follow after

^ Sati, summarised in Hardy's 'Manual,' p. 412. - Api/apana and upaga7^hana, both new words. This definition is in keeping with the etymological meaning of the word sati, which is ' memory.' It is one of the most difficult words (in its secondary, ethical, and more usual meaning) in the whole Buddhist system of ethical psychology to translate. Hardy renders 'conscience,' which is certainly wrong ; and Gogerly (see my ' Buddhist Suttas,' p. 144) has 'meditation,' which is equally wide of the mark. I have sometimes rendered it ' self-possession.' It means that activity of mind, constant presence of mind, wakefulness of heart, which is the foe of carelessness, inadvertence, self-forgelfulness. And it is a very constant theme of the Buddhist moralist. Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., makes upa/Mana, 'readiness,' its mark. ^ These are the various moral qualities and mental habits which together make up Arahatship, and may be said also to make up Buddhism (as the Buddha taught it). It was on these that he laid special stress, in his last address to the members of the Order, just before his death (' Book of the Great Decease,' III, 65, in my ' Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 60-63) ; and the details of them will be found in the note to that passage.

II, I, 12. MINDFULNESS (SATi). 59 those qualities that are desirable, and not after those that are not ; thus does he cultivate those which ought to be practised, and not those which ought not. That is how repetition is the mark of mindfulness,' ' Give me an illustration.' * It is like the treasurer of the imperial sovran \ who reminds his royal master early and late of his glory, saying : " So many are thy war elephants, O king, and so many thy cavalry-, thy war chariots and thy bowmen, so much the quantity of thy money, and gold, and wealth, may your Majesty keep yourself in mind thereof.' ' And how. Sir, is keeping up a mark of mindfulness ? ' ' As mindfulness springs up in his heart, O king, he searches out the categories of good qualities and their opposites, saying to himself: "Such and such qualities are good, and such bad ; [38] such and such qualities helpful, and such the reverse." Thus does the recluse make what is evil in himself to disappear, and keeps up what is good. That is how keeping up is the mark of mindfulness.' ' Give me an illustration.'

' It is like the confidential adviser of that imperial ' iTakkavattissa bha?z</agariko, no doubt with allusion to the gahapati-ratana;;/, one of the seven treasures of the mythical King of Glory (see my ' Buddhist Suttas,' p. 257). It is particularly interesting to me to find here the use of the word ' treasurer ' instead of 'householder;' for it was in that exact sense that I had understood the word gahapati in that connection, at a time when, in the then state of Pali scholarship, it seemed very bold to do so. ^ Literally ' horses.' The whole list is again a manifest allusion to the corresponding one in the Sutta of the Great King of Glory. 6o THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, t, 13. sovran ^ who instructs him in good and evil, saying : " These things are bad for the king and these good, these helpful and these the reverse." And thus the king makes the evil in himself die out, and keeps up the good.' ' Well put, Nagasena ! ' 132. The king said: 'What, Nagasena, is the characteristic mark of meditation ^ ? ' ' Being the leader, O king. All good qualities have meditation as their chief, they incline to it, lead up towards it, are as so many slopes up the side of the mountain of meditation.'

' Give me an illustration.' ' As all the rafters of the roof of a house, O king, go up to the apex, slope towards it, are joined on together at it, and the apex is acknowledged to be the top of all ; so is the habit of meditation in its relation to other good qualities.' ' Give me a further illustration.' ' It is like a king, your Majesty, when he goes down to battle with his army in its fourfold array. The whole army — elephants, cavalry, war chariots, and bowmen — would have him as their chief, their ^ Pariwayaka, the seventh treasure of the King of Glory. (Compare the 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 259.) It will be seen that our author is in substantial agreement with the older tradition, and does not, like the Lalita Vistara, understand under this officer a general. ^ Omitted by Hardy. ^ Samadhi. Buddhaghosa, loc. cit. p. 65, gives also 'being the chief as its mark, but he previously (p. 64) gives avikkhepa, 'serenity,' as the mark of samma-samadhi, and also (p. 63) of samadhindriya, while 'being unshaken by spiritual pride' is his mark (p. 63) of Samadhi-bala, lines would incline towards him, lead up to him, they would be so many mountain slopes, one above another, with him as their summit, round him they would all be ranged. [39] And it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One : " Cultivate in yourself, O Bhikkhus, the habit of meditation. He who is established therein knows things as they really are\"' ' Well put, Nagasena !'

14. The king said: 'What, Nagasena, is the characteristic mark of wisdom ^ ? ' * I have already told you, O king, how cutting off, severance, is its mark ^, but enlightenment is also its mark.' ' And how is enlightenment its mark ? ' ' When wisdom springs up in the heart, O king, it dispels the darkness of ignorance, it causes the radiance of knowledge to arise, it makes the light of intelligence to shine forth ^, and it makes the Noble Truths plain. Thus does the recluse who is devoted to effort perceive with the clearest wisdom the impermanency (of all beings and things), the suffering (that is inherent in individuality), and the absence of any soul,' ' Give me an illustration.' ' It is like a lamp, O king, which a man might introduce into a house in darkness. When the lamp had been brought in it would dispel the darkness, ^ Sawzyutta Nikaya XXI, 5. ^ Pa««a. Hardy in the 'INIanual of Buddhism,' pp. 414, 415, gives a jumble of this passage and several others. ' See above, p. 51. * Vidawseti, not in Childers ; but compare Thcri Gatha, 74; Anguttara III, 103; and Gataka III, 222,

62 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, i, 15. cause radiance to arise, and light to shine forth, and make the objects there plainly visible. Just so would wisdom in a man have such effects as were just now set forth.' ' Well put, Nagasena !' 15. The king said: 'These qualities which are so different \ Nagasena, do they bring about one and the same result ? ' ' They do. The putting an end to evil dispositions.' ' How is that ? Give me an illustration.' * They are like the various parts of an army — elephants, cavalry, war chariots, and archers — who all work to one end, to wit : the conquest in battle of the opposing army.' ' Well put, Nagasena !' Here ends the First Chapter. ^ That is, the five referred to above, p. 51, § 9. Book II. Chapter 2. I. [40] The king said: ' He who is born, Nagasena, does he remain the same or become another ? ' * Neither the same nor another.' ' Give me an illustration.' ' ' Now what do you think, O king ? You were once a baby, a tender thing, and small in size, lying flat on your back. Was that the same as you who are now grown up ? '

' No. That child was one, I am another.' ' If you are not that child, it will follow that you have had neither mother nor father, no ! nor teacher. You cannot have been taus^ht either learnino-, or behaviour, or wisdom. What, great king ! is the mother of the embryo in the first stage different from the mother of the embryo in the second stage, or the third, or the fourth ^ ? Is the mother of the baby a different person from the mother of the grown-up man ? Is the person who goes to school one, and the same when he has finished his schooling another ? Is it one who commits a crime, another who is punished by having his hands or feet cut off 2.-*' ' Certainly not. But what would you. Sir, say to that ? ' The Elder replied : ' I should say that I am the same person, now I am grown up, as I was when I was a tender tiny baby, flat on my back. For all these states are included in one by means of this body.' ' Give me an illustration.' ' On these four stages see Gataka IV, 496, and Sa;«yutta X. i. 3. ^ Hardy makes sad nonsense of all this.

64 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, i. ' Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through ? ' ' Yes, it might do so.' ' Now, is it the same flame that burns in the first watch of the night. Sir, and in the second?' ' Or the same that burns in the second watch and in the third ? ' ' Then is there one lamp in the first watch, and another in the second, and another in the third ? ' ' No. The light comes from the same lamp all the night through.' ' Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away ; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness \' ' Give me a further illustration.' ^ Hardy (p. 429) renders this as follows: 'In the same way, "•reat king, one being is conceived, another is born, another dies ; when comprehended by the mind, it is like a thing that has no before, and no after ; no preceding, no succeeding existence. Thus the being who is born does not continue the same, nor does he become another; the last winyana, or consciousness, is thus united with the rest.' (!) He confesses himself in doubt as to the last few words, but is quite unconscious of having completely misinterpreted the whole paragraph.

The meaning is really quite plain in- both the Pali and the Sinhalese. A man, at any one moment, is precisely all that he is then conscious of. The phase of his self-consciousness, the totality of that of which he is conscious, is always changing ; and is so different at death from what it was at birth that, in a certain sense, he is not the same at the one time as he was at the other. But there is a continuity in the whole series;— a continuity dependent ' It is like milk, [41] which when once taken from the cow, turns, after a lapse of time, first to curds, and then from curds to butter, and then from butter to ghee. Now would it be right to say that the milk was the same thing as the curds, or the butter, or the (jhee ? ' * Certainly not ; but they are produced out of it.' ' Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away ; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness.'

' Well put, Nagasena !' 2 ■•. The king said : * Is a man, Nagasena, who will not be reborn, aware of the fact ? ' ' Yes, O king.' 'And how does he know it ? ' ' By the cessation of all that is cause, proximate or remote ^, of rebirth.' ' Give me an illustration.' ' Suppose a farmer, great king, had ploughed and sown and filled his granary ; and then for a period should neither plough nor sow, but live on the on the whole body. And this fits the simile, in wliich the lamp is the body, and the flame the changing self-consciousness; whereas it is impossible to make the simile fit the conclusion as rendered by Hardy. On the phrase apubbaw a/{'ariyaw see Dr. Morris's note at p. 10 1 of the Pali Text Society's Journal, 1887, and the passages he there quotes. ^ Omitted in Hardy. The correlative question is discussed below, III, 5, 8, p. 112. ^ That is to say, Tawha and Upadana. 66 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 3. stored-up grain, or dispose of it in barter, or deal with it as he had need. Would the farmer be aware, great king, that his granary was not getting filled '^ '

* Yes, he ought to know it.' 'But how?' * He would know that the cause, proximate and remote, of the filling of the granary had ceased.' 'Just so with the man you spoke of. By the cessation of all that leads to rebirth, he would be conscious of having escaped his liability to it.' ' Well explained, Nagasena ! ' 3 ^ The king said : 'He who has intelligence, Nagasena, has he also wisdom ^ ? ' ' Yes, great king.' [42] ' What ; are they both the same ? ' 'Then would he, with his intelligence — which, you say, is the same as wisdom — be still in bewilderment or not ? ' 'In regard to some things, yes; in regard to others, no.' ' What would he be in bewilderment about ? ' ' He would still be in bewilderment as to those parts of learning he had not learnt, as to those countries he had not seen, and as to those names or terms he had not heard.' ' And wherein would he not be in bewilderment ? ' ' As regards that which has been accomplished by insight — (the perception, that is,) of the imper-

^ Summarised in Hardy's 'Manual,' p. 414. ^ iVana and pa«?7a. manence of all beings, of the suffering inherent in individuality, and of the non-existence of any soul '.' ' Then what would have become of his delusions on those points.' * When intelligence has once arisen, that moment delusion has died away.' * Give me an illustration.' * It is like the lamp, which when a man has brought into a darkened room, then the darkness would vanish away, and light would appear.' ' And what, Nagasena, on the other hand, has then become of his wisdom ?' ' When the reasoningf wisdom has effected that which it has to do, then the reasoning ceases to go on. But that which has been acquired by means of it remains — the knowledge, to wit, of the impermanence of every being, of the suffering inherent in individuality, and of the absence of any soul.' ' Give me an illustration, reverend Sir, of what you have last said.' 'It is as when a man wants, during the night, to send a letter, and after having his clerk called, has a lamp lit, and gets the letter written. Then, when that has been done, he extinguishes the lamp. But though the lamp had been put out the writing would still be there. Thus does reasoning cease, and knowledge remain.'

' Give me a further illustration.' ' In Eastern districts [43] the peasants have a custom of arranging five pots full of water behind ^ That is, he might still be wrong on matters of mere worldly knowledge, but would be clear in his mind as to the fundamental truths of religion. Compare the analogous distinctions often drawn as to the inspiration of Scripture, or the infallibility of the Pope. 68 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA, II, 2, 3. each hut with the object of putting out at once any spark of fire that may be kindled. Suppose now the house had caught fire, and they had thrown those five potfulls of water over the hut, and the fire had gone out, would those peasants then think of still going on using the water-pots ?' ' No, Sir, the water-pots would be done with. What would be the use of them (on that occasion) any more ? ' ' The five water-pots are the five organs of moral sense — faith, to wit, and perseverance in effort, and mindfulness, and meditation, and the reasoning wisdom. The peasantry are the recluse, who is devoted in effort ^ ; the fire is sinfulness. As the fire is put out by the water in the five pots, so is sinfulness extinguished by the five organs of moral sense, and when once extinguished it does not again arise^'

* Give me a further illustration.' ' It is like a physician who goes to the sick man with the five kinds of druQ-s made from medicinal ^ Yogava^-aro ; one of the technical terms in constant use by our author, but not found in the PaH Pi/akas. Hardy renders it, ' who is seeking Nirva;/a ; ' but though this may be suggested by the term, it is not its meaning. Literally it is ' he whose sphere, whose constant resort, is Yoga.' Now yoga is ' diligence, devotion, mental concentration ; ' and there is nothing to show that our author is using the word as an epithet of Arahatship. It seems to me, therefore, that the whole compound merely means one of those ' religious,' in the technical sense, who were also religious in the higher, more usual sense. It would thus be analogous to the phrase sa/wgamava^aro, 'at home in war,' used of a war elephant in the Sawgamava^ara Gataka (Fausboll, II, 95), and of a soldier below, Mil. 44. ^ This must, I think, be understood in a modified sense, for the first of the four Great Exertions (Sammappadhanas) is the effort to prevent sinful conditions arising.

roots \ and grinding diem up, gives him to drink, and thereby his sickness passes away. Would the physician in that case think of making any further use of the medicine ?' ' Certainly not, the medicine has done its work. What would be the use of any more ?' 'Just so, O king, when sinfulness is destroyed by the five moral powers, then reasoning ceases, but knowledge remains.' [44] ' Give me a further illustration.' 'It is like a warrior, at home in war, who takes five javelins and goes down to battle to conquer the foe. And when he has cast them the enemy is broken. There is no need for him to go on casting javelins any more.' * Well put, Nagasena !' 4. The king said : ' He who will not be reborn, Nagasena, does he still feel any painful sensation ?' The Elder replied: 'Some he feels and some not' 'He may feel bodily pain, O king; but mental pain he would not.' ' How would that be so .'^' ' Because the causes, proximate or remote, of bodily pain still continue, he would be liable to it. But the causes, proximate or remote, of mental agony having ceased, he could not feel it. For it has been said by the Blessed One : " One kind of pain he suffers, bodily pain : but not mental." '

' Then why. Sir, does he not die ?' * The Arahat, O king, has need neither to curry ^ Pa«/{'a mula bhessa^^ani : not the five principal sorts of medicine mentioned by Childers. 70 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 5. favour nor to bear malice. He shakes not down the unripe fruit, but awaits the full time of its maturity. For it has been said, O king, by the Elder, Sariputta, the Commander of the faith [45] : "It is not death, it is not life I welcome; As the hireling his wage, so do I bide my time. It is not death, it is not life I want ; Mindful and thoughtful do I bide my time\"' 'Well put, Nagasena!' 5. The king said: 'Is a pleasant sensation, Nagasena, good or evil or indifferent ?' ' It may be any one of the three.' ' But surely, Sir, if good conditions are not painful, and painful ones not good, then there can arise no good condition that is at the same time painful ^.' ' Now, what do you think, great king ? Suppose a man were to hold in one hand a red-hot ball of iron, and in the other a lump of icy snow, would they both hurt him ?'

* Yes ; they both would.' ' But are they both hot ?' ' Certainly not.' * But are they both cold ?' 'No.' ' Then acknowledge yourself put in the wrong ! If the heat hurts, and they are not both hot, the pain cannot come from the heat. If the cold hurts, ^ These verses are nearly the same as those put in reverse order into Sariputta's mouth in the Theri Gatha, 1003, 1002. And the first two hues, as Dr. Rost was good enough to point out to me, are identical (except as to a slight grammatical variation) with Manu '■* And the same, therefore, of pleasant sensations that are evil and they are not both cold, the pain cannot come from the cold. How then, O king, can they both hurt you, since they are not both hot, nor both cold, and (as one is hot and the other cold) the pain comes neither from the hot nor from the cold ? ' ' I am not equal to argument with you. Be so good, Sir, as to explain how the matter stands.' Then the Elder reasoned with king Milinda, persuading him by talk on the subject drawn from the Abhidhamma, such as : ' There are these six pleasures, O king, connected with life in the world, and these other six with renunciation. There are six griefs connected with life in the world, and six with renunciation. There are six kinds of indifference to pleasure and to grief connected with life in the world, and six with renunciation. [46] Altogether there are thus six series of six, that is to say, thirtysix kinds of sensations in the present, and the like number in the past, and the like in the future. And adding all these up in one total we arrive at one hundred and eight kinds of sensation.'

* Well put, Nagasena ! ' 6\ The king said : 'What is it, Nagasena, that is reborn ? ' ' Name-and-form is reborn.' 'What, is it this same name-and-form that is reborn ? ' ' No : but by this name-and-form deeds are done, good or evil, and by these deeds (this Karma) another name-and-form is reborn.' ^ This dialogue is in Hardy, p. 429 (No. 7). 72 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 6. ' If that be so, Sir, would not the new behig be released from its evil Karma^?' 1 The Elder replied : ' Yes, if it were not reborn. But just because it is reborn, O king, it is therefore not released from its evil Karma.' * Give me an illustration.' ' Suppose, O king, some man were to steal a mango from another man, and the owner of the maneo were to seize him and brins: him before the king, and charge him with the crime. And the thief were to say : " Your Majesty ! I have not taken away this man's mangoes. Those that he put in the o-round are different from the ones I took. I do not deserve to be punished." How then ? would he be guilty ?'

'Certainly, Sir. He would deserve to be punished.' * But on what ground ?' ' Because, in spite of whatever he may say, he would be guilty in respect of the last mango which resulted from the first one (the owner set in the ground).' 'Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are done by this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its Karma).' ' Give me a further illustration.' ' It is like rice or sugar so stolen, of which the same might be said as of the mango. [47] Or it is like the fire which a man, in the cold season, might kindle, and when he had warmed himself, leave still burning, and go away. Then if that fire were to set 1 Repeated below, III, 5, 7, p. 112. another man's field on fire, and the owner of the field were to seize him, and bring him before the king, and charge him with the injury, and he were to say: "Your Majesty! It was not I who set this man's field on fire. The fire I left burninof was a different one from that which burnt his field. I am not guilty." Now would the man, O king, be guilty?'

' Because, In spite of whatever he might say, he would be guilty in respect of the subsequent fire that resulted from the previous one.' ' Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are done by this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its Karma).' ' Give me a further illustration.' ' Suppose, O king, a man were to take a lamp and go up into the top storey of his house, and there eat his meal. And the lamp blazing up were to set the thatch on fire, and from that the house should catch fire, and that house having caught fire the whole village should be burnt. And they should seize him and ask : " What, you fellow, did you set our village on fire for?" And he should reply: "I've not set your village on fire ! The flame of the lamp, by the light of which I was eating, w^as one thing ; the fire which burnt your village was another thing." Now if they, thus disputing, should go to law before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case ? '

' In the villagers' favour.' 74 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 6. ' Because, Sir, in spite of whatever the man might say, the one fire was produced from the other.' 'Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.' ' Give me a further illustration.' ' Suppose, O king, a man were to choose a young girl in marriage, and give a price ^ for her and go away. [48] And she in due course should grow up to full age, and then another man were to pay a price for her and marry her. And when the first one had come back he should say : " Why, you fellow, have you carried off my wife?" And the other were to reply: " It's not your wife I have carried off! The little girl, the mere child, whom you chose in marriage and paid a price for is one ; the girl grown up to full age whom I chose in marriage and paid a price for, is another." Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case ?'

' In favour of the first' ' Because, in spite of whatever the second might say, the grown-up girl would have been derived from the other girl.' 'Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form ^ Suhka/?z datva. Literally ' paying a tax.' So early were early marriages 1 Compare Theri Gatha, 402. Hina/i-kumbur6, p. 58, has woe/up di, ' having provided her with means of subsistence.' But, of course, the Suhka must have been a price paid to the parents. which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.' ' Give me a further illustration.' ' Suppose a man, O king, were to buy of a herdsman a vessel of milk, and go away leaving it in his charge, saying : " I will come for it to-morrow;" and the next day it were to become curds. And when the man should come and ask for it, then suppose the other were to offer him the curds, and he should say: " It was not curds I bought of you; give me my vessel of milk." And the other were to reply: " Without any fault of mine ^ your milk has turned to curds." Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case ?'

' In favour of the herdsman.' ' Because, in spite of whatever the other might say, the curds were derived from the milk.' * Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form that finds its end in death, and another that is reborn. But that other is the result of the first, and is therefore not thereby released from its evil deeds (its bad Karma).' * Very good, Nagasena ! ' 7 2. The king said : ' Will you, Nagasena, be reborn ? ' ^ A^anato : there is an ambiguity here, as the word may mean ' to me not knowing it,' or ' to you not knowing it.' Hina/ikumbure takes the latter interpretation, and renders : ' O come ! Do you not know that your milk has become curds ? ' (Embala, tage kiri mawfi bawa no dannehi dceyi.) "^ ^ Not in Hardy. 76 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 8. ' Nay, great king, what is the use of asking that question again ? Have I not already told you that if, when I die, [49] I die with craving in my heart, I shall ; but if not, not ^ ? '

' Give me an illustration.' ' Suppose, O king, a man were to render service to the king ^ : and the king, pleased with him, were to bestow an office upon him. And then that he, while living through that appointment, in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, should publicly declare that the king had repaid him naught. Now would that man, O king, be acting rightly ? ' ' Most certainly not.' 'Just so, great king, what is the use of asking that question again ? Have I not already told you that if, when I die, I die with craving in my heart, I shall ; and if not, not ? ' * You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.' 8. The king said : ' You were talking just now of name-and-form. What does " name " mean in that expression, and what " form " ? ' * Whatever is gross therein, that is " form": whatever is subtle, mental, that is " name." ' ' Why is it, Nagasena, that name is not reborn separately, or form separately ? ' ' These conditions, great king, are connected one with the other ; and spring into being together.'

' Give me an illustration.' ' As a hen, great king, would not get a yoke or ^ See above, Chapter i, § 6, p. 50. 2 This shuile, with a different conclusion, recurs below, II, 3, 10 an egg-shell separately, but both would arise in one, they two being intimately dependent one on the other ; just so, if there were no name there would be no form. What is meant by name in that expression being intimately dependent on what is meant by form, they spring up together. And this is, through time immemorial, their nature \' ' You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.' 9. The king said : ' You speak, Nagasena, of time immemorial. What does this word " time " mean ?' * Past time, O king, and present, and future.' * But what ? is there such a thing as time ^ ' ' There is time w^iich exists, and time which does not.' ' Which then exists, and which not ? ' [50] ' There are Confections (constituent potentialities of being) -, O king, which are past in the sense of having passed away, and ceased to be, or of having been dissolved, or altogether changed. To them time is not. But there are conditions of heart which are now producing their effect, or still have in them the inherent possibility of producing

^ Evam eta.m dJgham addhanawz sa7«bhavitaw : which Hardy, p. 141, renders: 'They accompany each olher (as to the species, but not as to the individual) during infinitude.' But even the Si/«halese text cannot be made to mean this. ** Sawzkhara. See the full list in my 'Buddhism,' pp. 91, 92 (a list, indeed, not found as yet in the Pi/akas, and probably later, but yet founded on the older divisions, and explanatory of them). They are all those divisions into which existence (or the process of becoming and ceasing to be as Buddhism looks at it) should be divided, and are practically so many sorts of action (Karma). For the older divisions see the note at the passages quoted in ' Vinaya Texts,' I, 76. 78 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. 11, 2, 9. effect, or which will otherwise lead to reindividualisation. To them time is. Where there are beings who, when dead, will be reborn, there time is. Where there are beings who, when dead, will not be reborn, there time is not ; and where there are beings who are altogether set free (who, having attained Nirva/m in their present life, have come to the end of that life), there time is not — because of their having been quite set free \'

' You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.' Here ends the Second Chapter. ^ Parinibbutatta. Hardy renders this whole clause (the last lines) : ' Nirva;/a is attained, time is no longer.' But this is one of the endless confusions arising out of not knowing the distinction between Nirvana and Parinirvawa, To a man who had ' attained Nirvawa ' there would still be time as long as he was in the enjoyment of it, that is as long as he continued in his present (and last) existence. The Si?«halese is perfectly clear. Book II. Chapter 3. I. The king said : ' What is the root, Nagasena, of past time, and what of present, and what of future time ? ' ' Ignorance. By reason of Ignorance came the Confections, by reason of the Confections consciousness, by reason of consciousness name-and-form, by reason of name-and-form the six organs of sense \ by reason of them contact, by reason of contact sensation, by reason of sensation thirst, by reason of thirst craving, by reason of craving becoming, by reason of becoming birth, by reason of birth old age and death, grief, lamentation, sorrow, pain, and despair. Thus is it that the ultimate point in the past of all this time is not apparent.'

* You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.' 2. The king said : ' You say that the ultimate point of time is not apparent. Give me an illustration of that,' 'Suppose, O king, a man were to plant in the ground a tiny seed, and that it were to come up as a shoot, and in due course grow, develope, and mature until it produced a fruit. [51] And then the man, taking a seed from that fruit, were again to plant it in the ground, and all should happen as before. Now would there be any end to this series ? ' * Certainly not, Sir.' ^ Sa/ayatanani, that is the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body (as the organ of touch), and mind (or, as we should say, brain). 8o THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 2. * Just SO, O king, the ultimate point in the past of the whole of this time is not apparent.' ' Give me a further illustration.' ' The hen lays an eg^. From the egg comes a hen. From the hen an egg. Is there any end to this series ? ' ' Just so, O king, the ultimate point in the past of the whole of this time is not apparent'

' Give me a further illustration.' Then the Elder drew a circle on the ground and asked the king : ' Is there any end to this circle ? ' ' No, it has no end.' ' Well, that is like those circles spoken of by the Blessed One \ " By reason of the eye and of forms there arises sight -, when these three come together there is touch, by reason of touch sensation, by reason of sensation a longing {Tanha, thirst), by reason of the longing action (Karma), and from action eye is once more produced ^" Now is there any end to this series ? ' ^ Hina/i-kumbur8 applies this to the previous words (the circles of the chain of Hfe quoted in § i from the Mahavagga I, i, 2), and he is followed by Hardy, p. 434. Trenckner makes it apply to the following words, giving the reference to No. 18 in the Magg/ilma. Nikaya, and I think he is right. Whichever way it is taken, the result is much the same. 2 A'akkhu-viT/Tiawa. It is not clear from the terse phraseology of this passage whether this is supposed to be a subjective stage preliminary to the 'touch' (phasso), or whether it is inclusive of it. (Compare Dhamma Sahga«i, 589, 599, 620.) I am inclined to think it is the former. But if the latter be meant it might be rendered ' there arises that consciousness (of existence) which is dependent upon the eye.' See below, § 4.

^ That is, another eye in another birth. Then setting out a precisely corresponding circle of each of the other organs of sense (of the ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind^), he in each case put the same question. And the reply being always the same, he concluded : 'Just so, O king, the ultimate point of time in the past is not apparent.' ' You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.' The king said : ' When you say that the ultimate point is not apparent, what do you mean by " ultimate point " ? ' ' Of whatsoever time is past. It is the ultimate point of that, O king, that I speak of.' ' But, if so, when you say that it is not apparent, do you mean to say that of everything ? Is the ultimate point of everything unknown ? ' ' Partly so, and partly not.' * Then which is so, and which not ? ' ' Formerly, O king, everything in every form, everything in every mode, was ignorance. It is to us as if it were not. In reference to that the ultimate beginning is unknown. But that, which has not been, becomes ; as soon as it has begun to become it dissolves away again. In reference to that the ultimate beginning is known ^.' [52]

'But, reverend Sir, if that which was not, becomes, and as soon as it has begun to become passes again ' In the text the whole sentence is repeated of each. ^ That is, ' the beginning of each link in the chain — the beginning of each individuality — can be traced, but not the beginning of each chain. Each life is a link in a chain of lives, bound together by cause and effect, different, yet the same. There are an infinite number of such chains ; and there is no reference in the discussion to any greater unity, or to any " ultimate point " of all the chains.' [35] G away, then surely, being thus cut off at both ends, it must be entirely destroyed^? ' ' Nay, surely, O king, if it be thus cut off at both ends, can it not at both ends be made to grow again ^ ? ' ' Yes, it might. But that is not my question. Could it grow again from the point at which it was cut off ? ' ' Give me an illustration.' Then the Elder repeated the simile of the tree and the seed, and said that the Skandhas (the constituent elements of all life, organic and inorganic) were so many seeds, and the king confessed himself satisfied.

4. The king said : ' Are there any Confections ^ which are produced ? ' ' Which are they ? ' ' Where ihere is an eye, and also forms, there is sight ^, where there is sight there is a contact through the eye, where there is contact through the eye there is a sensation, where there is sensation there is a longing ^, where there is longing there is a grasping ^, where there is grasping there is a becoming, ^ That is, ' each individuahty must be separate. The supposed chain does not really exist.' ^ There is an odd change of gender here. Possibly the word ' ignorance ' has been dropped out. Trenckner says the passage is corrupt, and the Si;«halese is so involved as to be unintelligible. ^ Safikhara, potentialities, possible forms, of sentient existence. * ^akkhu-vi««a«a. See note 2 above, p. 80. ^ Upadana, a stretching out towards a satisfaction of the longing, and therefore a craving for life, time, in which to satisfy it. where there is becoming there is birth, and at birth old age and death, grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair begin to be. Thus is the rise of the whole of this class of pain. — Where there is neither eye nor form there is no sight, where there is not sight there is no contact through the eye, where there is not contact there is no sensation, where there is not sensation there is no lono - ing, where there is not longing there is no grasping, where there is not grasping there is no becoming, where there is not becoming there is no birth, and where there is not birth there is neither old ao-e nor death nor grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair. Thus is the ending of all this class of pain.'

' Very good, Nagasena ! ' 5. The king said : ' Are there any Confections (qualities) which spring into being without a gradual becomine.'^ ' ' No. They all have a gradual becoming.' ' Give me an illustration.' ' Now what do you think, great king ? Did this house in which you are sitting spring suddenly into being ? ' [53] ' Certainly not, Sir. There is nothing here which arose in that way. Each portion of it has had its gradual becoming — these beams had their becoming in the forest, and this clay in the earth, and by the moil and toil of women and of men ^ was this house produced.' Mt is a small matter, but noteworthy, that the Buddhist texts always put the women first. 84 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 5. ' Just SO, great king, there Is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be ! ' ' Give me a further Illustration.' ' They are like all kinds of trees and plants which, when set in the ground, grow, develope, and mature, and then yield their fruits and flowers. The trees do not spring Into being without a becoming. It is by a process of evolution that they become what they are. Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be ! '

' Give me a further illustration.' ' They are like the pots of various kinds which a potter might form when he has dug up the clay out of the earth. The pots do not spring into being without a becoming. It Is by a process of evolution that they become what they are. Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It Is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be ! ' ' Give me a further illustration.' * Suppose, O king, there were no bridge of metal on a mandolin \ no leather, no hollow space, no frame, no neck, no strings, no bow, and no human effort or exertion, would there be music ? ' * Certainly not. Sir.' ' But if all these things were there, would not there be a sound ? ' ^ Viwaya patta?/;. I don't know what this is. The Siwzhalese merely repeats the words. ' Of course there would.' 'Just SO, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be ! '

' Give me a further illustration.' ' Suppose, O king, there were no fire-stick apparatus \ no twirling-stick \ and no cord for the twirling-stick, and no matrix ^ and no burnt rag for tinder, and no human effort and exertion, could there be fire by attrition ? ' * But if all these conditions were present, then might not fire appear ? ' [54] 'Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be ! ' * Give me one more illustration.' ' Suppose, O king, there were no burning glass, and no heat of the sun, and no dried cow-dung for tinder, could there be fire ? ' ' But where these things are present there fire might be struck, might it not ? ' ' Yes.' ' Just so, great king, there is no Confection which ^ Ara«i, ara7ii-potako, and uttarara«i. The exact differentiation of these parts of the fire-stick apparatus is uncertain. The Siwhalese throws no real hght on them, as it translates them respectively ya/a liya, 'under wood,' matu liya; 'upper wood,' and uturu liya, also 'upper wood.' This method of ignition was probably quite as strange to Hina/i-kumbure as it is to us.

86 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 6. has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evohition that Confections come to be ! ' ' Give me another illustration.' ' Suppose, O king, there were no looking-glass, and no light, and no face in front of it, would there appear an image ?' ' But given these things, there might be a reflection ? ' ' Yes, Sir, there might.' 'Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be !' ' Very good, Nagasena ! ' 6. The king said : 'Is there, Nagasena, such a thing as the soul ^ ? ' 'What is this, O king, the soul (Vedagu)?' * The living principle within - which sees forms through the eye, hears sounds through the ear, experiences tastes through the tongue, smells odours through the nose, feels touch through the body, and discerns things (conditions, " dhamma ") through the mind — just as we, sitting here in the palace, can look out of any window out of which we wish to look, the east window or the west, or the north or the south.'

The Elder replied : ' I will tell you about the five ^ Vedagii, see below, III, 5, 6, p. iii, not found in this meaning in the Pi/akas. ^ Abbhantare^ivo, also not found in this sense in the Pi/akas. At la, rendered just above 'image' or 'reflection,' is the word used in them for soul. Hina/i-kumbure renders this here by pra?2a ^iwa, 'breath-soul' See below, III, 7, 15, p, 132 ; and above, II, 4, p. 48 ; and II, 2, 6, p. 71. doors \ great king. Listen, and give heed attentively. If the Hving principle within sees forms through the eye in the manner that you mention, [55] choosing its window as it likes, can it not then see forms not only through the eye, but also through each of the other five organs of sense ? And in like manner can it not then as well hear sounds, and experience taste, and smell odours, and feel touch, and discern conditions through each of the other five organs of sense, besides the one you have in each case specified?' * Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately, the latter sense to the former organ, and so on. Now we, as we are seated here in the palace, with these windows all thrown open, and in full daylight, if we only stretch forth our heads, see all kinds of objects plainly. Can the living principle do the same when the doors of the eyes are thrown open ? When the doors of the ear are thrown open, can it do so ? Can it then not only hear sounds, but see sights, experience tastes, smell odours, feel touch, and discern conditions ? And so with each of its windows ?'

[56] * Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately. Now again, great king, if Dinna here were to eo outside and stand in the gateway, would you be aware that he had done so ? ' ' Yes, I should know it,' ' And if the same Dinna were to come back again, and stand before 3^ou, would )'0u be aware of his having done so ?' ^ It is odd he does not say six. 88 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. TI, 3, 6. ' Yes, I should know it.' ' Well, great king, would the living principle within discern, in like manner, if anything possessing flavour were laid upon the tongue, its sourness, or its saltness, or its acidity, or its pungency, or its astringency, or its sweetness ^ ? ' ' Yes, it would know it.' ' But when the flavour had passed into the stomach would it still discern these things ? ' ' Certainly not.' ' Then these powers are not united one to the other indiscriminately. Now suppose, O king, a man were to have a hundred vessels of honey brought and poured into one trough, and then, having had another man's mouth closed over and tied up, were to have him cast into the trough full of honey. Would he know whether that into which he had been thrown was sweet or whether it was not ?' ' No, Sir.' ' But why not ?'

' Because the honey could not get into his mouth.' ' Then, great king, these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately ^/ ' I am not capable of discussing with such a reasoner. Be pleased, Sir, to explain to me how the matter stands.' Then the Elder convinced Milinda the king with discourse drawn from the Abhidhamma, saying : ' It is by reason, O king, of the eye and of forms that sio^ht arises, and those other conditions — contact. ^ This list recurs below, II, 4, i. 2 That is: ' Your " living principle within" cannot make use of whichever of its windows it pleases. And the simile of a man inside a house does not hold good of the soul.' See the end of II, 3, 16. sensation, idea, thought, abstraction, sense of vitality, and attention ^ — arise each simultaneously with its predecessor. And a similar succession of cause and effect arises when each of the other five organs of sense is brought into play. [57] And so herein there is no such thing as soul (Vedagu) ^.' 7. The king said : ' Does thought-perception ^' arise wherever siofht arises * ? '

' Yes, O king, where the one is there is the other.' ' And which of the two arises first ? ' ' First sight, then thought,' ' Then does the sight issue, as it were, a command to thought, saying : " Do you spring up there where I have ? " or does thought issue command to sight, saying : " Where you spring up there will I." ' ' It is not so, great king. There is no intercourse between the one and the other.' ' Then how is it, Sir, that thought arises wherever sight does ?' ' Because of there being a sloping down, and because of there being a door, and because of there being a habit ^, and because of there being an association.' ' How is that ? Give me an illustration of mind arising where sight arises because of there being a sloping down.' ' Now what do you think, great king ? When it rains", where will the water go to ?' ^ The last four are /i'etana, ekaggata, ^ivitindriyaw, and manasikaro; and in the Sinhalese are simply repeated in their Sinhalese form. ^ This conclusion is all wrong in Hardy, pp. 4,-7, 458.

^ Mano-vi;7«a;/a;;/. * Ka.kkhu-viniia.na,m. ^ A'i««atta, which Hina/i-kumbure renders puruduboewin. * Deve vassante: 'when the god rains.' 90 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 7- ' It will follow the slope of the ground.' ' And if it were to rain again, where would the water go to ?' ' It would go the same way as the first water had ' What then ? Does the first water issue, as it were, command to the second, saying : " Do you go where I have ?" Or does the second issue command to the first, saying : " Whithersoever you go, thither will I "?' ' It is not so. Sir. There is no intercourse between the two. Each goes its way because of the slope of the ground.' 'Just so, great king, [58] is it by reason of the natural slope that where sight has arisen there also does thought arise. And neither does the sightperception issue command to the mind-perception, saying : " Where I have arisen, there do thou also spring up ; " nor does the mind-perception inform the sight-perception, saying : " Where thou hast arisen, there will I also spring up." There is no conversation, as it were, betw^een them. All that happens, happens through natural slope.'

* Now give me an illustration of there being a door.' ' What do you think, great king ? Suppose a king had a frontier city, and it was strongly defended with towers and bulwarks, and had only one gateway. If a man wanted to leave the city, how would he go out ?' * By the gate, certainly.' * And if another man wanted to leave it, how would he go out ?' ' The same way as the first.' ' What then ? Would the first man tell the second : " Mind you go out the same way as I do" ? Or would the second tell the first : " The way you go out, I shall go out too"?' * Certainly not, Sir. There would be no communication between them. They would go that way because that was the gate.' 'Just so, great king, with thought and sight.' * Now give me an illustration of thought arising where sight is because of habit.' ' What do you think, great king ? If one cart went ahead, which way would a second cart go ?' ' The same as the first.' ' But would the first tell the second to go where it went, [59] or the second tell the first that it would go where it (the first) had gone ?'

' No, Sir, There would be no communication between the two. The second would follow the first out of habit.' 'Just so, great king, with sight and thought.' ' Now give me an illustration of how thought arises, where sight has arisen, through association.' * In the art of calculating by using the joints of the fingers as signs or marks ^ in the art of arithmetic pure and simple^, in the art of estimating the probable ^ Mud da. Hma/i-kumbure is here a little fuller ihan Buddlia- ■ghosa at vol. i, p. 95 of the Sumangala. He says: yam se oehgili purukhi alwa gena sa;7;7a ko/a kiyana hasta niudra jastraya, 'the finger-ring art, so called from seizing on the joints of the fingers, and using them as signs.' ^ Gawana. Hiua/i-kumbure says: a-(-X'/ndra wu gawa?;/ i'astraya,*the art of unbroken counting,' which is precisely Buddhaghosa's explanation (confirming the reading we have there adopted), and probably means arithmetic without the aids involved in the last phrase. We have here in that case an interesting peep into the 92 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 8. yield of growing crops \ and in the art of writing, O king, the beginner is ckimsy. But after a certain time with attention and practice he becomes expert. Just so is it that, where sight has arisen, thought too by association springs up.'

And in response to similar questions, the Elder declared that in the same way thought sprang up wherever there was hearing, or taste, or smell, or touch : that in each case it was subsequent to the other, but arose without communication from [60] the natural causes above set out. 8. The king said : ' Where thought (mental perception 2) is, Nagasena, is there always sensation?' ' Yes, where thought arises there is contact, and there is sensation, and there is idea, and there is conceived intention, and there is reflection, and there is investigation ^' 9. ' Reverend Sir, what is the distinguishing characteristic of contact (Phassa)?' ' Touch ^, O king.' ' But give me an illustration,' ' It is as when two rams are butting together, O progress of arithmetical knowledge. When our author wrote, the old way of counting on the fingers was still in vogue, but the modern system was coming into general use. ^ Sank ha, literally ' calculation,' but which Hardy amplifies into Kshetraya wr/ksha vilokaya ko/a phala prama«aya kiyannawu sa7«khya ^astraya. 2 Mano-vi77;7a«a as all through the last section. The reader must not forget that ma no is here strictly an organ of sense, on an exact level with eye, ear, tongue, &c.

^ A'etana, vitakko, and vi-^aro. See fuller further on, §§ 11, 13. 14- * Phusana. So also Buddhaghosa at p. 63 of the Sumangala. king. The eye should be regarded as one of those two, the form (object) as the other, and the contact as the union of the two.' ' Give me a further illustration.' * It is as when two cymbals ^ are clashed together. The one is as the eye, the other as the object, and the junction of the two is like contact.' * Very good, Nagasena ! ' lo. ' Reverend Sir, what is the characteristic mark of sensation (Vedana) ?' ' The being experienced, great king, and enjoyed ^.' * Give me an illustration.' * It is like the case of the man ^ on whom the king, pleased with a service he has rendered him, should bestow an office. He while living, through that appointment, in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, would think : " Formerly I did the king a service. For that the king, pleased with me, gave me this office. It is on that account that I now experience such sensations." — And it is like the case of the man [61] who having done good deeds is re-born, on the dissolution of the body after death, into some happy conditions of bliss in heaven. He, while living there in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, would think : " Formerly I must have done good deeds. It is on that account that I now experience such sensations." Thus is it, great king, that the being experienced and enjoyed is the characteristic mark of sensation,'

' Very good, Nagasena ! ' ^ Samma, compare Theri Gatha, 893, 911. ^ Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., only gives the first of these. ^ See for a similar illustration above, II, 2, 7, p. 76. 94 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. IT, 3,1 r. II. 'What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nagasena, of idea (Sa;^;1a) ? ' ' Recognition, O king^. And what does he recognise ? — blueness and yellowness and redness and whiteness and brownness.' ' Give me an illustration.' ' It is like the king's treasurer, O king, who when he sees, on entering the treasure, objects the property of the king of all those colours, recognises (that they have such). Thus it is, great king, that recognition is the mark of idea.' ' Very good, Nagasena ! ' ' What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nagasena, of the conceived purpose (A^etana) ?' ' The being conceived, O king, and the being prepared ^.' ' Give me an illustration.' ' It is like the case of a man, O king, who should prepare poison, and both drink of it himself, and give of it to others to drink. He himself would suffer pain, and so would they. In the same way some individual, havinof thousfht out with intention some evil deed, on the dissolution of the body after death, would be reborn into some unhappy state of woe in purgatory, and so also would those who followed his advice. — And it is like the case of a

^ So also Buddhaghosa, Sumangala, p. 63. ^ Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., gives no mark of A'etana, but he gives both it and 'the being prepared' as the marks of the Confections. It is not clear from the INIilinda alone how to render the term ^etana, but I follow Ahguttara III, 77 (where it is placed on a level with aspiration), and Dhamma Sawgam 5 (where it is said to be born of the contact of mind, perception, and exertion). ir, 3, 13. PERCEPTION. 95 man, O king, who should prepare a mixture of ghee, butter, oil, honey and molasses, and should both drink thereof himself and o-ive of it to others to drink. He himself would have pleasure, and so would they. [62] In the same way some individual, having thought out with intention some good deed, will be reborn, on the dissolution of the body after death, into some happy state of bliss in heaven, and so also would those who follow his advice. Thus is it, great king, that the being conceived, and the being prepared, are marks of the conceived purpose.' ' Very good, Nagasena ! ' 12. 'What, Nagasena, is the distinguishing characteristic of perception (Vi/^/^ana) ?'

' Recognition S great king.' ' Give me an illustration.' . ' It is like the case of the guardian of a city w^ho, when seated at the cross roads in the middle of the city, could see a man coming from the East, or the South, or the West, or the North. In the same way, O king, he knows an object which he sees with his eye, or a sound which he hears with his ear, or an odour which he smells by his nose, or a taste which he experiences with his tongue, or a touchable thing which he touches with his body, or a quality that he recognises by his mind. Thus is it, great king, that knowing is the mark of perception.' * Very good, Nagasena ! ' 13. ' What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nagasena, of reflection (Vitakka). ^ Vi^anana. So also Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., and below, III, 7) 15, P- 131- 96 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 14. ' The effectino- of an aim \' ' Give me an illustration.' ' It is like the case of a carpenter, great king, who fixes in a joint a well-fashioned piece of wood. Thus is it that the effecting of an aim is the mark of reflection.'

' Very good, Nagasena ! ' 14. 'What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nagasena, of investigation (Vi/^ara) ? ' ' Threshing out again and again ^.' ' Give me an illustration.' ' It is like the case of the copper vessel, which, when it is being beaten into shape [63], makes a sound again and again as it gradually gathers shape ^. The beating into shape is to be regarded as reflection, and the sounding again and again as investigation. Thus is it, great king, that threshing out aofain and ao^ain is the mark of investig^ation.' ' Very good, Nagasena ! ' Here ends the Third Chapter ^ ^ Appana, which Hina/i-kumbure renders pihi/ana. Buddhaghosa, p. 63, gives abhiniropana as its mark, which comes to much the same thing. ^ Anuma^^ana. So also Buddhaghosa, loc. cit. p. 6^. The word is not in Childers, but see Morris in the Journal of the Pali Text Society, 1886, p. 118. ^ Anuravati anusandahati. Not in Childers. Hina/ikumbure says pasuwa anurawa;/a kere da anuwa pihi/a da. * The following two sections form an appendix to this chapter corresponding to that formed by the last three sections of Book III, Chapter 7. The numbering of the sections is therefore carried on in both cases.

Book II. Chapter 3. 15. The king said : ' When those conditions (whose marks you have just specified) have run together, is it possible, by bending them apart one to one side and one to the other \ to make the distinction between them clear, so that one can say : " This is contact, and this sensation, and this idea, and this intention, and this perception, and this reflection, and this investigation 2 " ? ' ' No : that cannot be done.' ' Give me an illustration.' ' Suppose, O king, the cook in the royal household were to make a syrup or a sauce, and were to put into it curds, and salt, and ginger, and cummin seed ^, and pepper, and other ingredients. And suppose the king were to say to him : " Pick out for me the flavour of the curds, and of the salt, and of the ginger, and of the cummin seed, and of the pepper, and of all the things you have put into it." Now would it be possible, great king, separating off one from another those flavours that had thus run together, to pick out each one, so that one could say : " Here is the sourness, and here the saltness, and here the pungency, and here the acidity, and here the astringency, and here the sweetness ^ " ? '

^ Vinibbhu^itva vinibbhu^itva. This question is identical with the one asked of the Buddha at Ma^^/zima Nikaya 43, p. 293. Compare also p. 233 and Tela Ka/aha Gaiha 59. ^ This list differs from that in II, 3, 8, by the addition of vi««a«a. ^ Giraka. Compare (7ataka I, 244; II, 181, 363. Hina/ikumbuie translates it by duru, and Hardy by 'onions' (p. 439). * This is the same list as is found above, II, 3, 6 ; and below, III, 4, 2, and the items are not intended to correspond with the condiments in the list above. 98 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. IT, 3, 16. ' No, that would not be possible [64]. But each flavour would nevertheless be distinctly present by its characteristic sign.' 'And just so, great king, with respect to those conditions we were discussing.' ' Very good, Nagasena ! ' 1 6. The Elder said: 'Is salt, O king, recognisable by the eye ? ' ' Yes, Sir, it is.' ' But be careful, O king.' 'Well then, Sir, is it perceptible by the tongue ?' ' Yes, that is right.' ' But, Sir, is it only by the tongue that every kind of salt is distinguished ? '

' Yes, every kind.' ' If that be so, Sir, why do bullocks bring whole cart-loads of it ? Is it not salt and nothing else that ought to be so brought ? ' ' It is impossible to bring salt by itself. But all these conditions ^ have run together into one, and produced the distinctive thing called salt ^. (For instance) : salt is heavy, too. But is it possible, O king, to weigh salt ? ' ^ Not saltness only, but white colour, &c. &c. ^ He means the king to draw the conclusion that that distinct thing is only recognisable by the tongue ; so the senses are not interchangeable. In other words it is true that salt seems to be recognised by the sight, as when people load it into carts they do not slop to taste it. But what they see is not salt, what they weigh is not salt, it is whiteness and weight. And the fact of its being salt is an inference they draw. So, great king, your simile of the soul being inside the body, and using the five senses, as a man inside a house uses windows, does not hold good. See the conclusion above of II, 3, 6, p. 88.

II, 3, i6. CONDITIONS. 99 ' Nay, great king, it is not the salt you weigh, it is the weight.' ' You are ready, Nagasena, in argument' Here ends the questioning of Nagasena by Milinda^ ^ This is again most odd. One would expect, ' Here ends the questioning as to characteristic signs.' See the note at the end of last chapter. lOO THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. HI, 4, r.

the removal of difficulties. I. [65] The king said: 'Are the five Ayatanas, Nagasena, (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body,) produced by various actions, or by one action?' (that is, the result of various Karmas, or of one Karma.) ' By various actions, not by one.' ' Give me an illustration,' ' Now, what do you think, O king ? If I were to sow in one field five kinds of seed, would the produce of those various seeds be of different kinds ?' 'Well, just so with respect to the production of Ayatanas.' ' Very good, Nagasena ^ ! ' 2. The king said : * Why is it, Nagasena, that all men are not alike, but some are short-lived and some long-lived, some sickly and some healthy, some ugly and some beautiful, some without influence and some ofgreatpower,some poor and some wealthy, some low born and some high born, some stupid and somewise.'*' ^ The chapters go straight on because Books II and III are really only parts of one Book. See abo\e, p. 4. ^ The meaning here is not easy to follow, as the word Ayatana is used either for the organs of sense, or for the objects of sen'^e ; and there is nothing in the context to show which is meant. Probably the idea is that good sight, hearing, &c. in one birth are each the result of a separate Karma in the last birth. But I am by no means sure of this, and the Si/«lialese (p. 76) is just as ambiguous as the Pali.

The Elder replied : 'Why is it that all vegetables are not alike, but some sour, and some salt, and some pungent, and some acid, and some astringent, and some sweet ?' ' I fancy, Sir, it is because they come from different kinds of seeds.' 'And just so, great king, are the differences you have mentioned among men to be explained. For it has been said by the Blessed One : " Beings, O brahmin, have each their own Karma, are inheritors of Karma, belong to the tribe of their Karma, are relatives by Karma, have each their Karma as their protecting overlord. It is Karma that divides them up into low and high and the like divisions ^" ' ' Very good, Nagasena ! ' 3. The king said : ' You told me, Nagasena, that your renunciation was to the end that this sorrow might perish away, and no further sorrow might spring up ^.' [66] ' Yes, that is so.' ' But is that renunciation brought about by previous effort, or to be striven after now, in this present time ?' The Elder replied : ' Effort is now concerned with what still remains to be done, former effort has accomplished what it had to do.'

' Give me an illustration ".' ^ ]\Ir. Trenckner points out that this quotation is from the Magg/iima, No. 135. The doctrine is laid down frequently elsewhere also in the Pi/akas. See, for instance, Ahguttara IV, 197 (pp. 202-203 of Dr. Morris's edition for the Pali Text Society). ^ Above, II, I, 5, p. 50, and compare I, 38. ^ These three illustrations recur (nearly) below, III, 7, 3, pp. 125-126. ' Now what do you think, O king ? Is it when you feel thirst that you would set to work to have a well or an artificial lake dug out, with the intention of getting some water to drink ?' ' Certainly not, Sir.' 'Just so, great king, is effort concerned now with what still remains to be done, former effort has accomplished what it had to do.' ' Give me a further illustration.' ' Now what do you think, O king ? Is it when you feel hungry that you set to work to have fields ploughed and seed planted and crops reaped with the intention of getting some food to eat ?' ' Certainly not, Sir.' * Just so, great king, is effort concerned now with what still remains to be done, former effort has accomplished what it had to do.'

' Give me a further illustration.' * Now what do you think, O king ? Is it when the battle is set in array against you that you set to work to have a moat dug, and a rampart put up, and a watch tower built, and a stronghold formed, and stores of food collected ? Is it then that you would have yourself taught the management of elephants, or horsemanship, or the use of the chariot and the bow, or the art of fencing ?' ' Certainly not. Sir.' ' Just so, great king, is effort concerned now with what still remains to be done, former effort has accomplished what it had to do. For it has been thus said, O king, by the Blessed One : " Betimes let each wise man work out That which he sees to be his weal ! Not with the carter's mode of thought, but firm Ill, 4, 4. rURGATORY. IO3 Let him, with resohition, step right out. As a carter who has left the smooth high road, . And turned to byways rough, broods ill at ease ' — (Like him who hazards all at dice, and fails) — So the weak mind who still neglects the good, And follows after evil, grieves at heart. When fallen into the power of death, as he, The ruined gamester, in his hour of need -." '

[67] ' Very good, Nagasena ! ' 4. The king said : ' You (Buddhists ^) say thus : " The fire of purgatory is very much more fierce than an ordinary fire. A small stone cast into an ordinary fire may smoke for a day without being destroyed ; but a rock as big as an upper chamber cast into the furnace of purgatory would be that moment destroyed." That is a statement I cannot believe. Now, on the other hand you say thus : " Whatsoever beings are there reborn, though they ^ G/^ayati. It is an odd coincidence that this word, which means either to burn or to meditate, according to the root from which it is derived, can be rendered here either ' burn ' or ' brood ' in English. In fact it is the second, not the first, root that is here intended, as is plain from such passages as Gataka III, 354, where the compound pagg/iayati means ' to brood over a thing.' ^ Quoted from the Sawyutta Nikaya II, 3, 2 (p. 57 in M. Peer's edition, published by the Pali Text Society). The readings there differ slightly from those of our text here, and the verses are put into the mouth of Khema, the god, instead of being ascribed to the Buddha. Hina/i-kumbure (p. 79) agrees with M. L^on Feer in reading mando for mano in the last line; and I have followed them in my translation. There are several stanzas in the Galaka book of carters lost in the desert, but there is nothing to identify any one of them with the story referred to.

^ ' You ' in the plural : that is, ' you Bhikkhus.' So also above, pp. 30. 50. burn for hundreds of thousands of years in purgatory, yet are they not destroyed." That too is a statement I don't beHeve.' The Elder said : ' Now what do you think, O king ? Do not the females of sharks ^ and crocodiles and tortoises and peacocks and pigeons eat hard bits of stone and gravel ?' ' Yes, Sir. They do.' ' What then ? Are these hard things, when they have got into the stomach, into the interior of the abdomen, destroyed ?' ' Yes, they are destroyed.' ' And the embryo that may be inside the same animals, — is that too destroyed ?' ' Certainly not.' ' But why not.' ' I suppose. Sir, it escapes destruction by the influence of Karma.' 'Just so, great king, it is through the influence of Karma that beings, though they have been for thousands of years in purgatory, are not destroyed. If they are reborn there, there do they grow up, and there do they die. For this, O king, has been declared by the Blessed One: "He does not die until that evil Karma is exhausted ^." ' ' Give me a further illustration.'

^ It may be noticed that the particular feminine forms chosen are in each case unusual, being in ini instead of the simple i. The first animal, the Makarini, is said by Childers to be a mythical animal, but it is clear from Buddhaghosa on A'ullavagga V, i, 4, that an ordinary animal is meant, and that is so I think here, though the translation ' shark ' is conjectural. ^ From Ahguttara III, 35, 4 (p. 141 of Dr. Morris's edidon for the Pali Text Society). ' Now what do you think, O king ? Do not the females of Hons and tigers and panthers and dogs eat hard bits of bone and flesh ?' ' Yes, they eat such things.* ' What then ? are such hard things, [68] when they have got into the stomach, into the interior of the abdomen, destroyed ?' ' Yes, they are destroyed ?' * And the embryo that may be inside the same animals, — is that too destroyed?' ' Certainly not.' ' But why not ? ' * I suppose, Sir, it escapes destruction by the influence of Karma.' 'Just so, great king, it is by the influence of Karma that beings in purgatory, though they burn for thousands of years, are not destroyed.'

' Give me a further illustration.' ' Now what do you think, O king ? Do not the tender women — wives of the Yonakas, and nobles, and brahmins, and householders — eat hard cakes and meat ?' ' Yes, they eat such hard things.' * And when those hard thinors have c:ot into the stomach, into the interior of the abdomen, are not they destroyed ? ' ' Yes, they are.' ' But the children in their womb, — are they destroyed ?' ' And why not ? ' ' I suppose. Sir, they escape destruction by the influence of Karma ? ' 'Just so, great king, it is through the influence of Karma that beings in purgatory, though they burn for thousands of years, yet are they not destroyed. If they are reborn there, there do they grow up, and there do they die. For this, O king, has been declared by the Blessed One : " He does not die until that evil Karma is exhausted." ' ' Very good, Nagasena !' 5. The king said : ' Venerable Nagasena, your people say that the world rests on water, the water on air, the air on space ^ This saying also I cannot believe.'

Then the Elder brought water in a regulation water-pot ^ and convinced king Milinda, saying : * As this water is supported by the atmosphere, so is that water supported by air.' ' Very good, Nagasena ! ' 6. The kine said : ' Is cessation Nirva/^a^? ' ' Yes, your Majesty' [69]. ' How is that, Nagasena ? ' ' All foolish individuals, O king, take pleasure in ^ This is not a distinctively Buddhist belief. It was commonly held at the time by other teachers. Compare ' Book of the Great Decease,' III, 13 (in 'Buddhist Suttas,' Sacred Books of the East, vol. xi, p. 45). 2 Dhamma-karakena. The passages show that this was a pot so made, that no water could pass from it except through a filtering medium. When not being actually used the water was no doubt kept at a certain height in it by the pressure of the atmosphere. I do not know of any specimen preserved in our modern museums or figured on ancient bas-reliefs, and the exact shape is unknown. It must be different from the one represented in plate xlviii of Cunningham's ' Bhilsa Tope.' See A'ullavagga V, 13, I (note); VI, 21, 3 ; XII, 2, i; Mahava7«sa, p. 60.

'^ Nirodho nibbanan ti. in, 4, 7- NIRVAiV^A. 107 the senses and in the objects of sense, find dehght in them, continue to cleave to them ^ Hence are they carried down by that flood (of human passions), they are not set free from birth, old age, and death, from grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair, — they are not set free, I say, from suffering. But the wise, O king, the disciple of the noble ones, neither takes pleasure in those things, nor finds delight in them, nor continues cleaving to them. And inasmuch as he does not, in him craving- ceases, and by the cessation of craving grasping ^ ceases, and by the cessation of grasping becoming ^ ceases, and when becoming has ceased birth ceases, and with its cessation birth, old age, and death, grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair cease to exist. Thus is the cessation brought about the end of all that ^gg^^gation of pain. Thus is it that cessation is Nirva//a.' * Very good, Nagasena ! ' 7. The king said : ' Venerable Nagasena, do all men receive Nirva;^a ?' ' Not all, O king. But he who walks righteously, who admits those conditions which ought to be admitted, perceives clearly those conditions which ought to be clearly perceived, abandons those conditions which ought to be abandoned, practises himself in those conditions which ought to be practised, realises those conditions which ought to be realised — he receives Nirva;^a.'

' Very good, Nagasena !' ^ A^^^osaya ti/Manti. Compare Ahguttara II, 4, 6, and Theri Gatha, 794. ^ Tawha, Upadana, Bhava. 8. The king said : ' Venerable Nagasena, does he who does not receive Nirva;/a know how happy a state Nirvana is ^ ?' ' Yes, he knows it.' ' But how can he know that without his receiving Nirva;^a ?' ' Now what do you think, O king ? Do those whose hands and feet have not been cut off know how sad a thing it is to have them cut off?' ' Yes, Sir, that they know.' ' But how do they know it ?' ' Well, by hearing the sound of the lamentation of those whose hands and feet have been cut off, they know it.' [70] ' Just so, great king, it is by hearing the glad words of those who have seen Nirva;^a, that they who have not received it know how happy a state it is.' ' Very good, Nagasena !' Here ends the Fourth Chapter. ^ The opposite point (whether he who has Nirvana, knows that he has it) is discussed above, II, 2. IIT, 5, 2. THE BUDDHA PRE-EMINENT. lOQ Book III. Chapter 5.

I. The king- said: 'Have you, Nagasena, seen the Buddha?' ' No, Sire.' 'Then have your teachers seen the Buddha ?' * Then, venerable Nagasena, there is no Buddha ^ ! ' ' But, great king, have you seen the river Uha in the Himalaya mountains .'*' ' Or has your father seen it ? ' ' Then, your Majesty, is there therefore no such river ? ' * It is there. Though neither I nor my father has seen it, it is nevertheless there.' ' Just so, great king, though neither I nor my teachers have seen the Blessed One, nevertheless there was such a person.' * Very good, Nagasena !' 2. The king said : ' Is the Buddha, Nagasena, pre-eminent ? ' * Yes, he is incomparable.' * But how do you know of one you have never seen that he is pre-eminent.' ' Now what do you think, O king ? They who have never seen the ocean would they know con- ^ This dialogue is so far identical with VI, i, i. It is a kind of parody on Gotama's own argument about the Brahmans and Brahma ('Have they seen God,' &c.) in the Tcvi^^a Sutta I, 1215, translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 172-174.

no THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. IIT, 5, 3. cerning it : " Deep, immeasurable, unfathomable is the mighty ocean. Into it do the five great rivers flow — the Ganges, the Jumna, the A/'iravati, the Sarabhu, and the Mahi— and yet is there in it no appearance of being more empty or more full !" ?' ' Yes, they would know that.' 'Just so, great king, when I think of the mighty disciples who have passed away then do I know that the Buddha Is incomparable.' [71] ' Very good, Nagasena !' 3. The king said : ' Is it possible, Nagasena, for others to know how incomparable the Buddha is ?' * Yes, they may know it.' ' But how can they ?' ' Long, long ago, O king, there was a master of writing, by name Tissa the Elder, and many are the years gone by since he has died. How can people know of him ?' ' By his writing, Sir.' 'Just so, great king, whosoever sees what the Truth 1 is, he sees what the Blessed One was, for the Truth was preached by the Blessed One.' ' Very good, Nagasena !' 4. The king said : ' Have you, Nagasena, seen what the Truth is ?'

' Have not we disciples, O king, to conduct ourselves our lives long as under the eye of the Buddha, and under his command - ?' ' Very good, Nagasena ! ' ^ Dhamma?/^, here nearly = Buddhism. See below, III, 5, 10. "^ Mr. Trenckner thmks there is a lacuna here ; and Hina/ikumbure's version perhaps supports this. He renders the passage, ' How can a man use a path he does not know ? And have not we Ill, 5, 6. THE SOUL. I I I 5. The king said: 'Where there is no transmigration, Nagasena, can there be rebirth ? ' ' Yes, there can.' ' But how can that be ? Give me an iUustration.' * Suppose a man, O king, were to h'ght a lamp from another lamp, can it be said that the one transmigrates from, or to, the other ?' 'Just so, great king, is rebirth without transmigration.' ' Give me a further illustration.' ' Do you recollect, great king, having learnt, when you were a boy, some verse or other from your teacher ? ' ' Yes, I recollect that.' * Well then, did that verse transmigrate from your teacher ? '

'Just so, great king, is rebirth without transmigration.' * Very good, Nagasena !' 6. The king said : ' Is there such a thing, Nagasena, as the soul ^ ? ' ' In the highest sense, O king, there is no such thing -.' our lives long to conduct ourselves according to the Vi nay a (the rules of the Order), which the Buddha preached, and which are called the eye of the Buddha, and according to the Sikkhapada (ethics) which he laid down, and which are called his command ? ' But there are other passages, no less amplified in the Sinhalese, where there is evidently no lacuna in the Pali ; and the passage may well have been meant as a kind of riddle, to which the Sinhalese supplies the solution. ^ Vedagft. See above, 11, 3, 6, p. 86 (note). ^ Mr. Trenckner thinks there is a lacuna here. The Si;//halese follows the Pali word for word. ' Very good, Nagasena ! ' 7. [72] The king said : 'Is there any being, Nagasena, who transmigrates from this body to another ? ' ' No, there is not.' ' But if so, would it not get free from its evil deeds.'

' Yes, if it were not reborn ; but if it were, no ^' ' Give me an illustration.' * Suppose, O king, a man were to steal another man's mangoes, would the thief deserve punishment?' ' But he would not have stolen the mangoes the other set in the ground. Why would he deserve punishment ?' ' Because those he stole were the result of those that were planted.' ' Just so, great king, this name-and-form commits deeds, either pure or impure, and by that Karma another name-and-form is reborn. And therefore is it not set free from its evil deeds ?' 8. The kine said : ' When deeds are committed, Nagasena, by one name-and-form, what becomes of those deeds ?' ' The deeds would follow it, O king, like a shadow that never leaves it ^.' ' Can any one point out those deeds, saying: " Here are those deeds, or there" ?' ^ This is an exact repetition of what we had above, II, 2, 6. ^ These last words are a quotation of those that recur at Samyutta III, 2, 10, 10, and Dhammapada, verse 2, Iir, 5, TO. THE BUDDHA. I I 3 ' Give me an illustration.'

' Now what do you think, O king ? Can any one point out the fruits which a tree has not yet produced, saying : " Here they are, or there " ? ' ' Certainly not, Sir.' 'Just so, great king, so long as the continuity of life is not cut off, it is impossible to point out the deeds that are done.' ' Very good, Nagasena !' 9. [73] The king said : ' Does he, Nagasena, who is about to be reborn know that he will be born ? ' ' Yes, he knows it, O king.' * Give me an illustration.' * Suppose a farmer, O king, a householder, were to put seed in the ground, and it were to rain well, would he know that a crop would be produced.' ' Yes, he would know that.' 'Just so, great king, does he who is about to be reborn know ^ that he will be born.' ' Very good, Nagasena ^ !' 10. The king said: 'Is there such a person as the Buddha, Nagasena?' ' Can he then, Nagasena, be pointed out as being here or there ?' ' The Blessed One, O king, has passed away by that kind of passing away in which nothing remains which could tend to the formation of another indi-

^ That is before he i- born. ^ This is all very parallel to II, 2, 2. viduaP. It is not possible to point out the Blessed One as being here or there.' ' Give me an illustration.' ' Now what do you think, O king ? When there is a great body of fire blazing, is it possible to point out any one flame that has gone out, that it is here or there ? ' ' No, Sir. That flame has ceased, it has vanished.' 'Just so, great king, has the Blessed One passed away by that kind of passing away in which no root remains for the formation of another individual. The Blessed One has come to an end, and it cannot be pointed out of him, that he is here or there. But in the body of his doctrine he can, O king, be pointed out. For the doctrine^ was preached by the Blessed One ?' Here ends the Fifth Chapter. ^ Anupadisesaya nibbanadhatuya. 2 Dhamma. See above, III, 5, 3. Ill, 6, r. THE BODY. I I Book III. Chapter 6. I. The king said: * Is the body, Nagasena, dear to you rechises ? '

* No, they love not the body.' ' Then why do you nourish it and lavish attention upon it ?' 'In all the times and places, O king, that you have gone down to battle, did you never get wounded by an arrow ?' * Yes, that has happened to me.' ' In such cases, O king, [74] is not the wound anointed with salve, and smeared with oil, and bound up in a bandage.' * Yes, such thiuQ^s are done to it.' 'What then? Is the wound dear to you that you treat it so tenderly, and lavish such attention upon it?' ' No, it is not dear to me in spite of all that, which is only done that the flesh may grow again.' 'Just so, great king, with the recluses and the body. Without cleaving to it do they bear about the body for the sake of righteousness of life. The body, O king, has been declared by the Blessed One to be like a wound. And therefore merely as a sore, and without cleaving to it, do the recluses bear about the body. For it has been said by the Blessed One : "Covered with clammy skin, an impure thing and foul, Nine-apertured, it oozes, like a sore \" '

' Well answered, Nagasena ! ' ' I have not been able to trace this couplet. On the sentiment compare the eloquent words of the young wife at vol. i, p. 200 of my ' Buddhist Birth Stories,' and Sutta Nipata I, 11. Il6 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILTNDA. ITT, 6, 2. 2. The king said : ' Did the Buddha, Nagasena, die omniscient one, foresee all things ? ' ' Yes. The Blessed One was not only omniscient. He foresaw all things.' ' Then why was it that he was in the habit only from time to time, and as occasion arose, of laying down rules for the members of the Order ^ ? ' ' Is there any physician, O king, who knows all the medicinal drugs to be found on the earth ? ' ' Yes, there may be such a man,' * Well, O king, does he give his decoctions to the patient to drink at a time when illness has already set in, or before that ? ' ' When the malady has arisen.' 'Just so, great king, the Blessed One, though he was omniscient and foresaw all things, laid down no rule at an unseasonable time, but only when need arose did he establish a regulation which his disciples were not to transgress as long as they lived.'

' Well answered, Nagasena ! ' 3. [75] The king said : ' Is it true, Nagasena, that the Buddha was endowed with the thirty-two bodily marks of a great man, and graced with the eighty subsidiary characteristics ; that he was golden in colour with a skin like gold, and that there spread around him a glorious halo of a fathom's length?' * Such, O king, was the Blessed One,' * But were his parents like that }' ' No, they were not' ' I n that case you must say that he was born so. But surely a son is either like his mother, or those on ^ This is how Hina/i-kumbure understands the passage. Ill, 6, 4. CONDUCT. I I 7 the mother s side, or he is hke his father, or those on the father's side ! ' The Elder rephed : ' Is there such a thing, O king, as a lotus flower with a hundred petals ? ' ' Yes, there is.' * Where does it grow up ?' ' It is produced in mud, and in water it comes to perfection \' ' But does the lotus resemble the mud of the lake, whence it springs up, either in colour, or in smell, or in taste ?'

' Then does it resemble the water ?' * Nor that either.' 'Just so, great king, is it that the Blessed One had the bodily signs and marks you have mentioned, though his parents had them not.' ' Well answered, Nagasena !' 4. The king said : ' Was the Buddha, Nagasena, pure in conduct (was he a Brahma-/('arin)?' ' Yes, the Blessed One was pure.' * Then, Nagasena, it follows that he was a follower of Brahma ^.' ' Asiyati. See Dr. Morris in the 'Journal of the Pali Text Society,' 1884, p. 72. "^ There is an untranslatable play here upon the name of the god, which is used in its sense of ' pure, best,' in the expression ' pure in conduct.' The first question really amounts to : Was the Buddha's conduct 'Brahma,' that is, 'best,' which has come to have the meaning 'pure' for the same reason that our expression ' a moral man ' has often that particular connotation ? It is quite true that the etymological meaning of the word is neither ' best ' nor ' pure ' ; but when our author wrote the secondary sense had completely, in Pali, driven out the etymological sense.

I 1 8 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. Ill, 6, r-y ' Have you a state elephant, O king ? ' ' Well now, does that elephant ever trumpet (literally " cry the heron's cry^")?' ' But is he, then, on that account a follower of the herons ? ' ' Of course not.' ' Now tell me, great king, has Brahma wisdom (Buddhi), or has he not ?' ' He is a being with wisdom.' ' Then (on your argument) he is surely a follower of Buddha '-^' ' Well answered, Nagasena ! ' 5. The king said : ' Is ordination =^ a good thing ? ' ' Yes, a good thing and a beautiful.' ' But did the Buddha obtain it, or not ? ' ' Great king, when the Blessed One attained omniscience at the foot of the tree of Knowledge, that was to him an ordination. There was no conferring of ordination upon him at the hands of others — in the way that the Blessed One laid down regulations for his disciples, never to be transgressed by them their lives long ^ ! ' ' Very true, Nagasena ! ' ' This technical term for an elephant's trumpeting is not infrequent. See, for instance, Gataka I, 50.