Discourses and Enchiridion

CHAPTER XIX How one should behave towards tyrants. The tyrant's power is merely external.If a man possesses some advantage, or thinks he does though he does not, he is bound, if he be uneducated, to be puffed up because of it. The tyrant, for instance, says, 'I am mightiest of all men.' Well, and what can you give me? Can you enable me to get what I will to get? How can you? Can you avoid what you will to avoid, independent of circumstances? Is your impulse free from error? How can you claim any such power? Tell me, on shipboard, do you put confidence in yourself or in the man who knows? And in a chariot? Surely in him who knows. How is it in other arts? Exactly the same. What does your power come to then? 'All men pay me attention.'

He is not respected as one to be admired and imitated.Yes, and I pay attention to my platter and work it and polish it and I fix up a peg for my oil-flask. Does that mean that these are superior to me? No, but they do me some service, and for this reason I pay them attention. Again: do I not pay attention to my ass? Do I not wash his feet? Do I not curry him? Do you not know that every man pays regard to himself, and to you only as to his ass? For who pays regard to you as a man? Show me. Who wishes to become like you? Who regards you as one like Socrates to admire and follow? 'But I can behead you.' Well said. I forgot, of course, one ought to pay you worship as if you were fever or cholera, and raise an altar to you, like the altar to Fever in Rome.

Plain English · paraphraseHe is not respected as someone to be admired and copied. Yes, I pay attention to my platter and polish it, and I make a peg for my oil-flask. Does that mean these things are better than me? No. They are of some use to me, and for that reason I take care of them. Again: do I not take care of my donkey? Do I not wash his feet? Do I not groom him? Do you not know that every man cares for himself, and for you only as he would for his donkey? For who treats you as a person? Show me. Who wants to become like you? Who looks up to you as one might look up to Socrates, to admire and follow? "But I can behead you." Well said. I forgot, of course, one should worship you as if you were fever or cholera, and build an altar to you, like the altar to Fever in Rome.

What disturbs a man is not the tyrant's bodyguard but his own judgements.What is it then which disturbs and confounds the multitude? Is it the tyrant and his guards? Nay, God forbid! It is impossible for that which is free by nature to be disturbed or hindered by anything but itself. It is a man's own judgements which disturb him. For when the tyrant says to a man, 'I will chain your leg,' he that values his leg says, 'Nay, have mercy,' but he that values his will says, 'If it seems more profitable to you, chain it.' 'Do you pay no heed?' No, I pay no heed. 'I will show you that I am master.' How can you? Zeus gave me my freedom. Or do you think that he was likely to let his own son be enslaved? You are master of my dead body, take it. 'Do you mean that when you approach me, you pay no respect to me?' No, I only pay respect to myself: if you wish me to say that I pay respect to you too, I tell you that I do so, but only as I pay respect to my water-pot.

Man, like other creatures, acts for his own ends, but to achieve his true end, must serve the community.This is not mere self-love: for it is natural to man, as to other creatures, to do everything for his own sake; for even the sun does everything for its own sake, and in a word so does Zeus himself. But when he would be called 'The Rain-giver' and 'Fruit-giver' and 'Father of men and gods', you see that he cannot win these names or do these works unless he does some good to the world at large: and in general he has so created the nature of the rational animal, that he can attain nothing good for himself, unless he contributes some service to the community. So it turns out that to do everything for his own sake is not unsocial. For what do you expect? He cannot abjure his own interest: he must seek to be at unity with himself.Do you expect a man to hold aloof from himself and his own interest? No: we cannot ignore the one principle of action which governs all things—to be at unity with themselves.

What follows? When men's minds harbour wrong opinions on things beyond the will, Regard for tyrants and their courtiers arises from false notions about external things.counting them good and evil, they are bound to pay regard to tyrants. Would that it were only tyrants, and not chamberlains too! How can a man possibly grow wise of a sudden, when Caesar appoints him to the charge of the privy? How is it we straightway say, 'Felicio has spoken wisely to me'? I would fain have him deposed from the dung-heap, that he may seem foolish to you again. Epaphroditus had a shoemaker, whom he sold because he was useless: then by some chance he was bought by one of Caesar's officials, and became Caesar's shoemaker. If you could have seen how Epaphroditus honoured him. 'How is my good Felicio, I pray you?' Then if some one asked us, 'What is your master doing?' the answer was, 'He is consulting Felicio about something.' What, had he not sold him for useless? Who has suddenly made a wise man of him? This is what comes of honouring anything outside one's will.

Plain English · paraphraseWhat follows? When people's minds hold wrong ideas about things beyond their control, respect for tyrants and their courtiers comes from false ideas about external things. Thinking they are good or bad, people must respect tyrants. If only it were only tyrants, and not their underlings too! How can a man suddenly become wise when Caesar puts him in charge of private matters? How is it that we immediately say, "Felicio has spoken wisely to me"? I would like to remove him from the dung-heap so that he seems foolish to you again. Epaphroditus had a shoemaker, whom he sold because he was useless. Then, by chance, he was bought by one of Caesar's officials and became Caesar's shoemaker. If you could have seen how Epaphroditus honored him. "How is my good Felicio, I ask you?" Then, if someone asked us, "What is your master doing?" the answer was, "He is consulting Felicio about something." Had he not sold him for being useless? Who suddenly made him wise? This is what happens when you honor anything outside your will.

Men give thanks for office instead of for right will and natural impulse.He has been honoured with a tribuneship. All who meet him congratulate him; one kisses his eyes, another his neck, his slaves kiss his hands. He comes into his house and finds lamps being lighted. He goes up to the Capitol and offers sacrifice. Who, I ask you, ever offered sacrifice in gratitude for right direction of the will or for impulse in accordance with nature? For we give thanks to the gods for what we think our good! If you want a crown, let it be a plain crown of roses.To-day one spoke to me about the priesthood of Augustus. I told him, 'Fellow, leave the thing alone; you will spend a great deal on nothing.' 'Well, but those who draw up contracts will record my name.' Can you be there when men read it and say to them, 'That is my name,' and even supposing you can be there now, what will you do if you die? 'My name will remain.' Write it on a stone and it will remain. But who will remember you outside Nicopolis? 'But I shall wear a golden crown.' If you desire a crown at all, take a crown of roses and wear that: you will look smarter in that.

CHAPTER XX How reason has the faculty of taking cognizance of itself. Reason is the only faculty that can take cognizance of itself.Every art and faculty has certain principal things of which it is to take cognizance. When therefore the faculty itself is of like kind with the objects of which it takes cognizance, it must of necessity have power to take cognizance of itself: when it is of unlike kind, it cannot take cognizance of itself. For instance, the shoemaker's art is concerned with hides, but itself is absolutely different from the material of hides: for this reason it does not take cognizance of itself. Grammar again is concerned with written speech: is it then written speech itself? Certainly not: therefore it cannot take cognizance of itself. For what purpose then have we received reason from nature? That we may deal with impressions aright. What then is reason itself? A system framed from impressions of a certain kind. Thus it naturally has the power to take cognizance of itself. Again, sagacity has been given us. To take cognizance of what? Things good and bad and indifferent. What is it then itself? Good. And what is folly?

The philosopher has to test impressions just as the assayer tests the currency.Bad. Do you see then that of necessity sagacity has the power of taking cognizance of itself and its opposite? Therefore the primary and highest task of the philosopher is to test impressions and distinguish them and to make use of none which is untested. Consider how we have invented an art to test the currency, in which we are admitted to have some interest. Look how many means the assayer uses to test the coin—sight, touch, smell, finally hearing: he breaks the penny and attends to the sound, and is not content with hearing its note once, but by much attention gets an ear for music. Thus, where we think it makes a serious difference to us whether we are right or wrong, we take great pains to distinguish the possible sources of error, and yet when we have to do with our Governing Principle itself, poor thing, we gape and sleep and are ready to accept any impression that comes: for we do not notice our loss.

But most of us do not take the trouble to learn how to distinguish good and evil.When you wish, therefore, to realize how little concerned you are about good and evil, and how eager about things indifferent, consider how you regard physical blindness on the one hand, and mental delusion on the other, and you will recognize that you are far from having a proper feeling in regard to things good and evil. 'Yes, but it needs much preparation and much toil and We are told that it requires long study, but the main doctrine is short enough.study.' What of that? Do you expect that a brief study will enable you to acquire the greatest art? Yet the principal doctrine of philosophers itself is brief enough. If you will learn it, read Zeno's words and you will see. For it is no long matter to say man's end is to follow the gods, and the essence of good is the power of dealing rightly with impressions. Still, it takes time to analyse our notions, and to confute false doctrine, such as that of Epicurus.'Tell us then what is "God," and what is "impression," and what is nature in the individual, and what in the universe'. That is a long story.

Again, if Epicurus should come and say, that the good must be in the flesh, that too means a long discussion; it means we must be taught what is the commanding faculty in us, what constitutes our substantial and true nature. If it is not probable that the good of the snail is in the shell, is it probable that man's good is in his body? Take yourself, Epicurus. What is the more masterful faculty you possess? What is it in you which deliberates, which examines everything, which examines the flesh itself and decides that it is the principal thing? Why do you light a lamp and toil for us, and write such big volumes? Is it that we may not be ignorant of the truth? Who are we? What concern have we with you? So the argument becomes a long one.

CHAPTER XXI To those who wish to be admired. A man's true end is to be in harmony with Nature.When a man has his proper station in life, he does not hanker after what is beyond him. What is it, man, that you wish to have? 'I am content if I am in accord with Nature in what I will to get and will to avoid, if I follow Nature in impulse to act and to refrain from action, in purpose, and design and assent.' To seek admiration is to accept the opinion of madmen.Why then do you walk about as if you had swallowed a poker? 'I would fain that they who meet me should admire me, and cry aloud, "What a great philosopher"!' Who are these by whom you wish to be admired? Are not these the men whom you generally describe as mad? What do you want then? Do you want to be admired by madmen?

CHAPTER XXII On primary conceptions. Primary conceptions are common to all,Primary conceptions are common to all men, and one does not conflict with another. Who among us, for instance, does not assume that the good is expedient and desirable and that we ought in all circumstances to follow and pursue it? Which of us does not assume that the just is noble and becoming? but conflict arises in their application.At what moment then does conflict arise? It arises in the application of primary conceptions to particular facts; when for instance one says, 'He has done well: he is brave,' and another, 'Nay, he is out of his mind.' Hence arises the conflict of men with one another. Such is the conflict of racial customsSuch is the conflict between Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans—not the question whether holiness must be put before all things and must in all circumstances be pursued, but whether it is holy or unholy to eat of swine's flesh. or of persons, as Agamemnon and Achilles.Such you will find is the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles. Call them to come forward. What do you say, Agamemnon? Do you say that what is right and noble ought not to be done? 'Of course it ought.'

And what do you say, Achilles? Do you not approve of doing what is noble? 'Nay, I approve of it above all things.' Now apply these primary notions: and here the conflict begins. One says, 'I ought not to give back Chryseis to her father.' The other says, 'Nay, you ought.' Certainly one or other of them wrongly applies the primary notion of right. Again one says, 'Well, if I must give back Chryseis, I must take the prize from one of you': the other says, 'What, take away my beloved?' 'Yes, yours,' he says. 'Am I alone then to be the loser?' 'But am I alone to have nothing?' So a conflict arises.

Education consists in learning how to apply primary conceptions, and to distinguish what is in our power from what is not.In what then does education consist? In learning to apply the natural primary conceptions to particular occasions in accordance with nature, and further to distinguish between things in our power and things not in our power. In our power are will and all operations of the will, and beyond our power are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country, in a word—those whose society we share. Where then are we to place 'the good'? To what class of things shall we apply it? If we place the good among things not in our power, we shall fail in conduct,'To what is in our power.' Does it follow then that health and a whole body, and life are not good, nor children, parents, and country? No one will bear with you if you say that. Let us then transfer the name 'good' to this class of things. Is it possible for a man to be happy if he is injured and fails to win good things? 'It is impossible.'

Can he also find the proper way to live with his fellows? Nay, how is it possible? For instance, I incline by nature to my true interest. If it is my interest to have a field, it is also my interest to take it away from my neighbour: if it is my interest to have a robe, it is my interest also to steal it from the bath. This is the source of wars, factions, tyrannies, plots. and we shall not recognize in Zeus a Saviour.Again, how shall I be able to observe what is fitting towards Zeus, for if I am injured or unfortunate, he heeds me not? So one hears, 'What have I to do with him, if he cannot help me?' and again, 'What have I to do with him, if he wills that I should be as I am now?' It follows that I begin to hate him. Why then do we build temples and make images to Zeus as if he were an evil genius, as if he were Fever? How can we give him any more the name Saviour, Rain-giver, and Fruit-giver? Surely if we place the true nature of the good in outward things, all these consequences follow.

We must not be discouraged by the worldly wise, but must put 'the good' in the region of the will.What are we to do then? This is the search to be made by the true student of philosophy, who is in travail with truth. These are his thoughts: 'I do not see what is good and what evil. Am I not mad? I am.' But if I put 'the good' in the region of things that my will controls, every one will laugh at me. Some grey-haired old man will arrive, with many gold rings on his fingers: then he will shake his head and say, 'Listen to me, my child: you must study philosophy, but you must keep a cool head too. All that talk is folly. You learn the syllogism from philosophers, but you know better than the philosophers what you ought to do.' Fellow, why do you rebuke me then, if I know it? What am I to say to this slave? If I am silent, he bursts with anger. One ought to say, 'Pardon me as you would pardon lovers. I am not my own master. I am mad.'

CHAPTER XXIII Against Epicurus. Epicurus is inconsistent, admitting that we are social beings,Epicurus understands as well as we do that we are by nature social beings, but having once placed our good not in the spirit but in the husk which contains it he cannot say anything different. On the other hand he firmly grasps the principle that one must not admire nor accept anything which is severed from the nature of the good: and he is quite right. How can we be social beings, if (as you say) we have no natural affection for our offspring? but advising men not to bring up children, nor enter into politics.Why do you advise the wise man not to bring up children? Why are you afraid that they may bring him into troubles? Does the mouse he rears indoors cause him trouble? What does he care then, if a tiny mouse begins crying in his house? But he knows that if once a child is born, it will not be in our power not to love it nor care for it.

Epicurus says that the man who is wise does not enter into politics, for he knows what sort of things the politician has to do. Of course if you are going to live among men as if they were flies, what is to prevent you? But Epicurus, as though he did not know what natural affection is, says 'Let us not bring up children.' The lower animals teach us a lesson of affection for children.If a sheep does not abandon its offspring, nor a wolf, does a man abandon his? What would you have us do? Would you have us foolish as sheep? Even they do not abandon their young. Would you have us savage as wolves? Even they do not abandon theirs. Nay, who takes your advice when he sees his child fallen on the ground and crying? Why, I think that if your father and mother had foreseen that you were going to talk thus, even then they would not have cast you away from them.

CHAPTER XXIV How one should, contend, against difficulties. Difficulties are an opportunity for trial and exercise.Difficulties are what show men's character. Therefore when a difficult crisis meets you, remember that you are as the raw youth with whom God the trainer is wrestling. 'To what end?' the hearer asks.

That you may win at Olympia: and that cannot be done without sweating for it. To my mind no man's difficulties ever gave him a finer trial than yours, if only you will use them for exercise, as the athlete wrestles with the young man. If we send a spy to Rome he must be no coward.Even now we are sending you to Rome to spy out the land: and no one sends a coward as a spy, for that means that if he but hears a noise or sees a shadow anywhere, he will come running in confusion and saying that the enemy are close at hand. So now if you come and tell us 'The doings in Rome are fearful, death is terrible, exile is terrible, evil-speaking is terrible, poverty is terrible: fly sirs, the enemy is at hand', we shall say to you, 'Begone, prophesy to yourself, the only mistake we made was in sending a man like you to spy out the land'. Against the false spy's report we set the report of Diogenes,Diogenes, who was sent scouting before you, has brought us back a different report: he says, 'Death is not evil, for it is not dishonour'; he says, 'Glory is a vain noise made by madmen'. And what a message this scout brought us about pain and pleasure and poverty! 'To wear no raiment', he says, 'is better than any robe with purple hem'; 'to sleep on the ground without a bed', he says, 'is the softest couch.' enforced by his peace of mind, and good condition.Moreover he proves each point by showing his own confidence, his tranquillity of mind, his freedom, and withal his body well knit, and in good condition. 'No enemy is near,' he says, 'all is full of peace.'

What do you mean, Diogenes? 'See,' he says, 'have I suffered shot or wound or rout?' That is the right kind of scouting: but you come back to us and talk at random. Drop your cowardice and go back again, and take a more accurate observation. What am I to do then? If you remember to take only what is yours, you need fear no emperor.What do you do, when you disembark from a ship? Do you take the helm and the oars with you? What do you take then? You take what is yours, oil-flask and wallet. So now if you remember what is yours, you will never claim what is another's. The emperor says to you, 'Lay aside your purple hem.' See, I wear the narrow one. 'Lay aside this also.' See, I wear the toga only. 'Lay aside the toga.' See, I take that off too. 'Ay, but you still rouse my envy.' Then take my poor body, every bit of it. The man to whom I can throw away my body has no fears for me. 'But he will not leave me as his heir.'

What? Did I forget that none of these things was mine? In what sense do we call them 'mine'? Only as we call 'mine' the pallet in an inn. If then the inn-keeper dies and leaves you the pallets, well and good; if he leaves them to another, that man will have them, and you will look for another. Tyrants and kings after all are tragic figures, not to be envied.If you do not find one you will sleep on the ground, only do so with a good cheer, snoring the while, and remembering that it is among rich men and kings and emperors that tragedies find room, and that no poor man fills a part in a tragedy except as one of the chorus. But kings begin with a prelude of good things: Crown high the halls and then about the third or fourth act comes— O Cithaeron, why didst thou receive me? Poor slave, where are your crowns, where your diadem? Your guards avail you naught. Therefore when you come near to one of those great men remember this, that you are meeting a tragic character, no actor, but Oedipus in person. 'Nay, but such a one is blessed, for he has a great company to walk with him.'

I too join the ranks of the multitude and have a large company to walk with. In the last resort the door is open and you may leave the game.To sum up: remember that the door is open. Do not be a greater coward than the children, but do as they do. Children, when things do not please them, say, 'I will not play any more'; so, when things seem to you to reach that point, just say, 'I will not play any more,' and so depart, instead of staying to make moan.

CHAPTER XXV On the same theme. You have no reason, then, for fear or anxiety.If this is true, and if we are not silly and insincere when we say that for men good and evil lies in the region of the will, and that everything else has no concern for us, why are we disturbed or fearful any more? No one has authority over the things in which we are interested: and we pay no regard to the things over which others have authority. What more have we to trouble about? 'Nay, but give me commands' (says the student).

You need no other precept than that which Zeus has given youWhat command should I give you? Has not Zeus laid commands upon you? Has He not given you what is yours, free from hindrance and constraint, and what is not yours subject to hindrance and constraint? What command then have you brought with you into the world, and what manner of ordinance? to guard what is your own,Guard what is your own by all means, grasp not at the things of others. Your good faith is your own. . . . Who can take these qualities from you? Who shall hinder you from using them but yourself? And how will you do so? but your own is yours only so long as you use it.When you take no interest in what is your own, you lose it and it ceases to be yours.

When you have instructions and commands from Zeus such as these, what commands would you have from me? Am I greater or more trustworthy than He? Do you need any other commands if you keep these of His? Has He not laid these commands upon you? Look at the primary conceptions. Look at the demonstrations of philosophers. Look at the lessons you have often heard, and the words you have spoken yourself—all you have read, all you have studied. The limit of obedience is your own true advantage, which lies in what is proper and consistent.How long, then, is it right to keep these commands and not break up the game? As long as it is conducted properly. Here is a king chosen by lot at the Saturnalia: for they decide to play the game of 'Kings'. He gives his orders: 'You drink, you mix the wine, you sing, you go, you come'. I obey, that I may not break up the game. 'Now believe that you are in evil case.' I do not believe it, and who will compel me to believe it? Again, we agree to play 'Agamemnon and Achilles'. He who is given the part of Agamemnon says to me, 'Go to Achilles and drag away Briseis'. I go. 'Come.' I come.

In fact we must behave in life as we do with hypothetical arguments. 'Let us assume it is night.' Granted. 'What follows? Is it day?' No, for I have already assented to the assumption that it is night. 'Let us assume that you believe that it is night.' Granted. 'Now believe that it really is night.' This does not follow from the hypothesis. So too it is in life. 'Let us assume that you are unfortunate.' Granted. 'Are you then unfortunate?' Yes. 'What then, are you in misery?' Yes. 'Now, believe that you are in evil case.' This does not follow from the hypothesis: and Another forbids me.