Bhagavad Gita

Sanjaya narrates the course of the war. I. What did FiVidns sons and mine do when they assembled together on the sacred plain of Kurukshetra eager for battle, O Sa;«jaya ? 2. Having seen the army of the Pan^avas drawn up in battle-array, prince Duryodhana then approached his teacher and spoke (these) words : 3. " O teacher, look at this grand army of the sons of Pan^u, marshalled by thy talented pupil, the son of Drupada. 4. " Here are heroes, mighty archers, equal in battle to Bhima and Arjuna, — Yuyudhana, Virata, and Drupada, the master of a great car (maharatha), * 5. " Dhrishfaketu, Chekitana, and the valiant king of Kasi, Purujit and Kunti-Bhoja and that eminent man Saibya ; • Technically, ' maharatha' means ' a who single-handed can fight a thousand warrior proficient in military science archers," THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. I. 6. " The heroic Yudhamanyu and the brave Uttamaujas ; the son of Subhadra and the sons of Draiipadij all masters of great cars (maharathas). 7. " But know, O best of the twice-born, who are the most distinguished among us, the leaders of my army; these I name to thee by way of example.

8. " Thyself and Bhlshma, and Karna, and also Kripa, the victor in war, Asvatthaman and Vikarwa, and also Jayadratha, the son of Somadatta ; g. " And many other heroes who have given up their lives for my sake, fighting with various weapons, all well-skilled in battle. 10. " This army of ours protected by Bhishma is inadequate, whereas that army of theirs which is under the protection of Bhima is adequate. * 11. " And therefore do ye all, occupying your respective positions in the several divisions of the army, support Bhishma only." Both armies ready for battle. 12. His mighty grandsire, (Bhishma), the oldest of the Kauravas, in order to cheer him, sounded on high a lion's roar and blew his conch. 13. Then, all at once, conches and kettledrums, * This sloka is diftercntly interpreted that his army, larger and led by an by difterent commei'.tators. -4 nandagiri's abler leader than the enemy's, is more gloss suggests various interpretations likely to win the battle, which all go to make Duryodhana mean cymbols, drums and horns were played upon, and the sound was a tumultuous uproar. 14. Then, too, Madhava and the son of Vividu, seated in a grand chariot yoked to white horses, blew thair celestial conches.

15. Hrlshikesa blew the Panchajanya, and Arjuna blew the Devadatta. Bhima, (the doer) of terrible deeds, blew his great conch Paun^ra. 16. Prince Yudhish/hira, the son of Kanti, blew the Anantavijaya, while Nakula and Sahadeva blew the Sughosha and the Manipushpaka. 17. The king of Kasi, an excellent archer, Sikhaniin, the master of a great car, Dhrish/adyumna and \'ira/a, and the unconquered Satyaki ; IS. Drupada and the sons of Draupadi, O lord of earth, and the son of Subhadra, of mighty arms, all together blew their respective conches. ig. That tumultuous sound rent the hearts of (the people) of Dhritarash/ra's party, making both heaven and earth resound. Arjuna's survey of the enemy. 20-22. Then seeing the people of Dhritarash/ra's party regularly marshalled, while the discharge of weapons began, Arjuna, the son of Pa;/^u, whose ensign was a monkey, O King of earth, took up his bow and said thus to K/ishna : " O Achyuta (Immortal), place my chariot between the two armies, that I may just see those 2^ THE BHAGAVAD-GiTA. [DiS. I who stand here desirous to fight, and know with whom I must fight in this strife of battle. 23. '' I will observe those who are assembled here and are about to engage in battle desirous to do service in war to the evil-minded son of Dhritarash/ra,"

24-25. O descendant of Bharata, Hrishikesa (Krishna) thus addressed by Guiakesa (Arjuna) stationed that excellent car between the two armies in front of Bhishma and Drona and all the rulers of earth, and said : " O son of Pritha, look at thes3 assembled Kauravas." 26-27. Then the son of Pritha saw arrayed there in both the armies fathers and grandfathers, teachers, maternal uncles, brothers, sons, grandsons and comrades, fathers-in-law and friends. 27-2S. When the son of Kunti saw all the kinsmen standing, he was overcome with deepest pity and said thus in sorrow : Arjuna's words of despondency. 28-29. Seeing these kinsmen, O Krishna, arrayed and desirous to fight, my limbs droop down, and my mouth is dried up. A tremor comes on my body and my hairs stand on end, 30. The Ga;/^iva slips from my hand, and my skin is intensely burning. I am also unable to stand and my mind is whirling round, as it were. 31. And, O Kesava, I see omens foreboding evil. Nor do I see any good from killing my kinsmen in battle. 32. I desire not victory, O Krishna, nor kingdom, nor pleasures. Of what avail is dominion to us, O Govinda ? Of what avail are pleasures and even life ?

33-34. They for whose sake dominion, enjoyments and pleasures are sought b}' us are here standing, having staked their life and wealth : teachers, fathers, sons as well as grandfathers ; maternal uncles, fathers-in-law, grandsons, brothers-in-law as also (other) relatives. 35. These, O slayer of Madhu, I do not wish to kill, though they kill me, even for the sake of dominion over the three worlds ; how much less for the sake of the earth ! 36. O Janardana, what delight shall be ours after killing the sons of Dhritarash/ra ? On killing these felons, sin only will take hold of us. ^■}, We had then better not slay our own kinsmen, the sons of Dhritarash/ra ; for, how can we be happy, O Madhava, after slaying our own people ? 12 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. I. Arjuna's grief at the evils of war. 38-39. Though these, whose intelHgence is stricken by greed, perceive no evil in the extinction of families and no sin in treachery to friends, yet, O Janardana, should not we, who clearly see evil in the extinction of a family, learn to refrain from this sinful deed ? 40. On the extinction of a famil}', the immemorial dharmas * of that family disappear. When the dharmas disappear, impiety (adharma) overtakes the whole family, t

41. By the prevalence of impiety, O Krishna, the women of the family become corrupt. Women corrupted, there will be intermingling of castes (varna-sa;;zkara), O descendant of Vrish;zis. 42. Confusion of castes leads the family of these destroyers of families also to hell ; for, their forefathers fall (down to hell), deprived of the offerings of p\)idsi (rice-ball) and water. I 43. By these evil deeds of the destroyers of I families which cause the intermingling of castes, the eternal dharmas of castes and families are subverted. 44. We have heard, O Janardana, that necessary is the dwelling in hell of the men whose family dharmas are subverted. * The duties and ceremonies practised t Of the destroyed (according to some)) by th-3 family in accordance with the of the destroyer (accordiny to some scriptural command, others). 45. Alas ! we have resolved to commit a great sin, inasmuch as we are endeavouring to slay our kinsmen out of a craving for the pleasures of dominion. 46. It would be better for me, if the sons of Dhritarash^ra, with arms in hand, should slay me unarmed and unresisting in the battle. 47. Having said thus, Arjuna, sorrow-stricken in mind, cast aside his bow and arrows in the midst of the battle and sat down in the chariot.

Arjunas weakness condemned by the Lord. 1. To him who was thus overcome with pity and afflicted, and whose eyes were full of tears and agitated, the destroyer of Madhu spoke as The Lord said : 2. Whence in (this) perilous strait has come upon thee this weakness cherished by the ojxwoirthy. debarring from heaven and causing disgrace, O .\.rjuna ? 3. Yield not to unmanliness, O son of Pritha. It does not become thee. Cast off this base weakness of heart and arise. O tormentor of foes. Arjuna seeks instruction from the Lord. 4. O slayer of Madhu, how shall I assail in battle with arrows Bhishma and Dro«a, who are worthy of worship, O slayer of enemies. 5. Better indeed in this world to live even upon alms than to slay the teachers of high honor. But, were I to slay these teachers, I should only in this world enjoy the pleasures of w^ealth, delights stained with blood. 6. And we know not which * is the better * Which of the two — living upon alms witiiout slaying otfaers, or fighqpg tii« y wfaicfa is our dut7.— h,^) I — 10.] Sankhya'Yoca. 15 alternative for us ; nor do we know whether we shall conquer them or they will conquer us. Even the sons of Dhritarash/ra, after killing whom we do not wish to live, stand arrayed against us.

lessness, my mind confounded about Dharma, * I ask Thee : Tell me what is absolutely good. I am Thy pupil. Instruct me, who have sought Thy 8 I do not indeed S22 what can dispel the grief which burns up my senses, even after attaining unrivalled and prosperous dominion on earth or even lordship over gods. the tormenter of foes, said to Govinda, ' I will not fight,' and verily remained silent. the two armies, O descendant of Bharata, Hrishikesa, as if smiling, spoke these words: Self-knowledge alone eradicates misery. Now the portion from i. 2 to ii. g should be interpreted as showing whence arise those evils of grief, delusion, etc., which in sentient creatures cause the misery of samsara. — To explain : In ii. 4 ^/ seq . Arjuna displayed grief and delusion caused by his attachment for, and the sense of separation from, dominior,. the elders, sons, friends, wellwishers, kinsmen, near and remote relations, — all this arising from his notion that " I am theirs and they are < ' Pbanna ' here means ' 3rahinan ' who supports aU — (A) l6 THE ehagavad-gItA. [DiS. Ilf mine." It was when discrimination was overpowered by grief and delusion that Arjuna, who had of himself been engaged in battle as the duty of the warrior caste, abstained from fighting and proposed to lead a mendicant's life, which was the duty of a different caste^ Accordingly, all creatures whose intelligence is swayed by grief and delusion and other evil influences naturally abandon their proper duties and resort to those which are prohibited. Even if they are engaged in their duties, their conduct in speech, thought and deed is egoistic and is prompted by a longing for reward. In their case, then, owing to an accumulation of marit and demerit, of dharma and a-dharma, the sawsara, p which consists in passing through good and bad births, hap-

piness and misery, becomes incessant. Grief and delusion are thus the cause of sa;«sara. And seeing that their cessation could not b3 brought about except by Self-knowledge added to renunciation of all works, Lord Vasudeva wished to teach that knowledge for the benefit of the whole world through Arjuna and began His teaching with ii. ii. The doctrine that knowledge should be conjoined Against the foregoing view some f say : — Moksha cannot at all be attained by mere A'tmaj«ana-nish^ha, by * The brahmanas alone are allowed to Viitti on the Gitu was evilently very enter the fourth .-Israma of sa/imyasa, voluininous, inasmuch as 5ri Sankarach- which consists in the renunciation of all arya's bhashya is profeisodly very short formal religion and worldly poss2ssions. in compirison with it. It is, therefore, + According to A'nandigiri, the Vcitti- n it unlikely that the author of th3 Vritti kara is the commentator here referred on the Gita w..:- no other than Bodhaya- to. A V>-ittikira's interpretation of the na who is said to have written a volumin- Brahma-sutras I. i. II — 19 is also referred ous commentary on th? Brahmi-siitras, to by Sankaricharya in his commentary nearly a million slokas in extent, and of

on that section. It is very probable that which tha Sri-bhashya of Sri K amanuja- one and the same person was the author charya is said %q be a mere abstract, of the two Vnttis or gpmm.entaries. The jf — lOJ SANKhvA YOGA. I7 mere devotion to Self-knowledge preceded by the renunciation of all works — By what then ? — Absolute freedom can be attained by knowledge conjoined with works, such as the Agnihotra, prescribed in the 6ruti and the smriti. This is the conclusive teaching of the whole Gitii. As supporting this view may be cited — they say — the verses ii. 33, ii. 47, iv. 15, etc. It should not be supposed that the Vedic ritual is sinful because it involves cruelty, etc. "■'■ — Why ?. — For, our Lord says that, since fighting which is the profession of the warrior caste is the proper duty (of the caste), it is not sinful though it involves cruelty to elders, brothers, sons and the like and is therefore very horrible ; and He further says that, in the case of a neglect of this duty, "abandoning thy duty and fame thou shalt incur sin." (ii. 33). This is clearly tantamount to asserting that those rites which are enjoined as life-long duties by the Vedas are sinless though they involve cruelty to animals.

Sankhya and Yoga distinguished. This is wrong, since the Lord has made a distinction between J«ana-nishfha and Karma-nish/ha, between the devotion of knowledge and the devotion of works, as based respectively upon two distinct standpoints The real nature of the Self as expounded here in ii. 11 — 30 by the Lord is called Sankhya; an intellectual conviction of the truth produced by a study of that section, — that the Self is no doer, owing to the absence in Him of such changes as birth — forms the Sankhya standpoint (Sankhya-buddhi); and the enlightened who hold this view are called Sankhyas. Yoga consists in the performance — before the rise of the foregoing * Such as the eating of uchchhish/a or What remains of the food of which another has already eaten.— (A). r^ THE BAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. II. conviction— of works as a means to moksha, requiring a knowledge of virtue and sin, and presupposing that the Self is distinct from the body and is the doer and the enjoyer. Such conviction forms the Yoga standpoint (Yoga-buddhi), and the performers of works who hold this view are Yogins. Accordingly two distinct standpoints are referred to by the ^ Lord in ii. 39. Of these, He will assign to the Sankhyas

the J»ana-yoga, or devotion to knowledge, based upon the Siinkhya standpoint ; and so also He will assign to the Yogins the path of Karma-yoga, or devotion to works, based upon the Yoga standpoint (iii. 3). Thuswuth reference to the Sankhya and the Yoga standpoints two distinct paths have been shown by the Lord, seeing the impossibility of J«ana and Karma being conjoined in one and the same person simultaneously, the one being based upon the idea of nonagency and unity, and the other on the idea of agency and multiplicity. The distinction made here is also referred to in the 5atapatha-Brahma;;a. — Having enjoined renunciation of all works in the words, "The brahma^as who, having no worldly attachments, wish only for this region of the Self, should give up all worldly concerns, " the Brahma- »a continues thus in explanation of the said injunction : ^ »' What have we to do with progeny, — we who live in this region, this Self?" (Bnhadara«yaka-Upanishad, iv. 4, 22). In the same Brahma«a {ibid, i. 4, 17) we are told that, before marriage and after completing the investigation into the nature of the Dharma or \'edic injunctions, the man of the world ' desired ' to acquire the means of attaining to the three regions (of man, of Pit/'is, and of Devas), namely, a son and the twofold wealth,— the one kind of wealth being

called ' humian ^nmanmsha), ' consisting oi mrn-M and leadinig to the ie^:i(Mi of Pitris, and the otber kind off wealth bang caiM^ ' godly (dairal,* nnmsis<t™g in wisdsm (^vidTa, npasana) and leading to the region of Dsvas. Thus the Vedk; lites are intended fsK him oraly who has deames and has no knowledge of the Sdlf. The renandation of these isenjoined on him who sads cnlj the fcgion of the Sdf and is firee fr ' ~' Ti^sure. xhis a^!'ag»Tnii[ini«r qc the two fMlrihis to two mstmdt . of pe^Ae would be unjustifiable if the Locd had intended a simultaneous conjunctiaa <tf knowledge and Vedic rites. XeitlM9r could Aijuna's questifan with whic _: : ... t . j^ui: Discoujrse c^pensbe sattisfeudbcuily explained (on : .: i : ~ -^-"^ )• How might Aijuna fdbseJy impute to the IjobA — r ^ - ~ iiL I — that which is allied {by the of^oncjat) : been taught be&ure by the L.(iMrd and to have rrc : : by Aijuna, — namdiy, Idae impossibility of I: r.rt and wixrks being idllowed by one and the Sui ; well as the superisioty of knowledge to wtvks ? Meireovo^, if conjunctian of knowiedge and works be intended Cor all, it m^ust have been intended for Arjui!iJ. is well. In that case how migfat Aijiana adk about onlj of the two,

" Tell me con<dusively that which is the better of the two " (v. i) ? If a {^ysacian £as piresQribed a mixture composed of bo::^ sweet: and cooling articles far a man who wishes to reduce bilious heat (in the system) , thete cannott arise the question, '' which one akme of the two ingredients caa alleviate tnliotts Iieat ? ' 20 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. II. Arjuna's question, it might be alleged on the other side, was due to his not having understood aright the teaching of the Lord. Even then, the reply of the Lord should have been given in accordance with the question and in the following form : "I meant a conjunction of knowledge and works; why are you thus mistaken ?" It would not, on the other hand, be proper to answer in the words " A twofold path was taught by Me " (iii. 3), — an answer which is not in accordance with the question and is altogether beside it. If it be held that knowledge is to be conjoined with such works only as are enjoined in the smriti, even then the assigning of the two paths to two distinct classes of people respectively and other statements in that connection would be equally inexplicable. Moreover, Arjuna's blame of the Lord as conveyed by his words " why dost Thou command me to do this horrible deed ?" (iii, i) would be inexplicable, since he knew that fighting was enjoined in the smriti as a kshatriya's duty.

It is not, therefore, possible for anybody to show that the Gita-5astra teaches a conjunction of knowledge with any work whatever, enjoined in the sruti or in the smriti. Some cases of apparent conjunction explained. Now a person who, having been first engaged in works owing to ignorance and worldly attachment and other evil tendencies, and having since attained purity of mind by sacrificial rites, gifts, austerity, etc., arrives at the knowledge of the grand truth that "all this is one, the Brahman, the Absolute, the non-agent," may continue performing works in the same manner as before with a view to set an example to the masses, though neither works I — lo] SANKHYA YOGA. 21 nor their results attract him any longer. This semblance of active life on his part cannot constitute that course of action with \vhich knowledge is sought to be conjoined as a means of attaining moksha, any more than Lord Vasudeva's activity in His discharge of the duty of the military caste can constitute the action that is to be conjoined with His knowledge as a means to moksha, or that conduces to the attainment of any specific end of His; egotism and hope of reward being absent in both alike. He who knows the truth does not think 'I act, ' nor does he long for the results.

Or to take another example: suppose a man seeking svarga or other such objects of desire goes through the ceremony of the Agni-adhana as a preliminary to the performance of sacrificial rites such as the Agnihotra whereby to attain his desire, and then commences the Agnihotra, which has thus became a kamya (interested) rite; and suppose further that the desire vanishes when the sacrifice is half completed, but that the man goes on with it all the same : the Agnihotra can no longer be regarded as an interested rite. Accordingly our Lord says " though doing, he is not tainted," (v. 7), and "The Self neither acts nor is tainted. " (xiii. 31). Now as regards the passages, "Do thou also perform action as did the ancients in the olden time" (iv. 15), and " By action alone, indeed, did Janaka and others aim at perfection" (iii. 20), we must distinguish two cases and interpret the passages thus : First, suppose that Janaka and the rest were engaged in works though they knew the truth. Then, they did so lest people at large might go astray ; whereas they were sincerely convinced that 'the senses' — but not the Self— were engaged

22 THE BHAGAVAD-gIta. [DiS. II. in the objects (iii. 28). Thus they reached perfection by knowledge alone. Tliough the stage of renunciation had been reached, they attained perfection without abandoning Avorks ; that is to say, they did not formally renounce works. Secondly, suppose that they had not known the truth. Then the passages should be interpreted thus : — By meons of works dedicated to Isvara, Janaka and the rest attained perfection, — ' perfection ' meaning here either ' purity of mind' or ' the dawn of true knowledge.' It is to this doctrine that the Lord refers when he says " The Yogin performs action for the purification of the self. " (v. 11 ) . Elsewhere, after having said that ' man attains perfection by worshipping Him with his own dut}'' (xviii. 46) , the Lord again recommends the patli of knowledge, to him who has attained perfeclion, in the following words : " How he who has attained perfed^ion reaches Brahman, that do thou learn from Me. "( xviii. 50) . The conclusion, therefore, of the Bhagavad-gita is that salvation is attained by knowledge alone, not by knowledge conjoined with works. That such is the teaching of tlie Gita we shall shew here and there in the following sections according to the context.

The Self is immortal. Now finding no means other than Self-knowledge for the deliverance of Arjuna who was thus confounded as to his duty and was deeply plunged in the mighty ocean of grief, Lord Vasudeva who wished to help him out of it introduced him to Self-knowledge in the following words : — The Lord said : II, For those who deserve no grief thou hast grieved, and words of wisdom thou speakest. For the living and for the dead the wise grieve Such people as Bhishma and Drowa deserve no grief f, for they are men of good condudl and are eternal in their real nature. You have grieved for them saying " I am the cause of then- death; of what avail are pleasures of dominion and other things to me left alone without them ? " And you also speak the words I of wise men. Thus you exhibit inconsistency in yourself, — foolishness and wisdom, — like a maniac. For i , the wise ( pa.ndltcih ) — those who know the Self— grieve neither for the living nor for the dead. They alone are wise who know the Self. For, the sruti says :

" Having obtained wisdom {pdnditya., i. c, knowledge of the Self) in its entirety..." (Bri. Up. III. 5,1-) That is, you grieve for those who are really eternal and who really deserve no grief ; wherefore you are foolish. (Question) : — Why do they deserve no grief? [Ansiver) : — For, they are eternal. {Question) : — How ? {Anszi'cr) : — The Lord says : '' He who knows not the Self is subject personalities or their real nature. Perso- to illusion. He who is subject to illusion nally they are men of good condCct ; in will obtain right knowledge by devoutly their real nature (as identical with the listening to the words of the Scripture Absolute) they are eternal, and the spiritual teacher, and by investi- I Referring to what Arjuna said in gating into the nature of things as they i.^zetscq. — (A.) are with a view to clearly understand 5 The second half of the verse is intend- such teachings. This shews to what ed to show that Arjuna's delusion was class of persons this teaching is addressed. due to his ignorance of the true nature of — ( A. ) the Self.— (A.)

+ Whether you regard their present 14 THE BMAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. II. 12. Never did I not exist, nor thou, nor these rulers of men ; and no one of us will ever hereafter cease to exist. Never did I cease to exist ; on the other hand, I always did exist ; that is, through the past bodily births and deaths, I always existed. So also, never did you cease to exist ; on the other hand, you always did exist. So, never did these rulers of men cease to exist ; on the other hand, they always did exist. So, neither shall we ever cease to exist ; on the other hand, we shall all certainly continue to exist even after the death of these bodies. As the Self, the Atman, we are eternal in all the three periods of time (past, present and future). The plural ' us ' is used with reference to the bodies that are different ; it does not mean that there are more than one Self. {Question) : — Now, how is the Self eternal ? {Answer) : — Here follows an illustration : 13. Just as in this body the embodied (Self) passes into childhood and youth and old age, so does He pass into another body. There the wise man is not distressed.

We see how the embodied Self passes unchanged in the present body into the three stages (avasthas) of childhood, youth or the middle age, and old age or the age of decay, all distinct from one another. At the close of the first of these stages the Self is not dead, nor is He born again at the commencement of the second ; on the other hand, we see the Self passing unchanged into the second and third stages. Just so does the Self pass unchanged into another body. Such being the case, the wise man is not troubled (in mind) about it. Endurance is a condition of wisdom. Now Arjuna might argue as follows : It is true that when one knows the Self to be eternal there is no room for the distressful delusion that the Self will die. But quite common among people, as we see, is the distressful delusion that the Self is subject to heat and cold, pleasure and pain, as also to grief due to the loss of pleasure or to the suffering of pain. As against the foregoing, the Lord says : 14. The sense-contacts it is, O son of Kunti, which cause heat and cold, pleasure and pain ; they come and go, they are impermanent. Them endure bravely, O descendant of Bharata.*

The senses are those of hearing and the like, by which sound and other things are perceived. It is the contacts of the senses with their objects such as sound — or, according to another interpretation, it is the senses and the contacts — i. e., the sense-objects, such as sound, which are contacted by the senses, — which produce heat and cold, pleasure and pain. Cold is pleasant at one time and painful at another. So also heat is of an inconstant nature, f But pleasure and * Here Arjuna is addressed as the 'son of Kunti' and again as the 'descendant of Bharata,' to show that he alone is fit to receive the teaching who is well descended on the father's as well as on the mother's side. — (A.) f The separate mention of heat and cold which should properly be included under the category of objects (vishayas) implies that the subjective feelings of harmony and discord are the immediate antecedents of pleasure and pain. The external objects first produce subjective changes, such as the sensations of heat and cold or the feelings of harmony and discord, and then produce pleasure and pain.— (.\.) pain are constant in their respective natures as pleasure and pain. Wherefore heat and cold are mentioned separately from pleasure and pain. Because '■' these sense-contacts, etc., have, by nature, a beginning and an end, therefore they are not permanent. Wherefore do thou bravely endure f them, heat and cold &c. ; i. e., give not thyself up to joy or grief on their account.

[Question) : — What good will accrue to him who bears heat and cold and the like ? [Answer) : — Listen. 15. That wise man whom, verily, these afflict not, O chief of men, to whom pleasure and pain are same, he for immortality is fit. That person to whom pleasure and pain are alike, — who neither exults in pleasure nor feels dejected in pain, — who is a man of wisdom, whom heat and cold and other things such as those mentioned above do not affect in_virtue_of his vision of the eternal Self, — that man, firm in his vision of the eternal Self and bearing calmly the pairs of opposites (such as heat and cold), is able to attain immortality (moksha). | * Some MSS. of ths Bhdshya here add: "It may be objected that it the objects of the senses or their contacts give pleasure and pain, the wheel of mundane existence will be endless, since those objects and their contacts with the senses are endless. This objection does not apply here, for these...', t Here is laid down a second condition of right knowledge, vis., calm endurance in pleasure .and pain. — (\). ; Though by endurance alone one may not be able to secure the highest human end, still, when coupled with discrimination and indiflercnce to worldy objects and pleasures, it becomes a means to the right knowledge, which leads to deliverance. He who has satisfied all the conditions laid down can realize the nature of his own eternal Self, and then only is he fit for the final teaching that leads to deliverance. — (A),

The Real and the Unreal. For the following reason also it is proper that thou shouldst abandon grief and distressful delusion and calmly endure heat and cold, etc. For, 16. Of tiio unreal no being there is ; there is no non-being of the real. Of both these is the truth seen by the ssers of the Essence. There is no bhava — no being, no existence — of the unreal (asat) such as heat and cold as well as their causes. Heat, cold, etc., and the causes thereof, which are (no doubt) perceived through the organs of perception, are not absolutely real (vastu-sat) ; for, they are effects or changes (vikara), and every change is temporary. For instance, no objective form, such as an earthen pot, presented to consciousness by the eye, proves to be real, because it is not perceived apart from clay. Thus every effect is unreal, because it is not perceived as distinct from its cause. Every effect, such as a pot, is unreal, also because it is not perceived before its production and after its destruction."" And likewise the cause, such as clay, is unreal because it is not perceived apart from its cause, f

( Objection ) : — Then it comes to this : nothing at all exists. § {Ajisiciey) : — No (such objection applies here). For, every fact of experience involves twofold consciousness (buddhij. * Cp. ' Whatsvei- exists not in the be- fore ths perception of the series of causes ginning or in the end exists not really In and effects must be illusory. — (A). the present.' (Gaudap.ldakariktts on the § The objector evidently thinks that Miindiikya-upanishad. IV, 31).— (A). there cannot be a thing which is neither + This implies that the Absolute Reality a ca\iso nor an effect, is not conditioned by causality ; and there- 28 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS.II. the consciousness of the real (sat) and the consciousness of the unreal (asat). Now that is (said to be) real, of which our consciousness never fails ; and that to be unvcal, of which our consciousness fails. ■'■ Thus the distinction of reality and unreality depends on our consciousness. Now, in all our experience, twofold consciousness arises with reference to one and the same substratum (samanadhikarana), as, ' a cloth existent,' ' a pot existent,' ' an elephant existent ' — not as in the expression ' a blue lotus ' § — and so on everywhere. Of the two, *the consciousness of pot, &c., is temporary as was already pointed out, but not the consciousness of existence. Thus, the object corresponding to our consciousness of pot, &c., is unreal, because the consciousness is temporary ; but what corresponds to our consciousness of existence is not unreal, because the consciousness is unfailing.

{Objection) : — When the pot is absent and the consciousness of it fails, the consciousness of existence also fails. * There mast be an Absolute Reality not two distinct realities, related to each which is neither a cause nor an effect. other as the universal and the particulars, For, what is fleeting must be unreal, and or as a substance and its attribute. If what is constant must be real. In the the pot, &c., were as real as existence case of our illusory perception of a rope we should be at a loss to explain why, mistaken for a snake, we hold that the with reference to one and the same subsnake is unreal because our conscious- stratum, the two — existence and the pot ness of it fails, whereas what corresponds or the like— should always present themto "this" in the perception "this is a selves togsther to our consciousness any snake," — viz., the rope, — is real, because more than a pot and a cloth. Illusion, our consciousness of it is constant on the other hand, can account for the through all its illusory manifestations. twofold consciousness of existence and The reality and the unreality of things the pot and so on, arising with reference are thus to be inferred from our own jg g^g ^^j jj^j sa^^o substratum, there experience. being only ono Reality — namely, that

§ blue and lotus being two realities. which corresponds to existence — and all Existence and the pot refer — as in the the rest being unreal, as in the case of sentence ' this is tha man we saw' — to a rope mistaken for various other things only one thing really existing. They are which are unreal. — (A), (AnsKier) : — No '•■ (such objection applies liere). For the consciousness of existence still arises with reference to other objects such as cloth. The consciousness of existence corresponds indeed only to the attributive (visesha/^a). {Ohjecfion) :~L.ike the consciousness of existence, the consciousness of the pot also arises with reference to another pot (present). {Answer) : — You cannot say so, for the consciousness of the pot does not arise with reference to a cloth. {Objection) : — Neither does the consciousness of existence arise in the case of the pot that has disappeared. [AnsK'er) : — You cannot say so, for there is no substantive (viseshya) present. The consciousness of existence corresponds to the attributive ; and as there can be no consciousness of the attributive without that of the corresponding substantive, how can the consciousness of the attributive arise in the absence of the substantive ? — Not that there is no objective reality present, corresponding to the consciousness of existence.

{Objection) : — If the substantive such as the pot be unreal, twofold consciousness arising with reference to one and the same substratum is inexplicable.^ {Ansic'cr) : — No; for, we find the twofold consciousness arising with reference to one and the same substratum, even though one of the two objects corresponding to the twofold consciousness is unreal, as for instance in the case of a * The consciousness of existence still § The objector means this: In all our arises in conjunction with the abssnce of experience, we find both substantive the pot. When we say ' here is no pot,' and the attributive to be real. So, here, existence is signified by reference to the the pot must be as real as existence. — (A) place where the pot is said to be absent. 30 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS.II. mirage, where our consciousness takes the form " this is water." Therefore, there is no existence of the unreal, the fictitious — such as the body and the pairs of opposites — or of their causes. Neither does the real — the Self (Atman) — ever cease to exist ; for, as already pointed out, our consciousness of the Self never fails.

This conclusion — that the real is ever existent and the unreal is never existent — regarding the two, the Self and the non-Self, the real and the vmreal, is always present before the minds of those who attend only to truth, to the real nature of the Brahman, the Absolute, the All, ' That'. Thou hadst therefore better follow the view of such truth-seers, shake off" grief and delusion, and. being assured that all phenomena (vikaras) are really non-existent and are, like the mirage, mere fagle appearances, do thou calmly bear heat and cold and other pairs of opposites, of which some are constant and others inconstant in their nature as productive of pleasure or pain. What, then, is that which is ever real ? Listen : — 17. But know that to be imperishable by which all this is pervaded. None can cause the destruction of That, the Inexhaustible. Unlike the unreal, That — you must understand — does not vanish ; That, the Brahman, the 'Sat', the Real, by which all this world, including the akasa, is pervaded, just as pots and other objects are pervaded by the iikasa or space. Brahman does not undergo increase or diminution and is therefore inexhaustible. This Brahman, the ' Sat ', is not exhausted in Itself ; for, unlike the body It has no parts. Nor does It diminish by (loss of) anything belonging to It ; for, nothing

l6 — 18] S\NKHYA-YOGA. 31 belongs to the Self. Devadatta, for instance, is ruined by loss of wealth ; but Brahman does not suffer loss in that way. Wherefore, nobody can bring about the disappearance or destruction of the inexhaustible Brahman. Nobody— not even the Isvara, the Supreme Lord — can destroy the Self. For, the Self is Brahman Itself, and one cannot act upon oneself. What, then, is the unreal (asat), whose existence is not constant ? Listen : 18. These bodies of the embodied (Self) who is eternal, indestructible and unknowable, are said to have an end. Do fight^ therefore, O descendant of Bharata. It is said by the enlightened that these bodies of the Self, who is eternal, indestructible and unknowable, have an end, like those seen in dreams or produced by a juggler. — The end of such objects as the mirage consists in the cessation — as the result of investigation into their nature by proper tests of truth — of the idea of reality which has been associated with them. So also these bodies have an end. [No tautology is involved in the use of both ' eternal ' and ' indestructible ;' for, two kinds of eternality and of destruction are met with in our experience. The physical body, for instance, entirely disappearing when reduced to ashes, is said to have been destroyed. The physical body, while existing as such, may be transformed owing to sickness or such other causes, and it is then said to have ceased to be (something) and to have become (something else). "Eternal" and ' indestructible ' here imply that the Self is subject to neither sort of destruction. Otherwise, the eternality of

3^ THE bhagavad-gItA [Dis. II. Atman, the Self, might perhaps be understood to be like that of clay or other material objects. It is the denial of this which is conveyed by the two epithets.] The Self is unknowable, — not determinable by the senses (pratyaksha) or any other means of knowledge. [Objection) : — The Self is determined by the Agama or Revelation, and by perception &c. prior to Revelation, {Answcy) : — The objection is untenable, for the Self is self-determind (svatas-siddha). When the Self, the knower (pramatn), has been determined, then only is possible a search for proper authorities on the part of the knower with a view to obtain right knowledge. In fact, without determining the Self — ' I am I ' — -none seeks to determine the knowable objects. Indeed the Self is unknown (aprasiddha) to nobody. And the Scripture (Sastra) which is the iinar'' authority obtains its authoritativeness regarding the Self, as serving only to eliminate the adhyaropa/^a or superimposition (on the Self) of the attributes § alien to Him, but not as revealing what has been altogether unknown. The sruti also describes the Self thus : — " That which is the Immediate, the Unremote, the Brahman, which is the Self, which is within all." (Bn. Up. ii. 4. i).

Because the Self is thus eternal (nitya) and immutable (avikriya), therefore, do thou fight, — do not abstain from fighting. * i. e., the last. The Sruti teaches that reahsation of this truth taught by the the Seh'is the only real thing and that all, sruti.— (A) others are^ illusory and non-existent. § Such as humanity and agency. No pramana or authority can survive the l8 — 19] SANKHYA-YOGA. 33 Here the duty of fighting is not enjoined. Arjuna had already been engaged in lighting. But overpowered by grief and dehision he abstained from fighting. It is only the removal of obstructive causes (pratibandha, viz., grief and delusion) that is here attempted by the Lord. Wherefore in the words ' do thou fight ' the Lord issues here no new command (vidhi) ; He only refers to what is commonly known already. ■■'• The Self is unconcerned in action. The Lord now quotes two Vedic verses to confirm the view that the Gita-5astra is intended to remove the cause of sawsara, such as grief and delusion, but not to enjoin works. It is only a false notion of yours, says the Lord, that you think thus : " Bhishma and others will be killed by me in the battle ; I will be their slayer." — How ? —

ig. Whoever looks upon Him as the slayer, and whoever looks upon Him as the slain, both these know not aright. He slays not, nor is He slain. He who understands the Self — of whom we are speaking— as the agent in the act of slaying, and he who regards Him as the sufferer in the act of slaying when the body is slain, neither of these two has understood the Self aright, for want of discrimination. Those who think ' I slay ' or ' I am slain ' when the body is slain, and thus identify the Self with the object of the consciousness of 'I,' the ego (ahani), — they do not understand the real nature of the Self. * That is to say, the Lord does not here had no reason to desist from the fightin<: mean that fighting is absolutely neces- in which he had engaged of himself. sary. He has simply shewn that Arjuna Being immutable (avikriya), the Self is neither the agent nor the object of the action of slaying. The Self is immutable. How is the Self immutable ? — This is answered by the n3xt verse : 20. He is not born, nor does He ever die ; after having been, He again ceases not to be ; nor the reverse. Unborn, eternal, unchangeable and primeval, He is not slain when the body is slain.

He is not born ; no such change of condition as birth takes place in the Self. Nor does He die : this denies the last change of condition called death. — * Ever ' should be construed with the denial of every change, thus : He is never born, never dies, and so on. — For, the Self, having once existed, does not afterwards cease to be any more. In ordinary parlance he is said to die who, having once existed, afterwards ceases to be. Neither does the Self come into existence, like the body, having not existed before. Wherefore He is unborn. For, he is said to be born who, having not existed, comes into existence. Not so is the Self. Wherefore He is unborn. .\nd because He does not die, He is eternal. [Though, by the denial of the first and the last changes, all changes have been denied, yet it is thought necessary to .directly deny the intermediate changes, in the words ' unchangeable,' &c., so as to imply the absence of all such changes of condition as motion, though not specified here.] He is unchangeable : He is constant, not subject to the change of condition known as decline ( apakshaya ). Having no parts, He does not diminish in His own sub-

ig — 21 ] SAN'KHYA-VOGA. 35 stance. As devoid of qualities, He does not diminish by loss of a quality. He is primeval, not subject to the change known as growth (vrlddhi) as opposed to decline. For, that which increases in size by the accretion of parts is said to grow and to be renewed. As devoid of parts, the Self was as fresh in the past (as He is now or will be in future ; i. c. He is ever the same) ; He never grows. And He is not slain when the body is slain : He is not transformed when the body is transformed. — To avoid tautology, slaying is interpreted to mean transformation : the Self is not subject to transformation. This verse teaches the absence in the Self of the six * bhava-vikaras, — of the six vikdvas or changes of condition to which all hhavas or beings in the world are subject. The passage, on the whole, means that the Self is devoid of all sorts of change. Hence the words in the previous verse, " both these know not aright." The enlightened man has to renounce works. Having started (in ii. 19) the proposition that the Self is neither the agent nor the object of the action of slaying, and having stated in the next verse the immutability of the Self as the reason for that statement, the Lord concludes the proposition as follows ; — -

21. Whoso knows Him as indestructible, eternal, unborn and inexhaustible, — How, O son of Pritha, and whom, does such a man cause to slay, and whom does he slay ? * Such as birth, existence, growth, transformation, decline, and destruction. 36 THE BHAGAVAD-gItA. [DiS. II. He who knows the Self (described in the last verse) as indestructible, i.e., devoid of the final change called death, as eternal, i.e., devoid of change called transformation, as unborn and inexhaustible, i.e., devoid of birth and decline, — how does an enlightened man of this description do the act of slaying, or how does he cause another to slay ? He slays nobody at all, nor does he at all cause another to slay. — In both the places, denial is meant, since no question can have been asked." The reason f for the denial of slaying applying to all actions alike, what the Lord means to teach in this section appears to be the denial of all action whatsoever in the case of the enlightened ; the denial, however, of the specific act of slaying being only meant as an example. {Objection) : — What special reason for the absence of action in the case of an enlightened man does the Lord see Avhen denying actions in the words " how does such a man slay ? "

[Ansiver) : — The immutability of the Self has already been given as the reason for the absence of all actions. [Objection) : — True, it has been given ; but that cannot be a sufficient reason, since the enlightened man is distinct from the immutable Self. We cannot indeed say that a man who has known an immovable pillar can have no action to do. {Answer J: — This objection does not apply. For, the enlightened man is identical with the Self. Enlightenment (vidvattrt) does not pertain to the aggregate of the body, etc. Therefore, as the only other alternative, the enlightened man should be identical with the Self, who is not included * Because no reply follows. f ij;., the immutability of the Self, in the aggregate and is immutable. No action being possible in the case of an enlightened man, it is but just to deny all action in the words " how does sucli a man slay ?" Now, for instance, the Self, while remaining immutable, is, by reason of His not being distinguished from intellectual states (buddhi-vnttis), imagined, through ignorance, to be the percipient of objects, such as sound, perceived by the intellect and other means. Similarly, the Self is imagined to be enlightened, merely because of avidyrt associating Him with that intellectual perception — which is unreal — which takes the form of discrimination between the Self and the not-Self, while in reality the Self has undergone no change whatever. From this assertion of impossibility of action in the case of an enlightened man, the conclusion of the Lord is evident, that those acts which are enjoined by the scripture are intended for the unenlightened.

Works are meant for the unenlightened. {Objection) : — Even knowledge is intended for the unenlightened only, as it would be useless — like grinding the flour over again — to impart knowledge to those who already possess it. Wherefore, it is hard to explain the distinction that works are meant for the unenlightened, and not for the enlightened. (Ansji/er) : — This objection does not apply. For, the distinction can be explained by the existence or non-existence of something to be performed in the two cases respectively. (To explain) : There remains something for the unenlightened man to do, on understanding the meaning of the injunctions regarding the Agnihotra &c. He thinks that the Agnihotra and other sacrificial rites are to be 38 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. II. performed, and that the many necessary accessories thereto should be acquired. He thinks further, " I am the agent, ' this is my duty." Nothing, on the contrary, remains to be performed subsequent to the reahzation of the truth of such teachings as are contained in ii. 20 etc., regarding the, real nature of the Self. No other conviction arises except that the Self is one and non-agent. Wherefore, the distinction referred to can bs accounted for.

In the case of him who thinks that the Self is the doer of actions, there will necessarily arise the idea that he has this or that thing to do. A man who possesses this sort of knowledge is qualified for actions, and on him actions are enjoined. Such a man is unenlightened, for it is said that "both these know not aright" (ii. 19). In ii. 21, the enlightened man is specified, and with reference to him actions are denied in the words " how does such a man slay ?" Therefore the enlightened man who has seen the immutable Self and the nian who is eager for emancipation have only to renounce all works. '■'■'■ Hence it is that Lord Naraya»a distinguishes the enlightened Sankhyas from the unenlightened followers of works, and teaches to them respectively two distinct paths (iii. 3). Accordingly, Vyasa said to his son, "Now there are two paths." (Alokshadharma, xxiv. 6). In the same connection, Vy^sa said that the path of works is the first, and that renunciation comes next. Our Lord will refer to this distinction again and again in this work. {vide iii. 27, 28 ; v. 13, &c.) * The latter, i. e., he who is eager for the acts enjoined on him, these acts Moksha, but who does not yet possess being not prejudicial to his de%'Otion to Self-knowledge, has no doubt to perform knowledge.

Knowledge of the Immutable Self is possible. [Objection] : — In this connection some conceited pedants say: To no man can arise the conviction 'I am the immutable Self, the One, the non-agent, devoid of the six changes, such as birth, to which all things in the world are subject ; ' which conviction arising, renunciation of all works is enjoined. [Ansioci'): — This objection does not apply here. For, in vain then would be the Scriptural teaching, such as "the Self is not born," &c. (ii. 20). They (the objectors) may be asked why knowledge of the immutability, non-agency, unity, &c., of the Self cannot be produced by the Scripture in the same way as knowledge of the existence of dhavma and a-dharma and of the doer passing through other births is produced by the teaching of the Scripture ? [Opponent) : — Because the Self is inaccessible to any of the senses. [Answer) : — Not so. For, the Scripture says " It can be seen by the mind alone." [Bi'i. Up. iv, 4, 19). The mind, refined by Sama and Dama — /. e., by the subjugation of the body, the mind and the senses — and equipped with the teachings of the Scripture and the Teacher, constitutes the sense by which the Self may be seen. Thus, while the Scripture and inference ■•'• (anumiina) teach the immutability of the Self, it is mere temerity to hold that no such knowledge can arise.

* The inference may be thus stated : more than Infancy, youth and old age are such changes as birth, death, agency and inherent in Him. the like arc not inherent in tlic Sclf.any 40 THE BHAGAVAD'GiTA. [DiS. 11. The enlightened should resort to Jnana-Yoga. It must be granted that the knowledge which thus arises necessarily dispels ignorance, its opposite. This ignorance has been already indicated in ii. ig. It is there taught that the notion that the Self is the agent or the object of the action of slaying is a product of ignorance. That the agency, &c., of the Self is a product of ignorance holds good in the case of all actions alike, since the Self is immutable. It is only the agent, subject to variations of condition, that causes another person, who can be acted on by him, to do an action. This agency — direct and causative with respect to all actions alike — Lord Vasudeva denies in ii. 21 in the case of an enlightened man, with a view to show that the enlightened man has nothing to do with any action whatsoever. [Question) : — What, then, has he to do ? [Answer) : — This has been already answered in iii. 3, that the Sankhyas should resort to J»ana-Yoga or devotion to knowledge. So also, the Lord will teach renunciation of all works in the words, "Renouncing all actions by thought, the self-controlled man rests happily in the nine-gated city, — in the body — neither acting nor causing to act " (v. 13).

[Objection) : — Here the word ' thought ' implies that there is no renunciation of the acts of speech and body. [Answer): — No, for there is the qualification, 'all actions.' [Objection): — The renunciation of all mental acts only is meant. [Answer) : — No. Since all acts of speech and body are preceded by mental activity, they cannot exist when the mind is inactive. {Objection) : — Then, let him renounce all other acts of mind except such as are necessary for those acts of speech and body which are enjoined by the Scripture. (Aiisii'ei') : — No, for, there is the qualilication, "neither acting nor causing to act." {Objection) :— Then, the renunciation of all actions, here taught by the Lord, may be meant for the dying man, not for the living man. {Anszi'ey):—No; for, then, the qualilication ' rests in the nine-gated city — in the body ' would have no meaning. No man who is dying can by giving up all activity be said to rest in the body. ( Objection ) : — Let us then construe the passage thus : Neither acting nor causing another to act, he, the disembodied soul of the enlightened man, deposits (saw + nyas) all activity in the body (/. c., knows that all activity belongs to the body, not to the Sslf) and rests happily. Let us not, on the contrary, construe, as you ha\e done, ' he rests in the body,' &c.

{Answer) : — No. Everywhere (in thesruti and in the smriti) is emphatically asserted that the Self is immutable. "•' Moreover, the iict of resting presupposes a place to rest in, whereas the act of renunciation does not presuppose it. And the Sanskrit verb ' saw + nyas ' means ' to renounce,' not ' to deposit.' Therefore, the Gita-Sastra teaches that he wlio has acquired a knowledge of the Self should resort to renunciation only, not to works. Tiiis w^ shall show here and there in the following sections, wherever they treat of the Self. * Wherefore the Self cannot be the agent of an action. 42 THE BHAGAVAD-GiTA. [DiS, II. How the Self is immutable. To return to the immediate subject. It has been stated that the Self is indestructible. Like what is He indestructible ? Here follows the answer : 22. Just as a man casts off worn-out clothes " and puts on others which are new, so the embodied (Self) casts off worn-out bodies and enters others which are new. Just as, in this world, a man casts off the clothes that have been worn-out and puts on others which are new, in the same manner, like the man (of the world), the embodied Self abandons old bodies, and, with^-i'*- undergoing any change, enters others which are new.

Why is the Self quite changeless ? The Lord says : 23. Him, weapons cut not ; Him, fire burns not, and Him, water wets not; Him, wind dries not. Him, i. e., the embodied Self of whom we are speaking, weapons, such as swords, do not cut. As He has no parts, they can effect no division of Him into parts. So, hre does not burn Him : even fire cannot reduce Him to ashes. Neither does water wet Him ; for, the power of water lies in disjoining the parts of a thing which is made up of parts, by wetting it ; and this cannot take place in the partless Self. So, wind destroys an object containing moisture, by drying it up ; but even wind cannot dry up the Self. 24. He cannot be cut, nor burnt, nor wetted, nor dried up. He is everlasting, all-pervading, stable, firm, and eternal. Because the mutually destructive objects — namely, swords and the like — cannot destroy the Self, therefore He is everlasting. Because everlasting, He is all-pervading. Because all-pervading, He is stable like a pillar. Because stable, the Self is firm. Wherefore He is eternal, not produced out of any cause, not new.

Xo charge of tautology can be brought against the verses (ii. 21-24) o^ the ground that in ii. 20 the eternality and the immutability of the Self have been taught and that what has been said regarding the Self in these verses (ii. 21-24) ^dds nothing to what was taught in that one verse, — something being repeated verbatim, and something more being repeated in idea. Since the Self is a thing very difficult to understand, Lord VAsudeva again and again introduces the subject and describes the same thing n other words, so that in some way or other the truth may be grasped by the intellect of the mortals (saw/sarins) and thus the cessation of their saw/sara may be brought about. No room for grief. 25. He, it is said, is unraanifest, unthinkable and unchangeable. Wherefore, knowing Him to be such, thou hadst better grieve not. As the Self is inaccessible to any of the senses, He is not manifest. Wherefore, He is unthinkable. For, that alone which is perceived by the senses becomes an object of thought. Verily, the Self is unthinkable, because He is inaccessible to the senses. He is unchangeable. The Self isquite unlike milk, which, mixed with buiter-milk, can be itiade to change its form. He is changeless, also because

44 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS.lI. He has no parts ; for, whatever has no parts is ne\er found to undergo change. Because the Self is changeless, He is unchangeable. Therefore, thus understanding the Self, thou hadst better not grieve, nor think that thou art their slayer and tliat they are slain by thee. Grariting that the Self is not everlasting, the Lord proceeds .• 26. But even if thou thinkest of Him as ever being born and ever dying, even then, O mightyarmed, thou oughtst not to grieve thus. Granting that the Self — of whom we are speaking — is, according to the popular view, again and again born whenever a body comes into existence, and again and again dead whene^■er the body dies, — even if the Self were so, as you think, O mighty-armed, you ought not to grieve thus ; for, death is inevitable to what is born ; and birth is inevitable to what is dead. 27. To that whicli is born, death is indeed certain; and to that which is dead, birth is certain. ^^'herefore, about the unavoidable thing, thou oughtst not to grieve. To that which has had birth, death happens without failure, and birth is sure to happen to that which is dead. Since birth and death are unavoidable, therefore you ought not to grieve regarding such an unavoidable thing. If death is natural to that which has had birth, and if birth is natural to that which has had death, the thing is unavoidable. Regarding such an unavoidable thing you ought not to grieve.

25—29] SAN KliVA- YOGA. . ^5 Neither is it proper to f^rieve regarding beings which are mere combinations of (material) causes and effects ; for, 28. Beings have their beginning unseen, their middle seen, and their end unseen again. Why any lamentation regarding them ? The origin — prior to manifestation — of beings such as sons and friends, who are mere combinations of material elements correlated as causes and effects, is non-perception (avyakta). And having come into existence, their middle state — previous to death — is perceived. Again their end is non-perception: after death, they become unperceived again. Thus it is said : " He has come from non -perception (the unseen) and has gone back to non-perception (the unseen). He is not thine, nor thou his. What is this vain lamentation for ?" (^lahrtbh, Str/parva. 2-13) About these mere illusions — first unseen, then seen, and again unseen — what occasion is there for any lamentation? The Self just spoken of is very difficult to realise. Why am I to blame you alone while the cause, viz., illusion, is common to all ? One may ask : how is it that the Self is • difficult to realise ? The Lord says :

29, One sees Him as a wonder ; and so also another speaks of Him as a wonder; and as a wonder another hears of Him ; and though hearing, none understands Him at all. One sees the Self as a wonder, as a thing unseen, as something strange, as seen all on a sudden. And so, another speaks of Him as a wonder ; and another hears 46 THE BHAGAVAD-gItA. [DiS. II. of Him as a wonder. Though seeing Him, hearing and speaking of Him, none reahses Him at all. Or (as otherwise interpreted) : He that sees the Self is something like a wonder. He that speaks and he that hears of Him is only one among many thousands. Thus the Self is hard to understand. Now the Lord concludes the subject of this section thus: 30. He, the embodied (Self) in every one's bodv, can ^c^■er be killed, O descendant of Bharata. Wherefore thou oughtst not to grieve about any creature. Though the body of any creature whatever is killed, the Self cannot bs killed ; wherefore, you ought not to grieve regarding any creature whatever, Bhishma or anybody else. A warrior should fight. Here (in ii. 30) it has been shown that from the standpoint of absolute truth there is no occasion for grief and attachment. Not only from the standpoint of absolute truth, but also,

31. Having regard to thine own duty also, thou oughtst not to waver. For, to a Kshatriya, there is nothing more wholesome than a lawful battle. Having regard also to the fact that fighting is a Kshatriya's duty, you ought not to swerve from that duty, which is natural to a Kshatriya, — from that which is natural to you (/. c, becoming the caste and the order to which you belong). This fighting is a supreme duty, not opposed to Law, since it is conducive, through conquest of dominion, 29 — 34l SAN KHYA- YOGA. 47 to the interests of Law and popular well-being ; and to a Ksliatriya nothing else is more wholesome than such a lawful battle. And why also should the battle be fought ? The Lord says : 32. Happy Kshatrix'as, O son of Pritha, find such a battle as this, come of itself, an open door to heaven. Are not those Kshatriyas happy who find a battle like this presenting itself unsought, an open door to heaven ? Though found to be your duty, •ij. Now if thou wouldst not fight this lawful battle, then, having abandoned thine own duty and fame, thou shalt incur sin.

If, on the other hand, you will not fight this battle which is enjoined on you as a duty, and which is not opposed to Law, you will, by neglecting this battle, have abandoned your duty and lost the fame that you acquired by your encounter with such persons as Mahadeva." Thus you will only incur sin. Not only will you have given up your duty and fame, but also, 34. People, too, will recount thy everlasting infamy ; and, to one who has been esteemed, infamv is more than death. * When Vudhish/hira lost his kingdom appeared in the guise of a mountaineer by gambling. Arjuna went on a pilgrj- ( Kirita ^, and, havi.:g found the true "i.ige to the Himalayas to propitiate the characterof his adversary, he worshipped ds and obtain from them celestial wca- Him ai;d obtained thu Paiupatd astra pocs. There he fought with 5iva who a celestial missile. 48 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA [DiS. II. People, too, will recount your infamy, which will survive you long. To him who has bsen esteemed as a hero and as a righteous man and as one possessing other such noble qualities, death is preferable to infamy. withdrawn from the battle through fear ; and, having been (hitherto) highly esteemed by them, thou wilt incur their contempt.

Duryodhana and others — warriors fighting in great cars — • will think that you have withdrawn from the battle through fear of Kama and others, but not through compassion. — Who are they that will think so? — The very persons, Duryodhana and others, by whom you have been esteemed as possessed of many noble qualities. Having been thus esteemed, you will again grow very small (in their estimation). talk many abusive words. What is more painful than that ? There is no pain more unbearable than that of scorn thus incurred. Now, when you fight with Kar//a and others, 37. Killed, thou wilt reach heaven ; victorious, thou wilt enjoy the earth. Wherefore, O son of Kunti, arise, resolved to fight. Victorious : that is, having defeated Kar;;a and other heroes. In either case you will have an advantage only. Wherefore rise, with the resolution " I will conquer the enemy or die." Now listen to the advic3 I off^r to yo.i, while you fight the battle regarding it as a duty : 38. Then, treating alike pleasure and pain, gain and loss, success and defeat, prepare for the battle, and thus wilt thou not incur sin. Treating alike pleas'.iye and pain: i.e., without liking the one and disliking the other. Thus fighting, you will not incur sin. [This injunction as to fighting is only incidental.]

Worldly considerations have been adduced (ii. 31 — 38) to dispel grief and attachment ; but they do not form the main subject of teaching. On the other hand, it is the realisation of the Supreme Reality that forms the main subject of this portion (ii. 12, &c.) of the discourse; and this, which has been treated of already (ii. 20 ct seq.), is concluded in ii. 39 with a view to exhibit the division of the whole subject of the 5astra. For, by making such a division of the whole subject of the sastra as has been shewn here, that portion of the work which will treat of the two paths later on (iii. 3) will proceed the more smoothly; and the hearers also will understand it the more easily for this division of the whole subject. Hence says the Lord : 39. This, which has been taught to thee, is wisdom concerning Sankhya. Now, listen to wisdom concerning Yoga, which possessing thou shalt cast off the bond of action. This, which has been taught to you, constitutes wisdom (buddhi) concerning Sankhya or the true nature of the Absolute Reality,— that wisdom by which may be brought ^O THE BHAGAVAD-GiTA. [DiS. II"

about the cessation of the evil " which is the cause of sa;«sara,— of grief, attachment, and the like. Now, listen to the teaching (which follows presently) concerning Yoga, which is the means of attaining wisdom concerning Sankhya : this Yoga, which constitutes the worship of Isvara, consists in practising samadhi or m performing works without attachment, after killing all pairs of opposites (such as heat and cold). Now He extols the wisdom concerning Yoga, in order to create an interest in it.- — -When possessed of wisdom concerning Yoga, O son of Pntha, you will cast off the bond of action (karma), of dharma and a-dhavma, of virtue and sin, of merit and demerit, this severance of the bond being effected only on attaining to a knowledge of the Self through Divine Grace (Isvara-prasrida). Yoga, a safe course. 40. There is no loss of effort here, there is no harm. Even a little of this devotion delivers one from great fear. Unlike agriculture, nothing that is attempted here — in this path to moksha, in this devotion by works — is entirely lost. That is, there is no uncertainty regarding the result of any effort in the path of Yoga. Neither is there any chance of harm resulting from it, as it may sometimes result from medical treatment. — \Vhat is the result? — Anything done, however little it be, in this Path of Yoga, saves one from great fear, from the fear of sa/z^sara, of birth and death.

* Th? ignorance qf the true nature of the Si^lf, The wisdom concerning Sankhya and Yoga thus far described is of the following nature : 41. Here, O son of Kuru, there is one thought of a resolute nature. Many-branched and endless are the thoughts of the irresolute. Here, O son of Kuru, in this path to Bliss, there is only one thought of a resolute nature, and it is subversive of all other many-branched thoughts opposed to it, — that thought having sprung from the right source of knowledge. Those other thoughts which are opposed to it are various. By acting up to these many-branched thoughts, sa;//sara becomes endless and ever-spreading. But when, owing to discrimination produced by the right source of knowledge these thoughts of endless variety cease, sawsara also ceases. Owing to variety in each of their branches, the thoughts of the irresolute — of those who are not possessed of the discrimination produced by the right source of knowledcre — are endless. Na wisdom possible for the worIdIy = minded. As regards those who have no conviction of a resolute nature, 42-44. Xo conviction of a resolute nature is formed in the mind of those who are attached to pleasures and power, and whose minds are drawn away by that flowery speech which the unwise — enamoured of Vedic utterances, declaring there is nothing else, full of desire, having svarga as their

goal — utter, ( a speech ) which promises birth as the reward of actions and which abounds in specific acts for the attainment of pleasure and power, O son of Pritha. They are unwise ; they are wanting in discrimination. They are enamoured of the Vedic passages composed of many a praise (to gods) and unfolding various ends and means. They say that there is nothing else besides works which are the means of attaining svarga, cattle, and other such objects of desire. They are full of desires and are ever in pursuit of them. Their chief and final goal is svarga. They talk words, fine like a flowery tree, very pleasant to hear. Their speech holds out births as the reward of works, and treats of specific acts wherewith to secure svarga, cattle, progeny and the like, and wherewith to attain pleasures and power. Thus talking these foolish people wander in the sawsara. They regard pleasure and power as necessary ; they are in love with them and have identified themselves with them. Their intelligence and wisdom are blinded ( as it were ) by this speech abounding in specific acts. In their mind — samddhi, the biiddki, the antah-karana, in Avhich are gathered together all objects of enjoyment for the pnriisha, the individual soul — no conviction of a resolute nature, no wisdom concerning Sankhya or Yoga will arise.

Advice to the Yogin. The Lord now speaks of the result accruing to those lustful persons who are thus wanting in discrimination : 45. The Vedas treat of the triad of the gunas. Be, O Arjuna, free from the triad of the gu;zas, free from pairs, free from acquisition and preserva- tion, ever remaining in the Sattva (Goodness), and self-possessed. The Vedas ''■' treat of the triad of the guwas ; sa;«sara I is their subject. You, on the other hand, had better be free from the triad of the gu«as, /. c, be without desires. Be free from pairs ( dvandvas ), from all mutually opposed objects which are the causes of pleasure and pain. Take your stand ever in the Sattva : practise purity., To him who is '^ anxious to acquire what has not been acquired and to | preserve what has been already acquired, practice of virtue | is impossible ; wherefore be not anxious about new acqui- 1 sitions or about the preservation of the old ones. Be also self-possessed: be guarded. .^ This is the advice you haxe to follow when engaged in the performance of duty. {Question) : — If all those endless advantages which are said to result from the Vedic rituals are not to be sought after, to what end are they to be performed and dedicated to the Isvara ?

(Ausiyey) : — Listen to what follows : 46, What utility there is in a reservoir (as compared) with an all-spreading flood of water, the same (utility) there is in all Vedas for an enlightened Brahma7;a. ' 1. c, the Kannaka;i(/a, the ritualistic brought about by the interaction of the portion of the Vedas. guiias. + which is made up of virtuous, sinful, ; Do not yield to thj objects of the and mixed deeds and their results, all enses. 54 THE bhagAvad-gita. [Dis. li. Whatever utility — of bathing, drinking, and the like — is served by a well, a tank, and many other small reservoirs of water &c., all that utility is only as much as the utility which is served by an all-spreading flood of water ; that is, the former utility is comprehended in the latter. So also, whatever utility there is in all the Vedic ritual, all that is. comprehended in the utility of the right knowledge possessed by a Briihma/ia who has renounced the world and has completely realized the truth concerning the Absolute Reality ; this knowledge corresponding to the all-spreading flood of water."'' The sruti says : — " Whatever good thing is done by people, all that is possessed by him who knows what he (Raikva) knew." (Chh. Up. 4-1-4). The same thing will also be said here (iv. 33). Wherefore! , for a man who is qualified for works it is necessary to perform works (which stand in the place of wells and tanks ) before he becomes fit for the path of knowledge.

And as for you, 47. Thy concern is with action alone, never with results. Let not the fruit of action be thy motive, nor let thy attachmant b:^ for inaction. You are qualified for works alone, not for the path of knowledge. And then, while doing works, let there be no desire for the results of works under any circumstances whatever. If you should have a thirst for the results of * That is to say, all the pleasure which hended in the Infinite Bliss. Thus the results from the performance of all works Path of Karma- Yoga, which in the end enjoined in the Vedas is comprehended leads to the attainment of the infinite in the bliss which the man who has realis- bliss of the Self, cannot be futile, as the ed the Self finSs as the essence of his questioner has been led to suppose.— (A) own Self; and every one must, admit i Because the Path of Karma-Yoga is that alj kinds of limited bliss are compre- not futile.— (A), works, you will have to reap those fruits. Therefore let not your motive be the fruits of your action. When a person performs works thirsting for the results of those works, then he will bs subject to rebirth as the result of action. Neither may you be attached to inaction, thinking " Of what avail are these painful works if their fruits should not be desired ?"

If a man should not perform works urged by a desire for their results, how then are they to be performed ? The reply follows : 48. Steadfast in devotion do thy works, O Dhana;;/jaya, casting off attachment, being the same in success and failure. Evenness is called Yoga. Steadfast in devotion fYo:^'a) psrform works merely for God's sake, casting off even such attachment as this, "May God be pleased," and being equanimous in success and failure. Success ( siddhi ) consists in the attainment of knowledge ( J7/ana ) as the result of mind (Sattva) attaining purity when works are done by one without longing for their fruits ; and failure results from the opposite course. * What is that devotion (Yoga) to which Arjuna has been exhorted to resort in performing works ? The reply is this : — Evenness of mind in success and failure is called devotion (Yoga). In comparison with action thus performed in the service of the Isvara with evenness of mind, 49. \'erily action is far inferior to devotion in K -svisdom (buddhi-yogal, O Dhana;7g"aya. In wisdom 56 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. II. (buddhi) seek thou shelter. Wretched are they whose motive is the fruit.

Action done by a seeker of its reward is far inferior to devotion in wisdom, i.e., to action performed with evenness of mind ; for, the former is the cause of birth and death, O Dhana/wjaya. Wherefore, seek shelter in the wisdom of Yoga, or rather in the wisdom of Sankhya, which latter arises when Yoga attains maturity. That is, seek refuge in the knowledge of the Supreme Reality. For, wretched are they who resort to inferior action, who are incited to action by thirst for its fruit. The sruti says : " O Gargi, wretched is he who departs from this world without knowing the Akshara, the Imperishable." (BH. Up. 3-8-13). The merit of Wisdom. Now, learn as to what result he attains who performs his own duty with evenness of mind : 50. He who is endued with wisdom casts off here both good deeds and bad deeds. Wherefore apply thyself to devotion. In regard to actions devotion is a power. The man that has evenness of mind casts off in this world both merit and sin (suknta and dushknta, pu«ya and papa) through attaining mental purity and knowledge. Wherefore apply yourself to devotion with equanimity. For devotion is a power, — devotion being the equanimity of mind in success and failure on the part of him who is engaged in the performance of his own duties, his mind resting on the tsvara all | the while. It is indeed a power, because works which are

of a binding nature lose that nature when done with evenness of mind. Wherefore be equanimous. Results of Karma- Yoga. 51. For, men of wisdom cast off the fruit of action ; possessed of knowledge ( and ) released from the bond of birth, they go to the place where there is no evil. For, men of wisdom, possessing evenness of mind, cast off the fruit of works, i. e., escape from good and bad births. They then attain knowledge. While still alive, they are released from the bond of birth, and attain the supreme abode of Vish/m — the state of moksha or liberation — which is free from all turmoils. Or, the wisdom (buddhi) referred to in the three verses (ii. 49 — 51) may be the Sankhya-(not the Yoga-) wisdom, the knowledge of the Absolute Reality, (corresponding to the wide-spread expanse of water), which arises when the mind is purified by Karma- Yoga ; for, it is said in ii. 50 that wisdom directly brings about the destruction of good and bad deeds. - W'hen is that conviction attained which (it is said) arises as soon as the mind is purified by Karma- Yoga or devotion through works ? The answer follows :

52. When thy mind shall cross beyond the mire of delusion, then wilt thou attain to a disgust of what is yet to be heard and what has been heard. W^hen your intuition (buddhi) shall cross beyond the mire of delusion, by which the sense of discrimination between the Self and the not-Self is confounded and the mind (anta/i- 58 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. II. kara«a) is turned towards the objects of the senses — i. e., when your reason attains purity — then will you attain to a disgust of what is yet to be heard and what has already been heard '■'■'■ : they will appear to you to be of no use. You may now ask : " When shall I attain the true Yoga or conviction of the Supreme Truth, by crossing beyond the mire of delusion and obtaining wisdom by discrimination of the Self ?" Listen: 53. When thy mind, perplexed by what thou hast heard, shall stand firm and steady in the Self, then wilt thou attain Yoga. When your intuition (buddhi=:antaA-kara;2a) which has been perplexed by what you have heard about the multifarious ends and means in all their relations — concerning the life of activity and the life of retirement — shall stand firm, without distraction (vikshepa^viparyaya) and doubt (vikalpa^^sawsaya), in the Self (Samaidhi, i.e, the objective point of your meditation), then you will attain Yoga, samadhi, i.e., the knowledge which arises from discrimination.

The characteristic attributes of a perfect Sage. Having found an occasion for interrogation, Arjuna asks with a desire to know the characteristic marks of one who has attained wisdom in steady contemplation (sarnadhi- 54. What, O Kesava ! , is the description of one of steady knowledge, who is constant in con- ♦ except, of course, the teachings of the scripture regarding the .^tiiian, the Self.— (A) templation ? How does one of steady knowledge speak, how sit, how move ? How is a man who has a firm conviction that he is the Supreme Brahman, and who is intent on contemplation (samadhi), — how is such a man spoken of by others ? How does the man of steady knowledege himself speak ? How does he sit ? How does he move ? — In this verse Arjuna asks in order to know what the characteristic attributes of a man of steady knowledge (sthitaprajwa) are. From ii. 55 to the end of the Discourse (adhyaya), the characteristic attributes of a man of steady knowledge as well as the means of obtaining that knowledge are taught to him who, having from the very commencement renounced all works, has entered upon a course of Devotion to Knowledge (j«ana-yoga-nish/ha), as well as to him who has reached that stage by means of Devotion to works (Karmayoga). For, everywhere in spiritual science (adhyatmasastra), the very characteristic attributes of the successful Yogin are taught as the means (of attaining that stage), since they are to be attained by effort. The Lord now points out those characteristic attributes which, as attainable by effort, constitute the means as well.

(i) Satisfaction in the 5elf. The Lord said : 55. When a man, satisfied in the Self alone by himself, completely casts off all the desires of the mind, then is he said to be one of steady knowledge. When a man completely abandons all the various desires that enter the heart and is satisfied with the True Inner- 6o THE bhagavad-gIta. [Dis.II. most Self (Pratyagatman) in himself, without longing for external possessions, averse to everything else because of his acquisition of the immortal nectar, — i.e,, his realisation of the Supreme Truth, — then he is said to be a wise man (vidvan), one whose knowledge arising from the discrimination of the Self and the not-Self has been steadied. [If, on his abandoning of all desires, nothing should be found to cause satisfaction while the cause of the embodied state still operates, it would follow that his behaviour would be like that of a mad man or a maniac. Hence the words ' satisfied in the Self &c.] That is to say, he who has abandoned all desires connected with progeny, possessions and the world, who has renounced (all works), who delights in the Self and plays with the Self,— he is the man whose knowledge is steady.

(2) Equanimity in pleasure and pain. 56. He whose heart is not distressed in calamities, from whom all longing for pleasures has departed, who is free from attachment, fear and wrath, he is called a sage, a man of steady knowledge. His heart is not distressed in calamities such as may arise from disorder in the body ■■, (adhyatmika), &c. Unlike * Calamities are divided into the threj Aditidaivika, arising from the action of following classes according to their great, intelligent, cosmic forces such as sources: those which cause rain and storm or such Adhyatmika^ arising from disorder in beings as Vaksha, Rakshasa and Pisacha. one's own body; Pleasures also are divided into the Adhibhautika, arising from external same three classes, objects such as a tiger; 55 — 5^] SANKHYA-YOGA. 6l fire, which increases as fuel is added, his longing for pleasures does not increase a? more pleasures are attained. He is said to be a man of steady knowledge. He is called a sage, a Sannyasin, one who has renounced works. (^) Absence of attachment, delight and aversion. 57. Whoso, without attachment anywhere, on meeting with anj^thing good or bad, neither exults nor hates, his knowledge becomes steady. The sage has no attachment even for the life of the body. He does not exult in pleasure, nor is he averse to pain that may befall him. When he is thus free from delight and distress, his knowledge arising from discrimination becomes steady.

(4) Complete withdrawal of senses from objects. 58. When he completely withdraws the senses from sense-objects, as the tortoise (withdraws) its limbs from all sides, his knowledge is steady. He, /. e., the devotee who strives in the path of knowledge (j/mna-nish/'ha), withdraws his senses from all objects as the tortoise withdraws its limbs from all sides out of fear. {Question) : — Now, even the senses of a diseased man who is not able to partake of sensuous objects withdraw from sense-objects, but the taste for them ceases not. How does that cease ? {Aiisiver) : — Listen : 62 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. II. 59. Objects withdraw from an abstinent man, but not the taste. On 'seeing the Supreme, his taste, too, ceases. The senses, — ' vishaya//,' meaning literally sense-objects, here stands for the senses, — it is true, withdraw from objects even in the case of an ignorant person who, practising extremest austerity, abstains from all sensuous objects ; but the taste or inclination (rasa) for those objects ceases not. [Rasa is used in the sense of taste or inclination in such expressions as ' svarasena pravntta/^,' ' rasika/z,' and * rasa- j '/a//. 'J Even that taste, that subtle attachment, vanishes in the case of the devotee who, having seen the Supreme Reality, the Brahman, thinks 'I am myself That'; that is to say, his perception of sensuous objects becomes seedless (nir-bija), has lost all germ of evil. The meaning is this : In the absence of right knowledge, there can be no annihilation ''■'■ of taste for sensuous objects ; wherefore, steadiness of right knowledge (prajna) should be acquired.

Unrestrained senses work mischief. He who would acquire steadiness of right knowledge (prajwa) should first bring the senses under control. For, if not controlled, they will do harm. So, the Lord says : 60. The dangerous senses, O son of Kunti, forcibly carry away the mind of a wise man, even while striving (to control them). * It is no fallacy of mutual dependance For, desire in its grossest form disappears (anyonyasraya) to say that knowledge at the first dawn of knowledge, and, as arises on the killing of desires and that knowledge is steadied and perfected, even desires vanish when knowledge arises. the subtlest desires are killed out. ^g — 63] SAN KHVA- YOGA. 63- The senses are dangerous. They agitate the mind of the man who is incUned to sensuous objects. Having thus agitated the mind, they carry it away by force, while the man is wide awake * though the mind is posessed of discriminative knowlebge. (5) Devotion to the Lord. 61. Restraining them all, a man should remain steadfast, intent on Me. His knowledge is steady whose senses are under control. He should bring the senses under control and sit calm and intent on Me, Vasudeva, the Innermost Self of all ; i. e., he should sit thinking ' I am no other than He.' The knowledge of that devotee is steady who, thus seated, has by practice brought the senses under his own control.

Thought of sense -objects is the source of evil. Now the Lord proceeds to point out the source of all evil in the case of the unsuccessful : 62. When a man thinks of objects, attachment for them arises. From attachment arises desire ; from desire arises wrath. Attachment for objects arises when a man thinks of them specifically J — Wrath arises when desire is frustrated by some cause or other, 63. From wrath arises delusion; from delusion, failure of memory ; from failure of memory, loss * j.t^. while repeatedly thinking of the § i. e., thinks of -their beauty etc. evil nature of sensuous objects. 64 tHe bMaGavad-gIta [Dis. II. of conscience ; from loss of conscience he is utterly From v/rath arises delusion, a lack of discrimination between right and wrong. Verily, when a wrathful man gets mfatuated, he is led to insult even the Guru. From infatuation follows failure of memory. Despite the presence of favourable conditions, no reminiscences arise of things already impressed upon the mind by the teachings of the sastras and of the teacher (acharya). From failure of memory follows loss of conscience (buddhi) — the inability of the inner sense (anta/i-kara»a) to discriminate between right and wrong (karya and a-karya). By loss of conscience he is utterly ruined. Man is man only so long as his anta/ikara»a is competent to discriminate between right and wrong. When it is unable to do so, the man is utterly ruined. Thus, by loss of conscience (anta/j-kara?ia, buddhi) he is ruined, he is debarred from attainnig human aspirations.

Sense-control leads to peace and happiness. The contemplation of sense-objects has been described as the source of all evil. Now the means of deliverance (moksha) is described as follows : 64. He attains peace, who, self-controlled, , approaches objects with senses devoid of love and hatred and brought under his own control. The natural activity of the senses is characterised by love and hatred. He who longs for deliverance resorts only to unavoidable objects with senses— hearing, etc., — devoid of love and hatred and brought under his own control, his inner sense (atman = antaA-kara72a) being made obedient to his own will. Such a man attains peace, tranfiuillity, selfpossession. (Question) : — What will happen when peace is attained ? {Answer) : — Listen : 65. In peace there is an end of all his miseries ; for, the reason of the tranquil-minded soon becomes steady. On the attainment of peace there is an end of all the devotee's miseries such as pertain to the body and the mind. For, the reason (buddhi) of the pure-minded man soon becomes steady, pervading on all sides like the akasa ; i. c, it remains steadfast, in the form of the Self.

The sense of the passage is this : — -The man whose heart is pure and whose mind is steady has achieved his object. Wherefore the devout man should resort only to those sense-objects which are indispensable and not forbidden by the sastras, with the senses devoid of love and hatred. Tranquillity is thus extolled : 66. There is no wisdom to the unsteady, and no meditation to the unsteady, and to the unmeditative no peace ; to the peaceless, how can •' there be happiness ? To' the unsteady (ayukta — asamahita), to the man who cannot fix the mind in contemplation, there can be no wisdom (buddhi), no knowledge of the true nature of the Self. To the unsteady, there can be no meditation, no intense devotion to Self-knowledge. So, to him who is not devoted to Self-knowledge there can be no peace, no tran- 66 THE BHAGAVAD-GlTA. [DiS. II. quillity. To the peaceless man, how can there be happiness ? Verily, happiness consists in the freedom of the senses from thirst for sensual enjoyment, not in the thirst (tnsh«a) for objects. This last is mere misery indeed. While there is thirst, there can be no trace of happiness ; we cannot so much as smell it.

5ense = restraint conduces to steady knowledge. {Qncstiou) : — Why is there no knowledge for the unsteady ? {Ansit'cy) : — Listen : 67. For, the mind which yields to the roving senses carries away his knowledge, as the wind (carries away) a ship on water. P^or, the mind which yields to the senses engaged in their respective objects, /. e., the mind which is altogether engrossed in the thought of the various objects of the senses, destroys the devotee's discriminative knowledge of the Self and the not-Self. — How? — As the wind carries away a ship from the intended course of the sailors and drives her astray, so the mind carries away the devotee's consciousness from the Self and turns it towards sense-objects. Having explained in several ways the proposition enunciated in ii. 60 — 61, the Lord concludes by reaffirming the same proposition : 68. Therefore, O mighty-armed, his knowledge is steady whose senses have been entirely restrained from sense-objects. It has been shown that evil arises from the senses pursuing sense-objects. Wherefore, that devotee's knowledge is Steady whose senses have been restrained from sense-oUjects (such as sound) in all forms, subjective and objective. (6) The Universe, a mere dream to the Sajfe.

In the case of the man who possesses discriminative knowledge and whose knowledge has become steady, his experience of all matters, temporal and spiritual (laukika and vaidika, sensuous and supersensuous), ceases on the cessation of nescience (avidya) ; for, it is the effect of nescience ; and nescience ceases because it is opposed to knowledge. To make this clear, the Lord proceeds : 6g. What is night to all beings, therein the self-controlled one is awake. Where all beings are aw'ake, that is the night of the sage who sees. To all beings the Supreme Reality is night. Night is by nature tamasic, and, as such, causes confusion of things. The Reality is accessible only to a man of steady knowledge. Just as what is day to others becomes night to night-wanderers, so, to all beings who are ignorant and who correspond to the night-wanderers, the Supreme Reality is dark, is like night ; for it is not accessible to those whose minds are not in It. With reference to that Supreme Reality, the self-restrained Yogin who has subdued the senses, and who has shaken off the sleep of Avidya (nescience), is fully awake. When all beings are said to be awake, /. f., when all beings, who in reality sleep in the night of ignorance, imbued with the distinct notions of perceiver and things perceived, are as it were mere dreamers in sleep at night, — that state is night in the eye of the sage wl o knows the Supreme Reality ; for, it is nescience itself.

68 THE bhagavad-gIta. [DlS. II. Works are not meant of the sage. Wherefore works are enjoined on the ignorant, not on the wise. Wisdom (Vidya) arising, nescience (Avidya) disappears as does the darkness of the night at sunrise. Before the dawn of wisdom, nescience presents itself in various forms — as actions, means and results, — is regarded as authoritative, and becomes the source of all action. When it is regarded as of no authority, it cannot induce action. A man engages in action regarding it as his duty — regarding that action is enjoined by such an authority as the \'eda, — but not looking upon all this duality as mere illusion, as though it were night. When he has learnt to look upon all this dual world as a mere illusion, as though it were night, when he has realised the Self, his duty consists not in the performance of action, but in the renunciation of all action. Our Lord will accordingly show (v. ly cf seq.) that such a man's duty consists in devotion to wisdom, in j/nxna-nish/ha. [Objection) : — In the absence of an injunction (pravartaka prama»a -^= vidhi) one cannot have recourse to that course either.

(Aiisicey): — This objection does not apply; for, the knowledge of Atman means the knowledge of one's own Self. There is indeed no need of an injunction impelling one to devote oneself to one's Atman, for the very reason that Atman is one's own very Self. And all organs of knowledge (prama/^as) are so called because they ultimately lead to a knowledge of the Self. \\'hen the knowledge of the true nature of the Self has been attained, neither organs of knowledge nor objects of knowledge present themselves 6g — 70] SANKHYA-YOGA. 69 to consciousness any longer.^ For, the final authority, (viz., the Veda), teaches that the Self is in reality no percipient of objects, and while so denying, {i. e., as a result of that teaching), the \'eda itself ceases to be an authority, just as the dream-perception (ceases to be an authority) in the waking state. In ordinary experience, too, we do not find any organ of knowledge necessitating further operation (on the part of the knower) when once the thing to be perceived- by that organ has been perceived. (7) Subjug^ation of desire and personal self. The Lord proceeds to teach, by an illustration, that that devotee only who is wise, who has abandoned desires, and whose wisdom is stead*y, can attain moksha, but not he who, Vv'ithout renouncing, cherishes a desire for objects of pleasure.

70. He attains peace, into whom all desires enter as waters enter the ocean, which, filled from all sides, remains unaltered ; but not he who desires objects. The ocean is filled with waters flowing from all sides. Its state is unaltered, though waters flow into it from all sides ; it remains all the while Avithin its bounds without change. That sage into whom in this manner desires of all sorts enter from all sides without affecting him — as w^aters enter into the ocean — even in the presence of objects; in whose Self they are absorbed, and whom they do not enslave ; that sage attains peace (moksha), but not the other who has a longing for external objects. Because it is so, therefore, 70 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. II. 71. That man attains peace, who, abandoning all desires, moves about without attachment, without selfishness, without vanity. That man of renunciation, who, entirely abandoning all desires, goes through life content with the bare necessities of life, who has no attachment even for those bare necessities of life, who regards not as his even those things which are needed for the mere bodily existence, who is not vain of his knowledge, — such a man of steady knowledge, • that man who knows Brahman, attains peace (u'lrvkna.) , the end of all the misery of sawsjira (mundane existence). In short, he becomes the very Brahman.

Knowledge leads to Divine Felicity. This devotion to knowledge is extolled as follows: 72. This is the Brahmic state, O son of Pr/tha. Attaining to this, none is deluded. Remaining in this state even at the last period of life, one attains to the felicity of Brahman. This foregoing statey-to renounce all and to dwell in Brahman — is the Divine state, the state of Brahman. It pertains to and has its being in Brahman. On reaching this state, one is no longer deluded. Remaining in this state even at the last period of life, one attains moksha, the felicity of Brahman. And it needs no saying that he who renounces while yet a student and dwells in Brahman throughout life attains the Felicity of Brahman, the Brahma-Nirva7/a.

The two aspects of wisdom — relating respectively to Prav;'itti and NivTitti, i.e., to the Path of Works and the Path of Renunciation — with which the Gita-5astra is concerned have been pointed out by the Lord in the Second Discourse, speaking of them as wisdom concerning Sankhya and wisdom concerning Yoga. From ii. 55 to the end of the Discourse, He has recommended renunciation of action to those who hold to the Sankhya-buddhi (Sankhya aspect of wisdom) and has added in ii. 72 that their end can be achieved by being devoted to that alone. And as to Arjuna, He has declared in ii. 47 that he should resort to works (karma) alone as based on Yoga-buddhi (the Yoga aspect of wisdom), w^hile it has not been said that the Highest Good can be attained by that alone. '•' Seeing this, Arjuna is troubled in mind and therefore puts a question to the Lord. (HL i, 2). This perplexity in Arjuna's mind is quite explicable. He thinks, "how might the Lord first describe to me — a devout seeker of Bliss — the direct means of attaining Bliss, namely adherence to the Sankhya aspect of wisdom, and then command me to do action which is fraught with many a tangible evil and which is but an indirect and uncertain means of attaining Bliss ? Arjuna's question, too points to this state of mind ; and the Lord's words in reply to the question are

■* Vide ii. 4y— (A) 72 THE BMAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. III. explicable only when the sastra makes such a distinction (between Sankhya and Yoga) as has been described above. No conjunction of Knowledge and Action. A certain commentator* interprets the meaning of Arjuna's question differently and explains the Lord's reply as opposed (to the question) in meaning. So also, he sums up the teaching of the Gita-sastra in one way in the introductory portion of his commentary, while he interprets the question and answer in this connection in a different way. — How ? — It is stated in the introduction that a simultaneous conjunction of knowledge and action for men in all stages of religious life is inculcated 'in the Gita-5astra ; and moreover a specific statement is made amounting to an emphatic denial of the doctrine that moksha can be attained by knowledge alone, i. e., without those works which are enjoined by the scriptures as obligatory throughout life. But here, in the Third Discourse, he makes out that devotion to only one of the two paths is taught. This is tantamount to saying that the very works which are enjoined by the scriptures as obligatory throughout life have to be renounced. How is it possible either for the Lord to teach such contradictions or for the disciple to accept them ?

That commentator may perhaps explain away the contradiction thus : — It is only to the g/'ihasthas (to the order of married house-holders) — but not to other orders — that salvation by mere knowledge, preceded by the renunciation of works enjoined in the sruti and in the smnti, is denied.! * The Vrittikara is here referred to, mere knowledge is said to be possible in Vitie ante note on p. i6. the case o( otiicy orders. Thus, they hold, t In the ill. Discourse salvation by there is no contradiction. This, too, involves a self-contradiction. For, after declaring? (in the introduction) that a simultaneous conjunction of knowledfje and action is meant for all relij^ious orders by the (lita-iHStra, how could he, in contradiction lliereto, say here (in iii. Discourse) that salvation by mere knowledge is meant for some religious orders ? Then the commentator may explain away the contradiction thus : It is with reference to the srauta-karma ( action enjoined in the sruti) that the assertion is made that salvation by mere — I.e., unconjoined with the 5rautakarma — • knowledge is denied to the g;'ihasthas. The smarta-karma ( action enjoined in tlie smriti ) that is meant for a grihastha is ignored as if it were absent. '•' It is in this sense that salvation by mere knowledge is denied in the case ol gn hast has. 4

This also involves an absurdity. For. how is it possible for any intelligent man to believe that salvation by knowledge conjoined only with the smarta-karma is denied to a g/'ihastha alone, but not to other orders ? On the other hand, if, as a means of obtaining sah'ation, the smarta-karma should be conjoined with knowledge in the case of the sawnyasins— the fourth religious order, — then it follows ^K * Because it is or secondary import- ^K ance to him. ^L ; It may be fiirtlier explained thus : ^^P The sawnyasins have renounced only the siauta-Vcarma, l)ut tliey have yet to do certain acts and be bound by certain restrictions as enjoined in the smriti. Thus a conjunction of knowledge with action as a means of obtaining salvation holds good in the case of sawnyasins. On the other hand, the srauta-karnia is binding on a grihastha ; thit is to say, he cannot attain salvation by knowledge unconjoined with the sraut.i-kanna. The sniartakarnia which he is bound to do is only of secondary imporiance to him; and in the absence of the srauta-karma, which is of primary importance to him, the existence of the smarta-karma may be ignored in his case. Thus, while a sa;;;nyasin can attain salvation by knowledge conjoined with the smarta-karma, a gnhastha can obtain it by knowledge conjoined with the srauta-karma.

74 THE BIIAGAVAD-GITA [DiS. III. that, for the gnhasthas also, knowledge should be conjoined only with the smarta-karma, not with the sralita-karma. Then, he may explain away the contradiction thus : it is only in the case of a grihastha that a conjunction (of knowledge) with both the srauta-karnia and, the smarta-karma — both being of equal importance to him — is necessary for salvation, whereas the sawnyasins can attain moksha by knowledge conjoined with the smarta-karma only. If so, too much exertion in the shape of both the srautakarma and the smarta-karma, very painful in themselves, falls to the lot of the g;'ihastha. Renunciation enjoined in the scriptures. The commentator in question may now say : Because of this multiplicity of exertion, salvation is attained only by a g/'ihastha, but not by other religious orders who have not to do the iiitya or obligatory srauta-karma. * This, too, is wrong ; for, in all the Upanishads, in the Itihrtsas, in the Purtvia, and in the Yoga-sastra, renunciation of all karma is enjoined on the seeker of moksha as an accessory I to knowledge. Both in the 5ruti § and in the " According to a certain ritualistic § "On the completion of the studQ^it-

school of Mimamsakas, renunciation of life one should become an house-holder; the srauta-karma is intended for those then, leaving home, he should become a who are afflicted with physical disabilities, forest-dweller and then retire from the for the lame and the blind who cannot world. Or he may retire from the world perform the complicated Vedic sacrifices when he is yet a student, or retire from according to prescribed rules. According the house or from the forest, whether he to this view, the sawinyasins cannot attain is engaged in austerities or not, whether moksha, as they have not performed the he has completed or not the student's srauta-karma. career, whether he has quenched the ; If sawmyasa were meant for the lame sacrificial fires or not. In short, the very and the blind enly, it could r.ot h^ve day on which he may get disgusted with been meant as an accessory to know- the world, the same day he should retire edge. He nee that view is wrong. from it." J abdla-U panishad .^. smnti, a gradual passage (through the tliree orders to the fourth order) is enjoined, as well as a sudden jump (from any one of the three to the fourth order).

If so— the commentator in question may retort — it follows that a conjunction of knowledge with action is necessary for all religious orders. '•• No, (we reply). For, renunciation of all action is enjoined on the seeker of moksha, as the following passages from the 5ruti show : " Having given up all desire for progeny, for wealth, and for the world, they lead a mendicant life." — (Bri. " Wherefore, of these austerities, renunciation, they say, is excellent." " Renunciation alone excelled." (Taittiriya-Up. 4-79,78). " Not by action, not by progeny, not by wealth, but by renunciation, some attained immortality." {Ibid.^-12). " One may renounce the world when yet a student." ( Jabala-Upanishad, 4). The following passages from the smnti may also be quoted : — " Give up religion, give up irreligion. Give up truth, give up untruth. Having given up both truth and untruth, give up that § by which you give them up."' * When it is said that all the religious proved to be necessary in the case of all orders are sanctioned by the sruti, the asramas or religious orders, duties also that are assigned to them res- S Kven that idea of personality which \

pectively are binding on them. A con- is implied in the thought, ' I have aban- I junction ot knowledge with action is thus doned these. 76 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. III. "Finding the sawsara (mundane existence) worthless and wishing to get at the essence, the unmarried grow quite weary of life and renounce the world. " — (Brihaspati). Suka's teaching runs as follows : "By action a person is bound, and \>y wisdom he is released. Therefore, the sages who see the goal do no action."' (.Santipar\ a, ^lokshadharma, 241-7). Here (in the Bhagavad-gitu) also we have, " Renouncing all actions by thought, " &. (v. 12). Moksha cannot be the effect of an action. jMoksha, too, being no efl'ect of an act, no action will avail a miimukshu, a seeker of moksha. {Objection): — The performance of obligatory duties is intended for the mere avoidance of the sin (of their omission). {Answer) : — No. For, the sin arises only in the case of one who has not formally entered the fourth order, the order of sa;;myasins. It is certainly (as the opponent must admit) not possible to imagine that a sawnyasin Avill incur sin by omitting the agui-kdrya — worship of the sacred fire — as students (Bralimacharins) do thereby incur when they are not yet sa/«- nyasins, i.e., when they have not formally renounced works. '■=

Neither is it, indeed, possible to imagine the generation of sin — which is a hhdva or positive effect — out of the omission of the obligatory duties, — which is an abhdva II is iidmillc'lby all that :i nraliiiia- joiiH-fl only on the first onkr i.asramai. thuiiii a'cue incurs sin by omitting a^ni- ^'o i^iii in fact is incurred by any rtliyiou-i kdrya (throwing fuel into the sacred fire) order of men neglecting the duties not en- iuJ the ^■£dic -ludy, which arc both eu- joined en that cr Jcr. or mere negation ; for, that the generation of existence out of non-existence is impossible is taught by the sruti in the words " How can existence arise out of non-existence ?" [Chhdndogya-U panishad , 6-2). If the \'eda should teach what is inconceivable to us, viz., that evil arises from the omission of prescribed duties, it is tantamount to saying that the \'eda ccjnduces to no good and is therefore no authority ; for, performance and non-performance alike would only produce pain. This would further lead to the absurd ■■'• conclusion that srtstra or revelation is creative, not indicative, a conclusion which is acceptable to none. Hence no karma for sa;/myasins; and hence also the absurdity of a conjunction of knowledge and action.

Conjunction is inconsistent with Arjuna's question. Arjuna's question (in iii,) would also be inexplicable. If, in the Second Discourse, it w'as said by the Lord that both knowledge and action should be simultaneously conjoined in Arjuna himself, then his question in iii. i. cannot be explained. If it was taught to Arjuna that both knowledge and action should be conjoined in him, knowledge which is superior to action must certainly have been meant for him. Then there could be no occasion for the question, or the blams, which is implied in Arjuna's words " then Avhy dost Thou, O Kesava, direct me to this terrible action? " (iii. i.) It can by no means be supposed that knowledge, the superior of the two, was forbidden to Arjuna alone by the Lord in His previous teaching, — in which case the question on the part of Arjuna distinguishing (one path from the otherj * For, it is taiUaiuount to saying tlieit so by the sastra which is of absolute an abhava which in itself cannot produce authority, anuhhii^. ii iiivusttd with a iiu\str to do 78 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. III. might arise. If, on the other hand, it has been previously taught by the Lord that knowledge and action are intended for two distinct classes of men respectively, on the ground that a simultaneous de\'otion — on the part of one man — to knowledge and action was impossible owing to their mutual opposition, then the question (in iii. i) becomes explicable. Even supposing that the question was asked from ignorance, the Lord's answer that devotion to knowledge and devotion to action are assigned to two distinct classes of men cannot be explained. Neither can the reply of the Lord be attributed to His ignorance. From this very answer of the Lord — that devotion to knowledge and devotion to action are assigned to distinct classes of persons — follows the impossibility of a conjunction of knowledge and action.

Wherefore the conclusion of the Gita and of all the Upanishads is this, that moksha can be obtained by knowledge alone, unaided (by action). If a conjunction of the two were possible (for one man), Arjuna's request to the Lord to teach him only one of the tw^o, j;mna or karma, would be unaccountable. The Lord, moreover, emphatically teaches the impossibility of devotion to j/zana in the case of Arjuna, in the words "do thou therefore perform action only." (iv. 15). Which is better, Knowledge or Action. Arjuna said : I. If it be thought by Thee that knowledge is superior to action, O Janardana, why then dost Thou, O Kesava, direct me to this terrible action ? If it bad been meant that knowledge and action should be conjoined, then the means of salvation would be one only ; and, in that case, a groundless separation of knowledge from action would have been made by Arjuna declaring knowledge to be superior to action. If the two be regarded as constituting together a single means to a single end, they cannot at the same time be regarded to be distinct as producing distinct effects. '•' Neither could we account for what Arjuna said — " Why then dost Thou direct me to this terrible action ? " — as if meaning to censure the Lord, on finding that He — for what reason Arjuna could not see clearly — had exhorted him to follow the unwholesome course of action after declaring that knowledge was superior to action.

Now, if a conjunction of knowledge with the smartakarma only were intended for all by the Lord and understood by Arjuna as so intended, how could we then justify the words of Arjuna j " why dost Thou direct me to this terrible action ? " 2. With an apparently perplexing speech, Thou confusest as it were my understanding. Tell me with certainty that one (wa}) by which I may attain bliss. No doubt the I^ord speaks clearly ; still, to me of dull imderstanding the speech of the Lord appears to be perplex- ♦ This may be explained with reference ins of the two as distinct from each other to the present case thus: — When know- might find some justification. ledge and action are held to form together § For. then, the Lord who had taught but one means to moksha, they cannot at a conjunction of knowledge and action the same time be supposed to become could not have enjoined mere action on distinct as producing distinct effects. Arjuna, and so there would be no occa- If this were possible, Arjuna's consider- sion for Arjuna's complaint. So THE BIIAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. III. ing. Thereby "Thou confuses! as it were my understanding." Arjuna means — " It is not possible that Thou wouldst confuse me, Thou who hast undertaken to remove my confusion ? Hence I say ' Thou confusest ^5 it were my understanding.'" He goes on: — If Thou thinkest that knowledge and action, which are intended for two distinct classes of aspirants, cannot both be followed by one and the same person, then teach me one of the two, knowledge or action, after determining (within Thyself) that " this one alone is suited to Arjuna, and is in accordance with the state and powers of his understanding ;" teach me that one of the two, knowledge or action, by which I may attain bliss.

If knowledge had been intended by the Lord to be at least an accessory to devotion to action, why then should Arjuna wish to know about only one of them. It had not indeed been said by the Lord that He would teach him one only of the two, knowledge or action, but not both, — in which case alone Arjuna might ask for one only, seeing that both would not be taught to him. The Paths of Knowledge and Action. The Blessed Lord gives the following reply, which is in conformity with the question : The Blessed Lord said : 3. In this world a twofold path was taught by Me at first, O sinless one : that of the Sankhyas by devotion to knowledge, and that of the Yogins by devotion to action. In this world — with reference to the people of the three castes, for whom alone are intended the teachings of the sastra (the Scripture), — a twofold nish/ha or path of devotion 2 — 3] KARMA-YOGA. 8l was taught by Me, the Omniscient Lord, when at iirst, at the beginning of creation, I created people and revived the tradition of the \''edic doctrine for teaching them the means of attaining worldly prosperity and Bliss. — What was that twofold path of devotion ? — One of them was jwana-yoga, the devotion of knowledge — knowledge itself being yoga — suited Jo the Sankhyas, to those who possessed a clear knowledge of the Self and the not-Self, who renounced the world from the Brahmacharya (the first holy order or asrama), who determined the nature of things in the light of the Vedantic wisdom, who belonged to the highest class of sawnyasins known as the Paramahawsas, whose thoughts ever dwelt on Brahman only. The other was karma-yoga, the devotion of action, — action itself being Yoga or devotion, — suited to yogins, to karmins, to those who were inclined to action.

If it had already been taught or is going to be taught by the Lord in the Gita — and if it had been taught in the Vedas as well — that both knowledge and action should be conjoined in one and the same person as a means to one and the same end, how might the Lord teach Arjuna, who approached Him as a beloved pupil, that the two paths of knowledge and action were respectively intended for two distinct classes of aspirants ? If, on the other hand, w^e suppose, that the Lord meant that Arjuna, after hearing Him teach knowledge and action, would devote himself, of his own accord, to both of them simultaneously conjoined, but that to others He would teach that the two paths were intended for two distinct classes of aspirants, then it would be tantamount to saying that the Lord is subject to love and hatred and that therefore He is no 82 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. III. authority (in such matters) : which is absurd. Wherefore by no argument can a conjunction of knowledge and action be proved. Karma-Yoga leads to freedom from action. The superiority of knowledge to action, referred to by Arjuna (iii. i), must be true, because there is no denial of it. And it must also be true that tjie path of knowledge is intended for sawmyasins only. Since it has been stated that the two paths are intended for two distinct classes of aspirants, such is evidently the opinion of the Lord. Now seeing that Arjuna, afflicted as he was at heart on the ground that the Lord had urged him to action which caused bondage, was resolved not to perform action, the Lord proceeds with iii. 4.

Or, the connection of what has gone before with tlie sequel may be thus stated : As devotion to knowledge and devotion to action are mutually opposed, it is impossible for one man to resort to both of them at one and the same time. P'roni this it may follow that each leads to the goal quite independently of the other. But the truth is this : Devotion to action is a means to the end, not directly, but only as leading to devotion to knowledge ; whereas the latter, which is attained by means of devotion to action, leads to the goal directly, without extraneous help. To show this, the Lord says : 4. Not by abstaining from action does man win actionlessness, nor by mere renunciation does he attain perfection. 'Action' refers to the acts of worship (Yaj^^a) which, performed in this or a previous birth, conduce to the destruction of sins committed in the past and cause purity of mind (sattva, anta/[-kara«a) ; and by thus purifying mind, they cause knowledge to spring up and lead to the path of devotion to knowledge. It is said in the Maliabharata : "Knowledge springs in men on the destruction of sinful karma, when the Self is seen in self as in a clean mirror." (5ahtiparva, 204-S.)

By abstaining from action man cannot attain to actionlessness (naishkarmya), freedom from activity, z. ^., devotion in the path of knowledge, the condition of the actionless Self. From the statement that man wins not freedom from activity by abstaining from action, it is understood that by the opposite course, i.e., by performing action, man attains freedom from activity. For what reason, then, does he not attain freedom from activity by abstaining from action ? The answer follows: — For, performance of action is a means of attaining freedom from activity. Certainly there is no attaining of an end except by proper means. Devotion to action is the means of attaining freedom from activity, i. c, devotion to knowledge, — as taught in the sruti as well as here. In the sruti, for instance, karma-yoga is declared to be a means to j/zana-yoga in the following passage : " The Brahma?ms seek to know this (the Self) by the study of the \'edas, by yaj;?a or worship." (Bri. I Up. 4-4-2^)- In this passage, karma-yoga is pointed out as a means of reaUsing the Self that is sought after. Here (in the Bhagavad-Gita) the following passages point to the same view :

" But without Yoga, O mighty-armed, renunciation is hard to attain." (v. 6.) 84 THE bhagavad-gIta. [Dis. III. " Having abandoned attachment, Yogins perform action for the purification of the Self." (v. 11.) " Sacrifice, gift and also austerity are the purifiers of the wise." (xviii. 5.) Now, the following objection may be raised: — A passage in the smnti, — " Having promised* immunity from fear to all beings, one should resort to freedom from activity (naishkarmya)," — shows that actionlessness can be attained by renouncing the prescribed duties. Our experience also favours the idea that freedom from activity can be attained by abstaining from action. Of Avhat use then is the performance of action to one who seeks for freedom from action ? In reply the Lord says : Nobody can attain perfection, — i.e., freedom from activity, or devotion in the path of knowledge— by mere renunciation, by merely abandoning action, without possessing knowledge. The ignorant are swayed by Nature. For what reason, then, does a person not attain perfection, /. e., freedom from activity, by mere renunciation unaccompanied with knowledge ? — The reason thus asked for is gi\'en as follows : 5. None, verily, even for an instant, ever remains doing no action ; for every one is driven helpless to action by the energies born of Nature. The energies ( guwas ) are three, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.f ' Every one ' means every living being that is

+ Having promised that he would sa- all the sacrificial rites enjoined on a gri- crifice no animal, that he would do no hastha. harm to any being as he used to do when t For a description of these, vide Dis- '. he was a gnhastha, i.e.. having renounced coursp xiv. ignorant, (aj/?a), who knows not (tlie Self) ; for, it is said (of a wise man " that he is otie) " who is unshaken by the energies " (xiv. 23.) Since the Sankhyas have been distinguished from the Yogins (iii. 3), the Karma-yoga, devotion to action, is indeed meant for the ignorant only, not for the wise. As for the wise who are unshaken by the gu?jas, and who in themselves are devoid of any change whatever, the Karma-yoga is out of place. And this was explained at length in our comments on ii. 21. The unenlightened should not give up Karma = Yoga. Now, for him who knows not the Self, it is not right to I neglect the duty enjoined on him. So, the Lord says : 6. He who, restraining the organs of action, sits thinking in his mind of the objects of the sense?, self-deluded, he is said to be one of false conduct.

The organs of action are the hand, &c. The self-deluded man, the man whose anta//-kara«a is thus deluded, is called a hypocrite, a man of sinful conduct. 7. But whoso, restraining the senses by mind, O Arjuna, engages in Karma- Yoga, unattached, with organs of action, he is esteemed. If the ignorant man, who is only qualified for action, performs action with the hand, with the organ of speech, &c., •it He who knows the Self is immovable controlled the body and the senses — he by the guiias.and is thereforu said to have alone is driven to action by the gu;ias. — crossed over them. The man who knows (.\.) not the Self and who has not completely 86 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DiS. III. restraining the organs of knowledge by mind and unmindful of the result, he is more worthy than the other, who is a hypocrite. 8. ' Do thou perform (thy) bounden duty ; for, action is superior to inaction. And even the maintenance of the body would not be possible for thee by inaction. Thy bounden duty is the obligatory (nitya) act, that which one is bound to perform, and which is not prescribed (in the scriptures) as a means to a specific end. Action is superior to inaction in point of result. By inaction you cannot attain success in the life's journey. The distinction between action and inaction is thus seen in our own experience.

It is also wrong to suppose that actions lead to bondage and that they should not therefore be performed. — ^\Vhy ? g. Except in the case of action for Sacrifice's sake, this world is action-bound. Action for the sake Thereof, do thou, O son of Kunti, perform, free from attachment. Sacrifice (Yaj«a) here means Is vara, the Supreme Lord. So, the sruti* says ' Yaj/za, verily, is Vish7?u.' ' This world ' means those persons who, as qualified for action only, are bound to do it and who accordingly psrform it. The world is not bound by action done for the Lord's sake. Perform action without attachment. For the following reason also, action should be done by him who is qualified for it : 10. Having first created mankind together with sacrilices, the Prajapati said, "By this shall ye propagate ; let this be to you the cow of plenty. Mankind : composed of three castes. Fiyst : at the beginning of creation. The coiu of plenty : the cow which yields all desires. How can this be achieved by sacrifice ? 11. \\'ith this do ye nourish the Gods, and the Gods shall nourish you : thus nourishing one another, ye shall attain the supreme good.

"By this sacrifice ye nourish the Gods such as Indra. The Gods shall nourish you with rain, &c." 'The supreme good' is the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman in due course. Or, the 'supreme good' may mean 'svarga.'"' 12. ^'Nourished by the sacrifice, the Gods shall indeed bestow on you the enjoyments ye desire." Whoso enjoys — without offering to Them — Their gifts, he is verily a thief. Pleased with your sacrifices, the Gods shall bestow on you all enjoyments, including women, cattle, children, &c. He who enjoys what is given by Gods, i.e., he who gratifies the cravings of his own body and senses! without discharg- * 'The supreme Kood' here spoken of whereas hi the latter case it leads direct- iii:iy be either the knowledge of Brahman ly to svarga. or svarga. The result depends upon the + '• c., he who is bent upon feeding his motive of the aspirant, according as he own body and senses w^ithout satisfying desires salvation or worldly enjoyment. ihe Gods, the A'ishis and the Pitris rcs- lu the former case, the sacrifice leads to pectively by sacrilicc, by the ^ludy of thu purity of heart in this or a subsequent sacred scriptures, and by oflspring. brith and ultimately leads to knowledge.

ing the debt due to the Gods, is a thief indeed, a robber of the property of the Gods, &c. On the other hand, 13. The righteous, who eat the remnant of the sacrifice, are freed from all sins ; but sin do the impious eat who cook for their own sakes. Those who, after performing sacrifices to the Gods, &c., eat the remains of the food— which is called amnta, ambrosia — are freed from all sins committed at the five '•• places of animal-slaughter (such as the fire-place), as well as from those sins which result from involuntary acts of injury and other causes. But as to the others, who are selfish and cook food for their own sakes, what they eat is sin itself, while they themselves are sinners. The wheel of the world should be set going. For the following reason also should action be performed by him who is qualified for action. For, it is action that sets the wheel of the world going. — How ? — -The answer follows : 14-15. From food creatures come forth ; the production of food is from rain ; rain comes forth from sacrifice ; sacrifice is born of action ; know thou that action comes from Brahman and that

=? The five places referred to are the five maha-yajuas or great sacrifices fire-place, the water-pot, the cutting, which every dvija ought to perform, and grinding and sweeping apparatus. These "'hich are intended to satisfy the Bhutas, are the five places where injury to life ^^"^ ^'^^''^' ■"'^"- ^^^ ^°''^' ^"'^ ''^'^ is daily committed.- The sins committed Pi"''S- Vide Uanu Ail 67— 7:. here are said to be washed away by the Brahman comes from the Imperishable. Therefore, the all-pervading Brahman ever rests in sacrifice. All living creatures, it is evident, are born from food, which, when eaten, is converted into blood and semen. Rain proceeds from sacrifice as taught in the following text from the smnti : " The offering thrown into the fire reaches the sun ; from the sun comes rain ; from rain food ; and from this (food) all creatures." {Maim, iii. 76). Yaj/;a or sacrifice here spoken of refers to what is called apurva;-'' and this apurva is the result of the activities of the sacrificer and his priests (ritviks) engaged in a sacrifice. These activities are enjoined in the Veda (Brahman), and the Veda comes from the Imperishable, the Paramatman, the Highest Self. Because the Veda has arisen from the Highest Self, — the Akshara, the Imperishable, as the breath comes out of a man, therefore, the Veda, though all-comprehending as revealing all things, ever rests in sacrifice, i. e., it treats mainly of sacrifices and the mode of their performance.