On the Bondage of the Will (De servo arbitrio)

their resistance to truth ; and of making a stout attack upon her, when now they have even recognised her presence/ So then, it ought not to be ascribed to their own perverseness, that they keep their old mind; but to the obscurity and ambiguity of the arguments, with which they are assailed. This was just the conduct of the Greek philosophers also : that none of them might seem to yield to another, even though manifestly overcome, they began to deny first principles; as Aristotle recites. Meanwhile, we kindly persuade ourselves and others, that there are many good men in the world, who would be willing to embrace the truth, if they had but a teacher who could make things plain to them; and that it is not to be presumed, that so many learned men, through such a series of ages, have been in error, or that they have not thoroughly understood the truth. As if we did not know, that the world is the kingdom of Satan : in which, besides the blindness adherent as a sort of natural excrescence to our flesh, spirits even of the most mischievous nature having dominion over us, we are hardened in that very blindness; and now no longer held in chains of mere human darkness, but of a darkness imposed upon us by devils. sc.xviii. tfIf the Scriptures then be quite clear, why have

men of excellent understanding, you say, been for Why great so maQy ao;es blind upon this subject?' I answer, have been c they have been thus blind, unto the praise and blind about glory of Freewill : that this magnificently boasted vizTthat power, by which man is able to apply himself to they might those things which concern his everlasting salva- s Pertinaciter resistere, for titer impugnare.'] The unsuspected case was the real case : notwithstanding all his ostentatious professions of humility, Erasmus was not only rejecting clearest evidences of truth — which is bad enough — but even fighting against what he knew to be truth — wjiich, is far worse. tion; this power, I say, which neither sees what scxvin. it sees, nor hears what it hears — much less under ■ stands or seeks after these things ; might be St?ose.1I shewn to be what it is. For to this belongs, what But no ' Christ and his Evangelists so often assert from wonder, Isaiah, " Hearing, ye shall hear and shall not naturaie understand ; and seeing, ye shall see and shall not man is perceive." What does this mean, but that the ^things free will, or human heart, is so trodden under foot of God. of Satan, that, except it be miraculously11 raised up by the Spirit of God, it cannot of itself either see or hear those things which strike upon the very eyes and ears, so manifestly as to be palpable to the hand :

such is the misery and blindness of the human race. For it is thus, that even the Evangelists themselves, after expressing their wonder how it should happen that the Jews were not taken with the works and words of Christ — which were absolutely irresistible and undeniable — reply to their own expressions of wonder, by citing this passage of Scripture r1 by suggesting, forsooth, that man, left to himself, seeing sees not, and hearing hears not. What can be more marvellous ? " The light," saith he, " shineth in darkness, and the darkness apprehendeth it not."

h Mirabiliter suscitetur.'] Mir. would express either the nature or the degree of influence exerted ; but here it must be the nature : the very least degree of the Holy Ghost's regenerating energy, applied to the natural soul, produces this result ; an energy which admits not of degrees. One soul is not more regenerated than another : and every such act of regeneration is a miracle ; an exercise of super- creation grace and of supernatural power, effecting a supernatural constitution and state, in those that are the subjects of it. " Except a man be begotten from above, he cannot see the kingdom of God." " Except a man be begotten of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." " Of his own will begat he us by the word of truth." "Everyone that doeth righteousness hath been begotten of him." 1 See especially John xii. 37 — 41. It is remarkable that this passage of Isaiah is quoted more often than any other in the New Testament ; being found in each of the Evangelists, in Acts xxviii, and in Rom. xi. part ii. (John i. 5.k) Who would believe this? who

ever heard the like? that the light shineth in darkness; and yet the darkness remains darkness, and is not made light ? Besides, it is nothing wonderful, that men of excellent understanding have for so many ages been blind in divine things. In human things, it would be wonderful. In divine things, the wonder rather is, if one or two be not blind ; whilst it is no wonder at all, if all, without exception, be blind. For what is the whole human race, without the Spirit, but the kingdom of the devil, as I have said; a confused chaos of darkness? Whence Paul calls the devils, " the rulers of this darkness ;" and says (1 Cor. ii. 8.), " None of the princes of this world knew the wisdom of God !" What do you suppose that he thought of the rest, when he asserts that the princes of the world were slaves of darkness ? For, by princes, he means the first and highest persons in the world : whom you call men of excellent understanding. Why were all the Arians blind ? Were there not, amongst them, men of excellent understanding ? Why is Christ "foolishness" to the Gentiles?1 Are there not amongst the Gentiles men of excellent understanding? Why is he to the Jews "a stumbling-block?" Have there not been amongst the Jews men of excellent understanding ? " God knoweth the thoughts of the wise," says Paul ;

k Apprehendunt .] More proper than our version ''comprehend / which implies ( compassing about/ and so (translatively) ' taking in the whole of a substance :' ov KcneXaftcv avTo- ' did not lay hold of it, so as to possess it 5' ' did not receive/ or ( admit' the ' light ;' but (as Luther explains it) remained darkness still. See Sleusner in v. fccnaXauftdviv ' excipio/ ' admitto.' 1 1 Cor. i. 23. Our authorized version, and most copies, read " Greeks :" by which St. Paul frequently denominates that part of the world which is not Jewish ; as Rom. i. 16. It would seem to give more point to Luther's antithesis here : but <c Gentiles " is the more authentic reading. See Griesbach's text and note in loc. " for they are vain." He would not say, " of sc.xviir. men/' as the text itself has it;m but singles out * the first and chiefest amongst men :' that from these we may estimate the rest of them. But I shall perhaps speak more at large of these things, hereafter. Suffice it, for an exordium, to have premised * that the Scriptures are most clear ;' and e that, by these our dogmas may be so defended, as that our adversaries shall not be able to resist/ Those dogmas, which cannot be so defended, are other people's; and do not belong to Christians. Now, if there be those who do not see this clearness, and are blind, or stumble, in this sunshine ;

these, on the supposition that they are ungodly men, shew how great is the majesty and power of Satan in the sons of men: even such, that they neither hear nor apprehend the clearest words of God. Just as if a man, beguiled by some sleight of hand trick, should suppose the sun to be a piece of unlighted coal, or should imagine11 a stone to be gold! On the supposition that they are godly persons, let them be reckoned amongst those of the elect, who are led into error some little, that the power of God may be shewn in us : without which, we can neither see, nor do any thing at all. For, it is not weakness of intellect (as you complain), which hinders the words of God from being apprehended : on the contrary, nothing is more adapted to the apprehension of the words of God, than weakness of intellect. For, it is because of the weak, and unto the weak, that Christ both came, and also sends his word. But it is the mischievousness of Satan, who sits and reigns in our weakness, resisting the

m Psalm xciv. 11. n Puiet, sentiat.~\ Put. is rather matter of reasoning and argument; sent, rather matter of sense. Both are intermixed here, though each has its distinct appropriation : he thinks about the sun, he handles the stone. — A double error is pointed out by the illustration. These ungodly men assert what is not, and deny what is. part ii. word of God. If it were not for this acting of Satan, the whole world of men would be converted by one single word of God, once heard; nor would there be any need of more.0 sc. xix. And why do I plead long ? why do we not finish the cause together with this exordium, and shewn™ ^*ve sen^ence against you, on the testimony of your have ad- own words ? according to that saying of Christ, mittedthat "By thy words thou shalt be justified, and by is°ciear!e thy words thou shalt be condemned." p (Matt. xii. 37.) You assert, ' that the Scripture is not clear upon this point:' and then, as though the sentence of the judge were suspended, you dispute on both sides of the question, advancing all that can be said both for and against Freewill. This is all that you seek to gain by your whole performance ; which, for the same reason, you have chosen to call a Diatribe rather than an Apophasis,q or any thing else : because you write with the intention of bringing all the materials of the cause together, without affirming any thing. If the Scripture, then, be not plain, how comes it that those of whom you make your boast ; that is, so numerous a series of the most learned men, whom the consent of so many ages hath approved even to this very day; are not only blind upon this

° Luther does not distinguish here, as he ought to do, between what Satan has made of us, and what Satan personally does in us. The soul of man, in its natural state, is so blinded and hardened and satanized, that, even if there were no immediate agency of his upon any individual soul, the effect of fone' or even ' many ' words of God (unaccompanied by his quickening Spirit) would not be such as Luther describes ; but it would still reject the truth ! p A forced application of the words. The Lord is there speaking of the words being a sure index of the mind. Luther seems to have got some confusion into his mind, from Luke xix. 22. " Out of thine own mouth will I judge thee, &c." i A Greek term, which may express either ' affirmation' or f negation j ' but here clearly denotes the former : with allusion either to the ' explicit avowal of private opinion 5' or, to e the judge delivering his sentence in court.' subject, but even rash and foolish enough to cle- sc. xix. fine and assert Freewill from the Scripture, as though that Scripture were positive and plain. The greater number of these men come recommended to us, you say, not only by a wonderful knowledge of the sacred writings, but by piety of life. Some of them, after having defended the doctrine of Christ by their writings, gave testimony to it with their blood.

If you say this sincerely, it is a settled thing with you, that Freewill has assertors endowed with wonderful skill in the Scriptures; who have borne witness to it as a part of Christ's doctrine with their blood. If this be true, they must have considered the Scripture as clear : else, how should they be said to possess a wonderful skill in the sacred writings ? Besides, what levity and temerity of mind would it have been in them, to shed their blood for a thing that is uncertain and obscure ? This is not the act of Christ's martyrs, but of devils.

r Now, therefore, do you also i set before your eyes and weigh with yourself, whether you judge, that more ought to be attributed to the prior judgments8 of so many learned men, so many orthodox men, so many holy men, so many martyrs, so many ancient and modern theologians, so many universities, so many councils, so many bishops, and so many popes — who have thought the Scriptures clear, and have confirmed their opinion by their blood, as well as by their writings — or to your r Jam et tu pone."] Luther here retorts Erasmus's own words upon him. " Et tamen illud interim lectorem admonitum velim, si etc. . . .ut turn denique sibi ponat ob oculos tam numerosam seriem eruditissimorumvirorumetc turn illud secumexpendat, utrum plus tribuendum esse judicet tot eruditorum, tot orthodoxorum etc .... prsejudiciis, an unius aut alterius privato judicio.' 8 PrcEJudiclis.'] A forensic term, expressing either, 1. ( precedents which apply to an undecided cause 5' or, 2. c matters relating to the cause in hand, which have already been decided ;' or, 3. 'a previous judgment of the cause itself { as here. These men had sat in judgment upon this question before, and had decided it.

part II. own single judgment — which is that of a private individual — denying the Scriptures to be clear:' when, it may be, you have never sent forth one tear, or one sigh, for the doctrine of Christ. If you believe these men to have thought correctly, why not follow their example ? If otherwise, why boast yourself with such a puffed cheek and such a full mouth ; as if you would overwhelm me with a sort of tempest and flood of words : which falls, however, with still greater force upon your own head, whilst my ark rides aloft in security. For you, in the same instant, attribute the greatest folly and temerity to these so many and so great ones ; when you write, that they were most skilful in the Scriptures, yet have asserted by their pen, by their life, and by their death, a sentiment which you nevertheless maintain to be obscure and ambiguous. What is this but to make them most ignorant in knowledge, and most foolish in assertion? I, their private clespiser, should never have paid them such honour, as you, their public commender, do.1 sec. xx. I hold you fast then, here, by a horned syllogism,

as they call it:11 for one or other of these two Sd^elTto things must be false; either what you say, c that a dilemma, these men were worthy to be admired for their knowledge of the sacred writings, life and martyrdom ;' or what you say, 'that the Scripture is not plain/ But, since you would rather choose 1 Privatus &c] The substance is, e Insignificant Luther, whom Erasmus taunted with his obscurity, and with his contempt of these great men (though, in fact, he had only shaken off the yoke of their undue authority, without expressing any sentiment of contempt), would never have so vilified them in his privacy, as Erasmus — the man of name and fame — was doing by his public extolment of them.' u Cornuto syllogismo.~] Com. syll. Dilemma j so called, because the horns of the argument are, in this kind of syllogism, so disposed, that to escape the one you must run upon the other. The term f horns' is applied to argumentation ; from a certain disposition of forces, as well naval as military, in which they resemble the horns of the crescent moon. to be driven upon this horn of the two, c that the sec.xx.

Scripture is not plain ' (what you are driving at - throughout your whole book); it remains, that you must have pronounced them to be most expert in Scripture, and martyrs for Christ, either in fun or in flattery — certainly not seriously — merely to throw dust in the eyes of the common people, and to give Luther trouble, by loading his cause with hatred and contempt, through vain words. However, I pronounce neither true; but both false. I affirm, first, that the Scriptures are most clear; secondly, that those persons, so far as they assert Freewill, are most ignorant of the Scriptures; thirdly, that they made this assertion neither with their life, nor by their death, but only with their pen — and that, under absence of mind. I do therefore conclude this little disputation/ thus. ' By Scripture — seeing that it is obscure — nothing certain has yet been determined, or can be determined, on the subject of Freewill ; according to your own testimony/ That, ' by the lives of all men, from the beginning of the world, nothing has been shewn in support of Freewill/ is what I have argued above. Nowr, to teach any thing which is neither enjoined by a single word in Scripture, nor demonstrated by a single fact out of Scripture ; is no part of christian doctrine, but belongs to the true stories of Lucian :x except that Lucian — sporting as he does, on ludicrous subjects, in mere jest and wittingly — deceives nobody and hurts nobody. But

v Dispuiatiunculam.'] Disp. The diminutive implies e a discussion subordinate to the main point in debate.' x See Part i. Sect. v. note <J. Lucian, the Epicurean philosopher of Samosata, in Syria, ridiculed all religions ; and served Christianity, without meaning it, pretty much as Erasmus was doing — by depreciating the fashionable and reigning idolatry. He died wretchedly, a. d. 180. — Much of his writings is in dialogue — Erasmus's favourite composition — with which he interweaves many * true stories/ of very doubtful credit. part ii. these antagonists of ours play the madman on a ' serious subject — even one pertaining to eternal salvation — to the destruction of innumerable souls. sec. xxi. Thus, too, I might have put an end to this whole question about Freewill ; since even the testimony daimsvic- °f my adversaries is on my side, and at war with tory ai- theirs : whilst there is no stronger proof against an ^i?y,but accused person, than his own proper testimony ceed. against himself. But, since Paul commands us to stop the mouths of vain babblers, let us take the very pith and matter of the cause in hand; treating it in the order in which Diatribe pursues her inarch. Thus, I will first confute the arguments adduced in behalf of Freewill ; secondly, defend our own confuted ones ; and, at last, make my stand for the grace of God, in direct conflict with Freewill.

Erasmus' $ Definition of Freewill examined. And firsts as in duty bound, I shall begin with your very definition of Freewill; which is as follows : c Moreover, by Freewill here, I mean that power of the human will, whereby a man is able to apply himself to those things which lead to eternal salvation, or to turn himself away from them/ With great prudence, doubtless, you lay down a naked a definition here; without opening any part of it, as is customary with others : afraid of more shipwrecks than one ! I am, therefore, compelled to beat out the several parts of it, for myself The thing defined, if it be strictly examined, is certainly of wider range than the definition: it is, therefore, what the Sophists would call a defective definition; such being their term for those which do not fill up the thing defined.15 For I have shewn above, that Freewill belongs to none but God only. You might, perhaps with propriety, attribute will to man; but to attribute free will to him, in divine things,0 is too much : since the term Freewill, in the judgment of all ears, is a Bald and bare $' without any appendage of amplification, resolution of parts, or illustration.

b The idea is that of a mould not filled up : the definition is not commensurate with the thing defined. c See Part i. Sect xxv. note l. part in. properly applied to c that which can do, and which "' ' does/ towards God, whatsoever it pleases; without being confined by any law, or by any command. You would not call a slave free, who acts under the command of his master. With how much less propriety do we call a man, or an angel, free : when they live under the most absolute subjection to God (to say nothing of sin and death), so as not to subsist for a moment by their own strength. Instantly, therefore, even at the very doors of our argument, we have a quarrel between the definition of the name, and the definition of the thing; the word signifying one thing, and the thing itself being understood to be another. It would be more properly called vertible will, or mutable will. For thus Augustine, and after him the Sophists, extenuates the glory and virtue of that word Free; adding this disparagement to it, ' that they speak of the vertibility of the free will/ And so it would become us to speak, that we might avoid deceiving the hearts of men by inflated, vain, and pompous words : as Augustine also thinks, that we ought to speak in sober and plain words, observing a fixed rule. For, in teaching, a dialectic simplicity and strictness of speech is required; not big swelling words, and figures of rhetorical persuasions sect. ii. But, lest I should seem to take pleasure in

■ fighting for a word, I will acquiesce, for the mo- Defimtion menf \n \fo\s abuse of terms, ^r eat and dangerous as it is ; so far as to allow a ' free' will to be the same as a 'vertible' will. I will also indulge Erasmus with making Freewill ' a power of the human will;' as though Angels had it not : since, in this performance, he professes to treat only d f A fixed rule/ opposed to whim, taste or chance -, ' sober/ opposed to ' extravagant / f plain/ or ' proper/ opposed to f figurative / ' strictness of speech/ (i. e. words used in their own genuine and natural sense) opposed to ( metaphor/ f logic' opposed to f rhetoric.' of human Freewill : else, in this particular also, SECT. II. the definition had been narrower than the thing — * I hasten to those parts of the definition on which the subject hinges. Some of these are sufficiently manifest; others flee the light, as though a guilty conscience made them afraid of every thing : yet a definition ought to be the plainest and most certain thing in the world; for to define obscurely, is just like not defining at all. These parts are plain : 6 a power of the human will f also, e by which a man is able / also, c unto eternal salvation :' but those words, ' to apply himself;' and again, c those things which lead/ and again, ' to turn away himself/ are words of the hoodwinked fencer.6 What shall we then divine that saying, ' to apply himself/ to mean?

Again, 'to turn away himself V What are those words, e which lead to eternal salvation?' What corner are thev slinking" into ? I have to do, as I perceive, with a very Scotus or Heraclitus;f who wears me out with two sorts of labour. First, I have to go in search of my adversary, and to grope for him in the dark, amidst pitfalls, with a palpitating heart (a daring and dangerous en-

e A/idabate."] ( A man fighting in the dark, with his eyes blinded :' a name given (quasi ai/afiarai sive avravafia-ai) to certain fencers, or gladiators, who fought on horseback with their eyes covered ; or, more properly, ' to the man who went up into the chariot to fight with the charioteer.' It was one of the games of the Circus ; of which the peculiarity consisted in the conflict being maintained in the dark. Jerome has the expression, ''More andabatarum, gladium in tenebris ventilans 5' with allusion to the former of these customs. f Scotus.~\ The celebrated Duns Scotus, a Franciscan ; the great opponent of Thomas Aquinas, the Dominican. He acquired the name of the ' subtile' doctor 5 as his opponent did that of the ' angelic' Heraclitus, the weeping philosopher, was characterised as ' tenebrosus,' or f obscure 5' from the enigmatical style in which he communicated his reveries. Socrates is said to have expressed an admiration of some of his pieces, so far as he could understand them ; but to have intimated the danger there was of being drowned in his incomprehensible depths. part in. terprise); and, if I do not find him, to fight with hobgoblins, and beat the air in the dark, to no purpose. Secondly, if I shall have dragged him into the light; then at length, when I am worn out with the pursuit, I have to close with him in equal fight.

By c a power of the human will/ then, is meant, as I suppose, an ability, or faculty, or disposedness, or suitedness, to will, to refuse, to choose, to despise, to approve, to reject, and to perform whatever other actions there are of the human will. But, what is meant by this same power c applying itself and turning away itself;' except it be this very willing and refusing, this very choosing and despising, this very approving and rejecting; in short, except it be c the will performing its very office ;' I see not. So that we must suppose this power to be c a something interposed between the will itself and its actings :' a power, by which the will itself draws out the operation of willing and refusing, and by which that very act of willing and refusing is elicited. It is not possible to imagine or conceive any thing else here. If I be mistaken, let the fault be charged upon the author who defines, not upon me who am searching out his meaning. For, it is rightly said by the jurists, that the words of him who speaks obscurely, when he might speak more plainly, are to be interpreted against himself. And here, by the way, I could be glad to know nothing of these Moderns, g with whom I have to do, and their subtleties : for we must be content to speak grossly,11 that we may teach and understand. ( The things which lead to eternal salvation/ are the words and works of

s Moderni."] Quasi hodierni. The subtile doctor and his contemporaries, together with those who had preceded them, from Peter Lombard downwards,, were but men of ' to-day y as compared with the ancient logicians, and with the Fathers. Also, the Schoolmen were divided into three classes, like the Academics ; old, middle, and new. Scotus was of the last. h Crasse.'] ' Dull, heavy, fat-headed 5' as contrasted with their wire-drawn refinements. God, I suppose : which are set before the human sect. in. will, that it may either apply itself to them, or turn " aw ay from them. By the words of God, I mean as well the Law as the Gospel : works are demanded by the Law; faith by the Gospel.1 For there are no other things that lead either to the grace of God, or to eternal salvation, save the word and work of God : since grace, or the Spirit, is the life itself; to which we are led by the word and work of God.k But this life, or eternal salvation, is a thing in- Definition comprehensible to human conception; as Paul conlmuedcites from Isaiah (1 Cor. ii. 9.): u What eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath entered into the heart of man, are the things which God hath prepared for them that love him." For this also is placed amongst the chief articles of our faith: in confessing which we say, * and the life everlasting/ And what the power of Freewill as to receiving this article is, Paul declares in 1 Cor. ii. 10. " God," saith he, " hath revealed them to us by his Spirit." As if he should say, c except the Spirit shall have revealed them, no man's heart will know or think any thing about them ; so far is it from being able to apply itself thereunto, or to covet them/

Consult experience. What have the most excellent wits amongst the heathens thought of a 1 Luther speaks here, as theological writers commonly do. But the truth is ; the Law required faith, and the Gospel requires works : though the form of the two several dispensations was such as Luther represents them. The Law was designed to shut the Church up unto faith ; the Gospel, to open it, by that faith which is itself a work (for " this is the work of God that ye believe on Him whom He hath sent." John vi. 29.) to those works which alone are acceptable to God ; viz. the actings and manifestations of a self-emptied, contrite, and believing soul. k He speaks not of any particular word or work of God, but of his whole word, and of his whole work ; excepting only what he does, by his special grace, in and upon the hearts of his people. part in. future life, and of the resurrection? Has it not been, that, the more tliey excelled in genius, the more ridiculous did the resurrection, and eternal life, appear to them. Except you will say, that those philosophers and other Greeks, who called Paul a babbler,1 and an assertor of new Gods, when he taught these things at Athens, were not men of genius. Porcius Festns calls Paul a madman, in Acts xxvi.m (ver. 24.) for preaching eternal life. What does Pliny bark about these tilings, in his seventh book?

What says Lucian, so great a wit? Were these men stupid? Nay, it is true of most men, even at this day, that the greater their genius and erudition, the more they laugh at this article, and account it a fable ; and that openly. For, as to the secret soul, no man positively, except he be sprinkled with the Holy Ghost, either knows, or believes in, or wishes for eternal salvation, even though he may make frequent boast of it with his voice and with his pen. Would to God that you and I, my Erasmus, were free from this same leaven ! so rare is a believing mind, as applied to this article. — Have I hit the sense of your definition ? sect. iv. So then, Freewill, according to Erasmus, is a power of the will, which is able, of itself, to will

fromEras aD(* n0t t0 W*^ ^G W0Y& an(* WOrt °f ^°d \ ^Y mus's deft- which word and work, it is led to those things nition. which exceed both its sense and thought. — But 1 Babbler. ,] STre/^oAo-yo? is a term of contempt, applied properly to persons who went about the forum picking up the seeds and crumbs, or whatever else might fall between buyer and seller, and making a living out of them. Hence applied to a loose, ignorant, unordered, and unmeasured speaker ; one who retails the sort of refuse, common-place scraps, which he has picked up in the streets. New Gods, not in the invidious, or disparaging sense of demons, or of odi/uoues • but some additional deities : objects of worship, having the same sort of claim to reverence which the rest of their multiplied divinities had. m He says, Acts xxiv. j but the allusion is manifestly to Acts xxvi. if it be able to will and to refuse, it is able also sect.iv. to love and to hate. If it be able to love and to ' hate, it is able also, in some small degree, to do the deeds of the Law, and to believe the Gospel : because if you will, or refuse a certain thing, it is impossible but that you must be able to work something towards it, by means of that will, even though you be not able, through another's hindering, to finish it.

Now, since death, the cross, and all the evils of the world are numbered amongst those works of God which lead to salvation ; the human will must be able to choose even death and the man's own destruction. Nay, it is able to will all things ; whilst it is able to will the word and work of God. For, what can there be any where, that is below, above, within, or without, the word and work of God ; save God himself?11 And what is now left to grace, and the Holy Spirit ? This is manifestly to attribute divinity to Freewill : since to will the Law and the Gospel, to reject sin, and to choose death, is the property of divine virtue exclusively; as Paul teaches in more places than one.

Hence it appears, that no man, since the Pelagians' days, has written more correctly on Freewill, than Erasmus has. For I have said before, that Freewill is a term peculiar to God, and expresses a divine perfection. However, no man has attributed this divine power to it hitherto, except the Pelagians : for the Sophists, whatever they may think, certainly speak very differently about it. Nay, Erasmus far exceeds the Pelagians : for they attribute this divinity to the whole of the free will, Erasmus to half of it. They make Freewill to consist of two parts; a power of dis- n Intrci extrh.'] ' On this side of it, or beyond it :' which, when joined with the preceding words ( infra, supra/ express * the universal comprehension of the word and work of God 5' as containing ' all that is above, beneath, and on all sides of us' — with only one exception. part in. cerning, and a power of choosing: of which they feign the one to belong to the understanding, and the other to the will ; as the Sophists also do. But Erasmus, making no mention of the power of discerning, confines his praises to the power of choosing, singly ; and so deifies a sort of crippled and half-begotten Freewill. What would he have done, think you, if he had been set to describe the whole of this faculty ?

Yet, not content with this, he even exceeds the heathen philosophers. For they have not yet determined c whether any substance can put itself into motion;' and on this point, the Platonics and Peripatetics differ from each other, throughout the whole body of their philosophy. But, according to Erasmus, Freewill not only moves itself, but applies even to those things which are eternal; that is, incomprehensible to itself; by its own power. A perfectly new and unheard-of definer of Freewill; who leaves heathen philosophers, Pelagians, Sophists, and all others, far behind him ! Nor is this enough : he does not even spare himself, but even disagrees and fights with himself, more than with all the rest. He had before said, ' the human will is altogether inefficacious without grace;' (did he say this in jest?) but now, when he defines it seriously, he tells us that the human will possesses that power, whereby it is efficacious to apply itself to those things which are belonging to eternal salvation; that is, to those things which are incomparably above its power. Thus Erasmus is, in this place, superior even to himself also.0 sect.v. j)0 y0U perceive, my Erasmus, how, by this definition, you (without meaning it, as I suppose) betray yourself to be one who understands nothing

° Erasmus lias made Freewill greater than itself. Luther puns upon this, and intimates that he has even out-heroded Herod here j not only exceeding philosophers, &c. but even his own extravagant self. at all about these things, or who writes on them sect. v. in sheer thoughtlessness and contempt, without proving what he says, or what, he affirms. As I ^^Pthat have remarked before, you say less, and claim of the more, for Freewill, than all the rest of its advo- SoPhlstscates have done : inasmuch as you do not even describe the whole of Freewill, and yet assign every thing to it. The Sophists (or at least their father, Peter Lombard) deliver what is far more tolerable to us, when they affirm, that e Freewill is the faculty of first discerning good from evil, and then choosing good or evil according as grace be present, or be wanting/ p He agrees entirely with Augustine, that ' Freewill, by its own strength, cannot but fall ; and has no power, save to commit sin/ On which account, Augustine says, it should be called Bondwill, rather than Freewill; in his second book against Julian. But you represent the power of Freewill to be equal on both sides, inasmuch as it can, by its own strength, without grace, both apply itself to, and turn away itself from good. You are not aware how much you attribute to it by this pronoun ' itself/ or e its own self/ whilst you say, ?

it can apply itself! ' In fact, you exclude the Holy Spirit with all his power, as altogether superfluous and unnecessary. Your definition is therefore damnable, even in the judgment of the Sophists; who, if they were not so maddened against me by the blindings of envy, would rave at your book rather than mine. But, since you attack Luther, you say nothing but what is holy and catholic/ even though you contradict both yourself and them. So great is the patience of the saints/

p They ascribed tlie power of discerning;, out of hand; but the power of choosing good, conditionally. * Catholicum.~\ Cath. ( Ad omnes pertinens,' e quod ubique et apud omnes disseminatum est, et ab omnibus recipi debet.' ' What all are bound to receive as true.' r A sarcastic allusion to Rev. xiii. 10. xiv. 12. part in. I do not say this as approving the sentence of the Sophists on Freewill, but as thinking it more tolerable than that of Erasmus ; because they approach nearer to the truth : but neither do they affirm, as I do, that Freewill is a mere nothing. Still, inasmuch as they affirm (the Master of the Sentences5 in particular) that it has no power of itself without grace, they are at war with Erasmus ; nay, they seem to be at war also with themselves, and to be torturing one another with disputes about a mere word : being fonder of contention than of truth, as becometh Sophists. For, suppose a Sophist of no bad sort to come in my way, with whom I were holding familiar conversation and conference upon these matters in a corner; and whose candid and free judgment I should ask, in some such way as this : ' If any one should pronounce that free to you, which, by its own power, can but incline to one side (that is, to the bad side); having power, it is true, on the other side (that is, on the good side) — but that, by a virtue not its own ;

nay, simply by the help of another : could you refrain from laughing, my friend ?' For, upon this principle, I shall easily make it out that a stone, or the trunk of a tree, has Freewill ; as being that which can incline both upwards and downwards ; by its own power, indeed, only downwards ; yet, by another's help, and by that only, upwards also. And thus, as I have before said, by an inverted1 use of all languages and words, we shall at length come to say, c No man is all men;' c nothing is every thing:' as referring the one term to the thing itself, and the

s Master &c. A title with which Peter Lombard was dignified, from his work entitled ' The Sentences ;' by which he was supposed to have rendered the same service to Divinity, which Gratian, his contemporary, had done to Law. He was the father of scholastic theology, which succeeded to that of the Fathers ; his work being considered as the great source of that science, in the Latin church. He died A. d. 1164. 1 ' Turning words topsy-turvy.* other to some other thing, which is no part of SECT. VI. it, but may possibly be present to it and befal ~ ' It is in this way, that, after endless disputing^, they make the free will to be free by an accident; viz. as being that which may be made free by another. But the question is about the freedom of the will, as it is in itself, and in its own substance : and if this be the question resolved, there remains nothing but an empty name for Freewill, whether they will or no. The Sophists fail in this also ; that they assign a power of discerning good from evil, to Freewill. They also lower regeneration, and the renewal of the Holy Ghost ; and claim that extrinsic aid, as a sort of outward appendage to Freewill : v of which I shall say more hereafter. But enough of your definition : let us noAV see the arguments which are to swell out this empty little word.x

The first is that taken from Ecclus. xv. (vv. 15 — Ecci«s. xv. 18.) w The Lord made man from the beginning, cf^idered. and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commands, and his precepts. If thou shalt be willing to keep his commandments, and to perform acceptable faithfulness for ever, they shall preserve thee. He hath set fire and water before thee ; stretch forth thy hand unto whether u For example ; ' Nothing is all things.' Why, God made all things of nothing. You might call that ' nothing,' ' all things $' but it would be, by referring the term ' nothing' to the thing itself, and ' all things' to c the existent one % who being present communicates being (which he has in himself) to this ' nothing.' v Velut extcrne affinguntJ] The gift of the Spirit, though of course not inherent, they represented as inseparably attached to the free will ; and so, communicated as matter of course. x Irtflatura."] A figure taken from blowing a bladder,, or from raising a bubble, or from making a musical instrument to sound aloud : ' to give size, or substance, or sound, to this empty, speechless thing.'

part in. thou wilt. Before man is life and death, good and evil, whether him liketh shall be given him."y Although I might justly reject this book, for the moment I admit it; that I may not lose my time by involving myself in a dispute about the books received into the Hebrew canon : which you ridicule and revile not a little ; comparing the Proverbs of Solomon and the Love-song (as you by an ambiguous sort of jeer entitle it) with the two books of Esdras, Judith, the history of Susannah and of the Dragon, and Esther.2 This last, however, they have received into their canon ; although, in my judgment, deserving, more than all the rest, to be excluded. But I would answer briefly, in your own words : ' the Scripture is obscure and ambiguous in this passage;' it therefore proves nothing with certainty : and, maintaining as we do the negative, I demand of you to produce a place which proves what Freewill is, and what Freewill can effect, by clear words. Perhaps you will do this on the Greek calends.a Howbeit, to avoid this necessity, you waste many good words in marching over the ears of corn,b

y The Greek text, from which our authorized version is a faithful translation, omits the words ' conservabunt te,' and ' adjecit mandata et prsecepta sua.' Also in verse 17 ; ' bonum et malum.' The Syriac, or vulgar Hebrew, in which this book was originally written, is lost ; although Jerom professes to have seen it. What Jesus the Son of Sirach produced in the Syriac, his grandson translated into Greek, for the benefit of • his countrymen in Egypt ; who, by long disuse, had forgotten the Hebrew tongue. z c The rest of the chapters of the Book of Esther, which are found neither in the Hebrew, nor the Chaldee.' a Grcecas calendas.~\ e A day that will never come ;' a Latin proverb taken from the Greeks having no calends to their months, as the Latins had. b Super aristas incedis."] Applied proverbially, to ' one who affirms nothing absolutely :' he skims the ears of corn, fearing to set his foot on them. and reciting so many opinions on Freewill, that sect.vi. yon almost make Pelagius evangelical.0 Again; yon invent four kinds of grace, that yon may be able to assign some sort of faith and charity, even to the heathen philosophers. Again ; yon invent that threefold law of nature, works, and faith : a new figment, by which you enable yourself to maintain, that the precepts of the heathen philosophers have a mighty coincidence with the precepts of the Gospel.

Then again ; you apply that affirmation in Psalm iv. " The light of thy countenance has been marked upon us, Lord;"'1 which speaks of the knowledge of the very countenance of God (that is, of an operation of faith) to blinded reason. Now, let any Christian put all these things together, and he will be obliged to suspect that you are sporting and jesting with the dogmas and worship of Christians. For I find it most difficult indeed to attribute all this to ignorance, in a man who has so thoroughly ransacked6 all our documents, and so diligently treasured them up and remembered them. But I will abstain for the present, content with this short hint; till a fitter opportunity shall offer itself. But let me beg of you, my Erasmus, not to tease us any more in this way, with your c Who sees me V nor is it safe, in so weighty a matter, to be continually

c Pelagius.'] The great heresiarch of Freewill, in the fifth century ; a native of Wales, and as is supposed, a monk of Bangor • who exchanged his original name of Morgan, for the more imposing one of Pelagius. d We read Psalm iv. 6. "Lord lift thou'up," &c. as a prayer; but it may with equal propriety be read as an affirmation. e Nostra omnia sic perlustravit ."] I refer the ' nostra omnia' to the sacred records, * the authorized documents of Christianity;' not the writings of Luther and his friends. Perlustr. does not express ( real insight into the things contained in those documents,' but c complete outside inspection.' This is just the sort of knowledge which Luther would choose to ascribe to him, and which is amply sufficient to exempt him from the plea of ignorance. part in. playing at making* Vertumnuses of words, with sec. vii. You make three opinions on Freewill, out of ~ one ; accounting that a harsh one/ which denies onPF™eevviii that a man can w^ good without special grace ; stated. which denies that he can begin any thing good, denies that he can go on with any thing good, denies that he can complete any thing good. But though harsh, you account it highly approvable. It approves itself to you, as leaving man in possession of desire and endeavour, but not leaving him any thing to ascribe to his own powers. The opinion of those who maintain that Freewill can do nothing but sin ; that only grace works good in us ; seems still more harsh to you : but most of all, that opinion which affirms Freewill to be an empty name, God working both good and evil in us. It is against these two last opinions, that you profess to write.

sec. vni. Do you even know what you are saying, my Erasmus ? You make three opinions here, as if Erasmus ^ were the opinions of three different sects : inconsis- J .. x • • it i • l i i tent with not perceiving, that it is the same thing declared his defini- jn different words, with a twofold variety, by us, the same persons, and professors of one sect. But let me warn you of your carelessness, or dullness of intellect; and expose it. I ask then, how does the definition of Freewill, which you have given above, correspond with this first opinion of yours ; which you declare to f e Us,' opposed to ' every body.' He represents him as playing at peep with the learned j and as deceiving the people by his tricks upon words, by which he gave the same word as many faces as Vertumnus. He plagued the wise ; he deceived the vulgar. Vertumnus had many faces : hence, ' Vertumnis verborum ludere,' f to play at making words like Vertumnus ;' that is, different in appearance, whilst really the same. Erasmus could say and unsay every thing, by his copiousness, versatility, and ambiguity of words.

s Erasmus does not introduce the word f harsh' in describing this first opinion ; Lather ascribes it to him, as implied in his description of the other two. be highly approvable ? For you have said, that SEC- IXFreewill is a power of the human will, by which a man can apply himself to good. But here you say, and approve its being said, that a man cannot will good, without grace. Your definition affirms what its illustration denies ; and there is found c a yea and nay 9 in your Freewill : so that you at the same time both approve and condemn us; nay, condemn and approve yourself, in one and the same dogma and article.11 Do you not think it good, that it applies itself to those things which pertain to everlasting salvation? This is what your definition attributes to Freewill; and yet there is no need of grace, if there be so much of good in Freewill that it can apply itself to good. So then, the Freewill which you define, is a different thing from the Freewill which you defend ; and Erasmus has two Free wills more than others have, and those quite at variance with each other.

But, dismissing that Freewill which your defini- The approtion has invented, let us look at this contrary one, nio/conwhich the opinion itself sets before us. You grant, sidered. that a man cannot will good without special grace ; and we are not now discussing what the grace of God can do, but what man can do without grace. You grant therefore, that Freewill cannot will good. This is nothing else, than that it cannot apply itself to those things which appertain to eternal salvation, as you sung out in your definition. Nay, you say a little before, that the human will is so depraved, that, having lost its liberty, it is compelled to serve sin, and cannot restore itself to any better sort of produce. If I do not mistake, you represent the Pelagians to have been of this opinion. — Now, I think there is no escape here for my Proteus. He is caught and h The definition says, e can apply itself to those things, &c.' The approvable opinion says, f cannot will good.' part in. held by open words ; to wit, the will, having lost its liberty, is driven into, and held fast in, the service of sin. O exquisite Freewill which, having lost its freedom, is declared by Erasmus himself to be the servant of sin! When Luther said this, c nothing had ever been heard that is more absurd;' 'nothing could be published that is more mischievous than this paradox/ Diatribes must be written against him !

But perhaps nobody will take my word for it, that Erasmus has really said these things : let this passage of Diatribe be read, and it will excite wonder. Not that I am greatly surprised. The man who does not account this a serious subject, and is never affected with the cause he is pleading, but is altogether alienated from it in heart, and is tired of it, and chills under it, or nauseates it — how can such an one do otherwise than here and there say absurd things, incongruous things, discordant things? pleading the cause as he does, like a drunken or sleeping man, who belches out ' yes/ c no/ as the sounds fall variously upon his ears. It is on this account, that rhetoricians require feeling in an advocate ; and much more does theology require such a degree of emotion in her champion, as shall render him vigilant, sharpsighted, intent, thoughtful, and strenuous. sect. x. If then Freewill, without grace, having lost her freedom, is obliged to serve sin, and cannot will vabieoPi-" &°°d > ^ should like to know what that desire, nionfur- what that endeavour is, which this first and approver c°«- Vable opinion leaves to a man? i It cannot be good

desire, it cannot be good endeavour : because he cannot will good ; as the opinion says, and as you have conceded. Evil desire, therefore, and evil endeavour are alone left ; which, now that liberty is lost, are compelled to serve sin. — And what is meant, pray, by that saying 'This opinion leaves 1 ( It leaves man in possession of desire and endeavour/ &c. desire and endeavour, but leaves not that which sec. xi. may be ascribed to the man's own powers V Who can conceive this ? If desire and endeavour be left to Freewill, why should they not be ascribed to it ? If they are not to be ascribed, how can they be left? Are this desire and endeavour, which subsist before grace, left even to that \ery grace which is to come, and not to Freewill ; so as to be at the same time left, and not left, to this same Freewill? If these be not paradoxes, or rather monsters, I know not what monsters are. But perhaps Diatribe is dreaming, that there is Freewill a something between this being able to will good, not 'aneand not being able to will good, which is the mere f^-mediate power of willing ; distinct from any regard to good power of or evil. Thus, Ave are to evade the rocks by a the wllL> sort of logical subtilty ; affirming, that there is, in the will of man, a certain power of willing, which cannot indeed incline to good without grace, and yet even without grace does not forthwith will only evil :

a pure and simple power of willing; which may be turned by grace upwards to good, and by sin downwards to evil. But what then becomes of that saying, c having lost its liberty, it is compelled to serve sin V Where then is that ' desire and endeavour' which is left? Where is that power of applying itself to those things which belong to eternal salvation ? For that power of applying itself to salvation cannot be a mere abstract power of willing, unless salvation itself be called nothing. — Then, again, desire and endeavour cannot be a mere power of willing; since desire must lean and endeavour some whither, and cannot be carried towards nothing, or remain quiescent. In sliort, whithersoever Diatribe shall be pleased to turn herself, she cannot escape contradictions, and conflicting expressions : so that even Freewill herself is not so much a captive, as Diatribe who defends her. She so entangles herself, in her attempts to give liberty to

part in. the will, that she gets bound with indissoluble ' chains, in company with her freedmaid. Then, again, it is a mere fiction of logic, that there is this middle faculty of mere willing in man ; nor can those prove, who assert it. Ignorance of things, and servile regard to words, has given birth to this fancy; as if the will must straightway be such in substance, as we set it out in words. The Sophists have numberless figments of this sort. The truth rather is, what Christ says, u He that is not with me is against me." He does not say, c He that is not with me, nor against me, but in the middle/ For, if God be in us, Satan is absent, and only to will good is present with us. If God be absent, Satan is present, and there is no will in us but towards evil. Neither God, nor Satan, allows a mere abstract power to will in us ; but, as you have rightly said, having lost our liberty, we are compelled to serve sin • that is, we will sin and wickedness ; we speak sin and wickedness ; we act sin and wickedness. See into what a corner Diatribe has been driven, without knowing it, by invincible and most mighty truth \ who has made her wisdom folly, and compelled her, when meaning to speak against us, to speak for us, and against herself:

just as Freewill does, when she attempts any thing good ; for then, by opposing evil, she most of all does evil, and opposes good. Thus Diatribe is much such a speaker, as Freewill is an actor. Indeed, the whole Diatribe itself is nothing else but an excellent performance of Freewill, condemning by defending, and defending by condemning ;k that is, twice a fool, whilst she would be thought wise. sec. xn. rpj^ £rs{- opinion, then, as compared with itself, Th is such as to deny that man can will any thing

provable good, and yet to maintain that desire is left to him; k f Not only ruining her own cause, but establishing her adversary's/ and yet that this desire also is not his. Let us sec. xii. now compare it with the other two. — ( The second is harsher, which judges that Freewill has no °Pinion , , / . 9 Tp m, . , . compared power but to commit sin/ I ins, however, is with the Augustine's opinion ; expressed in many other other twoplaces, and specially in his treatise on the Letter and Spirit (the fourth or fifth chapter, if I am not mistaken), where he uses these very words. f That third opinion is the harshest of all, which maintains that Freewill is an empty name, and that all we do is necessarily under the bondage of sin/ Diatribe wages war with these two. Here, I admit that probably I may not be German enough, or Latinist enough, to enunciate the subject matter perspicuously; but I call God to witness, that I meant to say nothing else, and nothing else to be understood, by the expressions used in these two last opinions, than what is asserted in the first opinion. Nor did Augustine, I think, mean any thing else ; nor do I understand by his words any thing else, than what the first opinion asserts. So that the three opinions recited by Diatribe are, in my view, but that one sentiment, which I have promulgated.

For, when it has been conceded and settled, that Freewill, having lost her freedom, is compelled into the service of sin, and has no power to will any thing good; I can conceive nothing else from these expressions, but that Freewill is a bare word ; the substance expressed by that word having been lost. Lost liberty my art of grammar calls no liberty at all ; and to attribute the name of liberty to that wrhich has no liberty, is to attribute a bare name to it. If I wander from truth here, let who can recal me from my wanderings ; if my words be obscure and ambiguous, let who can make them plain, and confirm them. I cannot call lost health, health ; and if I should ascribe such a property to a sick man, what have I given him but a bare name ? But away with such monstrous expressions ! l2

Ecclesiasticus xv. J 4—1 Presumed, and expounded. For, who can bear that abuse of language, by which we affirm that man has Freewill; yet, with the same breath, assert that he has lost his liberty, and is compelled into the service of sin, and can will nothing good. Such expressions are at variance with common sense, and absolutely destroy the use of speech. Diatribe is to be accused, rather than we ; she blurts out her own words as if she were asleep, and gives no heed to what is spoken by others. She does not consider, I say, what it is, and of what force it is, to declare that man has lost his liberty, is compelled to serve sin, and has no power to do any thing good. For, if she were awake and observant, she would clearly see that the meaning of the three opinions, which she makes diverse and opposite, is one and the same. For the man who has lost his liberty, who is compelled to serve sin, and who cannot will good — what shall be inferred more correctly concerning this man, than that he does nothing but sin, or will evil ? Even the Sophists would establish this conclusion by their learned syllogisms. So that Madam Diatribe is very unfortunate in entering the lists with these two last opinions, whilst she approves the first, which is the same with them ; again, as her manner is, condemning herself, and expressing approbation of my sentiments, in one and the same article.

Let us now return to the passage in Ecclesiasticus; comparing that first opinion, which you declare to be appro vable, with it also, as we have now done wdth the other two. The opinion says, 6 Freewill cannot will good/ The passage from Ecclesiasticus is cited to prove, that ' Freewill is nothing, and can do nothing/ The opinion which is to be confirmed by Ecclesiasticus, then, declares one thing, and the passage from Ecclesiasticus is alleged to confirm another. As if a man, going to prove that Christ is Messias, should adduce a passage which proves that Pontius Pilate was Governor of S)Tia; or something else, sec.xiii. which is as wide from it as the extreme notes of the double octave.1 Just such is your proof of Freewill here : not to mention, what I have dispatched already, that nothing is here clearly and certainly , affirmed, or proved, as to what Freewill is, and can do. But it is worth while to examine this whole passage. In the first place, he says, c God made man in the beginning.' Here he speaks of the creation of man, and says nothing, hitherto, either about Freewill, or about precepts. It follows ; ' and left him in the hand of his own counsel/ What have we here ? Is Freewill erected here? Not even here is any mention made of precepts, for which Freewill is required; nor do we read a syllable on this subject, in the history of the creation of man.

If any thing be meant, therefore, by the words c in the hand of his counsel,' it must rather be, what we read in the first and second chapters of Genesis : c Man was appointed lord of the things which were made, so as to have a free dominion over them;' as Moses says, "Let us make man, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, &c." Nor can any thing else be proved from these words. For in that state, man had power to deal with the creatures according to his own will, they being made his subjects; and he calls this man's counsel, in opposition to God's counsel. But after this, when now he has declared man to have been thus constituted the ruler, and to have been left in the hand of his own counsel ; he goes on,

" He added his own commands and precepts." To what did he add them ? Why, to the counsel and will of man ; and over and above that establishment of the dominion of man over the rest of 1 Quod disdlapason conveniaf] A Greek proverb, denoting the greatest possible dissimilitude. part in. the creatures. By these precepts, he took away from man the dominion over one part of his creatures (the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for instance), and rather willed that it should not be free. Having mentioned the adding of precepts, he next comes to man's will towards God, and the things of God. " If thou shalt be willing to keep the commandments, they shall preserve thee, &c." From this place, then, £ if thou slmlt be willing/ the question about Freewill begins. So that we may learn from the Preacher, that man is divided between two kingdoms ; in the one of which, he is borne along by his own will and counsel, without any precepts or commandments from God; to wit, in the exercise of his relations to the inferior creatures. Here he reigns, and is lord, as having been left in the hand of his own counsel. Not that God so leaves him, even here, as not to cooperate with him in all things ; but that he leaves him a free use of the creatures, according to his own will, not restricting him by laws or injunctions.

Just as if you should say, by way of comparison, ' The Gospel has left us in the hand of our own counsel, to rule over the creatures, and use them as we please ; but Moses and the Pope have not left us in this counsel, but have restrained us by laws, and have rather subjected us to their wills/ — But in the other kingdom, man is not left in the hand of his own counsel, but is borne along, and led by the will and counsel of God. So that, as in his own kingdom, lie is borne along by his own will, without the precepts of another ; so, in the kingdom of God, he is borne along by the precepts of another, without his own will. And this is what the Preacher affirms, " He added precepts and commands ; If thou wilt, &C. &LC." m

m I object to this distinction,, as I have already done to the same in substance (Part ii. Sect, xxi.); nor can I believe it to If these things then be quite clear, we have sec.xiv. proved that this passage from Ecclesiasticus ; — makes against Freewill, not for it ; as subjecting ^ulTt^" man to the precepts and will of God, and with- least does drawing him from his own will. But if they be j?ot decide not quite clear, I have at least made out, that wni. * this passage cannot be brought to support Freewill, as being capable of quite a different interpretation from theirs : such, for instance, as I have just mentioned ; which is so far from being absurd, that it is most sound, and is consonant to the whole tenour of Scripture : whereas theirs is repugnant to that testimony, and is fetched from this single passage, in contradiction to the whole volume besides. We stand firm, and without fear, therefore, in our good sense of the words, which have been in the mind of the Apocryphal writer. Man had not Freewill given to him, in the exercise of one set of his relations (those to the creatures, for instance), more than in another. Dominion and superiority did not confer Freewill. He was, in reality, made accountable for his use of the creatures ; they were not given to him to do what he pleased with.

But, if it had been so, this would not have prevented his liability to have his will moved by a power without him. Insubjection and unaccountableness are of a perfectly different nature from Freewill. A despot may be ruled within, as well as a slave. But, taking the writer to mean that he was left to do his own will — this does not necessarily imply more than that he was left a free agent : and this he was left, with respect to all his relations, higher as well as inferior : and so are we. The difference between Adam's state before his fall, and ours who have been begotten out of him since — after having fallen in and with him — consisteth not in his having been any way independent of God — which we are not — or having had a will that was inaccessible to divine control — which we have not — but only in his ignorance of, and freedom from evil. He knew only good, and the devil had as yet no part in him. But, even in that state, he did only, and only could do, what God willed that he should do ; and, though without excuse in choosing evil (as having faculties and capacities, and being placed in circumstances, by and in which he ought at once to have rejected the temptation), did so choose, through the operation (not compulsory indeed, but efficacious) and according to the will, of Him who doeth all things : whose glory as well as prerogative it is, to govern a world of free agents.

part in. negatives Freewill, until they shall have con- firmed their affirmative, harsh, and forced one. When the Preacher therefore says, " If thou shalt be willing to keep the commandments, and to maintain acceptable faith, they shall preserve thee;" I do not see how Freewill is proved by these words. The verb is in the conjunctive mood (* If thou wilt'); which asserts nothing indicatively. Take an example or two. ' If the devil be God, he is worthy to be worshipped/ < If an ass fly, he has wings/ c If the will be free, grace is nothing/ The Preacher should have spoken thus, if he had meant to assert the freedom of the will : c Man can keep the commandments of God;' or, 'Man has power to keep the commandments/ But here Diatribe will cavil, that c the Preacher, in saying " If thou wilt keep," intimates that there is a will in man to keep, and not to keep ; for what meaning is there, in saying to a man who has no will, 'If thou wilt/ YVould it not be ridiculous to say to a man that is blind, ( If thou wilt see, thou shalt find a treasure V or to a deaf man, c If thou wilt hear, I will tell thee a pretty story?' This would be only laughing at their misery.

I answer ; these are the arguments of human reason, who is wont to pour out a flood of such wise sayings : so that I have not now to dispute with the Preacher, but with human reason, about an inference.11 That lady interprets the Scriptures of God by her own consequences and syllogisms ; drawing them whither she will. I shall undertake my office very willingly, and with full confidence of success, because I know that she chatters nothing but what is foolish and absurd ; the most of meant by * If thou wilt, &c.' n De sequeld.'] ( What follows, or is supposed to follow, from an assertion proved or admitted, but is not the immediate point in debate.' ' Consequence,' ( deduction,' ' inference.' all; when she sets about shewing her wisdom on sec. xv. sacred subjects. ■ Now if, in the first place, I should ask how it is proved to be- intimated, or to follow, that man has in him a will that is free, as often as it is said 'If thou wilt/ 'if thou shalt do/ 'if thou shalt hear/ she will say, ' because the nature of words, and the custom of speech amongst men, seem to require so.' She measures the things and words of God, then, by the things and usage of men. What can be more perverse than this ; when the one sort of things is earthly, and the other heavenly? Thus she betrays her foolish self; how she thinks nothing, but what is human, of God.

But what if I should prove, that the nature of words and custom of speech, even amongst men, is not always such as to make those persons objects of ridicule, who have no power to comply with the demand, as often as it is said to them, ' If thou wilt/ ' if thou wilt do/ ' if thou wilt hear ?- How often do parents mock their children, by bidding them come to them, or do this or that, for the mere purpose of making it appear how utterly incapable they are of doing so, and of forcing them to call upon the parent for his helping hand ! How often does the faithful physician command his proud patient to do or leave undone things which are either impossible, or noxious, that he may drive him to that knowledge of his disease, or of his weakness, through making trial of himself, to which he could not lead him by any other means ! What is more frequent, or more common, than words of insult and provocation, if we would shew, either to friends or to enemies, what they can do, and what they cannot do? I mention these things, only by way of manifesting to human reason, how foolish she is in attaching her inferences to the Scriptures; and how blind she is, not to see that these inferences are not always realized, even in human words

part in. and actions : yet, if she but see them fulfilled now ~~ and then, presently she rushes forwards with precipitation, and pronounces that they take place generally, in all human and divine forms of speech. Thus she contrives to make an universal of a particular, as the manner of her wisdom is. sec. xvi. Now, if God deal with us as a father with his childen, to shew us our impotency, of which we such forms are ignorant ; or as a faithful physician, to make of address, our disease known to us ; or if he insult us, as his enemies, who proudly resist his counsel, and by proposing laws to us (which is the most convincing way of doing it), say, ' Do, hear, keep;' or, ( if thou shalt hear, if thou shalt be willing, if thou shalt do;' will it be a just inference from hence, ' So then we can will freely, else God is mocking us ?' Is not this rather the inference, 6 So then God is making trial of us, whether we be friends or foes ; that, if we be his friends, he may lead us to the knowledge of our impotency, by the law; or, if we be proud enemies, then indeed he may truly and deservedly insult and deride us.'0 This is the reason why God gives laws ; as Paul teaches. p For human nature is so blind as not to know its own strength, or rather its own disease ; and is, besides, so proud as to think that it knows and can do all things. Now, God has not any more effectual remedy for this

° It is not Luther's business to state whence this difference of reception arises ; which is only through the free favour of God, making some to be his friends, by his Spirit working in due season, whilst he leaves others in their native enmity. Luther would not hesitate to assign this cause ; but he has here only to do with the fact, that the Lord tries and evinces these different characters of men, by such calls to obedience. p " Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight ; for by the law is the knowledge of sin." (Rom. iii. 20.) (< Moreover, the lawT entered that the offence might abound." (Rom. v. 20.) " Wherefore then serveth the law ? It was added because of transgressions." (Gal. iii. 19.) <l Wherefore the law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ." (Ibid. 24.) pride and ignorance, than the propounding of his SC. xvn. law; of which I shall say more in its proper place. Let it suffice to have taken but a sip of the cup here, that I might confute this inference of foolish, carnal wisdom, ' If thou wilt — therefore the will is free/ Diatribe dreams that man is sound and whole; just such as he is in the sight of his fellow men, in mere human affairs. Hence it is, that she cavils and says, c Man is mocked by such words as < if thou wilt/ c if thou wilt do/ c if thou wilt hear/ except his will be free/ But Scripture declares man to be corrupt and captive ; and not only so, but a proud despiser of God, and one ignorant of his corruption and captivity. So she plucks him by the sleeve, and endeavours to awaken him by such words as these, that he may own, even by sure experience, how incapable he is of any of these things.

But I will become the assailant nryself in this Diatribe conflict; and will ask, ' If thou dost indeed think, jjj8™^ Madam Reason, that these inferences stand good (if ference. thou wilt — therefore thou canst will freely), why dost thou not follow them ? Thou sayest, in that approvable opinion of thine, that Freewill cannot will any thing good. By what sort of inference, then, will it at the same time flow, as you say it does, from this passage, ' If thou shalt be willing to keep/ that man can will freely, and cannot will freely ? Do sweet water and bitter flow from the same fountain ? Are you not, even yourself, the greater mocker of man here; when you say that he is able to keep what he cannot even wrill, or wish ? It follows therefore, that neither do you on your part think it a good inference, ' If thou wilt — therefore thou canst will freely/ though you maintain it so vehemently : or else, you do not, from your heart, affirm that opinion to be ap provable, which maintains that man cannot will good/ — Reason is so entrapped in the inferences and words of her own wisdom, as not to know what she says, or what

part in. she is talking- about. Unless it be (as is indeed most worthy of her), that Freewill can only be defended by such arguments as mutually devour and make an end of each other : just as the Midianites destroyed themselves, by a mutual slaughter, whilst making war against Gideon and the people of God. Proves But let me expostulate, still more at large, with too much. this wise Diatribe. The Preacher does not say, * If thou shalt have a desire or endeavour to keep, which is, nevertheless, not to be ascribed to thine jwn powers;' as you collect from his words; but 6 If thou wilt keep the commandments, they shall preserve thee/ Now, if we would draw inferences, such as you in your wisdom are wont to do, we shall infer, * therefore man can keep the commandments :' and thus, we shall leave not only a little bit of a desire, or a sort of endeavourling, in man; but shall ascribe to him the whole fulness and abundance of power to keep the commandments. Else, the Preacher would be mocking the misery of man, by commanding him to keep, when he knew him to be unable to keep. Nor would it be enough, that he should have desire and endeavour:, not even thus would the Preacher escape the suspicion of using mockery; he must intimate that he has in him a power of keeping. Confirms _gut let us suppose this desire and endeavour ism?Sian" °f Freewill to be something.

What shall we say to those (the Pelagians, I mean) who, from this passage, were used to deny grace altogether, and to ascribe every thing to Freewill ? Without doubt, the Pelagians have gained the victory, if Diatribe's consequence be allowed. For the words of the Preacher import keeping, and not merely desiring or endeavouring. Now, if you shall deny to the Pelagians the inference of * keeping;' they will, in their turn, much more properly deny to you the inference of c endeavouring :9 and, if you take away complete Freewill from them,

they will take from you that little particle of it sc. xvn. which you say remains; not allowing you to claim for a particle, what you have denied to the whole substance. So that, whatever you urge against the Pelagians, who ascribe a whole to Freewill from this passage, will come much more forcibly from us, in contradiction to that little bit of a desire which constitutes your Freewill. q The Pelagians too will so far agree with us as to admit, that, if their opinion cannot be proved from this passage, much less can any other be proved from it : since, if the cause is to be pleaded by inferences, the Preacher makes the most strongly of all for the Pelagians; forasmuch as he speaks expressly of entire keeping. 6 If thou wilt keep the commandments/ Nay, he speaks of faith also : ' If thou wilt keep acceptable faith/ So that, by the same inference, we ought to have it in our power to keep faith also : howbeit, this faith is the alone and rare gift of God; as Paul says/ In short, since so many opinions are enumerated in support of Freewill, and there is not one of them but what seizes upon this passage of Ecclesiasticus for itself, yet those opinions are different and contrary ; it must follow, that they deem the Preacher contradictory and opposite, each to the other severally, in the self-same words. They

i Totum Uhero arbitrio tribuentibus.'] The Pelagians spake more wisely than many who oppose them. They maintained 1 the integrity of Freewill ;' an absolute power of willing good. Freewill is Freewill ; and, if there be any thing of it in man, there is the whole of it. r Luther refers, no doubt, to Ephes. ii. 8. Ci For by grace are ye saved through faith ; and that not of yourselves : it is the gift of God." His interpretation, if I understand the text aright, is incorrect : it is not 'faith' that is spoken of as the gift of God, but 'his whole salvation.' The truth of his affirmation, however, though not fairly deducible from this text, is unquestionable ; and may be shewn, as well from particular testimonies, as from the general tenour of Scripture. Matt, xvi. 17. John vi. 44, 65. Eph.es. i. 19. Coloss. ii. 12. (to which many others might be added) are decisive. Conclude that Ecclesiasticus proves nothing for Freewill, whether what is said be understood of Adam, or of men generally. cari; therefore, prove nothing from him. Still, if that inference be admitted, he makes for the Pelagians only, against all the rest : and so makes against Diatribe 5 who cuts her own throat here.8

But I renew my first assertion; viz. that this passage from Ecclesiasticus patronises none absolutely of those who maintain Freewill ; but opposes them all. For that inference, c if thou wilt — therefore thou canst/ is inadmissible; and the true understanding of such passages as these is, that, by this word and the like, man is warned of his impotency ; which, as being ignorant and proud, if it were not for these divine warnings, he would neither own nor feel. And here I speak, not of the first man only, but of any man, and every man; though it be of little consequence, whether you understand it of the first man, or of any other whatsoever. For, although the first man was not impotent through the presence of grace; still God shews him abundantly by this precept, how impotent. he would be in the absence of grace. Now if that man, having the Spirit/ was not able to will good ; that is, s Suo ipsius gladio jugulatur.*\ By quoting a passage for herself, which directly contradicts her. 1 Cum adesset Spiritus.~\ Luther assumes that Adam, in his creation state, had the Spirit ; of which there is no proof, and the contrary seems evidently to have been the fact. Made perfect after his kind, it was no part of his creation dues or gifts to have the Spirit. He was formed to glorify God, as his creature :

which implies a substance distinct from, and existing in a state of severance from his Creator ; like a piece of mechanism put out of the hand of its artificer. He was left to himself, therefore, having his own high moral powers and acquirements, but no extrinsic aid ; to make trial and to shew, what man in his entireness is, and wrhat he would become through temptation, if not inhabited by his Creator. This trial and manifestation would furnish an inference with respect to other creatures ; even as the same inference had already been furnished by the angelic nature. But this trial could not have been made, and this exhibition therefore could not have been effected, if he had possessed the Spirit ; or, in other words, if he had been united to God. So united, he could not have been overcome. That union, therefore (as Luther, and others with

obedience ; while as his will was yet new, and sc.xvin. good was newly proposed to him/ because the Spirit did not add it; what could we, who have not the Spirit, do towards good, which we have lost? It was shewn therefore, in that first man, by a terrible example, for the bruising under of our pride, what our Freewill can do when left to itself; yea, when urged and increased continually, yet more and more, by the Spirit of God. The first man could not attain to a more enlarged measure of the Spirit, of which he possessed the firstfruits, but fell from the possession of those firstfruits. How should we, in our fallen state, have power to recover those firstfruits, which have been taken from us ? Especially, since Satan now reigns in us with full power; who laid the first man prostrate by a mere temptation, when he had not yet got to reign in him. — It were impossible to maintain a stronger debate against Freewill, than by discussing this text of Ecclesiasticus, in connection with the fall of Adam : but I have not room for such a descant here, and perhaps the matter will present itself elsewhere. Meanwhile, let it suffice to have shewn, that the Preacher says just nothing in support of Freewill here (which its advocates, however, account their principal testimony) ; and that this and similar passages, ' If

him, would say), was dissolved } the Spirit which he had possessed was withdrawn during his temptation. Then, was he any longer the same substance, or person, which had received the command ? On this representation, the command was given him, having the Spirit ; and he was tried, not having the Spirit. — So demonstrable is it, that Adam had not the Holy Ghost 5 whose in-dwelling ' doth not appertain to the perfection of man's nature.' — But the argument from Adam's state to ours is quite strong enough, without this unwarranted assumption of Luther's. He that was just come out of the hands of his Creator, made in his image, and pronounced by him to be f very good,' could not stand against a single and solitary temptation : what should we do therefore ? u As opposed to that ' stale and rejected' thing which good is to us. part in. thou wilt/ cif thou wilt hear/ 'if thou wilt do/ — • declare not what man can do, but what he ought to do.v sec.xix. Another passage is cited by our Diatribe from the fourth chapter of Genesis, where the Lord Gen.iv. 7- says to Cain, "The desire of sin shall be subject

consi eie . ^ thee, an(| thou shalt rule over it." 'It is shewn here, says Diatribe, that the motions of the mind towards evil may be overcome, and do not induce a necessity of sinning/ This saying, ' that the motions of the mind towards evil may be overcome/ is ambiguous; but the general sentiment, the consequence, and the facts compel us to this understanding of it,x that, 'it is the property of Freewill to overcome its own motions towards evil, and that those motions do not induce a necessity of sinning/ Why is it again omitted here, ' which is not ascribed to Freewill' ?y What need is there of the Spirit, what need of Christ, what need of God, if Freewill can overcome the motions of the mind towards evil ? What has again become of that appro vable opinion, which says that Freewill cannot even will good ? Here, however, victory over evil is ascribed to v I cannot help regretting that Luther, after the example of his opponent, has given so much space to this Apocryphal testimony from Ecclesiasticus. I could have been glad, if he had not only stood upon his right, which he hints at in the opening of his discussion, declining to answer ; but had used the occasion to protest against the honour put upon this book, and the rest of its brothers and sisters, by binding them up in our Bibles and reading them in our churches.

— The collateral matter of the argumentation, however, is highly valuable ; and Luther could afford to make his adversary a present of an argument. Here, indeed, he may almost be said to have taken a culverin to kill flies withal. For, is it not Adam, clearly, of whom the Preacher speaks ; whose will is not the matter in debate ? and what, as we have seen, is said even of that will, which might not be said of ours ? It was left free to choose ; and if it should choose good, good would result from that good.

x Vi sententue, consequential et rerum hue cogiiur. y Referring to the f satis probabilis opinio { ' sed non relinquat, quod suis viribus ascribat.' See above, Sect. vii. this substance, which neither wills nor wishes sec.xix. good. Our Diatribe's carelessness is beyond all ' measure here. — Hear the truth of the matter in few words. I have said before, man has it shewn to him, by such expressions as these, not what he can do, but what he ought to do. Cain is told, therefore, that he ought to rule over sin, and to keep its lustings in subjection to himself. But this he neither did, nor could do, seeing, he was now pressed to the earth by the foreign" yoke of Satan. It is notorious, that the Hebrews frequently use the future indicative for the imperative : as in the twentieth chapter of Exodus ; 'Thou shalt not have any other Gods/ ' Thou shalt not kill/ 'Thou shalt not commit adultery / and numberless such like instances. On the contrary, if the words be taken indicatively, according to their literal meaning/ they would be so many promises of God, who cannot lie ; and so, nobody would commit sin, and there would be no need therefore of these precepts. In fact, our translator would have rendered the words better in this place, if he had said, • Let its desire be subject to thee, and do thou rule over iV Just as it ought also to have been said to the woman, ' Be subject to thy husband, and let him rule over thee/ — That it was not said indicatively to Cain, appears from this : it would in that case have been a divine promise ; but it was not a divine promise, for the very reverse happened, and the very reverse was done by Cain.b

2 Alieno imperio.~\ c A dominion out of himself ; ' so that he was no longer his own master. a Ut sonant.'] The sound, as opposed to the sense, or real import. b I admit Luther's principle, but demur to the application of it, both here and in the parallel to which he refers, Gen. hi. 16. The original passage is one of great difficulty. I incline to the interpretation which our authorized version gives to it ; and refer the words which are immediately under remark, as that appears to do, not to sin, but to Abel. " If thou doest well, shalt part in. Your third passage is from Moses, " I have set * before thy face the way of life and of death ; SECXX- choose that which is good/' &c. &c. * What Deut xxx could be said more plainly/ says Diatribe? 'He 19. con- ' leaves freedom of choice to man/ sidered. j answer, what can be plainer than that you are blind here? Prithee, where does he leave freedom of choice ? In saying, c choose V So then, as soon as Moses says ' choose/ it comes to pass that they do choose ! Again, therefore, the Spirit is not necessary : and since you so often repeat and hammer inc the same things, let me also be

thou not be accepted \ and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door. And unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him." Well, and not well, have relation to the then known will of God. Was Cain ignorant, with what sort of offering God was to be approached ? — Whatever might be said of later times, Cain must have heard all about Eden, the serpent and the woman, the serpent's seed and the woman's seed 5 and must have seen the coats of skins. Cain despised fC the way 5" he would none of Christ. — Then, God's words are adapted to quiet, and to instruct him. We know that a man can no more come by Christ, except it be given him from above, than he can come by the law. But this was not the thing to be shewn him ; he was to be reminded of the alone way of access, that he might make the fullest developement of himself, if he should continue to neglect and despise it : and, since jealous and angry fears were now arising in his mind with respect to his brother ; chiefly, lest he should lose the earthly superiority attached to his primogeniture ; he is pacified with an assurance (connected, doubtless, with the fore-mentioned condition), that this dominion should remain in his hands -, an assurance conveyed in words very nearly resembling those by which Eve was warned of her subjection to Adam.

The Septuagint gives another turn to the former part of the verse, but clearly refers the latter as I do ; and so in Gen. iii. 16. — According to this view, the words of this text have nothing to do with Freewill, though it seems the Hebrew Rabbins, as well as Luther and Erasmus, thought they had. (See Pole's Synops. in loc.) — If they must be referred to sin, not Abel ; Luther's interpretation is correct, and his answer unanswerable.— If the words be taken indicatively , they are a promise of God, which was broken as soon as made.

c lnculces.~\ A figurative expression from e treading in with the feet j ' hence applied to those efforts by which, like the pavier ramming down his stones, we aim to drive or beat our allowed to say the same thing many times over. If sec. xx. there be freeness of choice d in the soul, why has your approvable opinion said that the free will cannot will good ? Can it choose without willing, or against its will? — But let us hear your simile. It would be ridiculous to say to a man standing in a street where two ways meet, c you see two ways, enter which you please ; ' when only one is open. This is just what I said before, about the arguments of carnal reason : she thinks that man is mocked by an impossible precept ; whereas we say, he is admonished and excited by it to see his own impotency. Truly then, we are in this sort of street ; but only one way is open to us : or rather, no way is open.6 But it is shewn us by the law, how impossible it is for us to choose the one — that leading to good, I mean — except God give his Holy Spirit: how broad and easy the other is, if God allow us to walk in it. Without mockery then, and with all necessary gravity, it would be said to a man standing in the street, c enter which of the two you please ; ' if, either he should have a mind to appear strong in his own eyes, being infirm ; or should maintain that neither of these ways is shut against him.

The words of the law then, are spoken not to affirm the power of the will, but to enlighten blind reason ; that she may see what a nothing her light meaning into a person's head. Erasmus not only repeats, but pursues long desultory arguments, heaping one upon another, to prove his point. d Lihertas eligendi.'] Choice there must be, or there is no will : but that choice may be made under a wrong bias. This is properly the question of Freewill ; viz. : whether the will be under such a bias, or not. e Imo nulla patet.'] Referring to what he has said before, c about God's doing every thing ; ' and our doing all we do, by necessity. So, even the way of evil is only broad and easy, * si Deus permittat.' part in. is, and what a nothing the power of the will is. " By the law is the knowledge of sin/' says Paul ; he does not say the c abolition/ or the c avoidance,' of it. The principle1" and power of the law has for -its essence the affording of knowledge, and that only of sin; not the displaying of any power, or the conferring of any.

For thisg knowledge, neither is power, nor confers power, but instructs ; and shews that there is no power in that quarter, and how great is the infirmity in that quarter. For what else can the knowledge of sin be, but the knowledge of our infirmity and of our wickedness. Nor does he say, c by the law comes the knowledge of virtue, or good : 9 but all that the law does, according to Paul, is to cause sin to be known. This is that passage from which I drew my answer, c that by the words of the law man is admonished and instructed what he ought to do, not what he can do ;' that is, to know his sin, not to believe that he has some power. So that, as often as you cast the words of the law in my teeth, I will answer you, my Erasmus, with this saying of Paul; "By the law is the knowledge of sin/' not power in the will. Take now some of your larger Concordances, and heap together all the imperative verbs into one chaos (so they be not words of promise, but words of exaction and law), and I shall presently shew you, that by these is always intimated not what men do, or can do, but what they ought to do. Your grammar-masters, and boys in the streets, know this ; that by verbs

f Tota ratio et virtus legis.~] Rat. a word of very extensive and various signification, expresses ' the nature, order, object, structure, and relations of any substance.' e Principle' seems best to express it here : as comprehending* both design and constitution. Rat. et virt. The law is both framed for this purpose, and effects it. s I insert e this / because the two ibis, which follow, make it plain, that it is not knowledge in general, but this knowledge in particular, of which he speaks. of the imperative mood nothing else is expressed, secxxi. but what ought to be done : what is done, or ' may be done, must be declared by indicative verbs. How comes it then, that you theologians, as if you had fallen into a state of second childhood, no sooner get hold of a single imperative verb, than you are foolish enough to infer an indicative ; as if an act were no sooner commanded, than it becomes straightway, even of necessity, a thing done, or at least practicable. For how many things happen between the cup and the lip,11 to prevent what you have ordered, and what was moreover quite practicable, from taking place : such a distance is there between imperative and indicative verbs, in common and most easy transactions. But you1 — when the things enjoined, instead of being near to us as the lip is to the cup, are more distant than heaven from earth — and, moreover, impracticable — so suddenly make indicatives for us out of imperatives, that you will have the things to have been kept, done, chosen, and fulfilled, or about to be so, by our own power : as soon as ever the word of command has been given, e do, keep, choose.' k

In the fourth place, you adduce many like verbs Passages of choosing, refusing, keeping; as, 'if thou shalt f*™£*at' keep/ c if thou shalt turn aside/ ' if thou shalt considered. choose/ &c. &c. from the third1 and from the thirtieth chapter of Deuteronomy. c All these h Inter os et o§hm.~] ' The mouth and the cake ;' but I have preferred the more common proverb. ' Et vos.'] It would be read with more spirit in the form of a question : — ' And do you so suddenly make, &c. ?' k Luther is abundant in reply to this passage from Deuteronomy. 1. It proves too much. 2. Not ridiculous, if the way be supposed shut. 3. The law gives knowledge of sin. 4. Imperative verbs are not indicatives, 1 The reference to Deut. iii. appears to be incorrect : these expressions are all found in the xxxth ; and the like to them in xxvii. xxviii. xxix. But chap. iii. is a mere narrative. part in. expressions, you say, would be unseasonable, if man's will were not free to good.' I answer, you also are very unseasonable, my Diatribe, in collecting Freewill from these verbs ! For you professed to prove only desire and endeavour in your Freewill, and adduce no passage which proves such endeavour, but a string of passages, which, if your consequence were valid, would assign ' a whole* to Freewill."1 Let us, then, distinguish here again between the words adduced from Scripture, and the consequence which Diatribe has appended to them.

The words adduced are imperative, and only express what ought to be done. For Moses does not say, 3^011 have strength or power to choose, but ' choose, keep, do/ He delivers commands to do, but does not describe man's power of doing. But the consequence added by this sciolous Diatribe infers, ' therefore man can do these things ; else they would be enjoined in vain/ To which the answer is, < Madam Diatribe, you make a bad inference, and you do not prove your consequence : it is because you are blind and lazy, that you think this consequence follows, and has been proved/ These injunctions, however, are not delivered unseasonably, or in vain ; but are so many lessons by which vain and proud man may learn his own diseased state of impotency, if he try to do what is commanded. So again, your simile is to no purpose, where you say;

^Else it would be just as if you should say to a man, who is so tied and bound, that he can only stretch out his arm to the left, See ! you have a cup of most excellent wine at your right hand, and a cup of poison at your left : m Totum, opposed to particula ejus reliqua ; * that small remaining particle of Freewill which Erasmus professed to support and prove :' his texts would make it an integer, not a fraction. See above. Sect. iv. stretch out your baud to whichsoever side you SE. xxn. please/ ■ ■ I have a uotion that you are mightily tickled with these similes. But you do not perceive all the while, that, if your similes stand good, they prove much more than you have undertaken to prove ; nay, that they prove what you deny, and would have to be disapproved ; namely, that Freewill can do every thing. For, throughout your whole treatise, forgetting that you have said r Freewill can do nothing without grace/ you prove that c Freewill can do every thing without grace/ Yes, this is what you make out, at last, by your consequences and similes, that, either Freewill, left to herself, can do the things which are said and enjoined, or they are idly, ridiculously, and unseasonably enjoined. Howbeit, these are but the old songs of the Pelagians ; which even the Sophists have exploded, and you have yourself condemned. Meanwhile, you show by this forgetfulness and bad memory of yours, how entirely you are both ignorant of the cause, and indifferent to it. For what is more disgraceful to a rhetorician, than to be continually discussing and proving things foreign to the point at issue \ nay, to be continually haranguing against both his cause and himself ? n

I do therefore affirm again, that the words of HIs Sci4P; Scripture adduced by you are imperative words, notSng;T and neither prove any thing, nor determine any his addithing, on the subject of human power, but pre- scripture scribe certain things to be done, and to be left too much! undone: whilst your consequences or additions, n Contra causam et seipsumJ] Not only in opposition to the cause lie was advocating, but even to his own admissions and assertions. — But what a string of charges is here ! — Sciolist! a mere smatterer in learning and knowledge. — Pelagian ! which every ' would-be' orthodox disclaims — negligent, desultory, undiscerning, heartless! quam nihil vel. intelligas vel afficiaris causae ! part in. and your similes, prove this, if they prove any thing, that Freewill can do every thing without grace. This proposition, however, is not one which you have undertaken to prove, but have even denied : so that proofs of this kind are nothing else but the strongest disproofs. For let me try now, whether it be possible to rouse Diatribe from her lethargy. Supposel should argue thus : when Moses says, i choose life, and keep the commandment;' except a man can choose life and keep the commandment, it is ridiculous in Moses to enjoin this upon man: should I by this argument have proved, that Freewill can do nothing good ; or that it has endeavour, but not of its own power ?

° No, I should have proved, by a pretty bold sort of comparison/ that, either man can choose life and keep the commandment, as he is ordered to do ; or Moses is a ridiculous teacher. JBut who would dare to call Moses a ridiculous teacher? It follows therefore, that man can do the things commanded him. This is the way, in which Diatribe is continually arguing against her own thesis ; by which, she engaged not to maintain any such position as this, but to show a certain power of endeavouring in Freewill : of which, however, she makes little mention in the whole series of her arguments, so far is she from proving it. Nay, she rather proves the contrary : so as to be herself rather, the ridiculous speaker and arguer every where. q

° Sine suis viribus.~\ He plays upon ' the approvable opinion ;' which leaves endeavour, but does not leave it to be ascribed to Freewill' s own power. p Satis fort i contmtione.~\ Cont. is sometimes used in a rhetorical sense to express one of the parts of an oration ; ' disputatio sive disceptatio,' opposed to ' quaestio ' or c controversia ;' what might properly be called c the argumentation:' but is here used in another rhetorical sense, to express ' contrast, comparison, or antithesis j ' ( Moses's folly,' set in array against ( man's power.' ^ She imputed this to Luther : she would make either him or Moses absurd ; the real absurdity lay in adducing arguments, which either proved nothing, or proved the opposite. With respect to its being ridiculous, according sc. xxn. to the simile you have introduced, that a man tied ~7~ 7" by the right arm should be bidden to stretch out f^and his hand to the right, when he can only stretch it tied. out to the left; would it be ridiculous, I ask — if a man, who was tied even by both hands, should proudly maintain, or ignorantly presume, that he could do what he pleased on both sides of him — to bid such a man stretch out his hand to whichsoever side he likes ; not with the design of laughing at his captive state, but that the false presumption of his own liberty and power may be evinced, or that his ignorance of his captivity and misery may be made notorious to himself.

Diatribe is always dressing up for us a man of her own invention, who either can do as he is bidden, or at least knows that he cannot. But such a man is no where to be found : and if there were such a man, then it would indeed be true, that, either impossibilities are enjoined ridiculously, or the Spirit of Christ is given in vain.r

But the Scripture sets before us a man, who is Uses of not only bound, wretched, captive, sick, dead, t!je la^ but who adds this plague of blindness (through pfacicathe agency of Satan his prince) to his other bleplagues, and so thinks himself at liberty, happy, unshackled, able, in health, alive. For Satan knows, that, if man were acquainted with his own misery, he should not be able to retain a single individual of the race in his kingdom; because God could not choose but at once pity and help him, when now he had come to recognise his misery, and cry out for relief: seeing, he is a God so greatly extolled throughout the whole Scripture, as being near to the contrite in heart, that, in the sixty-first chapter of Isaiah (vv. 1 — 3.), Christ declares himself to have been even sent r If he can do what is bidden, there is no need of the Spirit ; if he knows he cannot, there is no longer any use for prescribing it. part in. into the world by Him, for the purpose of preaching the Gospel to the poor, and healing the broken-hearted. So that, it is Satan's business to keep men from the recognition of their own misery; and to keep them in the presumption of their own ability to do all that is commanded. Bui: the legislator Moses's business is the very opposite of this : he is to lay open man's misery to him by the law, that, having hereby broken his heart, and confounded him with the knowledge of himself, he may prepare him for grace,3 and send him to Christ, and so he may be saved for ever. What the law does, therefore, is not ridiculous, but exceedingly serious and necessary.1

Those who are now brought to understand these matters, understand at the same time, without any difficulty, that Diatribe proves absolutely nothing, by her whole series of arguments ; whilst she does nothing but get together a parcel of imperative verbs from the Scriptures, of which she knows not either the meaning or the use. Having done so, she next adds her own consequences and carnal similes, and thus mixes up such a potent cake,11 that she asserts and proves more than she had advanced, and argues against her very self. It would not be necessary, therefore, to pursue my rapid course v through her s Ad gratiam.'] Not, what is often understood by grace, ( the gift of the Spirit ;-' but, what grace truly is in its essence, ' the free favour of God.' * Ridicula. .seria. . necessarla.~\ Ridiculous may have respect either to the laugher, or the laughed at ; what we do in sport, or suffer as objects of sport. The law neither mocks, nor makes a fool of herself, though her ordinances be impossible to man 5 neither mocks, by calling merely to expose ; nor subjects herself to derision, by speaking where she has nothing to gain.

u Off am seems to be some allusion to Cerberus. yEn. vi. 420. v Percurrere.~] Luther applies the same term to his review of Erasmus's preface, implying short and lively animadversion rather than grave and elaborate research. So, just afterwards, / recenserej' ' enumeration,' or f recital,' rather than f investigation.' several proofs any further ; since they are all dis- sc.xxm. missed by dismissing one, as all resting upon one principle. Still, I shall go on to recount some of them, that I may drown her in the very flood in which she was meaning to drown me.x In Isaiah i. (ver. 19.) we read, "If ye shall isaiahi.19. have been willing, and shall have heard, ye shall xjlx\8)l* eat the good of the land:" where it would have m.'i.V. been more consistent, as Diatribe thinks, to have and some said, ' If J be willing ; ' ' If I be unwilling ; ! on °aggS ^ the supposition of the will not being free. sidered; The answer to this suggestion is sufficiently ^muchmanifest, from what has been said above. But no distinct what congruity would there be, in its being said tion be" here, ' If I will, ye shall eat of the good of the and Gosland V Does Diatribe, of her excessive wisdom, Pel* &cimagine that the good of the land could be eaten against the will of God; or that it is a rare and new thing for us to receive good, only if he will? ,

So in Isaiah xxx.y " If ye seek, seek ; turn ye, and come." ' To what purpose is it that we exhort those who have no power at all over themselves? Is it not just as if we should say to a man bound with fetters, move yourself that way ;' says Diatribe ? Say rather, to what purpose is it that you quote passages, which, of themselves, prove nothing, but by adding a consequence ; that is, by corrupting their meaning; ascribe every thing to Freewill : whereas only a sort of endeavour, and that not ascribable to Freewill, was to be proved? x Obruatur copid, seems to be some allusion to the dragon, Rev. xii. 15. " And the serpent cast out of his mouth water, as a flood, after the woman, that he might cause her to be carried away of the flood." y The reference seems to be to verse 21, where our translation has it, (( And thine ears shall hear a word behind thee, •saying, This is the way, walk ye in it, when ye turn to the right hand, and when ye turn to the left.1' part in. < I would say the same of that testimony in Isaiah xlv. " Assemble yourselves, and come ; turn to me, and ye shall be saved :" and of that in Isaiah lii. " Arise, arise, shake thyself from the dust, loose the chains from off thy neck." Of that also in Jeremiah xv. " If thou wilt turn, I will turn thee; and if thou wilt separate the precious from the vile, thou shalt be as my mouth." But Zechariah makes still more evident mention of the endeavour of Freewill, and of the grace which is prepared for the endeavourer. He says, " Turn ye to me, saith the Lord of Hosts, and I will turn to you, saith the Lord.5'2

In these passages, our Diatribe discovers no difference at all between law words and gospel words. So blind and ignorant is she forsooth, that she does not see what is Law and what is Gospel. Out of the whole of Isaiah, she brings not a single law word, except that first one, ' If ye shall have been willing/ All the other passages are made up of gospel words ; by which the contrite and afflicted are called to take comfort from offers of grace. a But Diatribe makes law 2 Isa. xlv. 20. lii. 1, 2. Jerem.xv. 19. The reference 'made to Zechariah seems properly to belong to Malachi iii. 7. See above, Part ii. Sect. xiii. note °. a Verba gratia oblatce.'] The expression, ' offers of grace,' is exceptionable, as implying freeness of choice ; in direct contrariety to Luther's position and arguments. The truth is, that, whilst he abhorred free choice, he liked free offers. I could have been glad if he had expressed his meaning more definitely; which is little else than e the promises of God received in such wise as they be generally set forth to us in holy Scripture 5' that is, received ' as promises of free favour made to persons of a certain character ; and not to individuals, as such.' What but these are the very and legitimate stay of God's eternally foreknown, elect, predestinated, and now quickened child, in the day of his tearing and smiting ? Is he to hear a voice, or see a vision, or receive some providential token, personal to himself; before he presumes to call upon the name of the Lord ? Are not these, <c Ho, every one that thirsteth y[ ff To this man will I look $'•' " Come unto me, all ye that travail and are heavy-laden •** ff The same Lord over all is rich

words of them. And pray what good will he do sc.xxin. in theology, or in the Scriptures, who has not yet got so far as to know what the Law is, and what the Gospel is ; or, if he does know, disdains to observe the difference ? Such an one must confound every thing ; heaven and hell, life and death; and will take no pains to know any thing at all about Christ. I shall admonish my Diatribe more copiously upon this subject hereafter. Look now at those words of Jeremiah and Zechariah : c If thou wilt turn, I will turn thee y and, ' Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you.' Does it follow, ' Turn ye/ therefore ye can turn ? Does it follow, c Love the Lord thy God with all thine heart,' therefore thou shalt be able to love him with all thine heart? What is the conclusion, then, from arguments of this kind, but that Freewill needs not the grace of God, for she can do every thing by her own power ? How much more properly are the words taken, just as they stand ! b c If thou shalt have been turned, I also will turn thee/ that is, if thou shalt leave off sinning, I also will leave off punishing ; and if, when thou art converted, thou shalt lead a good life, I also will do thee good, and will turn thy captivity and thy evils.0 But it does not follow

unto all that call upon Him" — his warrant for drawing near, and his first words of consolation ? — But these, at last, are not 4 offers ' of grace ; by which God throws himself, as it were, at the knees and feet of his creatures — subjecting himself to a refusal- nay, with full assurance that he must receive one, except he superadd a special and distinct impulse of his own to secure acceptance — but testimonies of his own mouth, and hand, and ordinances, borne to those souls which he, in his own good time, has made ready to welcome them ; that he will bind up, and heal, and own, these poor destitutes, amidst the gathered remnant of his heritage. b Verba, ut posita sunt."] ' Without additions,' such as Erasmus's. c I do not know that any reasonable objection can be made to Luther's paraphrase of Jeremiah xv. 19, and Malachi (he calls him Zechariah) iii. 7. But the quotation from Jeremiah part in. from these words, that a man can turn to God by his own power ; nor do the words affirm this : they simply say, ' If thou art converted ;' admonishing man what he ought to be. Now, when he shall have known and seen this, he would seek the power, which he hath not, from the source whence he might have it,d if Diatribe's Leviathan (her appendage and consequence, I mean) did not come in the way, saying, ' It would in vain be said, 6i Turn ye/' except a man could turn by his own power.' — What sort of a saying this is, and what it proves, has been declared abundantly.

It is the effect of stupor or lethargy to suppose that Freewill is established by those words, 'Turn ye,' c If thou shalt turn,' and the like ; and not to perceive, that, upon the same principle, it would also be established by this saying, u Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart;" since the demand in the one case, is equivalent to the command* in the other. Nor is the love of God, and of all his commandments, less required than our own conversion ; since the love of God is our true conversion. And yet no man argues Freewill from that commandment of love, whilst all argue seems perfectly out of place : it is a personal matter between the Lord and his Prophet, a converted man : what has this to do, then, with the question of Freewill ? d Qucerat uncle possit.'] I have been inclined to connect these words with the preceding sentence ; c by which he is admonished what he ought to be ; and having understood and discovered this, is admonished to seek the power which he hath not whence he might get it ; if Diatribe should not intervene,' &c.< — The punctuation, however, forbids this connection, and it does not appear to be Luther's meaning. He imputes it to Diatribe's false suggestion, if man, warned that he ought to turn to God, does not find out his own impotency, and seek his conversion from God. But there is much more that goes to this seeking, than Luther seems to include in it: under the clearest light, men will still resist conviction ; and the heart to seek, is as much a gift, as conversion itself.

e More literally, ' since the meaning of the commander and the demander is equal on both sides.' it from those words, c If tliou shalt be willing/ sc.xxiv. < If thou shalt hear/ ' Turn/ and the like. If then it folio weth not from that saying, c Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart/ that Freewill is any thing, or has any power, assuredly neither doth it from those, c If thou wilt/ ' If thou nearest/ * Turn ye/ and the like : which either demand less, or demand less vehemently, than that i Love God/ ' Love the Lord/ f Whatever reply, therefore, is made to that saying, c Love God/ forbidding to conclude Freewill from it; the same shall be made to all other expressions of command or demand, in forbiddance of the same conclusion : namely, that by the command to love is shewn 6 the matter of the law/- what we ought to do; but not the power of the human will, what we can do ; or rather, what we cannot do. The same is shewn by all other expressions of demand. It is evident, that even the schoolmen, writh the exception of the Scotists and the Moderns/1 assert, that man cannot love God with his whole heart. From whence it follows, that neither can he fulfil any of the other commandments ; since they all hang on this, as Christ testifies. Thus, it remains as a just conclusion, even from the testimony of the scholastic doctors, that the words of the law do not prove a power in the free will, bnt show what we ought to do, and what we cannot do.

But our Diatribe, with still greater absurdity, Mai. not only infers an indicative sense from that say- morf Par f Dilige Deum. Ama Dominum.~] Dil. and am. are here used as of like import : sometimes they are put in contrast, and that variously ; diligo being sometimes the stronger, and sometimes the weaker term. In distinguishing them, 'airio' may be understood to denote the love of appetite 5 and ' diligo' the love of reason. s Forma legis.~] More literally, c the shape, mould, or image of the law { ' what is comprehended in it.' h Scotistis et Modernis,'] See above, Part iii. Sect. ii. notes fg. • ............. part ill. ing of Zechariah, ' Turn ye unto me;' but main- tains, that it even proves a power of endeavouring in Freewill, and grace prepared for the endeavourer. And here, at last, she remembers her c endeavour / and, by a new art of grammar, < to turn/ with her, signifies the same as ' to endeavour :' so that the sense is, ' Turn unto me / that is, ' endeavour to turn/ and \ I will turn to you / that is, * endeavour to turn 'to you. At last, then, she attributes endeavour even to God; intending perhaps to prepare grace for His endeavourings also. For, if ' to turn 9 signifies 6 to endeavour 9 in one place ; why not in all ?

Again, in that passage of Jeremiah, 'If thou shalt separate the precious from the vile/ she maintains that not only 'endeavour,' but even 6 freedom of choice/ is proved : what she had before taught us to have been lost, and to have been turned into a necessity of serving sin. You see then, that Diatribe truly possesses a free will in her handlings of Scripture ; by which she compels words, of one and the same form, to prove endeavour in one place, and free choice in another; just as she pleases. But bidding adieu to these vanities, the word ' turn 9 has two uses in Scripture ; a legal, and an evangelical one. In its legal use, it is an exacter and commander ; requiring not endeavour only, but change of the whole life; as Jeremiah frequently uses it, saying, ' Turn ye every one from his evil way / ' Turn to the Lord :9 where it evidently involves an exacting of all the commandments. When used evangelically, it is a word of divine promise and consolation; by which nothing is demanded from us, but the grace of God is offered to us. Such is that of Psalm cxxvi. c When the Lord shall turn again the captivity o£ Zion / and that of Psalm cxvi. ' Turn again then unto thy rest, 0 my soul !' And so Zecharias

contrives to dispatch both sorts of preaching (law as sc.xxiv. well as grace) in a very short compendium. It is all law, and the sum of the law, when he says, ' Return unto me :' it is grace, when he says, ' I will return unto you/ As far, therefore, as Freewill is proved by that saying, e Love the Lord/ or by any other saying of any particular law; just so far, and no farther, is it proved by this summary law word 6 Turn/ It is the part of a wise reader of Scripture then, to observe what are law words, and what are grace words; that he may not jumble them all together, like the filthy Sophists, and like this yawning Diatribe.1 1 Luther's distinction between law words and gospel words, as applied by him in these two sections, severally and comparedly, is arbitrary, indefinite, and unavailing1. Arbitrary ; inasmuch as lie pretends not to have any recognised authority for it, and applies it inconsistently j sometimes calling words of exhortation or command c gospel words 5' and sometimes confining that term to words of promise, as opposed to them. ' Turn ye unto me ' is a law word ; ' I will turn to you ' is a gospel word. Indefinite ; because he gives no fixed rule by which to determine what is one, and what is the other ; but, according to his own account, leaves it to the discerning reader.

Unavailing ; because a gospel precept is not less impracticable than a law one to the free will. — In my view, he confounds matters ; for f return,' or ' repent,' is surely not a law precept, but a gospel one : the law knows nothing of repentance. — The truth is, he has given his answer to all these testimonies already. They are requirements j call them law requirements, if you will, or gospel requirements 5 they are something for man to do ; and, as he very properly argues, they are meant to shew him what he ought to do, but imply not any power either towards Law, or towards Gospel. The law is, properly, ( the law of the Ten Commandments ;* under which, speaking less precisely, may be comprehended all those precepts which fall in with the nature and design of that ' transcript of the creation law of man j" but nothing which regards his relations as a fallen, or as a restored creature. — Luther speaks confusedly, as other writers do, on this subject; not discerning the origin, design, and nature of that institution.— The law spake not till Moses ; spake only to the Jews, or then visible church of God ; was a preparation for, and a fore-preached Gospel. A law word therefore, rightly understood, is also a gospel word : a word which prepareth, by compelling a sense of need 5 and which— whilst it 'f shuts up unto

part in. por see now? now g^g treats that famous passage in Ezekiel xviii. " As I live, saith the Lord, I would not the death of a sinner, but rather Ezek.xviii. that he be converted and live." First, c It is so 23. con- often repeated, says she, in the course of this sidered' chapter, " shall turn away," " hath done," " hath wrought ;" in respect both of good and evil. Where then are those who deny that man does any thing ?? What an excellent consequence is here ! She was going to prove desire and endeavour in Freewill ; but she proves the whole act, every thing done to the uttermost by Freewill. Where now are they who maintain the necessity of grace and of the Holy Spirit? For this is her ingenious way of arguing : * Ezekiel says, If the wicked man shall turn away from his wickedness and do justice and judgment, he shall live. — Why then the wicked man presently does so, and can do so/ Ezekiel intimates what ought to be done; Diatribe considers this as what is done, and has been done ; again introducing a new sort of grammar, by which she may teach us that it is the same thing to owe, as to have — the same thing to be enacted, as to be performed — the same thing to demand, as to pay.